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ABSTRACT
In recent times many of the "givens" of post-World War Two International Relations have 
undergone remarkable and dramatic change. The Cold War it seems is over, once mortal 
enemies are recipients of food aid and questions of the ozone layer, AIDS, satellite 
surveillance and global drug cartels are the stuff of everyday International Relations 
analysis. In this situation patterns of thought and behaviour regarded, traditionally, as 
corresponding with a universal, essential "reality" in International Relations have come 
under increasing scrutiny and challenge.
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the widespread reassessment of 
contemporary International Relations now taking place. It does so in bringing to the 
debate the perspectives of a broad critical literature which has urged a more tolerant, self- 
reflective and sophisticated approach to theory and practice in a period resonant with old 
dangers and unique opportunities. It does so, more specifically, from a Critical Social 
Theory perspective which over that past decade has introduced to the International 
Relations agenda a range of approaches to knowledge and human society previously alien 
to it.
In particular, Critical Social Theory scholarship has located the ostensibly 
detached tradition and discipline of International Relations as an intrinsic element of a 
much larger cultural and philosophical enterprise, which, in the post-Enlightenment era, 
has become the dominant way of "knowing" the world and which has successfully 
transformed a particular "meaning" of reality into "reality" per se. This, singular, 
homogeneous and narrowly focused image of the world has become International 
Relations in the post-World War Two period, establishing the boundaries of legitimate 
and relevant theory and research and underpining the "art of the possible" in policy terms.
From a variety of Critical Social Theory perspectives scholars have sought to alert 
the International Relations community to the problems and dangers of this approach in an 
increasingly complex world. This is a central concern of this thesis which, via post-
modernist influences in particular, critically addresses issues crucial to future global 
power relations, in order that they be accorded a more serious and sophisticated treatment 
and that possibilities and potentials for thinking, speaking and acting in different ways be 
no longer silenced and excluded in the traditional manner.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE
Confronting The Unwritten Preface In International Relations 23
Critical Social Theory 44
Celebrating the Third Debate: Toward a Critical Social Theory 47 
of International Relations
The Post-Modernist Celebration of "Thinking Space" in 58
International Relations
CHAPTER TWO
The Modernity Question and the Positivist Framing of 68
Contemporary Social Theory
From Myth to "Cogito Man" and Beyond 75
Descartes and the Paradox of Modernity 80
The Emergence of Modem Positivist Thought 87
The Humean Synthesis and the Development of Positivism 91
The Kantian Turn: Towards a Modem Philosophy of Certainty 98
Comte and Logical Positivism: Framing Contemporary 101
Social Theory
The Behaviouralist Revolution and Contemporary 105
Social Theory
Summary 111
CHAPTER THREE
Bevond Modernism and Positivism?: Exploring the Foundationalist 113
Paradox in Social Theory
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (i): Popper and 117
Critical Rationalism
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (ii): The Paradigm 125
Challenge of Thomas Kuhn
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (iii): Scientific Realism 128
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (iv): Analytical 132
Philosophy and the "Linguistic Turn"
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (v): Hermeneutics - 141
From Von Humboldt to Dilthey and Weber
Summary 151
CHAPTER FOUR
Critical Social Theory and the Search for Thinking Space 154
Prising Open The "Orthodox Consensus": 156
Some General Perspectives
Questioning the "Perennial Questions": Reassessing 160
Contemporary Philosophy
Gadamer and a Critical Hermeneutics of Praxis 165
Confronting Modernity (i): The Critical Theory of the 169
Frankfurt School
Jurgen Habermas and the Emancipatory Project Revisited 173
Confronting Modernity (ii): The Post-Modernist Perspective 180
The Modernity Question Revisited: Habermas 184
and Post-Modernism
Summary 199
CHAPTER FIVE
The Making of International Relations: From Modernist Tradition 202
to Cold War Discipline
International Relations and Modernism: Some Broad 206
Discursive Connections
Neo-Kantianism and the Discipline of International Relations 216
The Making of a Discipline: Towards a Realist Science of 222 
International Relations
The Discipline Consolidated: The Cold War and the 227
Construction of a Positivist-Realist International Relations
Summary 237
CHAPTER SIX
The Positivist-Realist Phase: Morgenthau. Behaviouralism and the 241
"Quest for Certainty"
Politics Among Nations: The Verstehen Dimension 244
Modernisation Theory: The Modemist Knowledge/Power 251
Nexus Epitomised
The "Second Wave" of Positivist Realism: Behaviouralism 258 
and Strategic Discourse
Summary 278
CHAPTER SEVEN
International Political Economy and the Regime Debate: From 281
('Relative') Openness to Neo-Realist Closure
Vietnam, Interdependence and the Regime Debate 283
Regimes and the "Grotian" Search for Thinking Space 287
Neo-Realism: The New Orthodoxy in International Relations 297
From Reductionism to Banality: Kenneth Waltz and 299
Neo-Realist Structuralism
"Modified" Neo-Realism: Probing Some "Basic Assumptions" 320
Summary 331
CHAPTER EIGHT
Opening Up Some "Thinking Space" in International Relations: 334
(T) The Critical Theory Challenge
The Emancipatory Impulse in the Third Debate, 335
Habermas and the "Poverty of "Neo-Realism"
Cox, Gramsci and a Critical Theory Alternative to the 347
Neo-Realist International Political Economy
Summary 364
CHAPTER NINE
Opening Up "Thinking Space" in International Relations: 367
(iri Post-modernism: Reconceptualising International Relations
Textualising International Relations: 369
Re-reading the Tradition and its Discipline
Deconstructing Sovereignty: 384
Towards a New Genealogy of International Relations
Sovereignty, the State and the Anarchy Problematique 392
Reconceptualising Strategy and Security in the 406
Post-Cold War Era
One World, Many Worlds: Toward a Post-Modernist 413
Politics of Resistance?
CONCLUSION 424
BIBLIOGRAPHY 438
INTRODUCTION
In 1988 Roger Tooze spoke of his concerns about the "unwritten preface" in the study of 
contemporary International Political Economy.1 These concerns, Tooze explained, were 
provoked by a major silence within mainstream scholarship on questions of philosophy 
or, more precisely, on questions of epistemology, questions of how we come to "know" 
and give "meaning" to the world. This was the site of the "unwritten preface" to the 
extent that epistemological questions were either excluded entirely from the analytical 
agenda, or were marginalised as issues peripheral to the "real-worldism" of researchers 
who "define knowledge and knowing as non-problematic in the philosophical sense".2
There were, claimed Tooze, a number of negative implications associated with 
this situation which, nevertheless, continued to shape and direct study and research on an 
important aspect of international life. The first implication was that a state of "mutual 
incomprehension, if not antagonism" existed within the scholarly community, between 
those who maintained that any understanding of International Political Economy must be 
located in the broader philosophical context, and the great majority of scholars who 
considered philosophical debate insignificant to their research and analysis.3 
Accordingly, in the mainstream agenda of International Political Economy scholarship, in 
the late 1980s:
1 Roger Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface: 'International Political Economy' and Epistemology", 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17(2) (1988), pp.285-293. The term International Political 
Economy, as Tooze acknowledges, is a contentious one primarily because of its limited conceptual scope 
- as a reference to the political relations between states and/or national economies. This conceptual and 
linguistic connotation is not a neutral one, nor one incidental to the issues at hand. Rather it represents a 
way of "knowing" the world and a method of giving it "meaning" that is fundamental to the 
epistemological issues that Tooze raises and to the silences he describes. This and related issues of 
language will receive further attention as the thesis develops. The capitalised presentation of the term is 
to distinguish the scholarly community that Tooze's comments address from the broader notion of a 
functioning global economy, although this too, it will be argued, is not as obvious a distinction as it 
might appear.
2Ibid, p.285.
3Ibid.
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matters of philosophical interest and concern are either defined as not relevant 
to the individual or group producing knowledge or are left to the provenance 
of the theorists who inhabit a shadowy underworld of meta-everything.
These theorists are [considered! inconsequential to the 'real world', except to 
provide instrumental frameworks for the selection and ordering of 'the 
facts'.4
Explaining, more precisely, the nature of this mainstream approach Tooze gave it a name 
- positivism - and located four of the characteristics which accorded its adherents the 
confidence of their convictions. Firstly, he suggested, it was predicated upon the notion 
that "science provides the best way [of] understanding the physical world and that, 
secondly, "social and political phenomena are in principle amenable to the methodology 
of science". Its third characteristic: the proposition that "logical positivism represents the 
practice of science", is complemented by its fourth, that "positivism [is] the only 
appropriate basis for social science".5
On the basis of this "unity of science" thesis, articulated in positivist terms, 
alternative explanations of the world are dismissed as irrelevant and/or prescribed as 
insignificant, abstract and effectively "meaningless".6 This process of exclusion and/or 
marginalisation is rarely invoked (explicitly) in terms of "theory" versus "reality" in the 
1980s, but, more commonly, as an ongoing interchange between the advocates of a 
"scientific" theoretical approach to knowledge and society and those engaged in "non- 
scientific" theorising. In this regard, as Tooze confirmed, nothing much has changed 
since the behaviouralist-dominated days of the 1960s, when such a contrast characterised 
the dispute between mainstream social science scholars and theoretical dissenters within
4Ibid, p.286.
5Ibid, p.289, emphasis added.
^Here Tooze uses Richard Ashley as an example of an alternative voice excluded from serious 
consideration by a rigid disciplinary perspective on knowledge and reality. When Ashley, in The Political 
Economy of War and Peace (1980) sought to confront some of the philosophical "preface", he was, noted 
Tooze, "regarded as a theorist by the mainstream". Consequently, "much of what he (Ashley) had to say 
about IPE was marginalised before there was any consideration of the substance of his analysis", ibid, 
p.287.
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the social science community in the United States in particular.7 Consequently, three 
decades later, at the (North American) centre of international studies, mainstream scholars 
retain a commitment to a "unity of science" thesis and to its self-affirming logic as 
articulated in positivist based analysis. The presumption remains, therefore, that "real" 
knowledge (as opposed to abstract theorising) "is testable against a non-problematic 
reality", that "the language of theory...is independent of the language of observation 
(facts exist in their own right and are epistemologically prior to theorising)"; and that "a 
value-free account of IPE is both possible and necessary to produce objective 
knowledge".8
This positivist metatheoretical framework is, for Tooze, the keystone of the 
"unwritten preface" in that its self-affirming, self-enclosed logic renders further 
theoretical questioning of it unwarranted and effectively irrelevant.9 Acknowledging the 
power of this particular knowledge form, Tooze sought, nevertheless, to problematise it 
and, in a rudimentary way, open some space for alternatives to it. He proposed, 
consequently, that the dominant perspective on International Political Economy was 
inadequate on at least three counts. It was, he charged, limited in its intellectual and 
analytical scope, particularly regarding the issue of change which could only be 
accommodated in terms of prior changes in the world "out there"; moreover, it was 
intrinsically rigid and unable to reflect, seriously, upon either itself or alternatives to it, 
and it was "potentially harmful" in its refusal to think beyond its own arbitrarily
7On this issue see David Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics. Scholarship and Democracy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and John Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a 
Subfield”, in Political Science: The State of the Discipline edited by A. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: 
APSA, 1983).
^Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface" pp.289-290, emphasis added. The term IPE represents International 
Political economy.
9The point here, of course, is that if "real" knowledge is derived from activities "out there" in the real 
world (via testing procedures designed to separate out "facts" from interpreted, theorised values) then 
further reflection upon the theoretical process is hardly relevant to the business of "meaningful" research 
and analysis. This is particularly the case in regard to issues of epistemology and to the concerns, in 
general, of those "who inhabit a shadowy underworld of meta-everything".
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constructed boundaries of "knowing" and "meaning".10 Accordingly, argued Tooze, 
mainstream scholarship in the late 1980s must confront its "unwritten (philosophical) 
preface" in order that its (positivist) closure be opened, its silences be spoken, its 
limitations be reflected upon and its socio-intellectual processes of construction be more 
thoroughly understood in an age which increasingly defied simplistic and dogmatic 
representations of the "reality" of the global political economy.
This is where this thesis enters the debate. More precisely, it is in relation to 
some of the themes raised by Tooze in his critical commentary on scholarship in the 
International Political Economy field that this work seeks to broaden the debate and 
confront the issue of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations more generally.1 1 
It aims, in this regard, to go beyond the rudimentary critical perspectives of Tooze's short 
article and locate the issues at stake there as part of that larger and more profound 
conversation about the way we come to "know" and give "meaning" to the world that has 
energised social theory scholarship across the Anglo-American disciplinary spectrum in 
recent years. Integral to this new interdisciplinary conversation has been the proposition 
that the kind of "mutual incomprehensibility" described by Tooze, needs to be understood 
as an element of a more substantial "dialogue of the deaf', characteristic of Western 
thought generally in the post-Enlightenment period, as the pursuit of a rational-scientific
1^Even within the most illustrious of its contemporary texts, therefore, analysis is restricted to a narrow 
regime of "meaningful" knowledge and to a singular, rigidly inscribed method of attaining such 
knowledge. Tooze uses the example of Robert Gilpin, in this regard, particularly in The Political 
Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). A more detailed 
account of Gilpin's restricted approach appears in Chapter Seven of the thesis as part of a broader 
discussion of the issues raised by Tooze.
11 The term International Relations in its capitalised form will refer here to the conventional way that 
global life has been studied in Western (primarily) Anglo-American Universities and understood in 
intellectual and policy making circles. In this regard it is an extremely contentious term imbued with 
"traditional" and "disciplinary" connotations that will be critically addressed in this thesis. It is not 
meant, therefore, as a neutral or "descriptive" term but as a means of locating the major institutionalised 
forums in which the dominant notions of "reality" have been articulated and the dominant practices of 
Realism advocated and invoked.
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philosophy of society has become institutionally and culturally embedded in modem 
societies. 12
In seeking to resuscitate this silenced conversation, critically inclined scholars 
have confronted mainstream positivist perspectives with a range of counter arguments 
centred on at least three major themes designed to open an effectively closed modem 
discourse. The first theme has seen positivist based explanations of reality - gleaned from 
the knowledge of a world "out there" - countered with approaches which repudiate all 
"external" foundations for knowledge, which reject all notions of independent, 
universalised and essentialised foundations of understanding. The second has addressed, 
in more precise terms, the process of knowledge construction and has emphasised the 
socio-historical and cultural basis of understanding - the process of "meaning-making". 
The third has seen a renewed focus on the issue of language, not as a neutral agency 
merely "describing" reality, but as inexorably bound up in the constitution of reality.
In these terms the challenge to disciplinary orthodoxy, across Anglo-American 
social theory, has projected to the forefront of contemporary debate the largely taken-for- 
granted reference points for our understanding of the contemporary world, derived 
primarily from variations on Liberal and Marxist themes and represented as discrete, self- 
contained categories of, for example, the "real", the "rational", the "scientific", and the 
"foundational". In so doing it has sought to render problematic and open for further 
critical appraisal the dominant story of modem social life as it has been told by its major 
philosophical traditions. It has sought, more precisely, to re-address some of the most 
important themes in modem philosophy - the quest for a science of human society - 
questions of rationality, sovereignty, objectivity and truth - relations of subject and 
object, fact and value, knowledge and power, theory and reality, in order that we might 
understand more profoundly the way we think and act in human society in the late 
Twentieth century.
^T he term "dialogue of the deaf' comes from John Dunn in Western Political Theory in the Face of the 
Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.8.
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This is of significance for this thesis because, in recent years, critical challenges 
of this kind have begun to gain influence within the International Relations community as 
Tooze's concern with the "unwritten preface" indicates. Here, however, as in the larger 
interdisciplinary context, the issues at stake are more significant than those encompassed 
in any immediate conflict between "scientific" researchers and "theorists" engaged in the 
analysis of International Political Economy. Rather, the issues raised by Tooze represent 
a contemporary and microscopic dimension of a larger conversation about "knowing" and 
"meaning" that has been intrinsic to modem social life since images of cogito rationalism 
became fundamental to self-identity, and the (rational) pursuit of foundational certainty 
became the raison d'etre of modem theory and practice. More explicitly, the issue of an 
"unwritten preface" in International Relations resonates with the tensions and 
complexities of that period which has seen notions of cogito rationality and rational- 
scientific foundationalism transferred, via the European Enlightenment, to the 
contemporary age of nuclear weapons and an interdependent world economy. This has 
been a period, when, in unique technological circumstances, a narrowly based 
interpretation of social reality has been transformed into a universal agenda for all theory 
and practice; when, in the search for a secure (secular) foundation for understanding the 
modem world, the discourse of meaning associated with human history and politics has 
been appropriated by the scientific project; when an image of reality, centred on a model 
of the natural sciences has been embedded at the core of the study of human society by 
figures such as Hume, Kant, Comte, Dilthey, Marx, Russell and Popper.
In the early chapters of the thesis, consequently, attention will be focused on this 
broad historical and philosophical process of making the modem world "meaningful". 
As part of this early discussion attention will be paid also to the often "forgotten" 
influences of modem rationalism and foundationalism at the core of approaches 
ostensibly resistant to such influences. This is a crucial issue in an International Relations 
context, because it brings to the forefront of the discussion the question of the self- 
proclaimed Realist approach which has been dominant in the International Relations
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Community since the Second World War.13 The point, more precisely, is that for much of 
this time Realism has proclaimed its distance from the mainstream flow of modem theory 
and practice and from the influences of positivism, in particular. That it has done so in 
exemplary modernist terms and via positivist principles of dichotomised logic (e.g. 
dome stic/intemational) only adds to the complexity of the themes dealt with in this thesis.
At one level the paradox of the dominant Realist perspective illustrates the quite 
alarming theoretical unselfconsciousness characteristic of International Relations 
scholarship generally down the years, which in the contemporary period is reflected in the 
"post-positivist", "post-behaviouralist" and neo-Realist approaches to International 
Political Economy recorded by Tooze. At another level, the paradox and exclusionary 
tendencies associated with Realist thinking in the 1980s and 1990s represents the 
continuing and potent presence within International Relations of a modernist perspective 
which (via positivism in particular) "disallows reflection"14 upon the process by which it 
"knows" and gives "meaning" to the world.
The question of paradox and the non-reflective tendencies within modem thought 
will, consequently, be another important theme in the thesis. Indeed it will be a theme 
integral to it as the work seeks to provide a positive, constructive dimension to the 
discussion of the "unwritten preface" by highlighting the efforts of critically inclined 
scholars in the Third Debate in International Relations of recent years to expose orthodox 
paradox and encourage self-reflection. The major critical arguments of the thesis are
I^From this point on, the term Realism will appear in capitalised form when it refers directly to that 
dominant form of theory and practice in International Relations. This, again, is not an unproblematic 
representation of the term, but an attempt to demarcate a central term in the thesis from other uses of it 
(e.g. in more traditional philosophical realism) and, again, to overcome, as much as possible, the 
"quotation" issue. I am sensitive also to the fact than its conventional usage the notion of Realism in 
International Relations is integrally bound up with positivist philosophical perspectives. In a more 
nuanced climate this, in itself, would be an issue for debate. It never has been in International Relations, 
for reasons to do with the silences of the "unwritten preface". I will say something more comprehensively 
about the issue in Chapters Five and Six. And in Chapter One the question of the "differences" within 
Realism will be addressed (e.g. between Traditionalist and "scientific" Realism). On the issue of the 
differences between positivism and realism in Scientific circles see, for example, the debate in Russell 
Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).
14This is a Habermasian theme from Knowledge and Human Interests trans J. Shapiro (London: 
Heinemann, 1971), p.vii, which, I think, is particularly apposite in regard to positivist influences in 
International Relations.
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bound up with the attempts of (some) scholars in the Third Debate to confront Realism, 
and its major disciplinary "alternatives", with the silences and omissions of its "unwritten 
preface" and to indicate how a more open, tolerant and sophisticated understanding might 
be gained of a contemporary global situation of great danger and great opportunities.15 
Here, the insights of post-modernist scholarship are considered of particular interrogative 
value and themes derived from the post-modernist intervention in the Third Debate will be 
significant, both explicitly and implicitly, throughout the work.16
Before saying something more precisely about the way these themes are to be 
integrated in the thesis, one more general introductory point is worth making, which 
might help summarise the discussion to this point and sharpen an appreciation of the
^References to the Third Debate appear in capitalised form given its significance as a forum for Critical 
Social Theory scholarship. It is possible to locate the beginnings of the Third Debate in the early 1970s 
with the Interdependence debates and the larger orientation towards "globalism". But I am less interested 
in this facet of the issue and more in the Third Debate as a specific site of Critical Social Theory 
scholarship from around the early 1980s. For this angle see my "International Relations and the Search 
for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate", International Studies Quarterly 33(3) (1989), 
pp.269-279. For a more generalised treatment of the theme see, in particular, Ray Maghoori and Bennet 
Ramberg eds., Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1982); Michael Banks, "Where Are We Now?", Review of International Studies 11(3) (1985), 
pp.215-33; John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983); John 
Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1984); Josef 
Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", 
International Studies Q uarterly 33(3) (1989), pp.235-254; Lapid, "Quo Vadis International Relations? 
Further Reflections on the Next Stage’ of International Theory", Millennium 18(1) (1989), pp.77-88; 
Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Millennium 16 (1987), pp.231-249; 
Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.91-95; 
and N. J. Rengger, "Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.81-89.
16)In this thesis the term post-modernism will be used to designate that approach derived from a variety of 
contemporary Continental scholars including Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Baudrilliard and Lyotard, and 
from Nietzsche. The term post-modernism is a contentious one for a number of reasons, some of which 
will be touched on in Chapter Four. At this point the issue of contention I refer to, primarily, is the 
relationship between post-modernist scholarship and that described as post-structuralism. There are subtle 
differences between post-structuralist and post-modernist perspectives, as James Der Denan has noted in, 
"Philosophical Traditions in International Relations", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.189-193. Their shared 
insights and analytical commitments are more profound than their differences, however. As Der Derian 
has emphasised, both perspectives acknowledge the "constitutive nature of language" and they share an 
antipathy toward "closed" systems of knowledge "in which analysis and identity are reducible to binary 
oppositions”, ibid, p.192. My decision to use the term post-modernism rather than post-structuralism in 
this thesis, therefore, has less to do with any substantive differences between them, and more with a sense 
I have that the former term has a slightly broader connotative range than the latter (e.g. relating to art, 
architecture, "culture"). This is important in the present context, because, increasingly, the post-modern 
scholars being attracted to write and think on (Traditional) International Relations issues, are coming from 
previously alien realms of scholarship, from angles and perspectives which, it seems to me, signifies a 
post-modern spirit and scope. More specifically, the post in post-modernism denotes the attempt to go 
beyond the dominant ideas, concepts and practices of modernity, including the theory and practice of 
structuralism. For a broad overview of the modernity/post-modernity theme see Matei Calinescu, Five 
Faces of Modernity (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987).
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nature and purpose of the extended discussion to follow. The point, simply put, is that 
the need for a work of this kind has never been more acute. This is apparent enough if 
one ponders even briefly the kind of responses proffered by prominent figures in the 
International Relations community to the criticisms aimed at its dominant positivist-Realist 
sector. Tooze's comments indicated the general tone of such responses, and as the thesis 
unfolds many similar examples of orthodox crudity will be illustrated to supplement 
Tooze's argument. But it is not the more obvious examples of Realist intolerance and 
unselfconsciousness that are of most importance at the moment. Rather, it is the subtler, 
less obvious moments of Realist rigidity and limitation that are more significant because, 
in such moments, the power of modemist knowledge is never more evident, its capacity 
to render intelligent minds critically impotent never more stark.
Characteristically it is that which is left unsaid that is the crucial factor in these 
moments. This was the case in a recent work by Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach 
which, in the moderated theoretically sensitive tones of "post-positivist” scholarship in 
the 1990s, indicated a measure of empathy for those who "celebrated" the more critical 
atmosphere of International Relations in the current period, while supporting a 
reformulated "scientific" approach in which "we can adapt empiricism to the task of 
making sense of the world around us".17 The "dissident" scholarship of the critics was 
accorded credit for illustrating the "crude, often ahistorical empiricism that has dominated 
scholarship in our field for over three decades" and for introducing sophisticated insights 
drawn from interpretivist philosophies and literary theory.18 But, ultimately, concluded 
Ferguson and Mansbach, the critical challenges of the Third Debate must be resisted if 
their aim was to fundamentally undermine the traditional practices of the discipline. 
Instead, what was needed was a more nuanced empiricist approach which, in "setting 
forth values and assumptions, defining terms, clarifying variables, and collecting 
evidence for generalizations", could overcome in the future the silences, omissions and
17Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair Constructive Suggestions for 
Future International Theory", International Studies Quarterly 35(4) (1991), pp.363-386, at p.364.
18Ibid.
9
crudities of the past.19 This was the correct response, they argued, when the alternative 
was to "get hopelessly bogged down in epistemological debate".20 And after all, they 
insisted, it is one thing to appreciate post-modernist claims about textually based reality, 
but it is quite another if it means "that we are unable to penetrate the "external reality" 
behind the "texts" that describe that reality".21
A number of critical points might usefully be made about a position such as this, 
given the nature of the discussion on paradox and unselfconsciousness that preceded it. 
In particular Ferguson's and Mansbach's support for an adapted empiricism that is 
tolerant to other approaches and fully aware of its normative dimension requires 
comment, primarily because it represents the tip of a much larger modernist-positivist 
"iceberg" with all its attendant intolerance and unselfconsciousness. The problem here is 
that this notion of a tolerant empiricism is effectively a contradiction in terms. This is not 
a question of intentionality on the part of individual empiricist scholars, however 
empathetic they might be to "otherness". It is a question of the way that empiricist 
knowledge of self and the world is constituted. It is a question, in this regard, of a 
reductionist process which can recognise as "real" knowledge only that knowledge 
derived from an independent (foundational) source, either via inductivist "intuition", as in 
the case of much Traditionalist Realism, or more commonly by deductivist testing 
procedures which sift the residual "reality" from the normative impact of the human 
"tester". It cannot by its own metatheoretical logic allow for non-empiricist alternatives 
because, whatever else such alternatives represent, they cannot by (empiricist) definition 
represent "real" knowledge of the world "out there". Ferguson's and Mansbach's notion 
of an "external reality" behind the (post-modernist) "text" is an obvious enough example 
of the level at which alternative positions are understood and their own is not.
19Ibid.
20Ibid, p.383. 
21 Ibid, p.366.
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A second brief comment on their work might enhance the sense that Ferguson and 
Mansbach, and others of their ilk, are engaged in an enterprise which is not well enough 
understood. This relates to the unproblematic connection they draw between empiricism 
and the further development of a (social) "scientific" approach to International Relations. 
The point here, and it one that will receive extended discussion in the thesis, is that such a 
connection is, even its in own terms, illusory and contradictory. It is ironic, also, in the 
context of a purportedly self-conscious empiricism, that the most devastating indictment 
of empiricist based approaches to social science analysis came from perhaps the greatest 
of all empiricist scholars, David Hume, who, in the Eighteenth century rejected empiricist 
claims for scientific ("real") knowledge of the world as ultimately, and inevitably, 
metaphysical.22
One of the tasks of the thesis, as it develops, will be to illustrate that Hume's 
conclusion about the inadequacy of empiricism remains relevant to influential approaches 
which in the post-Kantian period have sought to overcome the implications of the 
Humean critique (e.g. Popper’s and Weber’s). This notion of having overcome or 
superseded the problems of Enlightenment thought is central to my third and final 
comment on the Ferguson and Mansbach position at this stage. This concerns the 
unspoken but very powerful assumption in the work of scholars such as Ferguson and 
Mansbach, and others, that the questions raised by critical voices in the 1980s and 1990s 
have been exhaustively debated in the past, when the major problems of the discipline and 
of the broader Western tradition were either resolved or deemed inherently unresolvable, 
and thus not worthy of further attention.
Such a position, it will be argued, is assumed at the core of mainstream (e.g. neo- 
Realist) scholarship, generally, in the 1990s and in the recent contributions of scholars
22The irony is increased for an argument that seeks to distance itself from positivism, but claim some 
sort of empiricist position, when one considers Leszek Kolakowski's proposition that Hume was also the 
"father" of positivism. See Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p.43.
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such as Thomas Beirsteker and Robert Keohane.23 In these cases, as in the case of 
Ferguson's and Mansbach's argument, the unstated proposition is that there is either 
nothing of fundamental value left to say about, for example, questions of ontology and 
epistemology, and/or that which has been said leads to the conclusion that there is no 
alternative to positivist/empiricist based analysis. Articulated in broader terms, the 
assumption is that whatever could have been usefully said on these complex philosophical 
issues has been said - over nearly three millenia of Western philosophy - and that the 
fruits of this debate have been fully integrated into the International Relations agenda. 
Consequently, the unspoken message from the orthodoxy to the critics of the Third 
Debate, is this: your "theoretical/philosophical" efforts are of some value and are 
appreciated for the intellectual contribution they make to scholarship generally. However, 
we do not need another "preface" for International Relations - it has already been written, 
in the "great texts" of Western history and philosophy - and it has been absorbed, 
understood and integrated within the discipline, particularly within the theory and practice 
of the dominant Realist approach.
This thesis will seek to illustrate that this is indeed a major unspoken assumption 
at the base of orthodox scholarship, and that it represents another and very potent 
example of the limited and narrow regime of understanding associated with the study of 
International Relations in the contemporary period. The suggestion here is not that the 
philosophical critiques of recent times are unique. Nor is it suggested that the questions 
and issues raised by these critiques are totally alien to the International Relations 
community. Rather, the suggestion is that if they have been absorbed, understood or 
integrated in International Relations at all, it has been in the most shallow and superficial 
of terms. The suggestion, more precisely, is that the questions and issues of the 
"unwritten preface" - of ontology and epistemology, of the way we think and act in the 
world and understand "reality" - have either been ignored in International Relations, or
23Beirsteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations", International Studies 
Quarterly 33(3) (1989), pp.263-267 and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", 
International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), pp.379-396.
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rendered marginal and barely relevant by an orthodoxy which has interpreted the Western 
historical and philosophical story in a narrow, exclusionary and inadequate manner. This 
orthodoxy, most influentially manifested in the "scientific" (neo)Realism of (mainly) 
United States scholarship, but also in its (mainly) British Traditionalist counterpart, 
continues, thus, to represent as the "reality" of International Relations a narrow, self- 
affirming and self-enclosed image of the world "out there". This Realist image, invoked 
via disciplinary ritual and training practices, represents a complex, ambiguous and 
heterogeneous matrix of existence as a simple, linear story of (socio-intellectual) unity, 
coherence and identity. The end result is an approach to the contemporary world 
fundamentally detached from the everyday experience of so much of that world.
Speaking of the Realist image of reality Robert Cox has portrayed it as a narrow,
conservative perspective which privileges "old [positivist] intellectual conventions"24 and
a limited "problem solving" orientation, that:
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given 
framework for action. [Its aim] is to make these relationships and institutions 
work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.25
The critical challenges of the Third Debate in International Relations have generally 
supported Cox's insights on this issue and have supported also his appeal for a more 
sensitive, sophisticated and critically attuned perspective, concerned "not just with a static 
past but with a continuing process of historical change".26 This is a position supported in 
this thesis, which argues for the kind of tolerant, open-ended and genuinely pluralist 
approach to theory and practice to be found in much of the critical literature of the Third 
Debate.
24Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in 
Neorealism and its Critics edited by R. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.205.
25Ibid, p.208. 
26Ibid, pp.208-209.
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It does so, in the first instance, as pan of a broad ranging discussion which seeks 
to locate the contemporary issues on the International Relations agenda as pan of a much 
larger "critical" conversation on human society within Western history and philosophy, 
which recently has resounded again throughout Anglo-American social theory. The first 
four chapters of the thesis are, in their different ways, concerned to illustrate the 
significance of this broader location and conversation for contemporary International 
Relations.
Chapter One is concerned primarily to introduce, in a more substantial way, many 
of the themes touched on above. It seeks to make some early connections between 
orthodox theory and practice, articulated in post-1945 positivist-Realism in particular, and 
the critical literature of the Third Debate which has confronted Realism with interrogative 
themes drawn from the wider interdisciplinary debates in social theory. It introduces the 
notion of a Critical Social Theory, in this context, and explains why Critical Social 
Theory approaches are considered most conducive to opening International Relations to 
its "unwritten preface", and to a more tolerant and inclusive understanding of itself and 
the world. Towards the completion of the chapter the discussion turns toward two rather 
controversial dimensions of the contemporary critical debate and indicates their 
significance for the thesis as a whole. The first, concerns the "celebratory" attitude within 
the Third Debate, the second, the post-modernist expression of this attitude.
Put simply, the "celebratory" attitude maintains that the critical offensive aimed at 
orthodox positions in International Relations has created a sense of uncertainty, insecurity 
and incoherence within the discipline, which is a healthy, positive and entirely necessary 
situation if its orientation towards closure and exclusion is to be fundamentally challenged 
and a genuine "thinking space" is to ensue. Prominent within the "celebratory" literature 
have been the wide-ranging contributions of scholars transferring post-modernist 
perspectives from Continental philosophical sources to the primarily Anglo-American 
arena of International Relations debate. Some of these post-modernist themes are 
discussed with particular attention being paid to the discursive analytical approach and to
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concepts of genealogy and logocentrism. Also raised briefly is the question of modem 
knowledge and power and the possibility of resistance to it in an International Relations 
context.
Chapter Two has a more precise analytical purpose in that it seeks to explain, in 
more detail, some of the connections between the broad social theory debates and the 
Third Debate in International Relations. It does this by focusing on two questions 
intrinsic to both - the question of modernity and the question of positivism. The initial 
discussion, in both cases, is oriented towards providing a definition for two of the most 
complex and contentious themes in social theory. The definition of modernity does not 
replicate the conventional perspective with its strict chronological orientation. It 
emphasises, instead, the "modem" as a particular way of framing the questions we ask of 
the world. This, it is argued, is a process of metatheoretical framing derived from 
Cartesian rationalism in particular, which remains paradoxically committed to (pre- 
modern) foundationalist and essentialist premises. This notion of the modem, it is 
suggested, adds a dimension to the conventional story of rational progress in that allows 
for the modernist commitments of ostensibly anti-modernist, anti-progressive forces and 
perspectives (e.g. Realism in International Relations).
The first half of the chapter is concerned to illustrate how modem subjects and 
objects have been produced and have reproduced themselves in terms of a modernist 
discourse. The discussion here is of a more conventional tenor to the extent that it tells 
the conventional modem story via some of its "great texts" and "great men" (e.g. Locke, 
Hobbes, Descartes and Kant). The purpose of the discussion is, nevertheless, always 
critically honed in that it draws attention to that which is left unsaid, and seeks to illustrate 
how the silences and omissions of the conventional modernist narrative were just as 
significant in shaping modem subjects and objects as were the rituals of seeing and 
"knowing" at the surface of human experience.
The chapter turns to the question of positivism in these terms. It defines 
positivism as the foremost philosophical expression of an empiricist epistemology, as
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crystalised in the Enlightenment.27 It then argues, via a discussion that ranges from 
Hume, through Comte and Logical Positivism to behaviouralism and the so called "post- 
behaviouralist" age of the present, that positivism is the site of some of the most powerful 
of modernism's influences (e.g. of paradox, foundationalism and unreflective 
conservative silence) to the extent that its adherents in the 1990s no longer recognise its 
impact upon their lives. This, as intimated above, is an issue directly relevant to an 
International Relations community which has either never acknowledged its positivist 
commitments (e.g. Wight, Bull and the Traditionalists generally) or which, in recent 
times, has represented its position in "post-positivist" terms (e.g. Ferguson and 
Mansbach and neo-Realism generally).
Chapter Three, accordingly, is concerned to confront this issue in a manner that 
International Relations scholars have been reluctant to confront it, by critically evaluating 
the often very sophisticated "post-positivist" perspectives in social theory which form the 
basis of similar claims in International Relations. The purpose of this discussion is to 
problematise one of the most powerful assumptions of Realist and neo-Realist thinking, 
an assumption which underpins the contemporary orthodoxy in International Relations. 
The chapter concentrates on five major "post-positivist" themes, all of which are of 
significance in the International Relations agenda in the 1990s. The first of these, Karl 
Popper's Critical Rationalism is accorded extended treatment as testament to its influence 
over the years. The others: Kuhn's paradigm approach; the Analytical Philosophy 
perspective (of Wittgenstein in particular); Scientific Realism (e.g. Structuration theory); 
and elements of the broad hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Verstehen, as articulated by 
Morgenthau via Weber) are discussed from a number of angles, and in a manner that 
seeks to them justice while illustrating their continuing commitment to positivist themes 
and modernism in general. Some of the implications of this situation are then considered, 
both for social theory and more particularly for International Relations.
27In this regard it follows Leszek Kolakowski's understanding of the issue, in Positivist Philosophy. 
pp.11-17.
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Chapter Four addresses the continuing narrowness and limitation of Anglo- 
American thought from another angle, that of Critical Social Theory approaches which 
have confronted positivism and modernism at the most profound philosophical level. 
Attention here is focused on themes intrinsic to International Relations - questions of 
rationality, empiricism, of "reading" history, of the subject in the philosophical text, of 
the object "out there" in the world, of relations between language and power, and of 
sovereignty. Two Critical Social Theory perspectives are accorded special attention - the 
Critical Theory approaches of two generations of Frankfurt School scholarship and of 
Jurgen Habermas, in particular, - and the post-modernist perspective introduced in 
Chapter One. These have been the most influential Critical Social Theory perspectives in 
the Third Debate and both, it is argued, have something important to offer in opening the 
fundamentally closed discourse of International Relations. Both approaches are, initially, 
discussed in general terms and their critical capacities are evaluated. The discussion then 
turns to the relationship between them and the tensions associated with that relationship. 
Reservations are expressed about both approaches, in this regard, and while preference is 
accorded the post-modernist position it is argued that, if post-modernism is to have the 
impact its insights warrant, it must continue its dialogue with critical modernist 
approaches such as Critical Theory.
Having thus established a broad discursive framework within which a debate on 
the "unwritten preface" of International Relations might be usefully understood, the idiom 
if not the critical purpose of the thesis changes, from Chapter Five on, as the discussion 
concentrates more directly on the literature commonly associated with International 
Relations. Chapter Five, accordingly, is concerned to illustrate how modemist and 
positivist influences have always been dominant in International Relations. It illustrates, 
firstly, how International Relations scholars have framed the questions they ask of the 
world in terms derived from a positivist reading of the modem Western narrative. It 
emphasises the way International Relations has come to "know" the world (i.e. in 
dichotomised terms of subject/object, fact/value, theory/practice, realism/idealism,
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domestic/intemational, sovereignty/anarchy) and how it has accorded "meaning" to the 
world it acknowledges "out there" (i.e. via inductivist and/or deductivist judgements on 
independent "facts"). Three more specific examples of the modernist legacy are then 
presented. The first stresses the continuity between the neo-Kantian idealism of the inter- 
war years and the Realism which superseded it at the centre of the discipline. The second 
concentrates on the first "great text" of International Relations, E. H. Carr's The Twenty 
Years Crisis and indicates how its positivist themes became the basis of the quest for a 
"science" of International Relations that continues, unabated to this day. The third 
provides a "concrete" example of the implications and dangers of this narrow discursive 
orientation - the orthodox reading of the Cold War - which saw the interpretive ambiguity 
of the immediate post-World War Two period reduced to a simplistic narrative of unified 
self-affirming certainty and a generation of "reality" set in terms of "us" and "them".28
Chapter Six investigates the "golden age" of Realist scholarship - between the 
early years of the Cold War and the end of the Vietnam War - when some of its 
inadequacies became too difficult to ignore, even for its adherents. Early in the chapter 
the most important of all Realist texts, Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, is the 
focus of attention. The discussion, however, speaks of Politics Among Nations in a way 
that Morgenthau refused to speak of it, in terms of Max Weber's influence upon it and the 
broader impact upon Traditionalist Realism of Verstehen hermeneutics, the "other side of 
the positivist coin".29 The discussion then traces the (often unacknowledged) connection 
between Politics Among Nations and the "quest for certainty" that characterised the
28And to underline the argument about a modemist/positivist discourse with influences beyond its 
ostensible boundaries, it notes, as in many other places in the thesis, that not only was the Realist 
perspective framed in this way, so too were its major disciplinary "alternatives". In the case of the Cold 
War discourse this included a Marxian and a "revisionist" variant of a dichotomised format in which a 
"knowing" subject observed the dangers of the world "out there".
29On Verstehen as "the other side of the positivist coin" see Susan Hekman, "Beyond Humanism: 
Gadamer, Althusser and the Methodology of the Social Sciences", Western Political Quarterly 36 (1983), 
pp.98-115; and Hekman, Weber. The Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory (South Bend, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
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"behaviouralist revolution" in International Relations in the 1960s.30 In this period an 
amalgam of ethnocentric arrogance, progressivism, innovation, pragmatism and rigid 
conservatism marked the positivist-Realist ascendency. This is illustrated in a brief 
discussion of the Modernisation literature and its "certainty" concerning the peoples of the 
Third World, and a larger inquiry into the mainstream scholarship on Cold War security 
and Nuclear strategy. The chapter ends with a critical retrospective on the era and its 
legacy and an illustration that in 1990s (e.g. in the work of Stephen Walt) that nothing 
much has changed after the debacle in Vietnam and in the "post-behaviouralist" era.31
Chapter Seven develops this theme further in returning the discussion to its 
original context and the question of an International Political Economy in the 1980s and 
1990s. The purpose of this chapter is to confront the claim of the new orthodoxy - neo- 
Realism - that it (i) represents something other than the discredited Realism of the 
Vietnam years; that (ii) its new interest in "economics" indicates a more sensitive and 
profound attitude to the world, beyond U.S. foreign policy interests and Traditionalist 
images of a world of security dilemmas and anarchical power balancing; and (iii) that its 
structuralist orientation represents a more sophisticated "post-positivist" comprehension 
of global affairs. These are themes countered in a discussion which looks critically at the 
contribution of figures such Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, Arthur 
Stein and Robert Keohane.
Chapters Eight and Nine are concerned, primarily, with Critical Social Theory 
alternatives to the modemist/positivist orthodoxy. Their purpose, accordingly, is to 
illuminate some of the "thinking space" that scholars utilising Critical Theory and post­
modernist themes have opened up in International Relations in recent years. Chapter 
Eight concentrates on the Critical Theory contribution in this regard. It reviews Richard 
Ashley's pathbreaking "Poverty of Neorealism" and evaluates both its obvious
30On this "quest" issue see Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", 
Daedalus 106(3) (1977), pp.41-66.
31 Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991), pp.211-239.
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contribution to later Critical Social Theory perspectives, and the silences in its argument 
which allowed its targets to sidestep some of its more devastating indictments of their 
"poverty". Robert Cox's contribution is also highlighted and Cox's recent work on 
political economy and hegemonic order is presented as an important counterpoint to the 
dominant perspectives of neo-Realism. The chapter ends with a discussion of Critical 
Theory scholarship that has much to contribute but which retains, to its detriment, the 
universalised and essentialised tendencies of post-Enlightenment emancipatory schemas.
The final chapter, Nine, engages with some of the post-modernist scholarship 
which, in recent years has added a "different" and critically potent dimension to the 
International Relations agenda. It seeks to illuminate this "difference" and via a series of 
post-modernist attempts to open up closed aspects of orthodox theory and practice, 
illustrate this potency. Four broad areas of the post-modernist contribution are 
addressed. The first concerns post-modernist attempts to undermine the textual basis of 
Realist understanding of the world by problematising the singular, essentialist reading of 
its "great texts" (e.g. of Thucydides and Machiavelli and of "diplomatic culture"). The 
second concentrates on the efforts of post-modernists to re-conceptualise some of the 
"givens" of the modemist-cum-Realist world view - notions of sovereignty and anarchy 
in particular - and the process by which Otherness is constituted. The third looks more 
precisely at post-modernist perspectives on questions of security and strategy in the post- 
Cold War era. The fourth, via R.B.J. Walker's One World. Many World's considers the 
nature of, and prospects for, a post-modernist politics of resistance in International 
Relations in the future.32 Throughout the discussion emphasis is placed on the inherent 
and purposeful "concreteness" of this post-modernist scholarship, and the connections it 
stresses between its discursive interrogations and the everyday "practice" of power 
politics.
32Walker, One World. Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Order (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner, 
1988).
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Throughout the thesis, also, another issue is paid serious attention. It concerns 
the (perceived) inaccessibility of the new Critical Social Theory literature for many, 
trained in and committed to, the traditional ways of reading and writing International 
Relations. Tooze, as indicated, was concerned about the problem of "incomprehension" 
in this regard and Steve Smith has recently made a similar point.33 My response to these 
concerns is to share them while acknowledging that not only those influenced by 
Continental scholarship are guilty of obscurification and jargonised presentation, as any 
perusal of mainstream International Relations journals will attest. It is a truism also that, 
having coaxed the International Relations thoroughbred to the wellspring of Critical 
Social Theory, there remains, very often, a reluctance even to wet the lips. As Donna 
Gregory has said, in relation to offers of post-modernist sustenance, the tendency has 
been to "attack" rather than to read.34
This thesis, nevertheless, represents an attempt to communicate sophisticated and 
often very complex themes in a manner which does them some interpretive justice, while 
accounting for the interested reader who might otherwise be inhibited and/or intimidated 
by the "foreignness" of the literary fare on offer. For this reason and to underline the 
point that it is International Relations' own (unwritten) preface that is at stake here, the 
discussion to follow is, for all its "foreign" influence, couched in a conventional language 
and, wherever possible, the references used are from traditional sources. The point, to 
reiterate it, is that it is not necessary to invoke a Foucault, a Derrida or a Habermas to 
comprehend that which has been left unsaid, unthought and unwritten in International 
Relations. On the critical margins of modem Western thought there have always been 
those working to open "thinking space", and even in the scholarship which has been 
integral to the framing of modem ways of thinking (e.g. Descartes, Hume, Kant, Weber,
33Smith, "The Development of International Relations as a Social Science", Millennium 16(2) (1987), 
pp. 189-206.
34Gregory, "Foreword”, in Intemational/lntertextnal Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics 
edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989), 
p.xiii.
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Popper) there were opportunities for critical reflection that have been effectively ignored, 
by Anglo-American social theory in general, and by International Relations in particular.
A Critical Social Theory perspective is necessary in this situation, however, 
because it explains how and why this continues to be the case, and because it illustrates 
the power and (largely unrecognised) dangers of the unsaid, the unreflected, and the 
"unwritten" in a world which everyday, and in so many ways, defies simplistic grand 
theorised invocations of its "reality".
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CHAPTER ONE
CONFRONTING THE UNWRITTEN PREFACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Reality, it seems, is not what it used to be in International Relations. In recent times 
patterns of thought and behaviour identified as corresponding with an enduring, essential 
reality of international life have been subject to remarkable and often dramatic change. 
Indeed, in the 1990s, it is suggested, we are living through a watershed period of 
revolutionary change, in which "ideologies are reordered, boundaries are redrawn, 
alliances are reshuffled, new symbols of identification arise and old identities are 
resurrected".1 The catalyst for much of the new revolutionary spirit has undoubtedly 
been the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Union which, in one form or 
another, and with varying results, have sparked off political tinder boxes from Beijing to 
Berlin.
In the West the resultant sequence of events has been cause for much celebration. 
There has been widespread rejoicing at the new opportunities for personal and political 
liberty within the societies of Eastern Europe, in particular. There has been smugness 
also. For those, in particular, who represent capitalism and utilitarian social relations as 
the natural order in the modem world, it was the Socialist system and not its market based 
counterpart that was always destined to "wither away".
Notwithstanding the now confident re-articulations of well rehearsed polemic and 
the optimism concerning post Cold War opportunity, and "new world" orders, there is 
also a not insubstantial sense that the current era is one of major crisis. At one level this 
is not at all surprising. The opportunities for future liberty in Eastern Europe are, after 
all, laced with the great dangers that have attended previous resurrections of national
^ e e  Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair Constructive Suggestions 
for Future International Theory”, International Studies Quarterly 35(4) (1991), pp.363-387; at p.363.
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identity in that complex region. Similarly, the social revolution unleashed by Gorbachev 
in the Soviet Union has, to understate the case, the potential for something other than a 
future characterised by openness and prosperity. And while celebration might be the 
appropriate response at scenes of erstwhile central balance foes actually transforming their 
swords into plowshares, there is well founded apprehension about the increasingly lethal 
arsenals of the Third World, where, for all the change and talk of historical watersheds 
there has been little, if any, change in the lives of those decades ago identified as the 
"wretched of the earth". Grinding poverty remains the most prominent characteristic of 
much Third World existence, where spiralling infant mortality rates, chronic 
unemployment and inadequate shelter and health care are the stuff of everyday life. And 
then there is the pall of smoke, the size of India, that hangs over the Amazon jungle.2
It is, however, another dimension to the issue of crisis that will receive most 
direct attention in this thesis. Simply put, it concerns the process by which we have 
traditionally understood and given meaning to reality in International Relations. Or, more 
specifically, it concerns the increasingly acknowledged inadequacies of the process by 
which we continue to reproduce that meaning, in the face of the dangers and opportunities 
of the contemporary period.
As R. N. Berki has recently reminded us, in a slightly broader context,3 the 
question of reality is not exhausted by reference to the "facts" of the world, or any simple 
aggregation of them. Rather, as Berki emphasised, reality can never be grasped in its 
factual completeness, because reality is never complete, never entirely coherent, never 
accessible to universalised, essentialist or totalised understanding of it. On the contrary,
2Like many of the terms and meanings associated with this thesis, the notion of a Third World spoken of 
in these terms, is a problematic concept. This is not just because of the differences and complexities of 
life within the geographical regions usually referred to as the Third World, but because of the increasing 
evidence that many of the characteristics commonly associated with life in those regions (Africa, Asia, 
Central and South America) are discernible within the First and Second (Socialist, ex-Socialist) worlds. I 
seek, nevertheless, to assist the flow of the work by keeping the use of "quotations" around terms such as 
this to a minimum. This is an issue of particular importance in a thesis such as this because of the 
question of representationalism that in its later stages will become more explicitly a matter for 
discussion.
3r .N. Berki, On Political Realism (London: J.M Dent, 1981).
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reality is always characterised by ambiguity, disunity, discrepancy, contradiction and 
difference. An adequate political realism, consequently, is one that above all recognises 
its limitations in this regard and acknowledges its partial, problematic and always 
contestable nature. Inadequacy, in this sense, is the representation of a partial, 
particularistic image of reality as (irreducible, totalised and uncontestable) reality itself. 
The problem, suggested Berki, is that it has been precisely this inadequate representation 
of reality that has dominated within the Anglo-American intellectual community, 
particularly that sector of it concerned with International Relations.
As a consequence two rather "primitive" themes have become increasingly 
associated with the question of political reality in International Relations. The first is 
articulated through the language and logic of "immediacy".4 The "real" world, in this 
regard, is that which is immediately "there", around us "disclosed to us by sensory 
information". Reality, on this basis, "is a world of tangible, palpable, perceptible things 
or objects. It is material and concrete". Accordingly, the correct (realistic) response to 
the real world out there is "accommodation". Realism, in International Relations, thus 
becomes the common-sensical accommodation to the tangible, observable realities of this 
(external) world. At this point the second "primitive" Realist theme acts to reaffirm the 
first and by its own logic, at least, grant it greater legitimacy. This, suggested Berki, is 
the "necessity" theme which confirms the need for accommodation to the facts of reality 
but which accords them greater historical and philosophical^facticity. Reality now 
becomes:
the realm of the unchangeable, inevitable and in the last resort inexorable 
occurrences, a world of eternity, objectivity, gravity, substantiality and 
positive resistance to human purposes.5
In this manner Realism is now imbued with moral, philosophical and even 
religious connotations, in its confrontation with the real world "out there". It becomes
4The "primitive" theme is Berki's in, On Political Realism, p.7.
5Ibid, p.8.
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moral in that it observes certain rules of conduct integral to the reality of human 
behaviour. It can take on a religious dimension in that reality is understood as an 
accommodation to an inexorable destiny emanating from the realm of ultimate 
"necessity". Its philosophical status is established as Realists, acknowledging the 
necessity for accommodation, represent their understanding of reality in the serious, 
resigned manner of (for example) the scholar/statesman contemplating the often 
unpalatable "is" of the world. The knowledge form integral to this Realist philosophy is 
that concerned, above all, with control. Because the reality in question is "the authentic, 
the significant, the important, the relevant, the ultimate, the veritable and attestable" real 
knowledge of the world must be revealed in unified and systemic terms, as an "operative 
principle".6
Ultimately, Berki argued, the knowledge form associated with a Realism of this 
kind is positivism; its philosophical identity, as a consequence, is marked by dualism and 
dichotomy. Thus, "realism in modem philosophy means the the assertion of a reality 
'independent' of the observer, to be distinguished from idealism which derives external 
reality from the thinking mind" .7 A positivist Realism in this way signifies its 
acknowledgement of a:
positively existing political reality 'out there' manifested in ever-recurrent 
institutional forms and relationships, those mainly of power and struggle, to 
be recognised and acquiesced in .8
The theory and practice of positivist Realism is at its most powerful, suggested Berki, in 
a form familiar to the International Relations community, the Realpolitik perspective of 
post-Bismarckian foreign policy. Here, the "immediacy" and "necessity" themes are 
synthesised in fundamental assertions about the anarchical reality of human life which,
6Ibid, p.9.
7Berki, On Political Realism, p. 15.
^Ibid. This is the "is" of the world "as it positively is and persists over time", as opposed to "idealism 
which believes that politics, as the creature of human will and design can be re-made according to 
intention".
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bereft of a Leviathan, is in "permanent need of restraint".9 A genuine Realist in this
circumstance is the observer of the world "out there" aware, above all, of the need for the
law and order proffered by the sovereign state in a post-Renaissance world of states. The
Realist, accordingly, remains "grimly and heroically pessimistic", perceiving:
law and order, and their maintenance by force, as a permanent and ever 
precarious holding operation [understanding] peace, tranquillity, prosperity, 
freedom [as] a special bonus, accruing to people as a result of living in a well 
ordered society...[where] the price to be paid is constant vigilance, constant 
readiness to use force.10
This scenario the Realist represents in appropriately stark "moral" terms, in which 
the recurring rituals of power politics are played out against "eternal moral laws which 
govern an eternally corrupt human nature".* 11 And, while in the broad sense there is 
acknow ledgem ent o f the philosophical legacy associated with this H obbesian/ 
M achiavellian scenario, there is also the increasingly powerful positivist tendency to 
"disavow reflection". As a result, positivist Realism, in this form, is "highly suspicious" 
of other forms of knowledge which place more emphasis on theoretical understanding of 
"abstract p rin c ip les" .12 Such approaches are regarded as, at best, "irrelevant to 
government" (and the maintenance of order) and at worst "inimical" to the real concerns 
of political life at the international level.13
For Berki this represents a logical circularity which, in detaching itself from 
theory and interpretation, effectively detaches itself from the interpretivist (historical, 
cultural and linguistic) context of everyday human existence - from the social and 
intellectual life blood o f reality. Even in its most sophisticated form (e.g. Popperian/ 
Lakatosian) a positivist-Realist approach is, from this perspective, an anachronistic
9Ibid.
10Ibid, p.16.
11 Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
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residue of the European Enlightenment, and mainstream Western philosophy in general, 
which continues the futile quest for a grand (non)theory of existence beyond specific 
time, space and political purpose.
Berki's commentary on the Realism issue is by no means original, of course. 
Arguments concerning the "theory impregnated nature of fact" and the notion of 
"interpreted" reality have long been part of Western philosophical discourse. Indeed they 
have been central to it since the Enlightenment, when the much longer Western tendency 
towards bifurcation was crystalised into claims for Realism set upon positivist principles 
of knowledge. Moreover, since Hegel sought to say something more profound about the 
"real" nature of the world by closing the Kantian dualism, approaches such as Berki's 
have represented one of the major "alternatives" to positivist-Realism.
For all this, and taking into account the simplicity with which the issue has been 
addressed to this stage, Berki's argument is useful here as a point o f entry into a more 
complex set of debates about understanding reality that are now resonating throughout the 
literature of the International Relations discipline. At the most immediate level, as 
intimated above, these debates reflect a sense of crisis among those seeking to explain the 
implications for International Relations of the extraordinary events associated with the end 
of the Cold War, in the face of widespread recognition that the positivist-Realist 
orthodoxy is incapable of providing such explanations in other than "primitive" terms. 14
14The question is broader than this, of course. As the discussion to follow will emphasise it is not just a 
matter of Realism’s inadequacy but the inadequacy of that whole discourse represented as International 
Relations, which includes the major alternatives to a Realist perspective (e.g. conventional Marxism, 
variants of systems theory, the so called pluralist and structuralist paradigms etc). For a general 
discussion of Realism and its "alternatives" see John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1983). On the Marxist alternative, which in International Relations has never 
had the kind of influences it has enjoyed, at times, in social theory generally, see John Maclean, "Marxist 
Epistemology, Explanations of 'Change' and the Study of International Relations", in Change and the 
Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimensions edited by Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1981); Maclean, "Marxism and International Relations: A Strange Case of 
Mutual Neglect", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (1988), pp.295-319; Vendulka 
Kubalkova and A.A. Cruikshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Andrew Linklater, Bevond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and 
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990); and Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and 
Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1985).
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This raises the question, more directly, of why this is so. In broader thematic 
terms it brings us directly to a central issue of this thesis, concerning the diversity of 
attempts to confront questions such as this as part of the extended intellectual agenda in 
International Relations of the 1980s and 1990s. For all the diversity of this literature one 
of its points of connection is the proposition that while, elsewhere, the problems of 
mainstream Anglo-American theory and practice have undergone sustained, critical 
challenge, International Relations remains the "backward discipline", still largely isolated 
from the main currents of contemporary intellectual life.15 The result: the continuing 
dominance of a "primitive" Realist approach set upon the kind of metatheoretical premises 
identified by Berki as the most inadequate in understanding reality in the world.
In this sense, at least, the critical scholarship of recent years is replicating themes 
addressed by commentators such as Robert Rothstein, who, in the early 1970s, 
acknowledged that Realism in International Relations, represented a rather dubious set of 
propositions about the "true nature" of the world that were "extrapolations from the 
diplomatic history of nineteenth century Europe".16 So extrapolated, the real world was 
one in which:
states were involved in an unending struggle with each other (because that 
was the nature of states in an anarchic world); power was necessary to 
survive in it or continue to to fight; all states were potential enemies...but the 
worst might be avoided by clever diplomacy and by virtue of the fact that all 
alike shared a similar conception of [utilitarian] rational behaviour.17
This, explained Rothstein, became the "catechism" of Western intellectual and policy 
making circles in the post World War Two period as International Relations became 
effectively part of a North American social science perspective, integrating its scientific 
quest with "the wisdom of certain 'eternal verities' conveniently collected in a few
15On the "backward discipline" issue see Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.9.
16R. Rothstein, "On The Costs of Realism", Political Science Quarterly. 87(3) (1972), pp.348-362. 
17Ibid, p.351.
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texts".18 The result was a particular "state of mind with which to approach problems"
which permeated University and Government sectors and which "conditioned the political
climate so that some actions seem 'to stand to reason' and others seem naive - by
definition".19 Realism, on this basis, was the:
doctrine which provided the intellectual frame of reference for the [academic 
and] foreign policy establishments...[which] determinefd] the categories by 
which they assessed the external world and the state of mind with which they 
approached prevailing problems.20
However, for all the sim ilarities between Rothstein's position and the 
contemporary critical literature, there is one significant distinction between them. It is that 
Rothstein, like many other commentators of the period, was speaking of this Realist 
"catechism" in retrospective tones. More explicitly, Rothstein, in 1972, spoke of this 
Realist approach as "no longer in style in academic circles", while acknowledging its 
continuing dominance among (policy) practitioners who were less troubled by the 
"inconsistencies and anomalies that trouble the theorist".21 This, as intimated, is by no 
means an isolated view. Since the early 1970s a plethora of works have claimed that the 
crude state centric images of the Realist "catechism" have been superseded. In the wake 
of the Vietnam War, in particular, International Relations literature has been characterised 
by a succession of claims to have gone beyond (crude) Realism and (unreflective) 
positivism.22 Indeed, it has been in this period that the discipline has understood itself as
18Ibid, p.350.
19Ibid, p.353.
20Ibid, p.348.
21 Ibid, p.347.
22From a number of angles, see R. Maghoori and B. Ramberg eds.. Globalism Versus Realism: 
International Relations' Third Debate (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); W.C. Olson and N. Onuf, "The 
Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed", in International Relations: British and American Perspectives, edited 
by S. Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations 
Theory", in Conflict in World Society: A New Approach to International Relations, edited by M. Banks 
(Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984); M. Sullivan, "Competing Frameworks and the Study of 
Contemporary International Politics", Millennium 7 (1978), pp.93-110; Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Robert Keohane, 
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); Roger Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface: International Political Economy",
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engaged in the third major stage of its (rational) development, centred around its Third 
"great" Debate.
The first of these debates, according to disciplinary folk lore, saw International 
Relations scholars responding realistically to the world "out there" in overturning the 
utopianism of Wilsonian Liberalism in favour of the power politics format outlined in 
E.H. Carr's, The Twenty Years Crisis (1939).23 The basic principles of this power 
politics Realism were then confirmed and rendered more systematic in the greatest of all 
the discipline's "great texts" - Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (1948). The 
search for the "objective" and enduring "laws" of international life, spoken of by 
Morgenthau, was then taken up in earnest as (mainly) North American scholars sought to 
give modem intellectual sustenance to Carr's appeal for a "science" of International 
Relations set upon Realist first principles.
The second developmental stage and associated "great debate" arose from this 
quest, and a conflict concerning it within Realist ranks in the mid-1960s. Here the 
(mainly) North American Behaviouralists, armed with (Popperian) falsification^  
techniques, sought to further distance Realist scholarship from the lingering metaphysics 
of the (mainly) British Traditionalists and their commitment to ambiguous "philosophical" 
concepts and themes.24 The second "great debate" petered out in the late 1960s with both
Millennium 17(2) (1988), pp.285-293; Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); J. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and 
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", International Organization 36 (1982), 
pp.379-415; and Kal Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory 
(Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1985).
23The "great texts" referred to here are E. H Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction 
to the Study of International Relations (1964 ed. London: Macmillan, first published 1939); and H.J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th ed. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1978). The status of Morgenthau's contribution is confirmed in Vasquez, The Power of Power 
Politics, chapter 3. On the first "great debate" see Kal J. Holsti, "Along the Road to International 
Theory", International Journal 39 (1984), pp.337-365; Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: W. Olsen and N. 
Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed"; Maghoori and Ramberg, eds., Globalism Versus 
Realism: Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: and Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate”, in 
International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory edited by M. Light and AJ.R. Groom (London: 
Frances Pinter, 1985).
24The term Traditionalists will be capitalised here to designate it from the more common usage of the 
term throughout the thesis. This again is by no means an unproblematic term. It relates to that sector 
within Realism, primarily in Britain, which have represented their power politics "catechism" in a fashion
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sides claiming victory as they spoke past each other in Knorr and Rosenau's Contending 
Approaches to International Relations.25
distinct from the mainstream of positivist-Realism in the United States. Characteristically, the 
Traditionalists (or Classical school of Realism) have emphasised historical and philosophical scholarship, 
rather than the explicit "scientific" approach dominant in the discipline since the early 1960s. I will 
outline my position on this issue in a number of ways throughout the thesis, but simply put, for now, I 
do not accept that the Traditionalist approach is fundamentally different from the "scientific" one, but 
maintain that it is a variation on it. The Traditionalism of Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, E.H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau or Stanley Hoffmann, for example, is a variation on the positivist theme which reflects the 
differences of style, emphasis and tone within a philosophical perspective which resonates with the 
influences of early British empiricism, the Humean scepticism of the Enlightenment, Comtean and 
Durkheimian data-gathering fetishes of the Nineteenth century and the contemporary concerns for 
falsificationism and "research programs". But the positivist story is more complex than this, to the 
extent that its principles of understanding and explanation remain powerful at its discursive intersections 
with a number of "alternative" perspectives, including the neo-Kantian and hermeneutic perspectives of a 
Weber or a Mannheim which have seeped into Anglo-American social theory offering a measure of 
interpretive sensitivity amid the explicit search for "value freedom". Traditionalist-Realism in this regard 
represents the "other side" of the explicit positivist coin, repudiating the "methodological" orientations of 
the post-Logical Positivist era, but continuing nevertheless to frame the questions it asks of the world in 
terms of the phenomenalist and nominalist perspectives on "knowing", which are a defining characteristic 
of positivist theory and practice. The result is a less harsh but no less committed rendition of a modernist 
ontology set in terms of a series of dualisms and dichotomies (subject/object, fact/value, theory/practice, 
is/ought) which afford "meaning" to a Realist world of order/anarchy, Realism/idealism, domestic/ 
international, and a Realist "history" defined in terms of "recurrence and repetition". One of the 
implications of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations is that the Traditionalists have never 
seriously reflected upon the discursive connections with their "scientific" counterparts. Hedley Bull's 
rather superficial attack on the behaviouralists in the second "great debate" of the 1960s was enough to 
convince both sides that nothing more could be said of value on the dispute between them. See Bull, 
"International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach", World Politics XVIII (1966), pp.361-377, 
reprinted in, Contending Approaches to International Relations edited by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). Herein lies one of the silences and limitations of 
International Relations. R.BJ. Walker has summed up the situation well enough with his insight that in 
the second "great debate" a:
version of a more or less decrepit [British] empiricism...primarily inductive and 
idiosyncratic in orientation [was pitted against] a predominantly American version of the 
same [positivist] empiricist tradition...which favoured a more deductive approach and which 
drew upon pragmatism and logical positivism.
Walker, Political Order and the Transformation of World Politics (World Order Studies Program, 
Occasional Paper No.8: Princeton University, 1980), p.29. On the question of positivism and its 
complexity see the discussion in Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis. A useful overview is 
provided by Peter Halfpenny, Positivism and Sociology: Explaining Social Life (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1982). On the Weber connection, particularly in an International Relations context see R. 
Factor and S. Turner, Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1984). On Weber, Mannheim and the "other side" of the positivist coin more generally see, Susan 
Hekman, "Beyond Humanism: Gadamer, Althusser and the Methodology of the Social Sciences", Western 
Political Quarterly 36 (1983), pp.98-115 ; and Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986).
25See Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International Relations: J. Dougherty 
and R. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1981); Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach"; 
Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Relations (New York: Wiley, 1957); Kaplan, "The 
New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations", World Politics 19 (1966), 
pp. 1-20; Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory"; and Vasquez, The Power of Power 
Politics. Chapter Two.
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In the period since the 1970s the developmental story has been renewed, albeit in 
slightly different form. Now, it is suggested, the era of positivist Realist dominance is 
effectively over and the International Relations field is, almost literally, the site of a 
hundred (theoretical) flowers blooming. The third disciplinary stage, consequently, is the 
stage of competing paradigms, of conflicting clusters of theory, of Globalism, Pluralism, 
Structuralism and of a resurgent International Political Economy. This is the age of 
Complex Interdependence and Transnationalism, of post-behaviouralism and/or post­
positivism, and, more latterly, of Regime Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory and in 
more general terms of neo-Realism.26
In this third and current developmental stage, however, the International Relations 
community has become engaged in a "great debate" unlike anything that has preceded it. 
As a consequence, it has been confronted with the kind of challenges to its self 
understanding and identity which, previously, it has either ignored or proclaimed 
marginal to the reality of an international environment, distinguished from its domestic 
counterpart by the anarchy "out there". It has, for example, been confronted with the 
proposition that its disciplinary self understanding, its image of a linear rational 
development - from the crudity of power politics Realism to the nuanced theoretical 
sensitivities of neo-Realism - is largely illusory. Or, to return to Rothstein's 
characterisation of events in the early 1970s, the proposition, from many quarters in the
26On neo-Realism see Robert Keohane ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert 
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and John 
Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis", WQtld 
Politics 35 (1983), pp.261-285. On Hegemonic Stability Theory see Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Keohane, "The Theory of 
Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Economic Regimes, 1966-1977", in Change in the 
International System edited by Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander George (Boulder. Westview 
Press, 1980); Keohane ed.. After Hegemony, and D. Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability 
Theory", International Organization 39 (1985), pp.579-614. For an overview discussion of Regime 
Theory, see Stephen Krasner ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); and for 
an example of "post-behaviouralism" and/or "post-positivism" see Ferguson and Mansbach, Between 
Celebration and Despair"; Thomas Beirsteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International 
Relations", International Stumps Quarterly 33 (1989), pp.236-267; and Friedrich Kratochwil and John 
Ruggie, "International Organization: The State of the Art on an Art of the State", International 
Organization 40 (1986), pp.263-84.
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Third Debate, is that power politics Realism is still very much in style in academic circles 
and that it is not only practitioners who are unconcerned by the "inconsistencies and 
anomalies" that permeate their understanding of the world they seek to explain in Realist 
terms.
This does not suggest that there have been no worthwhile attempts to confront the 
complex matrix of problems faced by International Relations scholars in the contemporary 
period. Nor does it simply dismiss the efforts of those who have sought to open up 
Realist theory and practice in one way or another in recent years. What it suggests is that 
while some of these attempts have shown themselves capable of producing interesting 
and important insight, they have, ultimately, closed off our capacity to ask "different" 
and more profound questions; to construct genuinely alternative interpretations about 
global life in the last pan of the Twentieth Century. This, as a number of critical 
commentators have argued, in their different ways, is because such approaches do not 
question profoundly enough the issue of how, as Rothstein put it, a positivist-Realist 
approach "determines the categories" by which the world is understood or how it comes 
to dominate "the state of mind" of intellectuals and policy makers and "condition the 
political climate" generally.27 As a consequence, mainstream International Relations 
scholarship in the 1990s, for all its developmental claims to the contrary, remains 
fundamentally incarcerated in the positivist-Realist framework that characterised its 
understanding of the world "out there" in the 1940s and 1950s.
This is obviously a theme of some importance for this thesis and between 
Chapters Five and Nine, in particular, it will receive more comprehensive and more direct 
treatment. At this point, however, John Vasquez's contribution to the debate might 
illustrate the complexity and significance of this issue, and why it requires serious 
attention in terms of the broader issue of the "unwritten preface".
27Rothstein, "On the Costs of Realism", p.353.
34
In the most comprehensive survey of the discipline yet undertaken, Vasquez in 
The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (1983) indicated clearly enough the major 
problems associated with understanding and explaining the real nature of contemporary 
international life, from a Realist perspective. More significantly, he did so in the 
falsification^ terms which, since 1945, have been dominant at the (North) American 
disciplinary centre.28 His findings, as one commentator put it, hit at Realism "like an 
Exocet missile".29 Constructing a data set of nearly 8,000 Realist hypotheses, Vasquez 
proceeded to then "test" them for their accuracy, their capacity for prediction and their 
"scientific" significance.30 Vasquez found, for example, that in terms of accuracy, no less 
than 93.1% of Realist hypotheses were falsified.31 On their capacity to predict behaviour 
at the international level the findings were just as devastating, to the extent that Vasquez 
concluded that, in the area that ought to have shown most impressive results - the power 
politics premises of Morgenthau - the actual situation was that "the central power politics 
framework [is] among the the poorest performers in actually predicting behaviour".32 
And on the question of "scientific importance", only 157 of the nearly 8,000 hypotheses 
failed to be falsified, and of these exceptions, nearly 70 percent were considered 
"trivial".33
2^The behaviouralist impact, in this context, will be discussed in Chapter Six. On this issue generally, 
see Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", Daedalus 106(3) (1977), 
pp.41-60; Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: and for updated confirmation of its continuing influence 
Hayward Alker and Thomas Beirsteker, "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist 
of International Savoir Faire", International Studies Quarterly 28(2) (1984), pp. 121-142.
2^Banks, "Where Are We Now?", p.222.
31Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.199.
31 Ibid, p.194.
32IbkL
33Ibid, p.199. And as P.M. Morgan in, Theories and Approaches to International Politics (New Jersey: 
Transaction Books, 1987), p.26, pointed out, the Traditionalists can take no heart whatsoever from 
Vasquez's findings even if they attempt to detach themselves from his American approach. The point is 
that, as Vasquez made clear, the premises that were being "tested" were Traditionalist premises "to a large 
extent quantitative international relations has been using the new behavioural techniques to reformulate 
and test propositions present in the Traditionalist literature".
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Setting aside the quantitative idiom at the end of his study Vasquez made clearer
the dangers associated with the dominant mode of understanding in International
Relations. He concluded, for example, that "as an image of the world employed by
policy makers, power politics promotes certain kind of behaviour and often leads to self
fulfilling prophecies".34 Drawing out some of the implications of this situation on the
central question of the discipline - the question of war and peace - Vasquez had a chilling
statement to make on the orthodox answer - the alliance system and balance of power.
Here, he maintained, the most likely (statistical) outcome of a state centric, anarchical
theory in power politics practice is war, not peace. His findings were that:
power politics is an image of the world that that encourages behaviour that 
helps bring about war...[thus] the attempt to balance power is itself pan of 
the very behaviour that that leads to war...[Consequently] It is now clear that 
alliances do not produce peace but lead to war.35
The value of Vasquez's study, apan from its comprehensiveness, is that it comes 
from inside the dominant (positivist) political science mainstream that since World War 
Two has largely determined the boundaries of International Relations. As such it 
represents a relatively reflective brand of positivism which fits the description above of 
much so called post-positivist/post-Realist work since the 1970s.36 That is, it is capable 
of important insight and of opening up debate to the point where many of the orthodox 
"anomalies" are exposed, but then, suspicious of the implications of moving off from its 
scientific foundation, it acts to close off debate, to effectively marginalise any 
fundamental challenge to that foundation. Vasquez, accordingly, having devastated the 
positivist-Realist orthodoxy in terms derived from Kuhn, in particular, proposed that, 
"the primary problem lies not in the research methodology of the field but in the
34Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.216.
35Ibid, p.220.
3^See for example Ferguson and Mansbach, "Beyond Celebration and Despair"; Beirsteker, "Critical 
Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations"; and Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International 
Organization: The State of the Art on an Art of the State".
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incorrectness of the [Realist] hypotheses that are being tested".37 Moreover, in offering 
advice on the future direction for the discipline, he suggested, promisingly, that 
"international relations inquiry should become more interdisciplinary than it has been", 
only to orient his interdisciplinary perspective, finally, toward the "political science theory 
and research" approach of David Easton.38
The foregoing, I think, is a useful example of the kind of restricted approach that 
has led to much frustration among those within International Relations hoping for a more 
genuinely open regime of thought in the wake of Vietnam, and the other "anomalies" in 
the Western world view in the 1970s. In this case it is not just the reference to Easton 
that is significant cause for frustration as much as Vasquez's unwillingness to confront 
the questions he raised, in more penetratingly critical terms. The question raised by the 
alliance issue is a case in point. Here, having undermined the Realist approach at its core 
and shown it to be both inadequate and highly dangerous, Vasquez is drawn to the 
proposition that "since it is now known that alliances...do not bring about peace, the 
theoretically interesting question is what causes actors to seek alliances".39 Having raised 
the question, however, Vasquez effectively retreated to the positivist theoretical "hard 
core" to begin to answer it, postulating (predictably) the need for more precise (scientific) 
methodological procedures. What he did not do is what much Third Debate literature has 
urged upon the discipline in general - to seriously re-address the way the questions are 
posed before assuming a foundational framework for any answers.
In Vasquez' case, however, there is never the attempt to confront the possibility 
that "what causes actors to seek alliances" has to do with the way they identify themselves
37 Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.226.
^Ib id , p.223. The significance of this will be developed further in the chapter to follow and in Chapter 
Six when the influence of behaviouralism is discussed. Easton, of course, was a major figure in the 
"behaviouralist revolution" in (mainly) North American social theory during the 1960s in particular. His 
major work is, probably, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science 2nd ed. 
(New York: Knopf, 1971).
39Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.220.
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as (sovereign state) actors and understand their relationship to the world "out there". In 
other words what Vasquez failed to do, in his otherwise remarkable study, is question the 
connection between his own approach, set upon the scientific premises of observation 
and testing, and the positivism underpining the frame of explanatory reference for 
International Relations in general, in which the world appears as an (objectified) realm of 
anarchy characterised by the utilitarian behaviour of individuals states, either systemically 
or contingently presented. This is a connection that has been urged by those in the Third 
Debate emphasising the need for more sophisticated inquiry into metatheoretical issues.40
It is argued, consequently, that for all their surface erudition, the Traditionalist 
heirs of Morgenthau and Carr continue to present their "historical and philosophical" 
accounts of reality in terms which substitute universalised and essentialist propositions of 
(anarchical) "recurrence and repetition" for serious historical and philosophical inquiry.41 
Moreover, it is charged, in the face of major "anomalies", the pursuit of scientific 
legitimacy for International Relations goes on, as Tooze suggested, articulated within 
neo-Realism as part of a rather dubious amalgam of state centric politics and neo-classical 
economics.42 Commentators such as Mervyn Frost have, in this circumstance , appealed 
to both "classical" and "scientific" Realists to go beyond the "positivist bias" at the core of 
their analysis which so limits its insights. The problem, argued Frost, is that both Realist 
articulations:
4^Vasquez's study ended at the end of the 1970s. His findings on the continuing dominance of positivist- 
Realism were affirmed by Alker and Beirsteker in, "The Dialectics of World Order".
41 See for example the works of Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations: 
R.B.J. Walker, "The Prince and The Pauper: Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of 
International Relations" in Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, 
edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); Steve Smith ed., 
International Relations: British and American Approaches: John Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American 
School of International Relations: The Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism", Australian Outlook 41(1) 
(1987), pp.45-52; and see my "Some Thoughts on the "Givenness" of Everyday Life in Australian 
International Relations Theory and Practice", Australian Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
4^See Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.204- 
236; Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", 
Millennium 10(2) (1981), pp. 126-155, both reprinted in Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane; and 
Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface".
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seek to verify their conclusions by reference to the "facts" which are in some 
sense "hard" and there for all to see (i.e. ascertaining the facts does not 
require an interpretative effort on the part of the investigator and the facts are 
ascertainable by the investigator without his having previously adopted any 
particular theory), and the links between conclusions and evidence (or 
hypothesis and verifying data) are intersubjectively verifiable. Both stress 
that the results of their studies do not derive from subjective, relative or 
conventional judgements...[and] common to both approaches is a radical 
distinction between the status accorded to factual judgements, to which the 
discipline of international relations should aspire and that accorded to value 
judgements.43
This issue has been raised from a slightly different angle by Stephen George in
his commentary on the Traditional/"scientific" debate within Realism .44 Focusing on the
Traditionalists of the "English School", in particular, George argued that Traditionalism is
committed to the view that "the only legitimate way to study international relations is the
examination of concrete historical situations"; these studies to be carried out "according to
essentially subjective and intuitive procedures". The problem with this position, he
noted, was that it represented, for its advocates, an "anti-theoretical" perspective which
merely described the world the way it "is". This, suggested George, has led to an
"unselfconscious" body of scholarship:
committed to the empiricist belief that the task of the historian is to tell the 
story of what really happened without imposing anything of himself on the 
narrative 45
The exemplar position in this regard was Martin Wight's, whose unselfconsciousness led 
to promulgations about the "recalcitrance" of International Relations to be theorised 
about, from a historiographical perspective rooted in positivist presuppositions about the 
distinction between "theorist (subject) and the world (object) "out there". In this context 
Wight came to a series of conclusions about the "real" nature of International Relations. 
He concluded, for example, that International Relations was ultimately the realm of
43Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations, p.10.
4 4 See Stephen George, "The Reconciliation of the "Classical" and "Scientific" Approaches to 
International Relations". Millennium 3-5 (1975), pp.28-40.
4 ^Ibid, p.34. On the broader notion of an "English School", see Roy Jones, "The English School of 
International Relations: A Case for Closure", Review of International Studies 7(1) (1981), pp.57-68.
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"recurrence and repetition" rather than progressive change.46 He concluded, furthermore, 
that this historical pattem - the enduring reality of recurrence and repetition - might be 
understood by Realists in the contemporary period via the textual utterances of three 
groupings or categories of thinkers: the Machiavellians (i.e.Realists) the Grotians (i.e. 
Rationalists) and the Kantians (i.e. Revolutionaries) .47 It was in relation to this 
"essentialist monologue"48 that Wight organised his history and its "great texts". And it 
was from this (objectified) perspective that contemporary Traditionalists were directed to 
the (essentialised) textual source of the enduring wisdom about International Relations 
contained in the permanent debate between Realists, Rationalists and (Kantian) 
Revolutionaries. Evaluating the results of this approach to "history and philosophy" 
John Fitzpatrick has argued that for all its (rather embroidered) erudition it was a 
"partisan" story that sought to "universalise" the Traditional (Realist) image of the 
European state system and to identify the perspectives of International Relations per se, 
"with the perspectives of a great power elite".49 Indeed, as Wight's protege, Hedley 
Bull, admitted, Wight's exemplary Traditionalism was predicated on the assumption that
46See, by Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?", in Diplomatic Investigations edited 
by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p.33; "Western 
Values in International Relations", in Diplomatic Investigations: Power Politics (London: Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1946); and System of States edited by Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1977).
4^Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?". Whatever Wight meant to illustrate by this 
trichotomy it has become another theme in Traditionalist literature which has been represented as 
somehow different from the dichotomised format of orthodox (American) Realism per se. It is difficult to 
understand how "difference" can be seriously claimed on this issue when what Wight did was to merely 
replicate the simplistic realist/idealist structure and to place another universalised category in its centre. 
The "Grotian" category might have afforded a mellower tone to power politics Realism and to 
Traditionalist analysis of the anarchical world "out there", but it did nothing to confront the problem of 
"primitive" dichotomised thinking which the Traditionalists were critical of in relation to their "scientific" 
counterparts. See also footnote 53.
4^This is R.B J. Walker's theme in, "The Prince and the Pauper".
4^Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations", p.47. This is a theme taken up 
also by David Boucher who has maintained that Wight's general understanding of the "order" issue in 
Western philosophy represents a highly problematic and rather simplistic reading of a complex literature, 
see Boucher, "The Character of the History of the Philosophy of International Relations and the Case of 
Edmund Burke", Review of International Studies 17 (1991), pp. 127-148.
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there was a "rhythm or pattern in the history of ideas which is there, waiting to be 
uncovered".50
This did not lead Bull, or Traditionalists in general, to a critical reappraisal of a 
scholar who personified the "alternative" to (North) American Realism. It resulted 
instead in the impotent posturing of the second "great debate", and the continuation of the 
"positivist bias" across the Realist spectrum. In Bull's case it led to an influential and 
often incisive contribution to the International Relations debate that was, nevertheless, 
limited by Traditionalist unselfconsciousness on the "theory" question. Accordingly, 
while seeking more sensitive answers to central Realist problems - i.e. of order and 
anarchy - Bull's (meta)theoretical commitments saw his questions framed in such a way 
that his analytical efforts were severely undermined. While seeking, therefore, to provide 
an alternative to the explicit positivist-Realism of his counterparts in the United States, 
Bull was drawn to the conclusion that anarchy was "the central fact of international life" 
and, most importantly, that it was the "starting point of theorising" about International 
Relations.51 This notion of an anarchical realm, beyond theorising, the point at which 
theorising "starts", is a typical example of the "positivist bias" noted by Frost. It was 
noted too by Jones, who perceived in Bull's work an objectified and essentialised notion 
of history and philosophy in which "time and change [were] a troublesome 
irrelevance".52 And it was noted from another angle by Fitzpatrick who has maintained 
that Bull "remained imprisoned in the restricted categories" of Wight's Eurocentric and 
elitist model to the extent "that the only analytical categories available" to Bull were those 
centred on an enduring dichotomy between the "great powers and the rest".53
50See Bull, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations", British Journal of International 
Studies 2(2) (1976), pp. 101-116, at p . I l l ,  emphasis added.
51 See Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations" in Diplomatic Investigations, ed. Butterfield 
and Wight, p.35, emphasis added.
32See Jones, "The English School", p.10.
53Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations", p.46. On some of the other the 
silences and omissions in Bull's thinking see H. Suganami, "Reflections on the Domestic Analogy: The 
Case of Bull, Beitz and Linklater", Review of International Studies 12(2) (1986), pp.145-158. This is
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It has been against this kind of background that the new critical approaches of the 
Third Debate have appealed for a broader, more sophisticated approach to questions of 
how the dominant framework of the Realist "catechism" remains so pervasive in an era 
which has ostensibly cast off its influences. Associated with these appeals has been the 
related concern to confront the International Relations discipline with issues, themes and 
approaches which, elsewhere have enabled Anglo-American scholarship to deal in a more 
sensitive and tolerant way with the problems of knowledge and human society in the last 
quarter of the Twentieth Century, in the age of "post-Realism" and "post-positivism".54
another dimension of the issue raised earlier in relation to Traditional (Classical) scholarship (see 
footnotes 24 and 47) and it requires a further comment here. The major focus of attention in this work 
will be on the centre of the International Relations discipline, in the United States. But as indicated here 
this does not mean that the peripheral outposts of International Relations theory and practice, in Britain 
and Australia, for example, are not part of the discussion to follow. On the contrary, as Frost's quotation 
suggested and Berki's early commentary and Walker's note on the second "great debate" (footnote 24) 
indicated, they are integral to it  This is not to ignore or remain insensitive to the claim, by the British, 
in particular, that theirs is a fundamentally different perspective that cannot be included in this way. It is 
to acknowledge that there are differences, of style, tone and emphasis (e.g. international "society") and that 
British scholarship has, on occasions, offered more sensitive insights on questions generally dismissed as 
"philosophical" by those at the hard edge of the "behaviouralist revolution". My position, nevertheless, 
is consistent with that of Vasquez, Frost, Walker, Fitzpatrick and R.N. Berki in suggesting that at the 
fundamental level, there is no great difference between the British (and Anglophile) positions and the 
"scientific" approach of American Realism. My suggestion, rather, is that this notion of difference is 
another site at which the lack of serious attention to the "unwritten preface" is evident, that the British, 
for all their "philosophical and historical" tendencies have never seriously contemplated the impact upon 
their thinking of questions of essentialism, and universalism and the logocentric structure of their 
"philosophy" in general. Accordingly, for all the professed "difference" of a Wight or a Bull, there is still 
the rather crude resort to the world "out there", to what Ashley has called the Anarchy Problematique and 
to an essentialised, ahistorical notion of "recurrence and repetition". Stephen George's perspective offers a 
clue as to the unacknowledged positivism at the core of the "historical" and "philosophical" approach of 
the Traditionalists. My own work, in recent times has sought to add a dimension to this argument. See 
"Some Thoughts on the Givenness of Everyday Life in Australian International Relations Theory and 
Practice". I will try to explain this position more precisely as the work develops. Chapter Two on the 
modemism/positivism issue might help in this regard, so too the discussions of Verstehen scholarship in 
Chapter Three, and the more direct commentaries in Chapters Five and Six. It is acknowledged, 
nevertheless, that this is an issue that warrants a more comprehensive argument than it is to receive in 
this thesis with its orientation towards the "unwritten preface" at the centre of the discipline.
5^For overviews of the broad interdisciplinary debate see F. Dallmayr, Bevond Dogma and Despair; 
Towards a Critical Phenomenology of Politics (South Bend, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); 
Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner eds., Social Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); 
Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1977); Giddens, Central Problems 
in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1979); Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: 
Macmillan, 1982); Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Giddens, Social Theory and Modem Sociology (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987); Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (London: Methuen, 
1976); Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism: Science. Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983); Terrence Ball ed., Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1987); Susan Hekman, Weber, the Ideal Type and Contemporary 
Social Theory (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Hekman, Hermeneutics and the 
Sociology of Knowledge: M. Wardell and S. Turner eds., Sociological Theory in Transition (Boston:
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In particular, it is suggested, more serious analytical attention must be paid to the 
historical and philosophical circumstances which saw positivism emerge as the foremost 
articulation of the Enlightenment pursuit of a rational scientific "foundation" for modem 
human life, for an "indubitable element of human existence that can 'ground' human 
knowledge".55 Hence, in recent times, a range of critical works aimed at the way in 
which the Realist mainstream of the International Relations discipline has framed the 
questions it asks of the international arena and has legitimated its answers. Hence, the 
increasingly critical responses to the dichotomised crudity of Realist scholarship which, 
in the face of generations of counter argument and vibrant debate in other areas of the 
Humanities, continues to represent its theory and practice in universalist and essentialist 
terms - as "corresponding" to an (anarchical) and unchanging reality - detached from and 
largely irrelevant to the complexities of domestic theory and practice.56 Hence, also, the 
growing frustration at the tendency within the discipline to fail to seriously confront the 
simplicity of its approach to fundamental analytical issues concerning, for example, the 
relationship of "knower" and "known", the nature of individuality, of (rational) choice, 
of reading "history", of power and of change. Hence, the attempts in the 1980s and 
1990s to speak in a more sophisticated and insightful manner about disciplinary "givens" 
such as the sovereign state, the utilitarian nature of the state system, and the overall 
closure of an approach to theory and practice rendered static by an uncritical adherence to 
Western, post-Renaissance, historical and intellectual experience.
Simply put, then, the Third Debate in International Relations has seen a dissent 
against a discipline seemingly unwilling to confront the most basic questions of its 
approach to theory and practice, in a period in which the dangers of narrow and intolerant 
thought and behaviour are ever more evident. This dissent I have described elsewhere as
Allen and Unwin, 1986); and Ian Craib, Modem Social Theory; From Parsons to Habermas (Sussex: 
Harvester, 1984).
55See Susan Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge, p.8.
5^See in particular Richard Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in 
Intemational/Intertexnial Relations eds. Der Denan and Shapiro.
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the search by Critical Social Theorists of International Relations for some "thinking 
space" within those dominant post-Enlightenment frameworks of theory and practice by 
which we have increasingly come to understand and identify ourselves and the "real" 
nature of the modem world.57 This Critical Social Theory term will be used throughout 
this thesis to refer to that form of dissent within the Third Debate which has most 
profoundly sought to challenge the closure of the Realist orthodoxy. At this point I want 
to explain more fully what this dissent represents by further introducing Critical Social 
Theory themes as they relate to the Third Debate in International Relations and to the 
issue of the "unwritten preface". I want also to begin to make explicit some of the, as 
yet, rather vague references to my own position in this debate, and in the thesis in 
general.
Critical Social Theory
The term social theory, as it is to be utilised in this thesis, is perhaps best defined by
Anthony Giddens, who has described a "body of theory":
shared in common by all the the disciplines concerned with the behaviour of 
human beings. It concerns not only sociology...but anthropology, 
economics, politics, human geography, psychology - the whole range of the 
social sciences...[I]t connects through to literary criticism on the one hand 
and to the philosophy of natural science on the other.58
More precisely, the notion of social theory, in this context, refers to that formal 
structuring of knowledge about "the behaviour of human beings" that has become the 
disciplinary core of the Western Humanities in the last century or so. The notion of 
Critical Social Theory, in this regard, relates to the widespread and diverse literature 
which, for the past three decades, in particular, has posed fundamental challenges to the 
"givens" of social theory orthodoxy, across the disciplinary spectrum. Speaking of
57Jim George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third 
Debate", International Studies Quarterly 33(3) (1989), pp.269-279, at p.273.
^Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, pp.5-6.
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Critical Social Theory, in these terms, Richard Bernstein has nominated scholars as 
diverse as Feyerabend, Gadamer, Rorty, Habermas and Foucault, as having contributed 
significantly to a "new sensibility and universe of discourse" and an "open and extended 
dialogue" in Anglo-American scholarship.59
Acknowledging the tensions and differences between such contributions, 
Bernstein has emphasised, also, the "similarities and shared resonances" of their critical 
enterprise. All, in their different ways, he suggested, were engaged in dissent against the 
dominant images of reality in the modem world projected by the major post-Cartesian 
theoretical traditions (e.g. Liberalism/Marxism) centred on the figure of "rational man" 
and the pursuit of a rational science of human society.60 All, in this context, sought to 
challenge what they perceived as the intellectual imperialism of the "spectator theory of 
knowledge" derived from the (Cartesian) foundations of modem thought and crystalised 
in the European Enlightenment.61 All were concerned to critically re-address the dualised 
and dichotomised "givens" of a post-Enlightenment frame of metatheoretical 
understanding, expressed, most potently, in the dominant positivist discourse of 
contemporary social science.
This has resulted, generally, in a Critical Social Theory approach which combines 
a genuine humility in front of knowledge, with a critical perspective which accepts no 
unquestioned givens, which takes nothing for granted, which acknowledges nothing 
axiomatically, which questions all presuppositions, which challenges all arbitrarily 
imposed boundaries, which always asks how and why. In the face of orthodoxy and 
traditional acquiescence, it represents, as intimated earlier, the face and voice of dissent.
59Bemstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.
60The term "man" will be used here as it has been by International Relations and Western traditions of 
thought in general- i.e. in privileged terms. I use the term in this way not as an insensitive acquiescence 
to the dominant discourse but to highlight the gendered nature of the theory and practice dealt with here, 
and a major silence on the International Relations agenda in particular. On this question, more generally 
see A. Jardine, Gvnesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985); and J. Rax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism, and Postmodernism in the 
Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
61 Ibid, p .l.
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This dissent, for all the negativity associated with it in some quarters62 is infused 
with a eminently positive direction and critical purpose which, simply put, is to prise 
open some space within orthodox social theory, in order that voices otherwise 
marginalised, be heard; that questions otherwise suppressed, be asked; that points of 
analytical closure be opened for debate; that themes, issues and arguments effectively 
dismissed from the mainstream be seriously reconsidered and re-evaluated. It has been 
with this purpose in mind that Critical Social Theory scholars have sought to break 
through the limits of our understanding of the present, and go beyond the boundaries of a 
dominant knowledge form set upon the notion of a single unified reality and its associated 
methodologies. It is in relation to this critical purpose that Critical Social Theorists have 
sought to open up some space so that we might begin to think in "different" ways, to 
explore the possibilities effectively closed off by orthodox notions of the "art of the 
possible". It has, to paraphrase Foucault, been the search for thinking space that has 
given the new conversation across the social sciences its critical energy, purpose and 
direction.63 It has been a search of many paths, many directions, but, at the intersections, 
Critical Social Theory scholarship has been engaged in a shared enthusiasm for the 
insights of alternative explanations of how we got to the present and why we think the 
way we do about the contemporary world. At these intersections, consequently, there 
has been renewed interest in the dissenting voices of thinkers and themes which might 
enhance the search for "thinking space".
There has, accordingly, been a renewed interest in the later works of Wittgenstein 
and others who have emphasised the significance of language in "making"social reality. 
Interest too has increased concerning the critical interpretivism of scholars such as 
Ricoeur and Gadamer, and their dissent against the one sided psychologism associated 
with much hermeneutics scholarship. Enhanced interest has been shown in philosophy
^ S e e  G. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
63Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences trans. A.M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p.386.
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of science debates, particularly on the question of science as a (paradigmatic) sociological 
enterprise taking place between competing speech communities. In recent times too, 
themes derived from Marxist discourse have received renewed attention, particularly the 
anti-vanguardist Marxism of Gramsci, and the Critical Theory of Habermas and two 
generations of Frankfurt School thinking which, while retaining elements of its Marxist 
legacy has sought a different kind of synthesis between philosophy and empirical 
research. Most significantly for this present work, there has emerged, also, a post­
modernist dimension within Critical Social Theory literature, which has confronted the 
disciplinary orthodoxy of Anglo-American social theory and modem thought, in general, 
with the dissenting voice of Nietzsche and, more directly, the deconstructivist strategies 
and "politics of representation" theme associated with scholars such as Foucault and 
Derrida.
In its (belated) transference to International Relations, the Critical Social Theory 
challenge to the reigning (Realist) orthodoxy, has resonated with the complexity, 
diversity and tensions associated with the larger interdisciplinary debates. Accordingly, 
when referring to the Critical Social Theory scholarship in International Relations, I have 
in mind the contributions of a whole range of scholars, including Richard Ashley, Rob 
Walker, Robert Cox, Mervyn Frost, James Der Derian, Michael Dillon, Michael Shapiro, 
David Campbell and Bradley Klein, all, in their different ways, seeking to open "thinking 
space" in a previously alien and closed discursive territory. For all their differences, 
however, they and their critical enterprises are connected by their "celebratory" attitude 
within the Third Debate in International Relations. This is an attitude which will be 
endorsed in a variety of ways throughout this thesis.
Celebrating the Third Debate: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations
Emphasising the parallels between the new Critical Social Theory challenges in 
International Relations, and the "intellectual ferment that the other social sciences are
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presently undergoing", Josef Lapid noted th a t, for the first time in any serious manner, 
the issues at stake included:
some of the most highly prized premises of Western academic discourse 
concerning the nature of our social knowledge, its acquisition, and its utility - 
including shibboleths such as "truth", "rationality", "objectivity", "reality" 
and "consensus".64
In particular, Lapid highlighted the significance of critical debates in International 
Relations, aimed a t :
the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative behavioural science [which] 
recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to reexamine 
the ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations of their scientific 
endeavours.65
In these circumstances, he argued, a new agenda was emerging in International 
Relations which replicated that of the interdisciplinary debate to the extent that the 
literature of the Third Debate now resonated with the four major analytical responses 
noted by Anthony Giddens in the broader social theory context.66 The first of these 
responses comprised the pall of "despair" which Giddens perceived descending over 
much mainstream scholarship in recent years. Among the "despairing", he suggested, 
were those increasingly anxious about the interest in metatheoretical inquiry among 
Anglo-American scholars. Accordingly, the "despairing" response has been characterised 
by appeals for the retention of orthodox attitudes and social scientific research methods. 
The second response, deemed "dogmatic" by Giddens, has seen attempts to counter the 
increased uncertainty of the times with a more strident reassertion of the enduring 
wisdom of disciplinary "great texts" and/or the great traditions of Western thought. If the 
first two responses have been largely negative in tone and implication, the third, 
invariably the most controversial, has been positive, indeed enthusiastically so, in 
"celebrating" the lack of intellectual security and foundational certainty across the
^ L ap id , "The Third Debate", p.236.
Ibid.
^ Ib id .
48
disciplines, as an opportunity to open up space for greater diversity, understanding, 
tolerance and "difference".67 The final response, which represents Giddens' own 
position (and that of Lapid) offers qualified support for this "celebratory" position, but 
mistrusting its (perceived) nihilistic tendency, has sought a more systematic 
"reconstruction" of disciplinary thinking and attitudes in the future.
All four responses are evident in the literature of the Third Debate, as Lapid 
suggested. Those, for example, who have "despaired" have done so, largely, in terms 
which echo the concerns of their counterparts in the interdisciplinary debates. There 
have, consequently, been widespread lamentations at the loss of cohesion and theoretical 
direction in International Relations, as "established patterns" become hazy or disappear 
beneath "trenchant criticism".68 There has been obvious frustration at the demise of 
"guiding principles"69 and, even in the most elastic of analytical spaces, there has been 
exasperation at the lack of clear direction in formulating new "paradigmatic" questions 
and answers.70 Some, meanwhile, have pronounced a state of absolute theoretical 
"chaos".71 Typically, the "despairing" responses has concentrated on the problems of the 
overly "theoretical" and/or "philosophical" nature of the new critical literature. Calling, 
therefore, for "concrete" research practices rather than abstract "theorising" have been 
prominent figures in the North American International Relations community, such as
6^See Lapid, "Quo Vadis International Relations?", p.84.
6^For example James Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), 
p. 13.
^9See G.M. Lyons, "The Study of International Relations in Great Britain”, World Politics 38(4) (1986), 
pp.626-645.
7^On the frustrations associated with this issue see the introduction to E. Morse, Modernisation and the 
Transformation of International Relations (New York: The Free Press, 1976); Mansbach and Ferguson, 
"Values and Paradigms Change: The Elusive Quest for International Relations Theory", in Persistent 
Patterns and Emerging Structures in a Waning Century edited by M. Kams (New York: Praeger Books, 
1986); Maghoori and Ramberg eds., Globalism Vers as Realism: Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the 
Inter-Paradigm Debate" Millennium 16 (1987), pp.231-249; Banks, “The Evolution of International 
Relations Theory”; and Holsti, The Dividing Discipline. Chapter 5.
71 For a despairing perspective see P. M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: and 
on the "chaos" of the contemporary period see Banks, "Where Are We Now?"
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Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, Thomas Beirsteker and James Rosenau, all, to one 
degree or another, and with different degrees of empathy, urging the retention of social 
science traditions in the face of philosophical abstractionism.72
The "dogmatic" (second) response has been articulated in International Relations 
somewhat differently than in the broader context, where the retreat to the great texts of a 
Mill, a Weber or a Marx is something of a disciplinary tradition in itself. In International 
Relations, however, the "dogmatism" has taken the form of a renewed search for security 
and certainty in, for example, Kenneth Waltz's retreat to the universalist axioms of 
structuralist Realism ,73 Robert Gilpin's attempts to relocate the central questions of war 
and peace in rational choice terms,74 and the decade long concern of neo-Realist scholars, 
in general, to re-establish the intellectual and institutional superiority of the (American) 
"hegemon".75 Here, nevertheless, the resort to the "great texts" of a Thucydides and a 
Machiavelli has increasingly marked the "dogmatic" attempt to accord contemporary 
credibility to a Realism in crisis.76 The "restructuring" response has been evident enough 
too, in, for example, the "synthetic" Critical Theory approach of Andrew Linklater and 
Mark Hoffman, and in the sophisticated positivism of Lapid, Vasquez and Ferguson and 
Mansbach .77 In Chapters Eight and Nine, in particular, more attention will be paid to 
responses such as these. For the moment, however, I want to concentrate on the
72See Beirsteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism"; Keohane, "International Institutions: Two 
Approaches", International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), pp.379-396; Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: 
Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit Driven Actors in World Politics", International Organization 40(4) 
(1986), p.553; and Ferguson and Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair".
73Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
74See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, and The Political Economy of International 
Relations.
75See for example, the discussions in Keohane, After Hegemony.
7^See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.66; and Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural 
Realism and Beyond", in Neorealism and Its Critics ed. Keohane, pp.507-508.
77Lapid, "Quo Vadis International Relations?"; Linklater, "Realism, Marxism and Critical International 
Relations Theory"; Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate"; Hoffman, 
"Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.91-95; Ferguson 
and Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair"; and Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics.
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"celebratory" scholarship of Critical Social Theory scholars in the Third Debate and the 
particular significance it has for the arguments to follow in this thesis
Its most immediate significance is that Critical Social Theorists, invoking 
"celebratory" attitudes and approaches, have provided some of the most stimulating 
contributions to the "new universe of discourse" in International Relations that Bernstein 
proclaimed integral to Western social theory, in general, in the past three decades.78 Even 
more significantly, perhaps, Critical Social Theory scholarship has taken International 
Relations into new intellectual territory, not in order to score cheap philosophical points 
over a Realism hardly able to defend itself, but so that dominant and dangerous discourse 
- intrinsic to international practice - be increasingly and more effectively challenged. The 
"celebratory" response is, in this sense, concerned to expose a regime of "theoretical" 
closure intrinsic to the everyday "practice" of power politics, as articulated from the Gulf, 
to the flattened Barrios of Panama City, from Tiananmen to Timor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, at a time of both great dangers and great 
opportunities in global politics, there has emerged in the "celebratory" works of the Third 
Debate a more profound concern than ever before in International Relations, to question 
the procedures by which the Realist orthodoxy (in particular) frames, not only its (power 
politics) answers, but its questions. It has, in this regard, taken seriously the challenge 
thrown out to the broader social theory community by Jane Flax in 1981, when she 
exhorted them to:
elucidate and examine the most prominent paradigm of reality, its 
characteristic institutions, the social and political forces which stimulate and 
support its modes of rationality, and to explore alternatives to the givenness 
of everyday life.19
The challenge posed by the "celebratory" literature has been summed up best (and 
ironically) perhaps by a Traditional-Realist, such as Kal Holsti, who, lamenting the
^B ernstein , Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.
^9jane Flax, ’’Why Epistemology Matters: A Reply to Kress”, Journal of Politics 43 (1981), pp.1006- 
1024, at p.1021, emphasis added.
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increasing "disarray" within a once coherent International Relations community, 
acknowledged that Realism and the (modem, Western) tradition from which it is derived, 
is now facing the kind of interrogative pressure previously unknown in the discipline. 
As Holsti has put it:
In the past decade, the three-centuries-long intellectual consensus which 
organised philosophical speculation, guided empirical research, and provided 
at least hypothetical answers to the critical questions about international 
politics has broken down.80
At the epicentre of the "broken down" discipline, maintained Holsti, was a multifaceted 
challenge to the "assumptions and world views upon which [Realism] is based". 
Consequently, in the turbulent times of the 1980s and 1990s, the critical voices raised 
against the Realist orthodoxy have:
raised new kinds of questions about international politics, questions which 
were not relevant to the kinds of problems contemplated by our intellectual 
ancestors and most of those working within the realist, or classical 
tradition.81
Whilst accepting the general thrust of Holsti's observation here - that the 
challenge to the "assumptions and world views" of Realism is causing tremors of 
uncertainty in International Relations - this thesis will take issue with the attendant 
proposition, that the questions raised by critical voices now, were "not relevant" in the 
period of unequivocal Realist dominance, from the end of World War Two until around 
the early 1970s. To suggest, moreover, as Holsti does, that the "behavioural revolution 
has had little to do with the present debates", is merely to underline the urgency of the 
need for a "preface" in International Relations, if only to put an end to the "sense of well 
being [and] satisfaction" which Holsti noted as characteristic of the Realist golden age.82
This thesis argues that it was this very sense of "well being and satisfaction" on 
the part of International Relations scholars, during periods of heightened intellectual
^Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, p.l. 
81 Ibid.
82Ibid, p.2
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activity such as that brought on by the behavioural revolution, that has increased the 
sense of disarray among Realists, in particular, in the 1990s. It further argues, in this 
regard, that when faced with the opportunity, in the 1960s, to think seriously about the 
questions raised by the behaviouralists in their dispute with the Traditionalists, the 
discipline settled instead for the shallow, the superficial, the easy polemic. Moreover, 
and most importantly, if Holsti is correct about the scope of the Third Debate - that it 
represents a challenge to a "three centuries long intellectual consensus which organised 
philosophical speculation [and] guided empirical research" in Western thought - then 
what is required is a broader engagement with modem Western thought than has yet been 
attempted by International Relations scholarship.83
In seeking to write a "preface" for International Relations, this thesis seeks to 
make a contribution of this kind, by opening up for debate a whole range of themes, 
issues and questions that might assist the contemporary attempt to come to grips with a 
challenge of the magnitude described by Holsti. It does so in following the lead of much 
Critical Social Theory literature of the "celebratory" mode, which has been concerned to 
confront the dominant images of contemporary human society by locating them as part of 
much broader framework of understanding derived, in particular, from the rational 
scientific postulates of European modernity.
For all its diversity, consequently, the Critical Social Theory literature evokes a 
shared sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with a Realist led discipline which, in the
^3One point is worth explicit comment here on the "new genre" of scholarship in International Relations. 
It is that at one level at least it is not "new" at all. It represents instead the attempt to confront the 
International Relations discipline with issues, themes and questions that elsewhere have been part of the 
analytical agenda for a considerable time. Nor is its critical concern with modernity and the problems of 
the dominant Western traditions "new" in the broader context. It has been a theme at the heart of both 
critical (e.g.. Frankfurt School) and Conservative (e.g. Leo Strauss, Arendt and Oakeshott) scholarship for 
many years. Its significance now, to reiterate, is that for the first time in any serious way these broader 
concerns are being directed to the International Relations discipline which for so long, to its detriment, 
has remained effectively isolated from the "great debates" of social theory; see my "Some Thoughts on the 
Givenness of Everyday Life". It should be noted also, that rarely, in these critical works, is it suggested 
that we simply jettison images that, since the Enlightenment, have provided the dominant (meta) 
theoretical framework by which we have understood ourselves and the modem world. The purpose, more 
specifically, is to confront the disciplinary mainstream with the limitations of its perspectives in order 
that International Relations scholars and practitioners, be more capable of dealing with a world in which, 
more than ever, reductionist grand theories, centred on crude dichotomies, are both inappropriate and 
dangerous.
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wake of the defeat of the Western superpower in Vietnam, a fundamental restructuring of 
the world economy, the continuing misery and volatility of Third World societies and the 
dangers and opportunities of the post-Gorbachev era, continues, generally, to approach 
the global arena in terms of a caricatured and limited agenda of understanding.
At one level, of course, the source of this caricature is simply enough located, in 
the crude dichotomies of the power politics Realism, dominant since the end of World 
War Two. At this level it is worth concentrating, for a moment, on what, in retrospect, is 
one of the most potent utterances in Realist textual history which has since become a site 
of philosophical ritual for a generation of International Relations scholars and policy 
analysts. Represented by E.H.Carr as a criterion by which a Realist attitude and 
approach could be distinguished from "unreal" perspectives, it suggested that, in regard 
to International Relations "the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which 
it is powerless to influence or alter”.*4 The point here is not that the commitment to a 
whole series of dichotomies (subject/object, fact/value, theory/practice) inherent in this 
statement is, by itself, or in isolation, the crux of Realist inadequacy or even the crudest 
articulation of its caricatured nature. The point, rather, as will be argued in more detail 
later, is that in the half century since The Twenty Years Crisis the positivist logic that, in 
that work, allowed for the separation of an (external) "sequence of events" from 
"thinking", has remained effectively unchallenged in the discipline Carr’s words did so 
much to define. Indeed, in the ensuing years positivist approaches have received 
enhanced intellectual and institutional sustenance in some of the most influential of Realist 
texts, both explicitly and in implicit and unacknowledged form.
This is not just a matter of Morgenthau orienting a whole generation of scholars 
towards the "objective laws" of politics at the international level.85 Nor is it simply about 
that moment of major irony in the first "great debate", when Carr attacked the inadequacy
^Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, p. 10, emphasis added 
^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp.4-5.
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of inter-war idealism on the basis that it was a narrow, ethnocentric approach, drawn 
uncritically from Western Enlightenment sources.86 It concerns too the nominally 
unrelated proposition of Knorr and Rosenau in 1969 that, in the dispute between Realists 
of the second "great debate", one point "command[ed] universal agreement, namely that it 
is useful and appropriate to dichotomize the various approaches to international 
phenom ena".87 It is integral also to Michael Sullivan's conclusion that one of the 
problems with the critiques of Realism, in the 1970s, was that perhaps "their picture of 
the world...[was] at variance with the real world",88 and to James Rosenau's continuing 
insistence, in the mid 1980s, on "the basic tenets of empirical science which require that 
variables be specified and the analyst be ever mindful of the eventual need to observe and 
measure".89 And it concerns Kal Holsti's Traditionalist commentary, on the same period, 
which suggested that a new paradigm would not be unwelcome in the discipline if it 
passed the test which both scientific and Traditionalist-Realist scholarship had instigated. 
The test of acceptance, Holsti explained, required that any new approach was 
characterised by "logical consistency, the capacity to generate research, and reasonable 
correspondence with the observed facts of international politics".90
The issue of caricature then, at this level, has to do with the question of 
positivism's multi-layered and continuing impact upon the International Relations 
discipline. More pertinently, perhaps, it concerns the question of how and why 
International Relations scholarship has remained committed to caricatured approaches to 
theory and practice that, across the Anglo-American disciplinary spectrum, have been 
subject to intense critique in the past three decades or more. The answer, from the Realist
86carr, Twenty Years Crisis. Chapters 3 and 4 in particular.
8* 7 8Knorr and Rosenau, Contending Approaches To International Relations, pp.13-14.
88m . Sullivan, "Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contemporary International Politics", p.108.
89This is Rosenau's view in, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit Driven Actors in 
World Politics", p.553.
^ K a l Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, p.vii.
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mainstream, is a predictable and well rehearsed one, of course, emanating as it does from 
the wisdom of previous "great debates". It is, simply put, that the discipline retains its 
distance from the broader debates because the theory and practice of International 
Relations is, by definition, fundamentally different from that in the "domestic" realm; the 
difference being the anarchical nature of international reality, which imposes the restricted 
premises of a power politics "art of the possible" upon the analyst and the policy maker. 
International Relations is in this way defined by the international/ domestic dichotomy 
and, in a self affirming (logical) feedback loop, the theoretical boundaries of the debate 
are set in precisely the terms established by Carr, in which thinking subjects are faced by 
an (objectified) world of endemic anarchy "out there" which "they are "powerless to 
influence or alter".
In the Third Debate of the 1980s and 1990s, however, this is a no longer an
irresistible logic even in a discipline so attuned to "disavow reflection" on the way it
(metatheoretically) frames its questions and constructs its answers. Consequently, the
concern to go beyond caricature, has seen critical scholars extend the International
Relations agenda into some previously alien intellectual territory. This has seen an
acknowledgement of the Third Debate as an intrinsic pan of a "major reorientation in
philosophy [that] has been occurring this century",91 centred on the attempt to:
make a decisive break from the comfortable, deeply ingrained and indeed 
addictive Western habit of making a rigid separation between subject and 
object, between the knower and the known.92
This, it is argued, is an issue of particular significance in International Relations, where 
the "addiction" has provided the "founding myth" of the discipline (e.g. the dichotomy of 
Realism and Idealism)93 and one of its points of greatest closure which, in the two earlier 
"great debates" effectively demarcated the boundaries of inquiry:
9 1 Walker, Political Theory and the Transformation of World Pobucs. p.4.
92 Ibid.
93Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory", International Studies Quarterly 31 
(1987), pp.65-86, at p.69.
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the point beyond which metatheoretical dispute need be pursued no further...
[at which] metatheoretical dispute have been, if not resolved, at least codified 
and left in peace.94
It is, therefore, in seeking to pursue this particular metatheoretical dispute a good deal 
further, that Critical Social Theorists have "celebrated" the extension and relocation of the 
International Relations agenda in the Third Debate to the larger frame of critical reference 
associated with the pursuit of a modem (rational-scientific) philosophy of human society, 
in the post-Enlightenment period. And this too is the general thematic context in which 
this thesis seeks to write a "preface" for International Relations, and explain, in as 
comprehensive terms as possible, what the Critical Social Theory challenge to 
International Relations is all about.
However, while I am in (some sense) privileging the "celebratory" perspective 
here, I will not do so uncritically. This would violate both the spirit and the integrity of 
the works in question and of my own ambition for the thesis. Consequently, while this 
work seeks to open up questions effectively closed off by more mainstream approaches, 
and while, in Chapters Eight and Nine, in particular, it will illustrate that there are 
alternative perspectives worthy of serious consideration, it ultimately has no easy 
answers to offer, no instant panaceas for an ailing discipline, no ready-made all-purpose 
"alternative" Realism to supersede the outdated model. Instead, my position on the 
question of alternatives is, perhaps, best explained by reference to the perspective 
introduced in Berki's work at the commencement of this chapter, and then to the 
influences of post-modernism upon this work.
The significance of Berki's scholarship, in this regard, is that while it was 
designed to expose the inadequacies of a positivist-Realist approach to knowledge and 
society, the alternative was not a simple Hegelian variant with similar totalising 
characteristics. Rather, for Berki, the important issue was not the advocacy of some 
simple dialectical counterpart to Realism, but the space opened by the careful application
94Ibid, pp.69-70.
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of (non-teleological) dialectical themes to a major site of positivist closure. In this regard 
any adequate approach to political reality was one which remained "conscious of its own 
limitations" and which did not "strive after a deceptive kind of coherence by obliterating 
differences and forgetting limitations".95
This is a theme integral to post-modernist approaches within Critical Social 
Theory, otherwise opposed to any semblance of dialectical logic. In bringing to 
contemporary debates critical perspective honed in discourse analysis, genealogy, 
deconstructionism, and textuality, post-modernism has added a potent and profound 
dimension to the exposure of "primitive" theory and practice in International Relations, 
which eschews the traditional search for ultimate coherence, irreducible answers, and 
ready made alternatives. It seeks rather to problematise and open to critical inquiry the 
processes - historical, cultural and linguistic - which accord notions of coherence and 
irreducibility their "meaning", and which situates the search for "alternatives" as the 
raison d’etre of critical inquiry. More explanation is obviously required on a complex 
perspective such as this, and it will be forthcoming, in Chapter Four, where my 
reservations about some aspects of post-modernism will be aired, and in Chapter Nine, 
where different dimensions of the post-modernist contribution to Critical Social Theory in 
International Relations will receive attention. For now a brief introductory commentary is 
necessary concerning what is still for the International Relations community a rather alien 
approach to theory and practice.96
The Post-Modernist Celebration of "Thinking Space" in International Relations
As indicated above the question of reality and realism, in post-modernist literature, is 
confronted in terms similar to the (broadly) Hegelian approach of Berki, and other Critical
95Berki, On Political Realism, p.10.
^ S e e  Joseph Lapid's comments in "Quo Vadis International Relations?"
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Social Theory approaches, including Habermas' Critical Theory. But, more 
unequivocally than all of these perspectives, post-modernists stress that reality is in a 
perpetual state of flux, of movement, change and instability. This is not the common 
understanding of the nature of reality of course. Social theory, in general, and 
International Relations in particular, have, as noted earlier, understood reality in 
essentialist, unitary and universalist terms. From a post-modernist perspective this is not 
surprising, because, it is maintained, the notion of a singular, stable, knowable reality has 
been an integral part of a dominant post-Enlightenment story, in which the ascent of 
Western "rational man" is located as integral to the gradual historico-philosophic 
unfolding of the world's "real" nature.97
Like all other claims to "know" the world and its (singular, essential) reality this is 
regarded as a narrative fiction, a story of certainty and identity derived from a dominant 
discursive practice which reduces the flux of existence to a strategic framework of unity 
and coherence. A discourse, in this context, is not synonymous with "language" as such, 
it refers, rather, to a broader matrix of social practices which gives "meaning" to the way 
that people understand themselves and their behaviour. A discourse, in this sense, 
generates the categories of "meaning" by which reality can be understood and explained. 
Or, more precisely, a discourse makes "real" that which it prescribes as "meaningful". In 
so doing a discourse of Realism, for example, establishes the socio-linguistic conditions 
under which "realistic" theory and practice can take place, and establishes simultaneously 
that "theory" and that "practice" which, by discursive definition, does not correspond 
with "reality". Understood this way:
To be engaged in a discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of 
meaningful conditions of existence. A discourse, then, is not a way of 
learning "about" something out there in the "real world"; it is rather, a way of
97See for example Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith 
(London: Tavistock, 1972); Foucault, The Order of Things: Foucault, Power/Knowledge trans. C. Gordon 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in The Foucault Reader edited 
by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); Jaques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) Derrida, Of Grammatologv trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1980); and Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and 
therefore, meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing.98
This discursive representation of reality in the world (and the "real" nature of 
subjects and objects in it) is for post-modernism an integral part of the relations of power 
which constitute all human societies. Accordingly, the process of discursive 
representation is never a neutral, detached one, but always imbued with the power and 
authority of the "namers" and "makers" of "reality" - it is always knowledge as power. A 
major concern for post-modernist scholars, consequently, is to interrogate the conditions 
of knowledge as power, to explain, how discursive power is constituted, how its 
premises and "givens" are replicated at all levels of society, and to reveal its limited, 
exclusionary practices, in order to open space for critical thought and action.
This, simply put, is what Derrida sought to do in locating the dominant modemist 
discourse in the post-Enlightenment search for an essential, universal "rationality"; for a 
"centred structure...a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude".99 Derrida 
focused his critical attention on the process by which this "certitude" was achieved. This 
he described as the logocentric process, a process of textual/social representation, 
derived, initially, from Classical Greek scholarship, which creates identity, unity and 
universalised "real" meaning by excluding from the "meaningful" that which does not 
correspond to the logo (original, singular, authentic) conception of the "real".100 In this 
way, at the core of Western history and philosophy, is a textual "past" framed in terms of 
a whole series of dichotomies which demarcate that which is "real" and that which, by its
98This is Bradley Klein's insight in, Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives Occasional Paper No. 3 
(New York: Centre on Violence and Human Survival, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1987), p.4.
99See Derrida, Writing and Difference, p.279.
^ S e e ,  in particular, Derrida, Of Grammatologv. More explicitly, the proposition here is that to 
understand modernity and dominant ways of representing the real nature of the modem world is to 
understand history as a text analogue. This is to say history needs to be understood as having been made 
via the dominant "readings" of it. The same understanding applies to the human agents of history who, 
in "making" history, do so in re-presenting its dominant textual utterances on the self and the world of 
selves. To understand the modem Western text therefore is to appreciate the dominance of a particular 
way of re-presenting the self (e.g. the rational individual) and the world (the progressively rationalised 
object of scientific knowledge). More explicitly it concerns a particular set of interpretive attitudes and 
practical dispositions (i.e. discursive practices) which enable this particular reading of the modem text to 
be represented as modernity itself - as corresponding to everyday reality "out there".
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definitional relationship with prescribed "reality", cannot be. This story, aggregated and 
institutionalised via its articulations across the contemporary social theory disciplines is 
the modernist, "meta-narrative” - the discourse of self/other, identity/ difference, of 
realism/idealism, of illusory certitude, of (for example) Realist knowledge as power, of 
an essentialised, universalised image of Reality as International Relations. 101
It was in relation to this notion of a textually constructed "meta-narrative" of the
present, that Foucault sought to de-construct the "past" in genealogical terms. The
genealogical approach, derived prim arily from N ietzsche , 102 was Foucault's
archaeological tool in his attempts to expose the discursive processes by which
contemporary subjects and objects have been constituted in terms of a dominant
"knowledge" and a singular, unified, "meaning". As Foucault put it in Pow er/
Knowledge, genealogies, are the stories of:
local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims 
of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise, and order...in the 
name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a 
science and its objects.103
Nothing in this genealogical approach to history is "given", natural, inevitable or 
unchangeable. Rather, the objects and subjects of history are discursively constructed via 
logocentric processes of framing real "meaning". This is, by definition, an approach to 
history suspicious of any kind of determinism, of universalised patterns of thought and 
behaviour, of developmental formats (e.g. stages of growth) or any grand theorised
101 This, it should be noted, does not suggest that a logocentric discursive regime disallows critical 
challenges to its dominance. These challenges are an ever present part of the struggle within which it 
exists. Its power, however, is that having established the existing historical and philosophical boundaries 
within which challenges take place, it continues to impose the boundaries - the framework - of those 
challenges. In so doing its power is articulated through its capacity to exclude, to trivialise, to 
marginalise - to oppose that which is real with that (for example) which is merely "utopian", "idealist" 
and "irrational. But this language of exclusion is no more linguistic, in the narrow sense, than is the 
notion of discourse; integral to both is the power that is dominant modem knowledge.
102pOr a discussion of genealogy in Nietzschean terms see William Connolly, Political Theory and 
Modernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), Chapter Five; see also the opening pages of Richard Ashley's 
"The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Relations", 
Alternatives XII (1987), pp.403-434.
103 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p.83.
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pronouncements of "essential" behaviour. It rejects, in this regard, conservative (e.g. 
Realist) postulations about "recurrence and repetition" as firmly as it rejects invocations of 
an (already existing) emancipatory spirit or revolutionary consciousness. It acknowledges 
no single, essential history, but the struggle of "histories", the struggle between 
discursive practices.
In terms of Western modernity, "history" is thus understood as the logocentrised 
privileging of a particular discursive constitution of subjects and objects (i.e. rational 
"man" confronted by a single "knowable" reality) and the marginalisation and\or 
exclusion of those "histories" (and their subjects/objects) which do not fit within the 
identifiable boundaries of the modemist "meta-narrative". The primary suggestion is that 
at the heart of modernism is a philosophical illusion, derived from the Greeks, which is 
centred on the notion that there is an ultimate foundation for our knowledge, beyond the 
social construction of that knowledge. The illusion, in other words, is that beyond mere 
social "appearance" there is a foundational "reality", a realm of purer understanding that, 
once discovered, can help us unlock the essential nature of the relationship between the 
subjects and the objects of the world.
Consequently, post-modernists have argued, since the European Enlightenment, 
in particular, modernist history and philosophy has become a "hermeneutics of 
suspicion", a search for the hidden, underlying, essential meaning of life. 104 More 
specifically, the overwhelming purpose of modemist thinking has become the "search for 
an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge" .105 And while belief 
in Archimedean points or external Gods, or the pursuit of ultimate foundations for reality 
might not, of itself, be a particularly dangerous phenomenon, post-modem scholars 
(following Nietzsche's lead) have pointed to some of the dangerous dimensions 
emanating from such beliefs and purpose. The problems associated with foundationalism
104This is a term associated initially with the critical hermeneutics scholarship of figures such as Paul 
Ricoeur. See "Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture", in P. Rabinow and W. 
Sullivan eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
^ 5See Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.16.
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have been powerfully articulated by Foucault who has warned of the associated tendency 
towards a totalising view of history:
whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a 
totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective 
recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of 
the past; a history whose perspective an all that precedes it implies the end of 
time, a completed development. 106
The point here, of course, and it is one that is at the heart of much of the Critical 
Social Theory of the contemporary period, is that the modemist search for foundation, 
indeed the very assumption of a single foundation for reality in the world, implies 
closure, intolerance and the attempted suppression of "difference". The argument, in 
general, is that in the post-Enlightenment era, in particular, as the search for "real" 
meaning has accelerated, modernist theory and practice has become more and more 
intolerant of "difference", of Otherness, of that which cannot be "rationally" controlled. 
Moreover, as modernist discursive influences have shaped the Western social theory 
disciplines, historico-philosophical "traditions" have become systematically identified and 
defended in terms of their foundationalist knowledge. This has given rise to a modem 
"ideological" spectrum, of sorts, as "knowing" and "meaning" have been carved into 
discrete, hermetically sealed, fiercely boundarised "Weltanshauungs" and disciplined 
rituals of re-presentation. Acknowledging the insights and differences of these traditions 
post-modernists have, nevertheless, placed critical emphasis also on the discursive 
connections between them, stressing that via their foundationalism, their associated 
epistemologies of real meaning and their totalising histories, they are integral elements of 
a larger modernist "meta-narrative.107
In its disciplinary articulation, therefore, the dominant Western historico- 
philosophical discourse has continued to "make" reality in terms of a hierarchised process
lO^See Michel Foucault, Language. Counter-Memory. Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, edited by 
D. Bouchard, trans. Bouchard and S. Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 152.
!0 7For example the intersecting nature of the Liberal "Whig" story of the march of progress, set upon 
universalised images of utilitarian rationality, the complex dialectical unfolding of Hegelian 
consciousness and the Marxian "stages" of growth, as the class "in itself' becomes the class "for itse lf.
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of "knowing" and "meaning" and a rigid process of closure and exclusion. Accordingly, 
one modem tradition after another has legitimated its own foundationalist position by 
reducing nearly three millenia of discursive struggle to a series of simple oppositions in 
which (our) "facts" are distinguished from (their) mere "values", (our) "rationality" from 
(their) "irrationality", (our) identity from (their) "difference", (our) "reality" from (their) 
"idealism/utopianism".
In its transference to International Relations this post-modernist perspective is 
evident in a subtle but important analytical refocusing - away from traditional concerns 
with individualised subjects and objects and the (epistemological) question of how we 
come to (rationally) "know" the world, and toward explanation based in social and 
historical processes and the on-going struggles between discursive strategies. Once 
focused in this manner debates over central issues in contemporary global life become 
inexorably bound up with questions of language and interpretation; the knowledge/power 
nexus; the construction of modem "man"; and the question of how to effectively resist the 
impositions of power articulated via the privileged logocentric discourses of modem 
scientific-rationality.
Critical attention has been particularly focused on the way that the post-1945 
discipline of International Relations has framed its traditional understanding of reality - 
centred on the great Realist dichotomies of order/anarchy, domestic/intemational and 
realism/idealism, those discursive meanings that accord it its power politics legitimacy. 
But post-modernist attention has, in an International Relations context, been focused 
beyond the relatively ordered arenas of "theoretical" conflict, per se. Stressing the 
knowledge/power nexus it has emphasised the implications of a modernist strategy of 
exclusion and foundationalist certainty for those who do not fit within its boundaries of 
identity, order and reality.108
108Not only post-modernists have oriented their thinking in this manner, Critical Theorists too have 
warned in their different ways that "the dream of knowing man scientifically... [reinforces] the techniques 
of surveillance and manipulation developed by power to 'normalize' and discipline men", see Martin Jay, 
Marxism and Totality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.526.
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Put simply, the concern here is that the discursive language and logic which 
defmes and excludes the "subversive" and the "terrorist" is also the power that legitimates 
their destruction on behalf of the sovereign state, the central government, the vanguard of 
the party. In more general terms this is a concern with a modernist knowledge form 
which, in its quest to "master" the natural and social worlds, has transformed the lives of 
peoples and cultures in every comer of the planet. The modernist authority vested in 
"rational man", for example, has been used to liberate, to empower, to revolutionise. But 
at a cost. For in spreading the word of the (post-Cartesian) "death of God" (and mythical 
thinking) and in proclaiming its new secular rational-scientific substitute, Western theory 
and practice has, often brutally, invoked its strategies of control, its discipline, its unified 
frame of reference about the good life, its singular "reality", its insistence on sovereignty, 
its bulwarks against nihilism. It is in this quest - to impose a singular, foundational 
"reality" upon miscreants and unbelievers - that the post-Enlightenment "will to 
knowledge" has quite literally become the "will to power".
It is in confronting this quest that Critical Social Theorists in general, and post­
modernists in particular have confronted the knowledge that is power in International 
Relations. It is in relation to this quest that post-modernists such as R.B.J. Walker have, 
in recent years, sought sensitive alternatives to it. A brief comment on Walker's efforts 
in this regard might help summarise the discussion to this point and help ventilate some 
of the themes that are to follow. Walker's One World. Many Worlds (1988) was 
concerned with the plight and the potentials of critical social movements around the world 
seeking, often in circumstances of great danger, to reclaim the power to make decisions 
about their lives. Their struggles, Walker suggested, have become significant for a 
number of reasons, not the least being that peoples engaged in them have recognised that:
it has become necessary to refuse received conceptual boundaries, to search 
for new forms of understanding, and to develop a clearer sense of the 
complex relationships between theory and practice, knowing and being.109
109R.B J. Walker, One World/Manv Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 
1988), p.7.
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Walker acknowledged as positive the localised and heterogeneous nature of these
attempts to find "thinking space", perceiving in them the possibility of an alternative
political future in which people might find ways of reclaiming their lives from the grand
theorised "traditions" that have shaped both the conservative and radical "art of the
possible" in modernity. It was in this context that Walker responded to the promptings of
those whose perspectives also prompted this attempt to write a "preface" for International
Relations; those who demand that problems be "solved", rather than merely
"philosophised" about. Walker responded by suggesting that:
[any solution] must grow out of the ongoing practices of people everywhere, 
not be molded by those who claim to have a god's-eye view of what's going 
on. It is sometimes important to resist the inevitable demand for hard-nosed, 
concrete solutions to particular problems.110
Developing the point further, he had this to say:
Under the present circumstances the question "What is to be done?" invites a 
degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant 
political forces of our time. It is an arrogance inconsistent with the kind of 
empirical evidence we have before us. This evidence requires a willingness 
to face up to the uncertainties of the age, not with the demand for instant 
solutions, but with a more modest openness to the potentials inherent in what 
is already going on. The most pressing questions of the age call not only for 
concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions but 
also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking o f the ways in which it is 
possible for human beings to live together.111
It is in this spirit and with these broad principles in mind that this thesis seeks to 
write a "preface" for International Relations, by explaining the nature and significance of 
the search for "thinking space" in Critical Social Theory and by paying particular attention 
to post-modernist themes and premises along the way.112
110Ibid.
11 ilbid, emphasis added.
112In doing so it is worth reiterating that to "celebrate" the space for more sophisticated theory does not 
in any way denigrate empirical research and/or "problem solving" analysis. The proposition, rather, is 
that such work, for all its objectivist insistence, can never be detached from theory.
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It seeks in this way to reconnect International Relations to the broader flow of 
contemporary "theoretical" inquiry, for all the "practical" reasons outlined above. In so 
doing it will bring to the forefront of contemporary debate on International Relations a 
number of critical and often unconventional themes, not as if in some realm of unified 
reality an essential/foundational Archimedean point of reality exists, in which ultimate 
answers can be found to the great questions of the 1990s, but in order to raise some 
questions that can no longer be ignored by scholars engaged, perhaps more directly than 
any others, with everyday questions of life and death. This questioning process will 
begin in the chapter to follow which goes to the core of the "unwritten preface" in 
International Relations, in modernist discourse and the powerful and enduring positivist 
re-presentation of it.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MODERNITY QUESTION AND THE POSITIVIST FRAMING OF 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY
The debate over modernity is multifaceted and complex. There is, for example, a large 
and sophisticated literature dealing with modernity which focuses on what might be 
described in the narrow sense as "cultural" studies or as the realm of "aesthetics" - of art, 
literature and architecture.1 These, however are elements of the debate that simply cannot 
be addressed here except in the most superficial of terms. Consequently, in this thesis the 
primary focus of attention will fall on what Calinescu has called modernism's "fifth face" 
- that which is "broadly philosophical, including problems of epistemology, the history 
and philosophy of science, and hermeneutics".2 Most explicitly it is concerned with the 
way in which the category of the modem has been understood and articulated in the major 
traditions of Western philosophy and social theory.
This is still an inherently complex enterprise, of course, but there is a clear and 
useful starting point for the discussion. It relates to the tensions between two broad 
positions on the modernity question which, in one form or another, have been evident 
within social theory literature over the past century. The first, which presents a positive 
and generally optimistic account of the modem world and its achievements, conceives of 
modernity in terms of a contrast - to earlier epoches characterised by myth and 
superstition in which the lives of individual subjects were suffocated beneath the
^For an interesting overview of the issue see Matei Calinescu's, Five Faces of Modernity (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987).
2Ibid, p.268. My concentration on the "fifth face" is not to suggest of course a fundamental distinction 
between philosophy, social theory and aesthetics. From the European Romanticism of the nineteenth 
century, through both generations of Frankfurt School scholarship, to contemporary post-modernism, the 
politico-philosophical critique of modernity has always been very closely associated with aesthetic 
critique. But except for brief and fleeting references this is just one of the dimensions of the present 
debate that I can not deal with here.
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uniformity and rigidity associated with the traditional "objects" of their world (e.g. gods, 
static social formations).* 3 Modernity, in this sense, represents a contrast to times and 
places that were "less free, less rational, less productive, less civilised, less comfortable, 
less democratic, less tolerant, less respectful of the individual, less scientific and less 
developed".4
A less sanguine interpretation of the modem world is also evident. It is one 
which, while it acknowledges the more obvious successes of modernity, emphasises also 
its costs, perceived as an alienation from a rich cultural and historical tradition, the loss of 
a sense of morality, and spirituality, and of an awareness of the need for social hierarchy 
and order. Modernity, from this perspective is often presented in terms of something 
lost, of a world in decay and decline, of flimsy, unanchored peoples reeling under the 
impact of "bureaucracy, nationalism, rampant subjectivism, an all consuming state, a 
consumer society" and rampant commercialism.5
This latter position has been quite clearly articulated in the populist promulgations 
of neo-conservatism in recent times.6 But it has a longer and more substantial intellectual 
lineage in the works of those who, inverting the notion of contrast and locating the 
"foundation" of the present in the "essence" of the past, have interpreted modernity 
against the perceived standards of some "golden age" of, for example, Greek rationalism
^See David Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel. Heidegger and After (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986), Ch.l; William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988); and Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, pp. 13-86.
4See Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.l
5Ibid.
^It is a theme clearly evident in the works of someone like Daniel Bell, for example, who when he is not 
proclaiming the "end of ideology" is pointing to the cultural demise of modem society, the spread of 
avant garde hedonism and the imminence of "revolution". Thus:
What we have today is a radical disjunction of culture and social structure, and it is such 
disjunctures which historically have paved the way for more direct social revolution. There 
is no distinction [anymore] between art and life. Anything permitted in art is permitted in 
life as well...[and] the life-style once practiced by a small cenacle is now copied by the 
"many"...and dominates the cultural scene.
See, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp.53-54.
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or theological certainty. Here, the historical approach of influential scholars such as Leo 
Strauss have been important. So too the sophisticated Aristotelian conservatism of 
Hannah Arendt and the updated Humean insight of Michael Oakeshott.7
This is a very important theme in an International Relations context where the 
modernist legacy has often been articulated in (ostensibly) anti-modem, anti-scientific 
ways by influential power politics Realists proffering Classical or Traditionalist 
perspectives.8 As later discussions will illustrate, however, the modemist influence upon 
Traditionalist, and all other variants of Realism in International Relations, is fundamental 
to the way it reads its "history", interprets its "great texts" and frames its understandings 
of the real world "out there". Indeed it is this "forgotten" modernist influence, that is, in 
many ways, the crux of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations, its hidden, 
ignored and/or marginalised (metatheoretical) dimension, that which speaks it, but which 
it cannot speak It is, accordingly, to the broader "positive" interpretation of modernity 
that this chapter turns, to begin to write and speak the "preface".
At the core of the "positive" interpretation of modernity is that image of linear 
rational progress that has become integral to the Western world view, per se. Here, 
modernity is understood in developmental terms - as a progression - from the mythical to 
the scientific, from the barbaric to the rational/democratic, from the constrained, ordered 
subject to the utilitarian individual "free to choose".9 It is in relation to this image of 
modernity that Western philosophy and contemporary social theory has framed its 
responses to the "perennial questions" - the questions of the relationships between 
subjects and objects, between humankind and the natural world, of the dilemmas of past 
and present, and of the possibilities for the future.
7On the influence of Straussian thought in Anglo-American intellectual circles see Richard Ashcraft, 
"Rethinking the Nature of Political Theory", Journal of Politics 44(2) (1982), pp.577-85. For Arendt see 
The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); and for Oakeshott, Rationalism in 
Politics (London: Methuen, 1962).
8See the comments in Chapter One, footnotes 24 and 53.
9On this theme in particular see Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity. Chapter 1.
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Modem subjects, as a result, have been defined in terms of their distance from 
traditional pre-modem objects. Knowledge, history and society, similarly, have been 
interpreted as a sequential movement in which an increasingly distanced rational subject is 
confronted by problems of the natural and social worlds and, via the correct "problem 
solving" techniques, overcomes them. Applied to the question of the "good" modem 
society this perspective has led to some unequivocal statements of modernity in which 
being modem is:
being "advanced" and being advanced means being rich, free of the 
encumbrances of familial authority, religious authority, and deferentiality. It 
means being rational and being "rationalised."10
This perspective has had a number of significant articulations within International 
Relations, some more explicit than others. Of the latter variety the crude 
developmentalism of W.W. Rostow (1962) and the equally crude authoritarianism of 
Samuel Huntington (1968) will receive more attention in Chapter Seven as part of a 
discussion of the Modernisation Theory of the 1960s.11
For now, however, two broader themes are of more immediate significance. The 
first relates to what Richard Rorty has called the "Cartesian, Lockean, Kantian" tradition 
of philosophy, which has framed contemporary Western theory and practice within one 
variant or another of "cogito" rationalism.12 The second theme, distinct, yet inexorably 
interwoven with the first, centres on the "mechanical paradigm" of the new physics of the 
Seventeenth century which had such an impact on the search for a science of philosophy 
since.13 More specifically, it concerns the development of a modem philosophy of
1^This is the view of Edward Shils, in Tradition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), p.288.
1 lln  Rostow's case, see The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960); and for Huntington see Political Order in Changing Societies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
12Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).
13This theme is introduced in interesting fashion in Jeremy Rifkin, Entropy: A New World View (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1980).
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science, in the post-Enlightenment period, dualistically framed in terms of "man", the 
rational knowing subject, responding to the vicissitudes of an "external" (objectified) 
realm of reality.
It is in this general context that a definition of the terms modernity, modernism 
and modernist thinking will be proffered in this thesis. It is a definition that rejects the 
notion of the modem as a precise historical/philosophical age or epoch and which 
understands it, instead, as a complex set of interpretative practices, simultaneously 
historical and linguistic, which had its (written) origins in the ancient Western classics. 14 
The first definitional theme, therefore, - modernity as a way of "framing" reality - 
highlights the interpretative continuity within Western philosophy of the attempt, via 
dualised and dichotomised premises, to objectify human knowledge in the search for an 
indubitable foundation for it.
It suggests that the idea of progress integral to contemporary Western theory and 
practice is set upon a particular process of interpretation in which the (historical and 
philosophical) "ascent of man" is framed as part of an attempt of subjects to increasingly 
distance themselves from the (metaphysical) objects of primitive, traditional, societies. In 
this sense, the dominant interpretative tradition of Western philosophy is the story of the 
unfolding of the human capacity to "rationalise". It is a story which, in its many re­
interpretations in different time and space, within vocabularies with modified, 
reformulated or even radically changed "meanings", has become for many contemporary 
writers and speakers unrecognisable as part of the original tradition.15 This has for so
14This definition is influenced primarily by Connolly's similar arguments in Political Theory and 
Modernity, which I want to develop a little differently here.
15By the seventeenth century for example the nature and role of the Classical (e.g. Aristotelian) subject 
was being transformed as the "objective" reality of the world was reinterpreted in accord with the universal 
laws of Newtonian particle mechanics and Cartesian certainty concerning the autonomous, individual ego 
- the rational modem subject that "thinks". By the early twentieth century, however, homage was being 
paid to a fully blown "science" - the new paragon of rationality - the contemporary vehicle of our 
detachment from relativism, myth and irrationality. And while a debt was acknowledged to earlier, more 
primitive understandings of (scientific) reality, "new" traditions now sought to elevate their techniques and 
methods above the "metaphysics" that had gone before to the extent that they sought to explain the reality 
of human society in terms of a modem theory of knowledge - without a subject.
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long been the case within Anglo-American social theory scholarship (and International 
Relations) which has acknowledged, to some extent, its simple linear notions of 
progress, its crude inductivism and the "theory impregnated" nature of "fact", but which 
has hardly touched upon the broader social and political implications of its logocentrism, 
and/or its relentless pursuit of a reality set upon indubitable foundations.
A second element of the modernity definition offered here seeks to add a 
dimension to this issue. This identifies modemist thought as the site of major paradox. 
The paradox in question is that which sees the celebration of an ever increasing distance 
from the primitive pre-modem world (and its idealism and metaphysics) continually 
predicated upon the most basic of assumptions in "pre-modem" thinking, the assumption 
that there is a foundation for human knowledge, prior to and beyond, history, culture and 
language. In the age which has ostensibly and triumphantly detached itself from the 
legacy of such "pre-modern" traits, the paradox of modernity is that a faith in 
foundationalism still reigns at its ontological core.
The paradox issue in this context is extremely complex. It is raised here not as a 
thematic precursor to an argument in favour of some arbitrary, synthesised notion of 
rationality or logical consistency against which all writing and thinking on modem 
political society must conform. It has a more significant role in the present discussion as 
the touchstone theme of the more sinister side to modernist theory and practice. It is a 
paradox, in this sense, which serves it power function by seeking to deny the very 
existence of paradox. Or, less obtusely, the paradoxical faith in foundationalism within 
modernity is, as scholars from Nietzsche to Adorno have noted, at the heart of the attempt 
to deny the differences, the discontinuities, the contradictions and the paradoxes that are 
an integral part of human life and reality. The continuing search for an ultimate, external, 
foundation for knowledge and increasingly the application of its certainties has, in this 
regard, seen the the "will to know" inexorably intertwined with "the will to power".
This is more than some vague reference to once liberating ideas having become 
ideological straightjackets, it goes to the heart of the attempts by Critical Social Theorists
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to illustrate the other side of the dominant story of Western progress to modernity. For 
some, such as Habermas, the problem is manifested most clearly, and most dangerously, 
as positivist based approaches to knowledge associated with scientific control of the 
natural environment increasingly become ideological mechanisms of social domination. 
For others, particularly post-modernists, the foundationalist paradox of modernity is 
articulated as a homogenising, totalising approach to theory and practice which, in 
logocentric fashion, celebrates identity, unity and sovereignty, while defining as Other, as 
threatening, that which is "different". Its critical emphasis accordingly is upon that which 
has been excluded from the grand design, upon the voices that are not heard within the 
cacophony of conformity, upon those disciplined and/or punished for their 
"difference" .16
The major genealogical question of modernity, in this regard, is the question of 
how its subjects and objects are "made" in discursive terms. From this perspective too 
the question of modernity and modemist thought is most usefully discussed - not as a 
well defined age or epoch in the traditional sense - but as a socio-linguistic process, by 
which (metatheoretical) rules of knowledge are set, particular theoretical and 
methodological categories are accorded universal meaning, and discursive boundaries are 
established and maintained.
To appreciate more fully the significance of this argument, and the "framing" and 
"paradox" themes underlying it, I want to broaden the scope of the debate a little at this 
point, in order to more directly indicate how the major traditions of contemporary social 
theory, and ultimately the dominant tradition of International Relations were derived from 
a particular way of "framing" Western history and philosophy. Integral to this
^M ost recently these concerns have been directed towards the most fundamental category of International 
Relations theory and practice - the sovereign state - understood not as some "given" realm of unity and 
identity, the progressive outcome of the modem detachment from its primitive feudal predecessor - but as 
a site of interpretive and political struggle "made" in and by particular discursive practices, and represented 
as International Relations. See Richard Ashley, "Untying die Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the 
Anarchy Problematique", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (1988), pp.227-262; and 
"Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in Intemational/Intertextual Relations: 
Postmodern Readings of World Politics edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1989).
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discussion, as it develops, will be the issue of positivism - the most important conduit of 
modernist history and philosophy across the social theory disciplines and within 
International Relations.
These are themes which warrant thesis length discussion in themselves, of 
course, but I offer here, initially, a brief sketch, a skeletal image of the way in which the 
story of the Western past and present have been commonly connected by philosophers, 
historians and social theorists. In the discussions to follow some of the missing nuance 
will be added as more emphasis is placed on particular thematic elements of this, 
admittedly, rather crude representation.
From Mvth to "Cogito Man", and Bevond
Jonathan Ree has established, in succinct fashion, some of the most important themes on 
the "framing" issue, with his description of the dominant approach to Western 
philosophy, as one which:
canonises the great thinkers and the basic texts...[and] indicates that being a 
philosopher means being a successor to Plato, Aristotle and the rest, and 
perpetuating the practices which according to the [mainstream] history of 
philosophy - these great men have bequeathed.17
In later chapters it will become clear that the impact of this "great man/great text" tradition 
upon International Relations has been considerable. But, even in more sophisticated 
intellectual climes, being a successor to Plato and Aristotle, it seems, has had its 
problems, particularly concerning the attempt to "succeed" the Greeks in their quest to 
find a secure foundation for human knowledge and social life. Indeed for some, as 
intimated above, an engagement with the great scholars and the great texts is an 
experience of such profundity that it leads to an overwhelming pessimism concerning the 
prospects for civilisation in the modem era.
17See Ree, Philosophy and its Past (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978), pp.1-2.
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Generally, however, the dominant story of Western history and philosophy h? 
been read, and celebrated, as an integral feature in the human trek towards enlightenment. 
On this account Western modernity is conceived of as emerging out of the darkness of 
primitive myth - towards the brilliant light of the Greek classical age - and/or out of the 
"dark ages" of Aristotelian and Christian speculation toward the dawning of modem 
consciousness in the European Renaissance and the age of science. 18 This broad 
framework of human progress, the Western story of the (philosophical) ascent of "man" 
has been filled out with the enduring wisdom of its heroic figures.19 Here, consequently, 
is celebrated the great poetic contribution of a Homer, the social vision of a Sophocles, 
the integrity and sacrifice of a Socrates, the historico-political insight of a Thucydides, the 
rationality of a Plato, the nascent empiricism of an Aristotle. All are presented as crucially 
significant voices in a larger social and rhetorical process by which understanding of the 
world and of the conscious subject in it is, slowly but surely, detached from the realm of 
myth and the unquestioned "givens" of a primitive life.
Within this process are perceived some specific patterns of detachment, more 
identifiably modem in character. The modem individual thus comes into view, albeit 
faintly, as the "subject" became increasingly detached from the previously dominant 
"objects" of mythical knowledge and reality. And with the emerging dualism between 
subject and object in Greek thought is glimpsed the first stirrings of modem rationality. 
Accordingly, as one commentator has affirmed, it was "the new image of the Cosmos 
moulded by the Greeks that pave[d] the way for the new view of the ego".20 But the 
modem view of the "ego", and of modem rationality was held in abeyance for a while,
A good overview of this debate is in J. Findlay, Four Stapes of Growth (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1966). For another view which sets out this story in this way, see B. Snell, The 
Discovery of Mind: The Greek Origins of Modem Thought trans. T. Rosenmayer (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1960).
19Much less emphasis has been placed on linking these intellectual positions to social, historical and 
linguistic structures. For a discussion of the implications of this detachment of the great men from their 
time, place and class see Richard Ashcraft, "Rethinking the Nature of Political Theory".
2^This is the view of Ernst Cassirer in, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy trans. 
M. Domandi (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p.124.
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for about a millennium in fact, while the power of theocracy reigned over the power of 
scientific inquiry. Yet even here the sense of a forward movement was not completely 
assuaged, as:
the mediaevals inherited a cosmology which both justified the belief in a 
supersensible reality and [which] at the same time presented an elevated 
picture of mans ability to gain access to it.
Most importantly from the neo-Platonists there was passed on:
a theory of creation, according to which the entire world emanates from the 
intellectual light of God's self contemplation. Reason, being the pan of man 
which participates in the intellectual light, knows things not as they seem but 
as they are.21
The great dualism remained then (between the worldly sphere and the God sphere 
of immutability - between appearance and reality) and increasingly "reason" became the 
"aspiration towards that ultimate sphere" .22 In its most influential Christian 
reformulation, by St. Augustine, the emphasis was adjusted somewhat as more stress 
was placed on the need for those in the "inner" sphere (of human society and politics) to 
turn away from the ephemeral and the sensual and toward the eternal truth of the "outer" 
realm of the single God, of ultimate knowledge and purity.23 And, with the Augustinian 
synthesis of Greek rationalism and Hebraic legend, another powerful emphasis was 
introduced to Western philosophy that has remained, in one form or another, at its core to 
the present day. This saw the species relativism of the Greeks relegated in favour of a 
focus on "man" and created "man" alone, as the focus of philosophical attention. More 
specifically it saw the classical dualisms reformulated somewhat into a matrix more 
recognisably modem, consisting of three oppositional couplings - those between man and
2 * See Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modem Philosophy: From De sc arte to Wittgenstein (London: 
Ark Paperbacks, 1984), pp. 14-15, emphasis added.
22Ibid, p.15.
220 n  the Augustinian dualisms see City of God trans. J. Healey, edited by R. Tasker, (London: J.R. 
Dent, 1945). For a broader discussion of Augustinian thought and influence, see H. E. Deane, The 
Political and Social Ideas o f St. Augustine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); and R. 
Milbum, F-arlv Christian Interpretations of History (London: Adam and Charles Black,1954).
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God, man and nature, and man and man - the reconciliation of which depended upon the 
"right use" of reason.24
For the exemplary figure of Christian pessimism, of course, there was a 
fundamental impediment (human created evil) to any reconciliation with God, at least in 
earthly terms. But this impediment theme has also been perceived as an important 
element of modemist progression, because derived from it, first in the Nominalist 
perspective in the middle ages, and then via the works of scholars such as Descartes, 
Spinoza, Kant, Freud and Hegel, philosophical focus has fallen upon the location of the 
created evil - the human mind - and the Classical/Christian dualisms have again been 
reformulated, as the struggle between egoistic man and natural man, between love of self 
and love of God, between self interest and social interest.25 In medieval Christianity 
therefore, for all its closure, there was space for the Greek notion of a cosmos to which a 
rational order applied, and for scholastic training in "science". The Humanists of the 
Renaissance were, consequently, able to advance the view that the Christian world view 
could be gleaned not only from the holy texts but from the scientific texts of the age. In 
the same vein, the Protestantism of the Reformation, with its attack on institutionalised 
Christianity, and its debunking of the miraculous, helped provide an intellectual bridge on 
which physics and astronomy could flourish at the expense of theological orthodoxy.26
240 n  the relationship between Greek thought and Augustinian Christianity see E. Hoffman, "Platonism 
in Augustine's Philosophy of History", in Philosophy and History edited by R. Klibansky and H J. Paton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
^5In a short hand presentation such as this many nuances are sacrificed for the broader goal of providing a 
thematic backdrop for the central focus of the discussion. For a work that tries (in very rudimentary 
fashion) to bring together some of these themes and relate them ultimately to contemporary (International 
Relations) thinking see my unpublished Honours thesis, "The Physis Factor: An Analysis of the Effects 
of a Classical Philosophical Theme on Aspects of Contemporary Political Theory" (University of 
Western Australia, 1981).
2^See Margaret Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988); H. Trevor-Roper, Religion. The Reformation and Social Change (London: 
Macmillan, 1967); G. R. Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 
1962) and F. Le Van Baumer, Main Currents of Western Thought (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952), 
Chapters 9 and 10.
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This Renaissance period is sometimes presented as a watershed in Western 
history and philosophy (and particularly, via Machiavelli, in International Relations). 
Here, the story goes, the great classical dualisms were confronted with an emerging 
scientific scepticism which radically transformed the nature of Western thought. "Lost" 
in the attack were the political, religious and spiritual unity of European Christendom; the 
certainty of theology; the faith and authority of the traditional bible; the prestige of the 
Catholic church; and the "divinity" of the Feudal state. In their stead there emerged 
"Renaissance man" set upon replacing metaphysics with truth, myth with fact. And here 
again the Western dualisms of life were reformulated to take into account an emerging and 
important distinction - that between modem science and philosophy. More specifically, 
the philosophical purpose of the Renaissance and the age of (scientific) revolution that 
followed it centred on another attempt to reconcile the great classical dualisms, this time 
via a synthesis of the "scientific" side of the polarity - set upon the notion of a universal 
fact of motion - with its other side - increasingly embedded in the logic and rationality of 
mathematics.27
Two kinds of synthetic activity are afforded particular attention in this regard. The 
first emphasises the axiomatic geometric principles and logico-mathematical deductive 
systems of figures such as Copernicus, Galileo and Newton, which were to have such a 
direct impact upon early empiricism. The second concentrates on the (related) attempt by 
Descartes, in particular, to re-unify the outer "infinite" world (of the Christian God) with 
the inner, "finite" world of "ego", of modem rational man.28 This Cartesian synthesis is
27See Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of 
Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power Discourse and Ideology 
in Modem Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Margaret Jacob, The Cultural 
Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, ch. 3; J. Bronowski and B. Mazlish, The Western Intellectual 
Tradition (London: Harper Bros, 1960), ch. 2; and also Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in 
the Philosophy of Science (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980).
28An enormous amount has been written on the Cartesian contribution to modem theory and practice. 
For a broad overview of Descartes thinking see, Margaret Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific 
Revolution: and G. E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Descartes. Philosophical Writings (London: Nelsons 
University Paperbacks, 1970); see also the interesting work by E. Gilson, "Concerning Christian 
Philosophy", in Philosophy and History ed. Klibansky and Paton, which emphasises the enduring 
connections between Descartes' new scientific philosophy and Christianity.
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of special significance here, not just because it marks a crucial juncture in the progress 
story - as Western "rational man" shifts inexorably away from the Classical age of myth - 
but as the point where the continuity of Western thought is (paradoxically) systematised 
into a recognisably modernist form.
The issue of significance here concerns the question of how (Classical) 
foundationalist themes remained integral to the framing regime that Cartesian thinking 
introduced in the Seventeenth century, at the very point when modem thinkers were 
beginning to celebrate their identity as the new sovereign figures of history, the makers 
and shapers of their own destiny. It is a question, more precisely, of how this paradox at 
the heart of post-Cartesian modernism impacted upon the theory and practice of the 
European Enlightenment, and ultimately the development of contemporary social theory 
and International Relations. Two themes drawn briefly from the complex Cartesian 
legacy might illuminate the "how" issue a little; the first, which accorded later rationalism 
its (illusory) coherence, the second, which provided empiricists and positivists with their 
particular variation on the coherence theme.
Descartes and the Paradox of Modernity
Located at that margin where Classical and Christian images of reality intersected with the 
scientific age of the Seventeenth century, Descartes was confronted with a series of 
questions that would not be unfamiliar to a contemporary social theorist or (neo-Realist) 
seeking coherence and stability in a time of ambiguity and disorder. In the immediate 
Cartesian context they related to a perceived gap in the new rational/scientific logic, a 
"space" that had to be filled if metaphysical (mythical) uncertainty were not to inhibit 
progress toward a new kind of reconciliation between man and God. The questions, 
roughly, were these:(i) given that we are rational, what is the exact nature of reason?:(ii) 
does reason have "laws" that are amenable to scientific resolution?:(iii) if reason is 
"scientific" what does this imply for the relationship between man and God?
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The answers Descartes proffered are extremely complex, of course, and cannot be 
discussed in any depth here, but one theme is of particularly importance for the 
discussions to follow, and requires, at least, brief comment. It is that in seeking to 
answer the great philosophical question of the age of rational science, Descartes sought a 
"mind" centred solution based on the most immutable of "external" foundations - that 
derived from God. This Cartesian logic is evident enough in Meditations of First 
Philosophy (1641) a work which represents the textual mainspring of a framing regime, 
and which continues to provide (paradoxical) certitude for those seeking ultimate answers 
in the present.29
Descartes sought in this work to throw off metaphysics once and for all and 
replace it with certainty. The basis for this certainty was, simply, that which could not be 
doubted. For Descartes, on this basis, the only foundation for certainty was that "I think": 
this he argued was a statement that was quite obviously "true", and self verifying, 
because even to doubt it, proves it. The keystone of a new philosophy of certainty then 
was human rationality - the mind that thinks - "cogito". This particular dimension of the 
Cartesian legacy has, rightly, received attention from critical thinkers in the contemporary 
period seeking to locate the discursive sources of modem sovereign identity. Richard 
Rorty, for example, has located in the Cartesian "cogito" theme a fundamental modernist 
trait in the process of framing centred on the notion of "mind", as a "special subject of 
study, located in inner space, containing elements or processes which make knowledge 
possible".30 This focus on the "mind" as the ultimate source of rational knowledge was 
of major significance, suggested Rorty, because it marked the beginning of a systematic 
philosophical search for an objective self conscious knowledge of reality, centred on the 
rational capacities of the modem sovereign individual.
29For a discussion of the significance of this text, see Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern 
Philosophy. Chapter 2; Bruce Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism and Pragmatism (New York: Random 
House, 1970); Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Rationalism, pp. 16-20; and Rorty, Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature.
30Ibid, p.6.
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But there is another element, it seems to me, that needs to be added to the 
Cartesian "cogito" theme if its enduring power and (paradoxical) nature is to be better 
appreciated. This concerns Descartes' efforts to ground the certainty of the "mind” in 
more traditionally appropriate terms, to go beyond mere subjectivity and connect rational 
"knowing" to an independent universe of things which, as the Classical/Christian 
scholars had maintained, could only be understood by the most rigorous application of 
"right reason"- a "right reason" for the modem thinker Descartes that lay in physics and 
mathematics.
To make this connection Descartes turned in the same direction as the Classical 
scholars before him - to the "outer" sphere, to that external source of reality that for so 
long had provided foundational knowledge and socio-ethical direction. The logic was 
simple enough: because I have doubts and seek to overcome them I obviously do not 
have perfect knowledge. But I do have an idea of perfection, in God. However, because I 
do not have perfect knowledge I could not have devised this idea. It could only have 
come from the realm of perfection, from God. There must, therefore, be a God (and 
more pertinently) there must be a realm of perfection, an independent reality, an 
immutable foundation for understanding the world, which via God given rationality (and 
the most rational methods of science) humankind has the capacity to grasp as "laws".31
This final theme is significant in regard to the Cartesian influence on empiricism, 
as well as his more obvious legacy for later "mind" centred rationalist thought. His 
contribution to empiricism, and thus, ultimately, to positivism, owed much to his status 
as a mathematician and a "founder of modem physics", and the impact of his work on 
N ew ton .32 Thus, while at one level Descartes' rationalist approach undermined the 
increasing faith in inductivist reasoning and a science based on quantification, the
3 *See Scruton, A Short History of Modem Philosophy for a broad overview discussion of this theme.
32 For a discussion of the Cartesian influence on Newton in this regard particularly as it relates to the 
"law of inertia" see ibid, pp.40-41.
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"cogito" process of a priori reflection was always connected (through God) to universal,
axiomatic, physical laws and the notion of a rigorous system of mathematised
understanding associated with them. Mathematics, proclaimed Descartes, included the
"primary rudiments of human reason" and was in terms of rational (God given)
knowledge "the source of all things". Subsequently, and as his influence grew
throughout Europe, Descartes' science of "universal mathematics" as an integral part of
the "mechanisation" of the (Western) world view:
succeeded in turning all of nature into simple matter in motion. [Descartes] 
reduced all quality to quantity and then confidently proclaimed that only space 
and location mattered...[This] mathematical world was tasteless, colourless 
and odourless. Mathematics represented total order, [it] successfully 
eliminated everything in the world which might in any way be thought of as 
messy, chaotic and alive...[it was a] world of precision, not confusion.33
It was left to Newton to devise the natural laws of time and space from this 
universal mathematical premise and, armed with the Newtonian laws of motion, the new 
modernists were able to celebrate a major detachment from the mythical world "by 
separating and then eliminating all the qualities of life from the quantities of which they 
are a part".34 With Newtonian particle mechanics, in other words, and with the 
interpretive space provided by Cartesian logic, seventeenth century Europeans proclaimed 
what contemporary positivists (and mainstream International Relations specialists) 
assume as "given" - a fundamental distinction between "objects" and "subjects", between 
"mind" and "matter", between "thought" and "fact.35
33Ibid, p.35.
34See Rifkin, Entropy, p.37. Newton's three laws (1) A body at rest remains at rest and a body in 
motion remains in uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by an external force. (2) The 
acceleration of a body is directly proportional to the applied force and in the direction of the straight line 
in which the force acts. (3) For every force there is an equal and opposite force in reaction. For a 
discussion see ibid, p.36
35 As Alfred North Whitehead was to point out (in terms which have relevance for Realist state centric 
analysis) one of the characteristics of the Newtonian framework was its inherent staticity. This was 
because, following Newton, it became possible to:
state the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying that it is just there, 
in that place: and, so far as simple location is concerned, there is nothing more to be said 
on the subject.
See, A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modem Mind (New York: New American Library, 1925), p.50.
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This "mechanical paradigm" proved irresistible to the philosophers of the day, 
particularly in England, where the natural laws of the universe were enthusiastically 
embraced by bourgeois thinkers seeking to explain the progressive nature of modem 
society as it successfully (and rationally) detached itself from the ancien regime. It was, 
consequently, from within the "mechanical paradigm" that British empiricism developed, 
and it was as part of an attempt to resolve tensions within early empiricist thought that 
Hume synthesised it into positivism proper.36 This Humean contribution to the dominant 
Western narrative will be the focus of attention, shortly, as will the major Kantian 
contribution, in this context.37
However, this very abridged and superficial treatment of Cartesian thought 
requires one final comment at this point: it is that in the wake of the Meditations, for 
example, it becomes possible to speak of a uniquely modernist thought, not necessarily in 
terms of the questions it asked, nor in strict historical terms, nor as a "break" with the 
past (e.g. between Ancient and Modems), nor even in its focus on "cogito man" per se, 
but in the way that Western philosophy was, from then on, increasingly captured by a 
particular way of framing its major debates. The Meditations in this sense represent the 
textual mainspring of a (metatheoretical) process by which the central questions, 
problems and patterns of Western philosophy have been systematically framed  to the 
present day.
^W ithout, hopefully, caricaturing the issue overly it might be suggested that there was a geographical 
distinction associated with the spread of Cartesian influence in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries 
in Europe. On the Continent rationalism flourished as scholars such as Spinoza and Leibniz sought to 
more rigorously apply the axioms of geometry and the new science of calculus to the great philosophical 
questions concerning the relations between God, and modem "man". In Britain, particularly England, 
where the theory and practice of bourgeois liberalism was at its most advanced, an atomistic, 
individualist, brand of empiricism became dominant that was fiercely (and paradoxically) anti­
metaphysical and generally inclined towards epistemological reductionism.
370n  the rationalist side it was the Cartesian notion of "essence" that was emphasised, the proposition 
that the "mind" has innate capacities of perception that allow us to know the essence of things aside from 
empirical observation. The empiricists and positivists utilised another interpretation of "cogito" to 
establish their alternative version of philosophical foundationalism and immutable certainty. For an 
accessible discussion of some of the complexities of this issue see Bruce Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism 
and Pragmatism.
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Richard Bernstein has had some interesting things to say on the Cartesian legacy, 
in this regard, emphasising that it remains integral to social theory in the late Twentieth 
century, expressed as the continuing pursuit of an Archimedean point - an irreducible 
foundation - upon which to ground our knowledge.38 Thus, while at one level it has been 
a legacy with radical modemist implications, the catalyst for a variety of emancipatory 
movements seeking to overcome the dominance of theology, metaphysics and 
"traditional" prejudice on behalf of rational human creativity, it has been a major 
philosophical conduit for (pre-modem) foundationalist logic.
The Cartesian legacy, in this regard, has made a major contribution to modem 
philosophical orthodoxy centred (ostensibly) on the theory and practice of "rational man", 
while connected by a metatheoretical umbilical cord to the "external" foundational 
authority of the new theology of rational science, the new metaphysics of empiricist/ 
positivism .39 It is in this sense that the Cartesian search for an irreducible foundation for 
human knowledge has retained its (paradoxical) significance for the critical debates in 
contemporary social theory.40 And in the broader context of this chapter, it is in this 
sense that the Cartesian legacy represents an exemplary modem perspective, in terms of 
its metatheoretical framework, which continues to dominate the way we ask our questions 
about knowledge and human society in the contemporary period. Consequently, as 
Bernstein has suggested, while modem thought has repudiated many of Descartes' 
substantive philosophical claims, it still resonates with the:
^Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.16.
39See for example the discussion of the "empiricist metaphysic" in E. Gellner, Legitimation of Belief 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Thomas McCarthy, in The Critical Theory of Jurgen 
Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), has spoken of the impact of the new theology of scientism 
integral to Western social theory in these terms: "the theory of knowledge (had become) the philosophy of 
science; reason became scientific reason; and the interests of reason was either denied or equated with the 
technical interest in in prediction and control of objectified processes", p.84.
4^This, to reiterate is not to suggest that Descartes was the first or only Western philosopher to engage 
in such a search. As the earlier discussion emphasised, foundationalism, in one form or another, has been 
a central feature of Western thought since Plato sought to "found" real knowledge of the world in an outer 
sphere of truth and perfection rather than in the inner sphere of politics and human imperfection. 
Accordingly the emphasis on Cartesianism does not imply the strict ancient/modem dualism of much 
mainstream political theory.
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problems, metaphors and questions that [Descartes] bequeathed to us... 
problems concerning the foundations of knowledge and the sciences, [the] 
mind-body dualism, our knowledge of the "external" world, how the mind 
"represents" this world, the nature of consciousness, thinking and will, 
whether physical reality is to be understood as a grand mechanism, and how 
this is compatible with human freedom.41
Significantly too, the legacy of Cartesianism has been manifested in a fundamental
anxiety at the core of modernist approaches to theory and practice. This Cartesian anxiety,
expressed, by Bernstein, as the "grand and seductive Either/or" dualism, states that:
Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our 
knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with 
madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.42
This is a foundationalist anxiety at the metatheoretical heart of modernity which continues
to be articulated across the social theory disciplines (and at the core of International
Relations theory and practice) as an objectivism characterised by:
the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical 
matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the 
nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or rightness.43
The dominant form of this objectivism, suggested Bernstein, is the one most commonly
encountered in positivism. It states that:
there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of us and that 
has a determinate nature or essence that we can know .44
Which brings us directly to the question of positivism and its significant influence upon 
Western philosophy and contemporary social theory.
This too is a complex and multifaceted issue that can only be sketchily dealt with 
at this point, but even in this form its possible, I think, to understand enough of the 
nature of the positivist perspective to understand its attraction and potency in a
^Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.17.
42Ibid, p.18. 
43Ibid, p.8. 
44Ibid, p.9.
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contemporary social theory context. The discussion to follow will also seek to explain 
how positivism, at least in its sceptical Humean form, provided a rudimentary "thinking 
space" for modemist scholarship which, even for Hume, was ultimately closed off by the 
power of its foundationalist legacy.
The Emergence of Modem Positivist Thought.
With the development of a "new physics" in the Seventeenth century based on the 
overthrow of Ptolemaic and Aristotelian cosmology, by scholars such as Copernicus and 
Galileo, the rudiments of an empiricist theory of knowledge were emerging in 
(particularly) Western Europe and Britain. Galileo, in particular, was important in this 
regard, as "the first to formulate...the phenomenalist programme for knowledge", and a 
conception of science, centred on the need for experimentation and the formulation of 
quantitative "laws".45
In England, moreover, Francis Bacon was pronouncing the "old" tradition of 
Greek philosophy as of no more value than "prattle... characteristic of boys", because, 
for all its philosophical contemplation it had not "adduced a single experiment which 
tends to relieve and benefit the condition of man".46 Accordingly, insisted Bacon, the real 
purpose of modem knowledge was "the building in the human understanding [of] a true 
model of the world, such as it is in fact, not such as man's own reason would have it 
be".47 In the same vein, and in terms which bring the knowledge/power nexus more 
starkly into focus (particularly Foucault's focus) Bacon's search for an objective
4 ^See Leszek Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p.28. Others too were 
contributing to a broader "scientific" understanding of the world in ways that were to remain embedded in 
positivism. In France, Mersenne outlined a new phenomenalist physics that was quantitative, 
mechanistic and anti-metaphysical and which aimed at "an exact quantitative knowledge of the 
phenomenal world, a knowledge sufficient for man's practical exploitation of that world", ibid, p.30.
^^This is taken from Bacon's "Novum Organum", as cited in Rifkin, Entropy, p.33.
47Ibid, p.34.
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knowledge of the world was one stimulated by the desire to gain, "command over things 
natural - over bodies, medicine, mechanical power and infinite others of this kind".48
It was in this discursive atmosphere that the tensions between the early inductivist 
logic of Bacon, Hobbes and (to a lesser extent) Locke on the one hand, and the rationalist 
subjectivism of Berkeley on the other, prompted the Humean attempt at synthetic 
resolution.49 These tensions can only be touched on here for their immediate significance 
to the later Humean argument. One theme of significance, in this context, concerns 
Hobbes' transference of the new physics of Galileo and Newton to a social context.50 In 
the early pages of Leviathan, for example, Hobbes framed all human life in (Newtonian) 
terms of matter in motion. However, and here the Cartesian influence was evident, for 
Hobbes the modern capacity to control both the natural and the social world was 
understood (via rational science) as part of God's revelatory power. The capacity to 
create order and a unity out of an otherwise atomised, contingently related sphere of 
existence was, in this sense, proof of God's sovereignty and the (inexorably related) 
explanatory power of modem science.51
48ßacon, cited in ibid, p.34.
49On this issue See M. Comforth, Science Versus Idealism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1946), 
pp.21-49; Scruton, A Short History of Modem Philosophy, pp.21-50; F. Cowley, A Critique of British 
Empiricism (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp.1-48; R. Schact, Classical Modem Philosophers: Descartes 
to Kant (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 100-120; and S. Gupte, The Origins and Theories 
of Linguistic Philosophy (Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1983), pp.31-74.
5^There are of course many dimensions to the work of Hobbes and those whose work is discussed from 
now on. At this point, however, I am interested in Hobbes' contribution to the "mechanisation of the 
world picture" theme and the conceptual space this provided for later empiricist thinking centred on an 
atomised, contingent premises. More specifically I am concentrating on the dominant interpretation of 
Hobbes (in Locke and Hume for example) which, for all its limitations has been basically unquestioned in 
International Relations. For a more sophisticated recent discussion of Hobbes see Michael Ryan, 
Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982), Chapter 1; and William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity. Chapters 2 and 3.
51See Leviathan edited by M. Oakeshott (Blackwell, Oxford, 1960), Chapter 1. For an overview 
discussion of Hobbes on this matter see D. Grace "Augustine and Hobbes", in, Comparing Political 
Thinkers edited by R. Fitzgerald (Sydney: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp.54-75. On p.56 Grace has this to 
say about some of the themes touched on here and more generally in relation to Hobbes' foundationalism:
For Hobbes (as opposed to Augustine) God is in the...background. He has set up the 
universe on certain principles...and left it running. Hobbes then is able to leave God out of 
his explanation of human behaviour and his theory of ethics. He is a materialist who 
reduces all that is and happens in the world to matter in motion.
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Hobbes' approach to knowledge and (analogised) society resonated with these 
themes. Accordingly, the human world, no less than the natural one, was made up of 
individual, atomised entities, contingently related. The "natural order" between 
individuals was, consequently, a utilitarian struggle of individual (self interested) entities, 
and, just as in the universe, unity and order in the human system was dependent upon a 
sovereign power, a Leviathan.52 Significant too, was Hobbes' early attempt to undermine 
rationalism via an empiricist theory of language. Here (foreshadowing the work of 
Locke, Hume and the Vienna Circle) Hobbes sought to do away with metaphysics by 
denying the a priori faculty and projecting a genetic account of the origin of "meaning" 
which rendered supersensible things "meaningless". "Real" knowledge, in this sense, 
was derived from individual sense impressions (of "real" things) and not from some 
innate "essence".53 In this way, as Michael Ryan has noted, Hobbes laid claim to an 
"absolute knowledge", which identified empiricist method with the axiomatic authority of 
the sovereign voice, in the sense that "the authority of the sovereign's law depends on the 
establishing of unambiguous proper meanings for words".54
John Locke’s theory of knowledge generally reinforced and enhanced these 
Hobbesian premises in maintaining that real knowledge of the world was derived from 
experienced sense data and not from some extra experiential or innate rationalist source. 
Hence the "tabula rasa" proposition.55 Moreover, with Locke, the Classical questions of
52At a more nuanced level, as Connolly in, Political Theory and Modernity has illustrated, Hobbes 
understood the rhetorical power associated with a common faith in the idea of sovereignty in the age 
where God and Feudal power relations were no longer obviously sovereign, see pp.30-40. Ryan develops 
a similar argument in his Introduction to Marxism and Deconstruction.
53 See Hobbes, Leviathan. Chapters 1 ,7  and 8.
54See M. Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction, p.3.
55See Essay Concerning Human Understanding edited by A. Campbell-Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959), 
II.i.2 vol. 1, pp. 121-122. And, developing some Hobbesian themes further, Locke sought to distance 
modem natural law thinking from the metaphysics of the ancients by reducing the great questions of 
philosophy to "experience" and an individual utilitarian model of rational choice. Consequently, and 
famously, "things... are good and evil, only in reference to [individual] pleasure and pain", ibid, II. xx 
p.303. For a broader debate on the close connections between the work of Hobbes and Locke often 
overlooked by those who would divorce the "liberal" from the "authoritarian", see Roger Masters, 
"Hobbes and Locke", in Comparing Political Thinkers ed. Fitzgerald, pp.l 16-141.
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"meaning" and "knowing" became increasingly reduced to "internal" processes of 
cognitive reflection. Modern epistemology became psychologically oriented and 
"reflection" upon the real meaning of political society was increasingly oriented toward 
utilitarian rational choice formulas of "means" and "ends".56 Moreover, in seeking to 
analogise Newtonian particle mechanics with the workings of the human mind, Locke 
developed a fundamental philosophical purpose for modem philosophy, in which the 
search for objective self consciousness in scientific rationality, becomes in Richard 
Rorty's terms, the search for a "final commensurating vocabulary for all possible rational 
discourse".57
This search saw the solipsistic tendencies in Locke's epistemology taken to the 
subjectivist extreme in the work of Berkeley, who, in accepting its foundationalist 
premises, effectively reduced the empiricist approach to an exclusive mind dependent 
process located in individual cognition. Ultimately, therefore, Berkeley attacked the 
illogicality of those who would, "distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their 
being perceived, so as to conceive of them existing unperceived".58 These, then, were 
some of the tensions confronted by David Hume in his attempt to solve the problem of the 
rationalist - empiricist debate, bequeathed to modernity by Descartes.
^Locke's individualist epistemology, based on "choice", was articulated, of course, in terms of a 
voluntarist social contract which converted Hobbes' "natural law" of sovereignty into a defence of 
bourgeois constitutional government. See Masters, "Hobbes and Locke"; Comforth, Science Versus 
Idealism pp.21-49; Scruton, A Short History of Modem Philosophy, pp.21-50; Cowley, A Critique of 
British Empiricism, pp.1-48; and Schact, Classical Modem Philosophers: Descartes to Kant, pp. 100-120.
57Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.387.
5^See Comforth, Science Versus Idealism, p.43. With Berkeley and Locke in particular modem 
empiricist thought gained another important dimension or orientation, which retained its inductivist base 
but more directly connected the search for scientific reality with an extreme subjectivism. In modified 
form this was an orientation that was to reappear later in post-Kantian fashion as variants of 
phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches to theory and practice.
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The Humean Synthesis and the Development of Positivism59
Hume's epistemological position is well enough known, set as it is upon a cognitively 
based dualism which went beyond the original Lockean formula. The result: the Humean 
distinction between "impressions" and "ideas".60 For Hume, thus, knowledge about the 
world as it really 'is' could only be gained from the initial realm of immediate sense 
experience or "impressions". All other cognitive activity, however complex or 
imaginative (including that associated with geometry, algebra and arithmetic), was 
perceived as belonging to the (retrospective/theoretical) realm of "ideas". It could not be 
considered as corresponding with reality simply because it relied upon abstract categories 
which did not correspond with "what is anywhere existent in the universe".61
This primary distinction drawn by Hume cannot be underestimated in any 
discussion on the nature and development of positivism. This is because, in more 
systematically logical terms than ever before, Hume made it possible to conceive of a 
realm of "fact" distinct from that of "theory", an "is" from an "ought", and a process of 
knowledge construction in which an objectively existing sphere of reality imposed its 
sense impressions upon a "passive" subject. It became possible in this context also to
^^Broad overviews on the influence of positivist/empiricist thinking across the social theory spectrum are 
to be found in Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy: Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power: Jeffrey 
Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology Volume 1: Positivism. Presuppositions and Current 
Controversies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); Norman Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of 
the Sciences: Critical Rationalism. Critical Theory and Scientific Realism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Publishing, 1983); Anthony Giddens, Positivism and Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1974); Russel 
Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and David 
Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics. Scholarship and Democracy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984).
6^The former, Hume maintained, corresponded to the immediate sense experience of the world; the latter, 
to the retrospective meaning or imagination associated with such experience (i.e. the distinction between 
the experience of pain, sound, colour, smell and later images or memory of it). Thus, "All the objects of 
human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, relations of ideas and matters of fact", 
cited in Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism and Pragmatism, p.43. On the issue generally see also 
Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.42-60; Scruton, A Short History of Modem Philosophy, pp.121- 
124; Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp.1-17; and Schact, Classical Modem Philosophers, 
pp. 185-203.
^ S e e  Scruton, A Short History of Modem Philosophy, p. 123.
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distinguish "facts" from "values", and to designate as "metaphysical" all non factual, 
(normative) elements of cognition.62
Leszek Kolakowski's interpretation of Hume, on this issue, locates four major 
(metatheoretical) "rules and evaluative criteria" integral to positivism. The first, which 
privileges phenomenalist epistemological principles states, in short, that only phenomena 
which can be directly experienced by the observing subject are capable of generating 
knowledge of the "real" nature of the world.63 In so doing, it acts to repudiate the notion, 
associated with classical metaphysics and theology, that observed phenomena are merely 
manifestations or "appearances" of some hidden essential reality that cannot be "known" 
in the scientific sense. It thus (ostensibly) acknowledges no underlying deep structures, 
no "essences" or "ideal states" beyond the worldly phenomena that can be experienced 
and empirically recorded.64
This phenomenalist rule has a second element which, in complementing it, 
informs the positivist scholar of what can be regarded as legitimate knowledge of reality 
and what cannot. This is the principle of nominalism. It proposes that general statements 
about the world that do not have their reference in independent, observable, atomised 
objects, should not be afforded real knowledge status. Objects, therefore, that are not 
referable to the senses cannot, by nominalist logic, be assumed to exist outside of the 
senses. Rather, from the perspective of a phenomenalist/nominalist based theory of 
knowledge, the real world, the world we can "know" must be centred on "individual, 
observable facts".65 Most significantly, from this perspective, theorising, however 
complex in nature, can only be a cognitive retrospective enterprise. It must take place,
this point see Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.43-50; Scruton, A Short History of Modem 
Philosophy, pp. 121-124; and Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp.56-78.
63See Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp. 11-17.
64See ibid, pp. 13-17. See also M. Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan, 1970), ch. 6.
^Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, p. 15; see also Bronowski and Mazlish, The Western Intellectual 
Tradition, pp.203-205.
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literally, after the (experienced) fact. Theory or the process of "theorising" is in this 
sense detached from (experiential) "practice". Theoretical knowledge can, thus, be 
acknowledged only as part of a cognitive (subjective) attempt to organise, categorise and 
give meaning to (already existing) reality. This leads to a third principle of positivism, 
that which "refuses to call value judgements and normative statements [real] 
knowledge".66 This principle asserts that it is not possible to speak meaningfully of (for 
example) "truth", "goodness", "harmony", "morality", and/or '"justice" in the world, 
because such categories, if they are said to exist at all, must be empirically observable and 
verifiable. It maintains that while we "are entitled to express value judgements on the 
human world...we are not entitled to assume that our grounds for making them are 
scientific".67 The fourth principle of positivism, invokes a commitment to the unity of the 
scientific method, and something more will be said on this issue in the next chapter when 
Popper's positivist status is considered.
The more immediate point, however, is that on the basis of these positivist 
principles, Hume stands as the quintessential Enlightenment philosopher, intent on 
constructing a secular, scientifically based philosophical foundation for modem society. 
However, it is Hume's scepticism concerning the inherent lim itations  of any 
positivist/empiricist approach which is also of significance here. This scepticism led him 
to a series of conclusions about empiricist based thinking which have continuing 
relevance for this discussion of the "unwritten preface", as points of critical entry into a 
largely closed discourse. This, primarily, is because Hume's major conclusion was that 
empiricist based claims for real knowledge could not be defended, except in metaphysical 
terms.
Hume's scepticism on this issue owed something to Locke's treatment of the 
question of how immediately sensed knowledge of external objects are transformed into
^Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, p.17. 
67Ibid.
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meaningful "fact" by the individual subject.68 Developed further by Hume the proposition 
was that while human knowledge is originally derived from immediate sense experience - 
the objects of cognition by which we come to "know", understand, give meaning to and 
make judgements about reality, are not external to the mind at all. We can, according to 
this logic, never actually "know" the nature of any externally existing reality, as early 
inductivists suggested, all we can finally know are the objects subjectively constructed 
within our own minds.69
The crucial question then becomes, of course, how do we "know" that these
sense impressions, these mediated copies of real things, are in fact derived from the
physical world of reality, external to us. The empiricist answer, of course, pointed to
"experience". But this, Hume suggested, was not logically possible because:
the mind has never anything present to it but perceptions and cannot possibly 
reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of 
such a connection is therefore without any foundation in reasoning.70
The point is that if we only know the world via (mediated) perception, we cannot 
possibly know a reality, external to the mind, by perception alone. Nor can memory 
provide the answer, for our memory is of that which we have perceived, and a priori 
inference is ruled out by Hume because, as with all rationalist formulas, it refers only to 
relations between "internal" ideas. What then of the basic argument of modem science, 
i.e. that we understand the real nature of the world via experiment and the knowledge 
derived from the conjunction between cause and effect? Well, here too Hume 
undermined the "givens" of his age, and of those to follow. Hume's position, on this 
issue, is explained by Bruce Aune, in this way:
6&On Locke's contribution in this regard see the discussion by Masters, "Hobbes and Locke"; and those 
by Comforth, Science Versus Idealism, pp.27-30; Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp. 1-11; 
Schact, Classical Modem Philosophers, pp. 179-184; Gupte, Origins and Theories of Linguistic 
Philosophy, pp.31-48; Fitzgerald, Comparing Political Thinkers, pp.l 17-140.
b^See the discussion in Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism and Pragmatism, p.64.
7^Hume cited in ibid, pp. 65-66, emphasis added.
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To infer that A is the cause of B we must have experienced a constant 
conjunction between cases of A and cases of B. Hence to infer that external 
bodies cause our sense impressions we must have experienced a constant 
conjunction between such bodies and our impressions. But to experience a 
conjunction of two things we must experience both things. Since we never 
directly experience external bodies, we cannot experience a correlation 
between those bodies and the impressions they are believed to cause.71
The implication of this argument is clear enough. It is that there is no logical basis, in 
empiricist terms, for the proposition that knowledge of reality is directly derived from of 
an independent, world "out there".
Hume's critical attention was, of course, turned with devastating results on the 
other great pillar of modemist thought - the rationalist notion of a "mind" centred 
foundation for knowledge, in modem cogito man. For Descartes of course this was the 
indubitable basis of certainty - that which could not be doubted. In Hume's work doubt 
abounded, primarily because of his insistence that it was not possible to actually perceive 
the "thing" (man) that thinks, or to "know" its real (objectified) nature. All that is ever 
known, he argued, are mediated perceptions of thinking man, even of the " se lf  as 
cogitator. Consequently:
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch m yself at any time without 
perception and never can observe anything but the perception [consequently]
I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a 
bundle of or collection of different perceptions.72
And in a passage that has all kinds of implications for the confident articulations of 
sovereignty in Realist logic and the associated invocation of identity in a world of 
difference, Hume proposed that:
The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make 
their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety 
of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time
71 Ibid, p.66.
72Ibid, p.67, emphasis added.
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nor identity in [its] differences-whatever natural propension we may have to 
imagine that simplicity and identity.73
This uncompromising approach to questions of knowledge led Hume to his 
condemnation also of the "supersensible" elements of Liberal social contract theory, 
which he argued, could not be "justified by history or experience, in any age or country 
of the world".74 Rather, he charged, any proclaimed correspondence between an external 
law of human nature, and the Whig notion of social progress, was nonsensical in both 
epistemological and political terms. The "naturally" endowed social contract was, he 
maintained, an entirely secular phenomenon centred on political elitism, which saw a 
change only in "the regal part of government...[a]nd it was only the majority of seven 
hundred, who determined the change for ten millions".75
There is then in Hume's sceptical position a glimmer of modernist "thinking 
space". It is, however, a glimmer that has been virtually ignored by orthodox social 
theory, and by International Relations scholars committed to the simpler, unifying 
features of the Humean contribution to modernism. This is perhaps not so surprising, in 
Hume's case, when one recalls that the potential for openness in Hume's critique of 
empiricism and rationalism was ultimately undermined by a process of self-closure based 
on the very positivist foundationalism his own logic condemned as inadequate.
There is no work that I am aware of that explains Hume's final decision to remain 
committed to a positivist approach other than his own in which he suggested that finally, 
logic and reason must always remain secondary to "belief", to "passion". More 
pertinently, Hume, it seemed, for all his scepticism, remained incarcerated within the
73Ibid.
74This is taken from Hume, Essays Moral. Political and Literary as cited in Paul Corcoran, "Rousseau 
and Hume", in Comparing Political Thinkers ed. Fitzgerald, p.168. Its significance for International 
Relations is explained, for example by Robert Cox in his, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations Theory", in Neorealism and Its Critics edited by Keohane (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986) in terms of the Realist propensity to analogise the Liberal distinction 
between civil society and the state to the domestic/intemational distinction.
75Corcoran, "Rousseau and Hume", p.169.
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modemist (Cartesian) dualism of either/or, which in his case was represented either as the
pursuit of "assurance and conviction", on the one hand or a situation in which:
all discourse, all action, would immediately cease, and men would remain in 
a total lethargy until the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, would put an end 
to their miserable existence.76
In this acquiescence before the foundational power of the "Cartesian anxiety" 
Hume was, perhaps, after all, the quintessential modernist, searching even at the critical 
margins for "assurance and conviction" in the face of the "necessities of nature". 
Whatever the case, if there is one theme that can be said to characterise the Western story 
of modernity in the period since Hume, it has been the search for "assurance and 
conviction" centred on a series of ingenious attempts to construct a scientific philosophy 
which avoided the paradoxical consequences exposed by Hume.
This is not all there is to the story, of course, for between Hume and the reign of 
Logical Positivist certainty and behaviouralism, there was the "Kantian turn" in the 
Western narrative. The significance of Kant for International Relations will be discussed 
in relation to inter-war "idealism" in Chapter Five, in regard to Weberian thought in 
Chapter Six, in relation to the critical Theory of Andrew Linklater in Chapter Eight, and 
from another angle, in Chapter Nine, via Richard Ashley's Foucauldian reading of 
Kantian influence on the question of sovereignty.77 At this point, however, my concern 
is to establish, in more conventional terms, the discursive connections between Kant and 
the dominant strain of modemist theory and practice located, by the Eighteenth century, in 
the space between early Humean positivism and rationalism.
7^Hume as cited in Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism and Pragmatism, pp.66-7. 
77Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War".
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The Kantian Tum: Towards a Modem Philosophy of Certainty
Kant sought to redeem philosophical thought from the scepticism of Hume in proposing a 
new variation on the Classical-cum-modern dualisms. Hume, as indicated above, 
ultimately advocated a positivist/empiricist approach to knowledge and society, even 
while the scepticism remained in his work about claims to have found the missing link in 
Western philosophy (i.e. between the laws of thought and reality). Kant perceived a way 
out of the dilemma by acknowledging the futility of all empiricist based claims to "know" 
the world in a direct, unmediated form, via "experience". Rather, he argued, the 
universal axioms of science are already presupposed in empirical analysis and thus cannot 
be logically derived from a process o f experience as empiricists argued. More precisely, 
argued Kant, the basis of knowledge was derived from a set of synthetic a priori 
categories of the mind.78 All knowledge consequently involves the application of these 
categories (e.g. time, space, cause) to "experience". All objects, in this sense, require 
(apriori) concepts derived from the basic mind categories. This includes the objects of 
science, thus all scientific explanation presupposes the (apriori categories of) the thinking 
subject.79
A new sense of (modem) scientific philosophy was possible on this basis because 
it was now acknowledged that factual scientific knowledge, derived from  "experience", 
must ultimately conform to the philosophical categories of mind, without which it is 
impossible to "experience". This gave added impetus to the search for a modem scientific 
philosophy centred on Cartesian "cogito man", because, as Richard Rorty has pointed 
out:
7^On the Kantian argument in this regard, see Scruton, A Short History of Western Philosophy, ch. 10; 
Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism and Pragmatism: Aronowitz, Science as Power. Habermas, Knowledge 
and Human Interests trans. J. Shapiro (Boston; Beacon Press, 1971), part 1; and from a different angle, 
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: and Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in The Foucault 
Reader edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).
79Aronowitz, Science as Power, pp. 240-244.
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Kant put philosophy "on the secure path to science" by putting outer space 
inside inner space (the space of the constituting activity of the transcendental 
ego) and then claiming Cartesian certainty about the inner for the laws of 
what had previously been thought to be outer.80
In this way, with the notion of modem man as both part of the (natural) world, 
yet "autonomous" of it (as the site of knowledge) Kant added a profound dimension to 
the modernist notion of the autonomous (sovereign) rational actor, able to "transcend" 
objective structures and finally "know" itself and the world. Importantly, thus, while 
Kant severely undermined the proposition that knowledge was grounded in "experience", 
the "Kantian turn" (toward transcendence and emancipation) remained objectivist, in its 
dualised acknowledgment of a world of rational subjects and "things in themselves". 
Accordingly, as Bernstein has explained, Kant did not "question the need for an 
ahistorical permanent matrix or categorical scheme for grounding knowledge", but, 
instead, and to a far greater extent than some of those he criticised, Kant insisted on "an a 
priori universal and necessary structure of human knowledge". Moreover, in seeking to 
establish an objective "moral" knowledge, autonomous of the is/ought framework, Kant, 
sought "to demonstrate once and for all that there is a basic universal, objective moral law 
for all rational beings".81 One more theme requires brief comment here in order that the 
significance of the Kantian reformulation of the modem story be more fully appreciated. 
It relates to the general direction of modem philosophy in the post-Kantian period, and to 
its new intellectual and institutional status in Western social theory.
The important issue here is that, following Kant, Western philosophy was 
effectively transformed into the paradigm of the "knowing" subject, as questions of 
"meaning" and "knowing" were increasingly centred on the study of epistemology. This 
was of major significance to post-Enlightenment historians and philosophers now able, 
with confidence, to "fit" the great thinkers of the past into a particular kind of discursive 
framework in which each asked - how is our knowledge possible? The attempts to find
S^Roily, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, p. 137.
^R ichard  Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.10.
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answers to this question now began to dominate the modem Western story. The answers 
(or attempted answers) of the great thinkers now become the intellectual building blocks 
to the present. Consequently, a particular discursive process drawn from Greek/Christian 
sources, energised by the Cartesian introduction of the rational subject, the Humean 
positivist intervention, and the a priori premise drawn from Kant, became, in the age of 
Western expansion and power politics, the universal mode of progressive thought, the 
process of framing all human history and thought. This regime of framing, based upon 
the paradoxes and ambiguities surrounding the new man/god of modernity, now became 
modernity, it gave new and more certain "meaning" to its reality. It became the "meta- 
narrative".
Following the framing of the modem "meta-narrative" in this way, at least three 
distinct though (metatheoretically) connected approaches to knowledge and society have 
been discernible in the post-Kantian period, all of which have been integral to the 
modernist framing of social theory. One, influenced by interpretivist themes drawn from 
Kant's apriori premise, has treated with some sensitivity the inherent problems of an 
empiricist approach to knowledge and society as outlined by Hume. It has, accordingly, 
centred its search for a modem scientific foundation for real knowledge in the realm of 
historically constituted social behaviour and accumulated cultural experience (in the 
"retrospective" realm of memory, habit and conventional wisdom). As such it has 
contributed to Anglo-American thinking a more critically inclined modernism with a more 
limited, less progressivist notion of science than that commonly associated with 
Enlightenment based thinking. This tradition is described by Susan Hekman as 
"positivist humanism" (Verstehen theory, phenomenalism, ordinary language analysis, 
etc) and more will be said about it in Chapter Three.82 A second post-Kantian tendency, 
privileging the Kantian "emancipatory" dimension, has, of course, been a major influence
^ S e e  Susan Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); 
and Weber, the Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory (South Bend: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1983). The approach has tended to privilege rationalist themes in Kant, focusing attention on the 
apriori categories of the mind, seeking the source of real foundational knowledge in intersubjective 
understanding. Its connection with hermeneutic thought (e.g. through Weber) will be considered in 
Chapter Three.
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upon modem radical thought, via its reformulations by Hegel and Marx, and this will be 
the focus of attention in Chapter Four and in direct International Relations terms, in 
Chapter Eight. For now, it is the third and dominant post-Kantian tendency that I am 
most concerned with, that characterised in the Nineteenth century by its privileging of the 
lingering objectivism in Kant, and the search for an objective foundation for knowledge 
in a world of "things in themselves".
Comte and Logical Positivism: Framing Contemporary Social Theory
It was upon this highly suspect theoretical edifice (a positivism stripped of its sceptical 
aspect) that in the mid-Nineteenth century August Comte's approach influenced Anglo- 
American social theory with the proposition that real scientific knowledge of social and 
political reality could indeed be attained by observation of an existing world of "facts", 
independent of any particular social theory or interpretation.83 The result, by the end of 
the Nineteenth century was, as Fred Suppe has confirmed, an increasingly unproblematic 
pursuit of scientific reality:
Firmly based on empirical inquiry rather than upon philosophical speculation.
[In which] there was no doubt that a real objective world existed independent 
of individual perceivers.84
^Though even in the crudest realms of positivist scientism there has usually been a passing reference to 
the issues raised by Hume. In Comte's work, for example, there is a rather shaky juxtaposition of both 
pragmatic and inductivist themes. See Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.70-2; Giddens, Studies in 
Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1977), pp.31-44; Keat and Urry, Social Theory as 
Science, pp.71-87. In its Comtean variation, as Giddens has noted, positivism represented a story of 
"human knowledge in general" and the development of scientific thought in particular which is perceived 
as having progressed through "the successive phases of "theological", "metaphysical" and "positive" 
thought. This developmental process was governed by a simple principle, in which:
those disciplines relating to phenomena furthest from man's own involvement and control, 
develop first, and the history of science as a whole is one of a progressive movement 
inwards towards the study of man himself.
Anthony Giddens, Positivism and Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1974), p .l.
^Fred Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p.8.
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Following Comte thus, the positivist/empiricist approach to knowledge and 
society in Anglo-American circles was effectively reduced to a one-dimensional enterprise 
(from the gathering of "facts" to the construction of "laws"). Indeed, pronouncing 
traditional philosophy dead, a contemporary positivism emerged which sought finally to 
fulfil the modern obligation to detach science from metaphysics and any lingering 
subjectivism. It did so, paradoxically, by recourse to a crude empiricist theory of 
knowledge which, as Hume a century earlier had shown, was ultimately metaphysical 
and subjectivist in the extreme.
By the turn of the century, however, some of positivism's cruder elements were 
coming under critical scrutiny in German and British philosophical circles. The impetus 
for the change came less, perhaps, from philosophical problems in the Hume-Kant 
debate, but more from problems raised by theoretical physicists finding anomalies in 
positivist logic as they developed the areas of quantum mechanics and relativity theory.85 
At stake were the axioms of Newtonian theory integral to modem thought since the 
Seventeenth century. More specifically following the works of scholars such as Einstein, 
Bohr and Heisenberg, renewed and critical attention was placed on fundamental questions 
concerning the nature of observation, of evidence and of the validity of experimental and 
quantitative methods for attaining and verifying "facts".86
The response of mainstream positivist scholarship however, was, (in Lakatosian 
terms) to protect the "hard core" of its theory, its empiricist epistemology, and address the
^Explaining this in Science as Power, p.241, Stanley Aronowitz has noted that the reason this challenge 
to positivist/empiricist thinking was taken so seriously at this time was precisely because it emanated 
from what had been the source of legitimate modem knowledge since Newton - theoretical physics. Thus, 
"physics had provided the opening for speculation; permission had been given”.
^ T h e  atmosphere of the times is captured nicely by Aronowitz when he recalls the frustration of the 
German physicist von Weizsäcker on encountering the positivist insistence "that anything that can be 
theorized is based on corresponding sense data". In response and in exasperation, von Weizsäcker 
countered with the proposition that "theoretical physics may posit phenomena for which the data not only 
are unavailable but cannot be observed or measured." Even more directly destabilising for the dominant 
Anglo-American philosophical perspective was a recognition that at the core of the natural sciences "Bohr 
and other modem physicists [now] refuse[d] to describe events in terms of properties of objects 
independent of the situation of the observer", ibid, pp.239-250, emphasis added.
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new challenge not as a matter of fundamental philosophical inadequacy but as primarily a 
methodological issue concerning the issue of verification. Faced by a challenge to 
modem objectivism the reaction was an attempt to distance scientific rationality further 
from the non-sense associated with the ("pre-modem”) metaphysical element in Western 
philosophy .87 More specifically it centred on the application of a stricter regime of 
mathematics and formal logic to the philosophical problems of the day, as articulated via 
the logical atomism of Russell, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the extreme 
phenomenalism of Mach.88
The general perspectives and goals of this new "Logical" Positivism were perhaps
best articulated by Herbert Feigl, who stressed that the Vienna Circle scholars, in
particular, sought a scientific philosophy of human society "in the spirit of Hume and
Comte, but equipped with more fully developed tools".89 More pertinently, the Logical
Positivists used their new tool kit to further distance rational scientific thinking from the
metaphysics of post-Kantian philosophy. As A.J. Ayer suggested, it was this:
explicit rejection of metaphysics, as distinct from a mere abstention from 
metaphysical utterances [that was] characteristic of of the type of [logical] 
empiricism known as positivism .90
Or, as Giddens' has put it, Logical Positivism sought to redefine philosophy as rational 
and scientific, by classifying:
Most of the traditional ontological and epistemological dilemmas of 
philosophy as belonging to metaphysics and hence outside the scope of 
rational discussion 91
870 r  more directly to distance itself from the metaphysical "sophistry and twaddle" that Hume believed 
"we should commit to the flames", see Norman Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.23.
88()n Logical Positivism, generally, see Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy. Giddens, Positivism and 
Sociology: Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory: Aronowitz, Science as Power; Fred Suppe, 
The Structure of Scientific Theories: and Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science. For a critique of 
phenomenalism which exposes its solipsism and paradox see Aune, Rationalism. Empiricism and 
Pragmatism, pp.75-100.
^C ited  in Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, p.44.
9^See Ayer's comments in Language. Truth and Logic (London: Gollancz, 1962), p. 135.
9 *See Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, p.44.
103
The end result was an approach to knowledge and society which asserted that the real task 
of modem philosophy was to analyse the "logical structure of scientific theories, of the 
principles of induction used by scientists [and] the logic of explanation".92 Any analytical 
enterprise outside this framework was deemed to be dealing in (philosophically) 
meaningless metaphysics. This position was exemplified in (the early) Wittgenstein's 
proposition that "[t]he right method of philosophy would be this: to say nothing except 
what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing 
to do with philosophy".93
With Logical Positivism, therefore, modemist philosophy altered its focal point. 
Whereas, in the post-Kantian period philosophical discourse had centred (often explicitly) 
on a priori cognitive themes; with the ascendancy of Logical Positivism, "real" 
knowledge became exclusively identified with an objectified notion of science and the 
scientific method. In this sense modernism and modernist philosophy, became, 
effectively, the philosophy of (objectivist) science. This new philosophical discourse of 
science now reformulated a central modernist question. Instead of directly asking how is 
our knowledge possible?, it now concentrated on the issue of how knowledge claims 
could be methodologically justified and validated. This was a subtle but important shift in 
that it shifted from the forefront of debate the question of the rational subject and the 
notion of a cognitive (a priori) constitution of objects. This "decentering" of the subject 
was not, it must be said, a precursor of things to come in post-modernism. It 
represented, rather, an attempt to distinguish once and for all between the scientific 
enterprise - concerned with the construction of objective knowledge (via a process of 
observation and testing) - and that residue of Western metaphysics concerned with 
discovering philosophical origins and with general questions of subjectivity. It sought 
above all, in this regard, to distance itself from the ambiguity, paradox and cognitive
9^See Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.22.
9^See L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosphicus trans. D.F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p.6, 53; cf. 4. 112.
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reflectivity which it associated with the "old" philosophy of Descartes and Kant. That it 
did so in terms framed by Descartes and Kant, and in a manner Hume showed to be 
paradoxical in the extreme, makes Logical Positivism perhaps the exemplary modemist 
perspective.
This is of some significance, of course, because it was with the dispersal of its 
leading exponents, in the wake of Fascism, that the Logical Positivist approach, in both is 
conservative and more liberal form (e.g. in Neurath) became a direct and very influential 
feature of Anglo-American social theory, and of behaviouralism in particular.
The Behaviouralist Revolution and Contemporary Social Theory
The continuing potency of the principles, (if not the explicit tone) of Logical Positivism 
have been the focus of attention among a whole range of Critical Social Theorists 
concerned at the closure it invokes upon thinking, speaking and acting in the world. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, for example, critical scholars such as C. W. Mills and Alvin 
Gouldner were warning of the dangers of positivist reductionism at the heart of a 
Sociology discipline in the United States, ostensibly committed to pluralist intellectual 
pursuits and social values.94
The particular concern of Mills and Gouldner, and of many Critical Social
Theorists since, was the impact upon North American scholarship (in particular) of the
"behavioural revolution" which, had "captured and pervaded" thinking on politics and
society, by the early 1960s. Indeed as David Ricci has put it, by this time
the behaviouralists [were] so persuasive within the discipline that there no 
longer existed any large and intellectually cohesive group of political
^4 See Carl Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Middlesex: Penguin, 1970); and Alvin 
Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
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scientists who believed in anything but behavioural work as the raison d'etre 
for the discipline.95
Behaviouralism, in this period, then, was integral to the way that social theory 
orthodoxies understood and explained the world. And in the early years of the Cold War 
it was integral to the particular way of framing the place and role of the "West" in its 
struggles with its enemies "out there".96 It did so in a manner which illustrated just how 
powerful the modernist framing regime had become at the North American centre of 
social theory, particularly in its Logical Positivist articulation. At the core of 
behaviouralism, accordingly, was the dichotomy between "science and nonscience".97 
More specifically, behaviouralism defined itself, primarily, in relation to the positivist 
dichotomy of is/ought. Thus, scientific (behaviouralist) research dealt with the "is" of the 
world, its tangible, verifiable "facts", while Others (political theorists, traditional 
philosophers, theologians, Marxists, etc) dealt with the "oughts", those aspects of 
existence that had no factual referents and thus could not generate "real" knowledge 98
Behaviouralism, therefore, was not concerned with "elaborations of political 
doctrine, or what the state ought to be", it focused only on "hypotheses which could be 
tested against empirical data".99 Following the dictates of Logical Positivism, the
95See Ricci, "Reading Thomas Kuhn in the Post-Behavioural Era", Western Political Quarterly 77 
(March 1963), pp.7-34, p.24. On behaviouralism generally, see also Ricci, The Tragedy of Political 
Science: John Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Subfield", in Political Science: The State 
of the Discipline edited by A.W. Finifter (Washington: APSA, 1983); S. Wolin, "Political Theory as a 
Vocation", in Politics and Experience edited by P. King and B. Parekh (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968); James Charlesworth ed., The Limits of Behaviouralism in Political Science (Philadelphia: 
The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1962); Roger Beehler and Alan Drengson eds., 
The Philosophy of Society (London: Methuen Books, 1978), esp ch. 5. For works of behaviouralist 
scholarship see David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science 2nd ed 
(New York: Knopf, 1971); and Heinz Eulau, The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random 
House, 1963).
9^This is an important issue for International Relations as the discussion in Chapter Six, in particular, 
will testify. On this see Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", 
Daedalus 106(3) (1977), pp.41-60.
97See Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, p. 136. 
98Ibid, pp.39-42.
" ib id , p.137, emphasis added.
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emphasis was on empirical verification rather than philosophical speculation. In this way 
post-World War Two social theorists sought to construct the "social physics" that Comte, 
in earlier time has posited as within the rational capacity of modem "cogito man". And 
there was no doubt about the nature of the enterprise, at least in its most basic form. It 
was, as one behaviouralist put it in the early 1970s, all about "a body of systematic and 
orderly thinking about a determinate subject matter".100
This is not to suggest that the behaviouralism of the 1960s and 1970s was no 
more incisive than the Comtean format of the Nineteenth century. One major addition, of 
course, aside from the mathematised influence of the Logical Positivists, was the impact 
upon it of Karl Popper's work and the post-Kantian sensitivities of Critical Rationalism. 
In the chapter to follow Popper's status in the modernist/positivist story will be the focus 
of extended discussion. The point, for now, is that the Popperian influence helped 
sharpen at least three features of the behavioural revolution: (i) its cumulative, linear sense 
of progress and truth, articulated via a scientific process of discovering and testing the 
"facts": (ii) the (related) sense of the problem of inductive empiricism (direct perception) 
and the need, therefore, for the "tentative" representation of deductive science 
(particularly after, and in response to, Kuhn’s critique in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1970): and (iii) a "non ideological" method for illustrating how the Western 
(i.e. United States) "open" system of politics, society and (rational-scientific) thought, 
was superior to Other "closed" ideological regimes.101
At one level, as David Ricci has noted, this led to an overwhelming concern with 
research methodology and scientific technique, rather than analysis, and with a 
"piecemeal" and "building block" approach to social issues which increased the
lOOfhis is from Evron Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioural Approach on Traditional Political 
Science", in Changing Perspectives in Contemporary Political Analysis edited by Howard Ball and 
Thomas Lauth (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), p.79, as cited in Ricci, The Tragedy of Political 
Science, p.140.
1111 Important here was Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies, particularly Volume Two on Hegel 
and Marx 5th ed (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) first published in 1945.
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conviction within behaviouralist circles that any alternative approach could only be
engaged in the realm of "traditional" thought, of speculative philosophy, of
"meaningless" normativism .102 It led, more pertinently, to a situation entirely familiar to
any critically inclined observer of the International Relations community:
whereby a certain kind of political analysis was read out of the realm of 
respectable inquiry and then largely ignored as useless to the affairs of 
realistic people.103
At another level, and also of immediate significance for its impact upon International 
Relations, this Popperian influenced behaviouralism concerned itself with the question of 
the modem "good life" only in terms of its falsification^ credo. Accordingly, its 
statements about issues of "good", "moral", and "ought", in this context, were couched 
in the language and logic of the value-free analyst responding to the data, as "tested". 
Thus, the Anglo-American structure of social relations and political economy was 
accorded superior status, not because of any ("traditional") commitments on behalf of the 
scientific testers, but precisely because they were societies open to systemic "testing". 
This perspective was articulated by Gabriel Almond, in terms which represented Anglo- 
American societies as having:
some of the characteristics of a laboratory; that is, policies offered by 
candidates are viewed as hypotheses, and the consequences of legislation are 
rapidly communicated within the system and constitute a crude form of 
testing hypotheses. 104
The point, made more succinctly, was that while Western (i.e. North American) society 
might not accord with all images of the Democratic "good society", it was superior 
because it provided "the necessary [pluralist] mechanism for [its] own correction" .105 
This was, undoubtedly an irresistible logic for many during the Cold War and it was
102Ibid, pp. 137-143.
103Ibid, p.150.
i^ T h is  is from Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics (August 1956), p.398, as 
cited in Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, p. 159.
105Ibid.
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integral to the rise in status of social theory scholarship in that post-World War Two 
period when United States society, in particular, celebrated the "end of ideology" and the 
triumph of pluralist democracy, albeit of the narrow institutionalist variety invoked by 
Schumpeter.106
In the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, however, and increasing doubts 
about the theory and practice of United States pluralism, the "givens" of behaviouralist 
positivism underwent enhanced critical scrutiny. An important dimension of this re­
assessment saw the legitimacy of the larger (social) "scientific" project itself challenged. 
Much of this challenge centred on the relationship between (social) scientific theory and 
the (policy) practice of the post-war "new society".107 But for all its instrumentalist tone 
the debate in the United States did at some points overlap with the longer and more 
"abstract" tradition of theoretical reflection on the European Continent. As Bernstein and 
others have attested, it was a debate that soon became locked into the larger questions of 
Western philosophy that under the positivist influence of the political science mainstream 
had been effectively removed from research agenda's as "irrelevant". Consequently, in 
the age that had so triumphantly celebrated its modernism by proclaiming the "end of 
ideology", and the capacity of problem solving techniques to solve the great questions of 
contemporary society, the challenges of the early 1970s focused again on philosophical 
themes that, from Descartes on, had framed the way that Anglo-American societies had 
understood themselves and their world. Questions once asked only at the margins of
lOÖMy comments here relate, generally, to that period in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, when 
"political science" was reduced to a concern for institutional systems, the "workings" of Government, etc, 
those aspects of society that were "concrete", that could be empirically observed, measured and tested for 
their correspondence to the "tentative” facts. See, for example, David Trueman, The Governmental 
Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951). The reference to Joseph Schumpeter relates to his Capitalism- 
Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950) in which he produced a theory of democracy 
that basically reduced it to a process in which largely disinformed citizens vote for a change in elite rule. 
The practical, testable (i.e. survey, voting studies) nature of this new theory was appealing, for obvious 
reasons to behaviouralist political scientists, bored by the "meaningless" debates over philosophical 
issues such as political participation. The implications of the above remain "tangible" to this day in 
Political Science Departments and in their products.
^ 7On this see Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, introduction.
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Anglo-American social theory, were now re-addressed more widely and with more
critical intent At its most profound this challenge:
posed questions about fundamental categorical distinctions between 'theory' 
and 'practice' where 'practice' is understood as the technical application of 
theoretical knowledge; the distinction between empirical and normative 
theory, where the former is directed towards description and explication of 
what is, while the latter deals with the clarification and justification of what 
ought to be; the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive discourse; 
and the distinction between fact and value.108
This was in many ways the catalyst of the Critical Social Theory challenges that in 
the 1990s are now beginning to make critical incisions into International Relations. As 
indicated in Chapter One, if there is one theme that has bound Critical Social Theory 
perspectives together over the years it is the affirmation that positivism remains alive, if 
not so well, at the core of orthodox social theory. Hence, to complete this discussion of 
the way that a modernist way of framing, continues, via contemporary positivism, to 
shape contemporary social theory (and International Relations) two synthesised 
statements on the nature of contemporary positivism and modernism are of value here.
The first comes from Norman Stockman who, concluding his comprehensive 
inquiry into the state of (social) scientific thought, in the 1980s, affirmed the discursive 
connections outlined in this chapter with the proposition that positivism continues to 
dominate in the:
tradition of empiricist attempts to provide a new foundation for knowledge on 
the basis of that which cannot be doubted. This attempt follows the Cartesian 
programme, and what qualifies it as empiricist is the idea that the indubitable 
basis must be presented in the realm of sensory experience. [This is]...the 
idea that there must be something that is absolutely certain, otherwise nothing 
is certain.109
The second statement, from Roy Bhaskar, develops these themes a little with his 
insights on how and why positivism continues to be such a powerful influence in the
108Ibid, p.21.
^ S tock m an , Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.30.
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contemporary period. In Bhaskar's view it is the updated "correspondence rule" that
continues to appeal: the rule which states that:
only by comparing our theories about the world with the world itself Viz our 
experience of it in an ultimately unbiased, impartial fashion, can we hope to 
improve our scientific knowledge about the world.110
And more precisely in relation to the discussion thus far:
The importance of positivism lies partly in the fact that almost all post 
Humean, post Kantian philosophies stand in certain critical, logical and 
historical relations to i t ; partly in the fact that it is the philosophy of common 
sense...par excellence; partly in the fact that it is intimately associated, on the 
one hand with the most successful scientific system hitherto seen, viz 
Newtonian mechanics, and on the other, with the most powerful socio­
economic order hitherto known, namely capitalism [and] partly in the fact that 
it continues to structure contemporary philosophy of science and social 
science, even when these are formally opposed to it. * 111
Summary
This chapter has sought to go to the core of the "unwritten preface" in International 
Relations by going, initially, to the metatheoretical core of Western social theory and 
illustrating, in admittedly rather sketchy terms, the connections between a dominant way 
of framing modernity, in Western philosophy, and the contemporary power of the 
knowledge that is positivism. Any attempt to boil down the complexity of the issues 
traversed in the discussion, thus far, risks doing further injustice to them. Yet its 
possible, I think, to make a summarised statement about where we have been in this 
chapter, by focusing on a theme that, in one form or another, was central to it.
110Ibid, p.21.
11 ^This is in Bhaskar's, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso Publishing, 1986), 
p.305, emphasis added. It is interesting for obvious reasons but for some not so obvious ones too in that 
it represents a critique of positivism from a position which still retains a commitment to the 
foundationalism of "the most successful scientific system hitherto seen". A broader discussion of the 
"Scientific Realist" alternative to positivism of Bhaskar, and others, such as Mary Hesse, will appear in 
Chapter Three. In the International Relations field the counterpart to Bhaskar's position might be that of 
Alexander Wendt, for example, in "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", 
International Organization 41 (1987), pp.335-370.
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This theme was evident in the attempt by the Greeks to distance themselves from 
their past by detaching themselves, via reason, from the traditional "objects" of then- 
world. It was articulated in the wake of the "death of God" in the Seventeenth century 
age of science and Cartesian rationalism, as the search for some other eternal, ultimate 
foundation for certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. In the European 
Enlightenment it became more intrinsically associated with the pursuit of an indubitable 
reality independent of the distortions of specific time place and culture - the search for a 
common human nature with laws of thought and behaviour synonymous with the axioms 
of natural science. From the Nineteenth century on it has energised the quest for a social 
theory purged of metaphysics, from which genuinely analytic statements might be made 
and/or scientific laws proclaimed, about modem human society.
This theme - the attempt to separate and distinguish that which is real, 
foundational, and eternal - from that prejudiced by history, culture and language - remains 
at the heart of contemporary Western social theory in its most powerful modernist 
representation - positivism. And, as Chapter One sought to illustrate, this theme remains 
at the core of the "primitive" Realism dominant in International Relations. It is, therefore, 
integral to any discussion of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations.
As both Chapter One and Two have indicated, however, there is great contention 
surrounding this theme, both in social theory and in International Relations. Particularly 
contentious is the proposition that a modernist framing regime, complete with 
foundationalist paradox, continues to dominate in an age which has proclaimed its post- 
behaviouralism, post-positivism and post-Realism. The next chapter seeks to confront 
some of this contention in evaluating some of the major claims, in social theory, to have 
breached the "meta-narrative", to have gone beyond objectivism, foundationalism and the 
modem framing practices of positivism. It seeks, therefore, to engage with another 
crucial aspect of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations.
112
CHAPTER THREE
BEYOND MODERNISM AND POSITIVISM?: EXPLORING THE 
FOUNDATIONALLST PARADOX IN SOCIAL THEORY
The preceding chapter sought to construct a broad framework of discussion in which an 
"unwritten preface" for International Relations might be understood. It did so in 
identifying the modemist framing regime within Western philosophy and contemporary 
social theory. Closing down the analytical focus a little, it then addressed the most 
influential articulation of modernist thinking - positivism - and its continuing impact 
across the social theory disciplines. The discussion emphasised the enduring and 
paradoxical foundationalism at the core of the positivist based orthodoxies in social theory 
and, implicitly at least, sought to indicate the connections between this situation and the 
"primitive" state of the intellectual art in International Relations, described in Chapter 
One.
This chapter now re-connects, more directly, themes introduced in Chapter One 
and Two in that it seeks to evaluate the claim, made by many in International Relations in 
recent years, that while orthodox (Realist) analysis, in particular, might have articulated 
some of the cruder aspects of the "positivist bias", in the past, it has now sloughed off its 
"primitivism" and is engaged in a post-positivist, post (Traditional) Realist phase of its 
development. This is a claim that tends to be asserted and/or implied rather than 
substantively argued, in International Relations, as the recent Ferguson and Mansbach 
article illustrates.1 Some of the broader implications of this assertive tendency will be 
addressed between Chapters Five to Nine. The present chapter, however, seeks to 
illustrate that across the interdisciplinary social theory debate claims for post-positivism 
and/or post-foundationalism are often highly problematic. It seeks, in this way, to
^See Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair Constructive Suggestions 
for Future International Theory", International Studies Quarterly 35(4) (1991), pp.363-387.
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undermine related claims in International Relations, and the logic that flows from them 
particularly in contemporary neo-Realism.
It is in this context that this chapter focuses, initially, on some of the most 
significant "post-positivist" claimants in social theory, in order that: (i) their influences be 
more clearly understood in a general social theory context; (ii) that a substantive 
dimension be added to the "unwritten preface" in International Relations; and (iii) to 
explain, from another angle, why Critical Social Theory scholarship in the Third Debate 
has, ultimately, been oriented toward two "post-positivist" approaches in particular - 
Critical Theory and post-modernism. These two approaches will receive extended 
treatment in the chapter to follow which will also address some of the most sensitive 
Critical Social Theory responses to the post-positivism issue and to the question of 
foundationalism .2
A brief exploration of some of the themes at the heart of the "post-positivist" 
debate might help focus attention on the discussion to follow. Here, the work of Mary 
Hesse is of value. In recent years, Hesse has sought to explain developments in the 
history and philosophy of science, placing particular emphasis on the impact of 
positivism upon the contemporary social sciences.3 She has concluded that dominant 
within Western social theory is an approach to knowledge gleaned from three empiricist 
based themes, crystalised during the Enlightenment. The first: a naive realism which 
postulated an external factual world (object) independent of the observer (subject): the 
second: the postulation of an intersubjectively available "scientific language", which 
afforded the capacity to simply "describe" the real world in terms unsullied by interpretive 
bias and/or theory; and the third: a correspondence theory of truth; the proposition, 
simply put, that statements about reality are true if they correspond with the "facts" and
2The notion of post-positivism will be addressed here, explicitly, but the question of modernism is 
always fundamental to the debate.
^In, for example, Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1980).
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false if they do not.4 The resultant "model" of social science analysis was one which 
indicated a capacity both to (objectively) "experience" the world, independent of theory, 
and/or in hypothetico-deductive terms "test" ones theories against the available (factual) 
evidence. It was under this modemist framing regime, as the previous chapter indicated, 
that the foundation of Enlightenment knowledge (i.e. the modem "meta-narrative") 
became the foundation for contemporary social theory.
The added value of Hesse's work is that it provides sophisticated discussion of 
the way this modernist way of framing reality has come under challenge in recent times. 
There have been two major dimensions to this challenge. The first has seen the 
previously "given" relationship between post-Enlightenment positivism and the natural 
sciences seriously re-assessed; while the second has undermined the unity of science 
proposition connecting the natural to the social sciences. Three associated arguments 
have been central to these challenges. One has stated that the "data" gained by analysts of 
human society cannot be independent of theory - that it is theoretical interpretation that 
gives meaning to data as "fact". Another has maintained that the relationship between 
(thinking, creating) subjects and the objects of the world, and between theory and fact, 
cannot be explained adequately in dualised or dichotomised terms. And, finally, there has 
been widespread repudiation of the notion of a detached, objective language which merely 
"describes" the factual reality of the world.5
Challenges of this kind have come from all angles since the heyday of the Logical 
Positivists, and at different times and in different places the claims of (among others) 
ethnomethodology, phenomenology, conventionalism, pragmatism, structuralism, 
Critical Rationalism, Analytical Philosophy, Scientific Realism, Critical Theory, post­
modernism and variants of hermeneutic thought have found support in this regard. In the 
present work some of these approaches cannot be addressed at all in any direct way while
4Ibid, p.vii.
5Ibid, pp.170-171.
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others will receive only brief comment. Five: Popper's Critical Rationalism, The 
Kuhnian challenge, Analytical Philosophy, Scientific Realism, and the broad hermeneutic 
tradition, will receive more extended analytical treatment in the discussion to follow.
The criterion of priority in this case is simple enough. The falsificationist theme 
and the general attitudes and principles of Popper's Critical Rationalism have been at the 
heart of the International Relations discipline, particularly in the United States, since the 
early Cold War period. They remain dominant, I will argue (in Chapters Six and Seven 
in particular) in, for example, the structuralist Realism of Kenneth Waltz, in the so called 
"renaissance" of contemporary security and strategic studies, and in the confident "post­
positivism" of scholars such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane in the neo-Realism 
of the 1990s.* 6 The hermeneutic tradition (or elements of it) has also had a significant, 
albeit less obvious, influence on International Relations, primarily via the Verstehen 
perspectives of Max Weber as relayed through the exemplar Realist texts of Hans 
M orgenthau.7 The influences of Analytical Philosophy have become more explicit in 
recent times in the works of scholars such as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie; and 
the Scientific Realist perspective is evident in the Third Debate, in the work of Lapid and 
Tooze, for example, and more specifically via the structuration approach of Alexander 
Wendt.8 The question of where to begin the discussion poses no real problem either. For
^The notion of "renaissance" here relates to Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies",
International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991), pp.211-239; Waltz's debt to Popper is evident in Theory of
International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). The Krasner reference is (among others) to
"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", in International Regimes edited by Stephen Krasner 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); and on Keohane see "International Institutions: Two
Approaches", International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), pp.379-396. In general term see Stanley
Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", Daedalus 106(3) (1977), pp.41-60.
7On the Weber-Morgenthau connection in this regard see Regis Factor and Stephen Turner, Max Weber 
and the Dispute over Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).
^See Kratochwil, "Regimes, Interpretations and the "Science" of Politics: A Reappraisal", Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 17 (1988), pp.263-284; on Ruggie, see "Continuity and Transformation 
in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", World Politics 35 (1983), pp.261-285; in Lapid's 
case see, "The Third Debate: On The Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", 
International Studies Quarterly 33(3) (1989), pp.235-254; on Tooze see, "The Unwritten Preface" 
Millennium 17(2) (1988), pp.285-293; and Wendt's structuration perspective is to be found in "The 
Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", International Organization 41 (1987), 
pp.335-370.
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forty years, or more, indeed, for the life of the International Relations discipline centred 
in the United States, the deductivist perspectives of Popper have been integral to it.
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (i): Popper and Critical Rationalism
It is not hard to understand why Popper's Critical Rationalism has been the most 
influential of the "post-positivist" approaches over the past three decades. Here, after all, 
was an approach to knowledge and modem society which acknowledged the crudities of 
the Logical Positivist legacy, and which accounted for elements of Continental (primarily 
Kantian) rationalism, while paying respect to Humean scepticism. Here, nevertheless, 
was an account of the Western philosophic tradition that was inexorably and triumphantly 
bound up with the "good" modem society, and which associated itself with a positive 
Enlightenment project centred on analytical openness, pluralism, objectivity (via testing 
procedures) and a process of cautious, progressive (rational) reform.
However, from the time that Popper delivered his "twenty seven theses" at the 
Tubingen conference in 1961, the debate has raged as to whether Critical Rationalism did 
represent a fundamental break with positivism and its associated problems, or whether it 
remained incarcerated within the foundationalist paradox of post-Cartesian thought.9 
Popper, insisted that it did.10 His opponents across the years, and the disciplines, have 
insisted that his Critical Rationalism, for all its sensitivity, remained part of a positivist 
tradition, limited by its modernist metatheoretical commitments.11 This is not a debate
^This refers to the controversy that has been central to social theory debate in Germany since 1961. It 
arose in the wake of a conference held in Tubingen on the nature of the social sciences, at which Karl 
Popper presented his twenty-seven theses on the issue and Theodor Adorno and others replied to him. 
Since then scholars on both sides of the divide have continued the dispute. For a discussion of these 
debates see Adorno ed.. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby 
(London: Heinemann, 1976).
^ O n  this claim see, The Logic Of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1968), chapters 1 and 4; 
and Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.1-20; as well as Adomo 
ed., The Positivist Dispute, pp.295-300.
1 ^ e e ,  Fred Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories (Chicago: University of Iliinios Press, 1977), 
chapters 1 and 2; Adomo ed., The Positivist Dispute: Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
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which can be confronted in other than the briefest of terms here, but one theme, drawn 
from the debate between Popper and his critics, might illustrate both the (continuing) 
appeal and the problems of Popper's position.
It relates, initially, to the way that Popper defined positivism - i.e. in a narrow and 
restricted way - as Logical Positivism - and the way that he sought to detach himself from 
this definition. In short Popper rejected positivism (i.e. Logical Positivism) on the basis 
that it misinterpreted the essence of the Enlightenment and the modem quest for scientific 
philosophy. 12 Popper, accordingly, sought (to some extent) to reconnect the "perennial 
questions" of Western philosophy with the essential scientific project. He argued, in the 
process, that the (Logical) positivist insistence on a dichotomy between science and 
metaphysics lacked logical credibility.13 Moreover, in confronting seriously the Humean 
self critique of positivism, Popper (ostensibly) repudiated logical atomism, the extreme 
nominalism which underpinned it, the "correspondence rule" associated with it, and the 
inductivist technique of knowledge construction built upon it which, since Bacon, at 
least, had been an integral part of Western scientific thought. Just as significantly, 
Popper rejected the phenomenalism (or sensationalism) that, via direct sensory 
experience, provided (logical) positivists their "protocol sentences" of real meaning. 14
The problem with (Logical) positivism, according to Popper, was, in this sense, 
simple enough. Its philosophy of science rested upon a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the real and critical method of the natural sciences. Thus its misguided "naturalism"
trans. J Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Norman Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the 
Sciences: Critical Rationalism. Critical Theory and Scientific Realism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1983), parts 2 and 3; Ernst Gellner, Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974), pp. 170-6; Barry Hindess, Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1977), ch. 7; A. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1976), pp. 138-141.
^ S e e  the discussion in Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.34-54 on the "modem positivists" as Popper 
termed them. For an overview see Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences pp. 19-27.
^ The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.34-47. Here he focused on the verifiability issue, arguing that if 
metaphysical statements were "meaningless" as (logical) positivism asserted, then verification could not 
be the criterion of "meaning". This was because in the process of verifying a statement it had to be 
understood and if it could be understood then it must have "meaning", ibid, p.47.
14Ibid, pp.27-47.
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suggested to social scientists that they "begin with observation and measurement...[and] 
proceed, next, by induction to generalisations and to the formation of theories" .15 This 
notion was inadequate, Popper charged, because discovery and progress in the natural 
sciences do not proceed in terms of generalisations derived from observation, but as part 
of a procedure which, methodologically, is centred on deductive causal explanations, and 
a regime of rigorous testing. It was in relation to this notion that Popper accepted the 
value ladenness of the scientific process, at least as it concerned the rules or behavioural 
conventions by which the scientific community "is guided when...engaged in research or 
in discovery" .16
To understand and continue (in a more restrained way) the Enlightenment tradition 
of progress was, for Popper, bound up in these conventions. Indeed, given the 
(ostensible) rejection of external foundations for knowledge, these methodological 
conventions now defined science and its theory of knowledge in sociological terms. The 
most famous and most important convention of course was the principle of falsifiability, 
and it was the application of the falsifiability principle that demarcated scientific (real) 
knowledge from other knowledge forms (e.g. speculative, normative, ideological, 
religious). The pursuit of scientific knowledge in this sense was not certainty of the 
Cartesian kind, but "freedom from dogmatism" and careful, progressive understanding of 
the world provided by "the adventure of science and by discoveries which again and 
again confront us with new and unexpected questions" .17 And in another famous passage 
Popper outlined his new Critical Rationalist notion of progress - one set upon a rational 
procedure of:
trial and error, of conjecture and refutation: of boldly proposing theories; of 
trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them 
tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful.18
15Adorno, ed., The Positivist Dispute, p.90.
1^ The Logic of Scientific Discovery p.50; see the discussion between pp.49-56.
17Ibid, p.38.
^Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. 3rd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) p.51.
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This was all wholesome stuff, of course, the stuff that the modem heroic figures 
of the age of the "end of ideology" were made of, even if the caution, moderation and the 
concern for "erroneous" theorising were conspicuous by their absence during the great 
bulk of The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and its Enemies (Volume Two) 
and its polemics on Kant, Hegel and Marx. This nevertheless has been the context in 
which Popper has sought to distance himself from positivism, proclaiming in unequivocal 
terms, that:
Throughout my life I have combated positivist epistemology...I have fought 
against the apeing of the natural sciences by the social sciences, and I have 
fought for the doctrine that positivist epistemology is inadequate; even in its 
analysis of the natural sciences.19
Even from this brief outline of Poppers position, it is clear that this is not a claim easily 
undermined. Popper's Critical Rationalism echoed the scepticism of Hume concerning 
the problems of inductivism and solipsism and, in rejecting the axioms of nominalism and 
phenomenalism, he acknowledged (seemingly) anti-foundationalist sociological 
principles. In the "behaviouralist revolution" of the 1960s and since, in a broad social 
theory context and in International Relations, this Popperian position has been 
maintained, albeit sometimes in reformulated (e.g. Lakatosian) terms.20
Popper's critics however have never accepted that his Critical Rationalism 
overcame the paradoxical limitations associated with positivist thought. The attack on
19This is in Adorno, ed„ The Positivist Dispute, p.299. An interesting angle on the heroic figures issue
is to be found in Charles Taylor "Overcoming Epistemology", in After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation? edited by Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1987), pp.464-488. Taylor here made the point that the status of someone like 
Popper was due primarily to the status of epistemology in Anglo-American intellectual circles. Only on 
this basis, argued Taylor, could Popper "obtain a hearing for his intemperate views about famous 
philosophers...which bore only a rather distant relation to the truth", ibid, p.464. Barbara Goodwin has 
developed the point in a somewhat different direction in, "Utopia Defended Against the Liberals", Political 
Studies XX VIII(3) (1980), pp.384-400. Goodwin argued here that to understand the status of Popper was 
to appreciate the significance of his "tolerant" scientism for a Cold War establishment, seeking to 
compare "open" societies with "closed" ones. This is a theme that from a slightly different angle post­
modernists such as David Campbell have brought to International Relations; see, "Global Inscription:
20See Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in Neorealism and its 
Critics edited by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pp. 160-162.
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Popper by both generations of the Frankfurt School is well enough known in this
regard,21 and more will be added on this issue later. But criticism of Popper's position
continues to flow from sources who, in other respects, would have little in common with
Habermas et al or, indeed, with each other. Critics such as Norman Stockman, Leszek
Kolakowski and Ernst Gellner, for example, have emphasised the significance within
Critical Rationalism of a central tenet of positivist thought - the notion of the unity of
scientific method.22 Their argument, consequently, is that while Popper detached his
Critical Rationalism from the nominalism and phenomenalism of Positivism, and while he
explicitly acknowledged the "theory impregnated" nature of observation, he
(paradoxically) continued to represent social theory and practice in terms of a single
foundation of understanding based on the (pure) method of the natural sciences. In the
Poverty of Historicism. this was clearly the position taken by Popper in his support for:
a doctrine of the unity of method; that is to say, the view that all theoretical or 
generalising sciences make use of the same method, whether they are natural 
sciences or social sciences...The methods always consist in offering 
deductive causal explanations, and in testing them (by way of predictions).23
For Stockman this represents positivism by any other name at the core of the most 
influential "post-positivist" perspective in social theory. He indicated how this was so, 
both in regard to falsificationism and in regard to Popper's treatment of the issue of 
scientific "laws". On the former issue it was Popper's support for the falsifications 
methods of Hayek in The Poverty of Historicism that alerted Stockman's critical 
attention.24 In this work Popper argued that "histories" critiques misunderstood the real
21 See Adorno, ed., The Positivist Dispute: Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests: and see the 
comments of Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1968). On this general 
theme also see Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 
pp.470-490.
22stockman, in Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences: Kolakowski, in Positivist Philosophy. 
(Middlesex: Penguin, 1972); and Gellner, in Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974).
23From Popper, Poverty of Historicism (1961), p.130; as cited in Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of 
the Sciences, p.123.
24Popper, as cited in ibid.
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nature of the scientific enterprise (e.g. as inductivist/nominalist) and he then provided an 
example of a corrective to this misunderstanding in the form of Hayek's economic theory 
(based on the convention of falsificationism). In so doing, suggested Stockman, 
Popper's approach was revealed:
as precisely that which was earlier criticised as positivistic; for the doctrine of 
the unity of method, rather than being proposed as a convention, is [now] 
advanced as a correct description, either of the methods in fact in use, or 
perhaps of the 'essence' of both the natural and the social sciences?25
These suspicion were enhanced for Stockman when taking into account Popper's
"rejection" of (Logical) positivism on the question of universal laws. In The Logic of
Scientific Discovery, for example, Popper rejected the idea of "the principle of the
uniformity of nature" on the basis that it was a proposition not falsifiable by empirical
evidence .26 Elsewhere, however, this logic was itself unequivocally undermined.
Consequently, and in relation to the social sciences, Popper proclaimed that:
it is an important postulate of scientific method that we should search for 
laws with an unlimited realm of validity [because] if we were to admit to laws 
that are themselves subject to change, change could never be explained by 
laws.27
And Popper had some rather strange things to say also about the "sociological" process of
understanding integral to Critical Rationalism. He maintained, for example, that:
of course this does not mean that all 'social laws', i.e. all regularities of our 
social life, are normative and man imposed. On the contrary, there are 
important natural laws of social life also. For these the term sociological 
laws seems appropriate.28
The problem here, of course, is not just the implied existence of "laws" beyond, and 
independent of the "normative", but the related and more explicit assertion concerning
25Popper, Poverty of Historicism. p.126.
^Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.253; as cited in Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the 
Sciences, p. 127.
27Popper, Poverty of Historicism. p.103, emphasis added.
2^Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. 5th ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p.67, 
emphasis added; also cited in Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.127.
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independent "natural laws of social life" which, by Popper's own logic (of 
falsificationism) and the rules of conventionalism, must be regarded as metaphysical, i.e. 
not empirically verifiable.29
Kolakowski, in his Positivist Philosophy, has added weight to the suspicion that 
Popper's sociological conventionalism remains grounded in positivist and foundationalist 
presuppositions. In Kolakowski's view the major difference between a genuine position 
set in terms of sociological convention, and positivism, is the notion held by the former 
approach tha t:
the data of experience always leaves scope for more than one explanatory 
explanation, and which one is chosen cannot be determined by experience.30
Because, however, Popper's approach to conventionalism and his definition of "real" 
science continued to accept as "given", an empiricist account of the origin of knowledge 
(the world of independent objects to be tested for their facticity) it ultimately "represents 
an extension of positivist philosophy".31
This is Gellner's conclusion also .32 Indeed, Gellner, like Kolakowski, has 
concluded that Popper smuggled back into his Critical Rationalism the very empiricist 
epistemology that (like Hume) he explicitly acknowledged as inadequate.33 Going 
further, Gellner has argued that the basic assumptions underlying Popper’s falsificationist 
principle are ultimately phenomenalist in nature. His proposition, accordingly, was that 
Popper's whole deductivist, hypotheses testing procedure, was (paradoxically) predicated
29On this issue Stockman is sensitive to the proposition that written at different times these statements 
might simply indicate intellectual looseness on Popper's part. He countered this by exposing the same 
themes in the work of another major Critical Rationalist, Hans Albert, and concluded that "the 
justification for the doctrine of the unity of method of the natural and the social sciences advanced by 
critical rationalism does not...seem to be satisfactory even by the standards of Popper's original theory of 
scientific method [falsificationism]", ibid, pp.127-128.
^Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, p. 158.
31 Ibid, p. 172.
3^Gellner, Legitimation of Belief.
33Ibid, pp. 174-7.
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upon a fundamental inductivist premise - the "empiricist metaphysic - the picture of the
world as constructed by sense data". This, Gellner acknowledged, remained a powerful
and compelling (if illusory) perspective in the contemporary period:
Not because the world is so constructed or because there is any such 'pure' 
data; [but] because this picture conveys so well the crucial [scientific] 
requirement - that of insoluble data which are independent of the theory that 
is being judged.34
For all his sophisticated attempts to detach himself from the legacy of Logical Positivism 
and the problems of empiricist inductivism, therefore, Popper and his Critical 
Rationalism, argued Gellner, retained an image of the knowledge process as a dualised 
"conflict between hard fact and logical contradiction". Popper, therefore, was "wrong in 
repudiating or disassociating himself from positivism".35
34 Ibid, p.175.
35Ibid, pp.174-5. In What is this Thing Called Science? Alan Chalmers has taken another angle on the 
Critical Rationalist issue, stressing the fundamental problems associated with Popper's notion of an 
objective "third world" of theory. As Chalmers has shown, while Popper's "third world" proposition (and 
his whole falsification argument) depended entirely upon a theoretical process involving atomised, 
contingently related actors, he simultaneously had to acknowledge that "human minds [second world] 
become crucial in forming the link between the first world of physical objects and the third world of 
theories". The problem for Popper, resullingly, was the deep contradiction involved in accepting on the 
one hand the "theory impregnated" nature of all fact, and on the other, retaining a commitment to a 
"correspondence theory" of truth, see ibid, pp. 139-140. There is also the question of Lakatos, of course, 
and whether he takes the Popperian perspective any further. This is not a major theme in the present 
discussion primarily because Lakatos has really only been invoked in passing by Realist scholars in 
International Relations, seeking to deflect criticism of their continuing "positivist bias". In this regard 
Keohane’s use of Lakatos' name in "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", is typical 
of the strategy. Lakatos, of course, sought to defend as much as was defensible of Popper's Critical 
Rationalism in the face of its critics, particularly Kuhn’s, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). 
The compromise perhaps was Lakatos’ repudiation of the strict falsificationist principles in Popper and 
his focus on a plurality of "research programmes" some of which (progressive research programmes) 
discover new "facts", while others (the degenerating variety) do not. See "Falsificationism and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge edited by 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970). This provided for 
Keohane an organising framework for debate which concluded, not surprisingly, that we need a number of 
"research programmes" all working away at "theory" in the International Relations discipline. See 
"Theory of World Politics", pp.189-200. The "theory" involved, of course, corresponded with the 
positivist presuppositions of both Lakatos and Keohane on what "theory" is. Omitted from the "theory" 
spectrum, therefore, were approaches that question the positivist notion of "theory". Keohane, utilising 
Lakatos again, has made his statement on these works elsewhere. In "International Institutions", p.392, 
for example, Keohane launched an attack on those "reflectivists" without "a research programme...[that] 
can illuminate important issues in world politics", making it clear that their efforts were not as 
significant as those engaged in the process of empirical research and "theory" testing. Richard Ashley and 
R.B J . Walker have responded by casting doubt on Keohane's understanding of his Lakatosian position in 
regard to "research programmes", emphasising the critical "reflective" aspects of Lakatos' work ignored by 
Keohane; see Ashley and Walker, "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International 
Studies", International Studies Quarterly 34(3) 1990, pp.259-269. The suspicion that Keohane might not 
have read/understood Lakatos on this issue is enhanced when one ponders the tolerance of Lakatos on 
"research programmes"compared to Keohane's intolerance regarding the value and significance of the
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Bevond Modernism and Positivism? (iri: The Paradigm Challenge of Thomas Kuhn.
In one form or another, of course, these are all themes to be found in the works of 
Thomas Kuhn, particularly The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) which, with its 
repudiation of the "discovery" based "building block" notion of scientific progress has 
become an influential counterpoint to the Popperian perspective in social theory. Kuhn's 
general paradigm arguments are well enough known not to warrant another 
comprehensive rehearsal of them here.36 But two Kuhnian themes, in particular, are just 
worth noting in relation to the Critical Rationalist approach, the first concerning his 
critical attitude toward the philosophy of science, the second, his interest in the 
"language" question.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn challenged the very authority of 
(post-Baconian) science and the "unity" of the scientific method with an explanation of 
the process of knowledge construction that did not emphasise atheoretical experimental 
techniques, or methodological directives. His focus, instead, was on the shared "rules of 
(paradigmatic) interpretation" which provided scientific communities, in different times 
and places, with an a priori framework of meaning and understanding about the "real" 
nature of the world, which their observations, hypotheses and testing procedures 
ostensibly "discovered". This went well beyond the sociological conventionalism of 
Popper with its continuing commitment to a cumulative progressivist notion of scientific 
discovery. Instead, rejecting the notion of a cumulative and incremental model of
"reflectivists". The point is that Lakatos maintained that even for the most established and "progressive" 
of "research programmes", it "may take decades of theoretical work to arrive at the first novel fact and still 
more time to arrive at interestingly testable versions" of that fact. Keohane, it seems has missed the 
point in his admonishment of the very new critical literature of the Third Debate even if it did fit within 
his "research programme" perspective. On Lakatos' position, see Jerry Ravetz, "Ideological 
Commitments in the Philosophy of Science", Radical Philosophy 37 (Summer, 1984), pp.5-11, at p.9.
3^See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2nd ed. enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970); see the discussion in Lakatos and Musgrave eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Fred Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories: G. 
Gutting ed., Paradigms and Revolutions (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980); 
Richard Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
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progress, towards truth or ultimate reality, Kuhn's argument complemented those of 
hermeneutic scholarship (and Wittgenstein and Winch) in emphasising the importance of 
language or, more precisely, the conflicts between "different language-culture 
communities".37
Progress in this language-culture context was dependent, not on the efforts of 
independent scientists engaged in (an individualised) process of observation and testing, 
as Popper proposed, but on the scientific community, as a whole, acknowledged as 
members of different "language groups" faced with "communication breakdown".38 
When this situation was recognized, Kuhn proposed, a wider, more meaningful dialogue 
might become possible across paradigmatic boundaries. Eventually, he argued, scholars 
would learn to "translate" rival theories, and in so doing "describe...the world to which 
[that] theory applies".39 Kuhn's central proposition then - that knowledge is constructed 
by social communities following agreed upon norms, traditions and rules of reading and 
interpretation, and not by an atheoretical process of "testing" (theory impregnated) 
observations - has obvious implications for Critical Social Theory approaches seeking to 
break down the objectivism and foundationalism of positivist based modernism. Of 
significance too was Kuhn's proposition that paradigms are not connected by some 
external realm of scientific fact, but have a fundamental incommensurability.40
For the less discerning of Kuhn's critics this incommensurability notion 
represents nothing less than meaningless relativism.41 But, as in the case made against 
post-modernists refusing to privilege one discourse against another, it is the charge rather 
than its intended target that lacks validity. The point is that the distinction between
37Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.205. 
38Ibid, pp.201-203.
39Ibid, p.202, emphasis added.
40Ibid, pp.92-111.
41 See G. Gutting ed., Paradigms and Revolutions.
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paradigms, as presented by Kuhn, does not exclude comparison and critical evaluation. 
What is excluded is the possibility of comparison and evaluation in terms of some neutral, 
atheoretical "foundation" of (scientific) knowledge, capable of arbitrating between 
paradigms. Kuhn, as I understand him, sought to explain that different paradigms 
comprehend and explain the world in ways that correspond, not to some illusory external 
realm of "fact", but to the knowledge rules and linguistic conventions at their 
(metatheoretical) heart. The notion of incommensurability, in this sense, sought to 
establish the parameters for inter-paradigmatic comparison, rather than declare such 
comparison impossible.
For all this, and for all its (controversial) impact upon social theory, the "post­
positivist" voice of Kuhn has rarely been echoed, directly, in International Relations. 
When it has been so utilised the results have been rather disappointing, and rarely has the 
Kuhnian interest in "language communities" been afforded serious attention.42 There are, 
of course, good reasons for Critical Social Theorists to be cautious about accepting the 
Kuhnian arguments, given the feeling in some quarters that his arguments are not 
necessarily "transferable" to social theory generally, and the lingering suspicion that a 
commitment to scientism persists. And there is also the broader, and understandable, 
concern about the whole paradigmatic structure, which perceives of thought and social 
behaviour in terms of discrete, hermetically sealed, frameworks. Whatever else this 
represents, it resonates with the same modernist tendencies which demarcated 
"philosophy" from "science", "theory" from "practice", "subjects" from "objects", 
"Realism" from "idealism" etc.
4 I^ refer here to the "paradigm” approach of some British International Relations scholarship in particular, 
which in Chapter Eight will receive more extended attention. On this issue see for example Michael 
Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate", in International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory edited by 
M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); Ernie Keenes, "Paradigms of International 
Relations: Bringing Politics Back In", International Journal 44 (1989), pp.42-67; and Mark Hoffman, 
"Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Millennium 16 (1987), pp.231-249. I exclude Vasquez 
from this general critique, his Power of Power Politics, for all its silences did seek to take the Kuhnian 
position seriously.
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This is acknowledged to some extent at least in another interesting "post­
positivist" perspective which has utilised Kuhnian, and general post-Kantian influences, 
to go beyond the Popperian dominated positivist agenda. This is the (mainly British) 
Scientific Realism of scholars such as Mary Hesse, Roy Bhaskar, Russell Keat and John 
Urry and Rom Harre, which is beginning to have an influence on the Third Debate in 
International Relations.43
Beyond Modernism and Positivism? riii): Scientific Realism
Scientific Realism has sought to fundamentally restructure thinking on philosophy of 
science issues, in particular, and social theory issues in general, in recent times. As part 
of this restructuring attempt it has attacked the whole positivist agenda, including its 
Popperian dimension, while developing an alternative approach to knowledge and society 
based on a form of critical hermeneutics. The Popper question is treated seriously in this 
literature, but very much as a lingering residue of a discredited Enlightenment 
epistemology.44 Critical Rationalism, consequently, is conceived of as another (if high 
profile) contemporary variant of the Cartesian system of understanding. In this sense, 
and for all its protestations to the contrary, the fa ls ifica tio n s  principle and the 
hypothetico-deductive approach in general, are perceived as derivatives of an atomistic 
ontology, a rationality based in "meaningful" propositions (connected to atomistic sense
43See, for example, Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstruction in the Philosophy of Science: Roy 
Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science 2nd ecL (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978); Bhaskar, The Possibility 
of Naturalism (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979); Bhaskar, "Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation", Radical Philosophy 26 (1980), pp. 16-28; Rom Harre, The Principles of Scientific 
Thinking (London: Macmillan, 1970); Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science: (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). For a useful overview of this literature see Susan Hekman, 
Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp.40-50. The best 
introduction to Scientific Realism in an International Relations context is by Josef Lapid in "The Third 
Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", International Studies 
Quarterly 33(3) (1989), pp.235-254. For an individual work of the genre see Alexander Wendt, "The 
Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory"; and Tooze "The Unwritten Preface".
^ S e e , in particular, Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science.
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impressions) and "the belief that the ideal form for knowledge, and especially for 
scientific knowledge, is the deductive system".45
This is a view evident in the work of Mary Hesse who, more clearly than her 
Scientific Realist colleagues, has outlined an alternative "post-positivist" direction for the 
future, which seeks once and for all to move beyond even the most sophisticated of 
modem "scienticisms" as represented by Popperian positivism. The basis of this new 
direction lies in an inversion of the notion that there is a unity of method between the 
natural and social sciences. There is such a unity, Hesse has argued, but it is based in 
hermeneutic logic.46 More explicitly, Hesse's Scientific Realism has rejected the 
modernist axiom that posits a dichotomy between the (pure) knowledge of science and the 
(impure) historically conditioned knowledge of social life. She has maintained, 
accordingly, that Western social theory can now release itself from the relentless search 
for a scientific knowledge of human society akin to that of the natural sciences, and begin 
to redirect its inquiries to the far more complex, but far more relevant, complexities of 
social interpretation. Indeed, in Hesse's view this process is already under way, in the 
extended social theory "conversation" of the 1980s. The crux of the conversation for 
Hesse, however, is the debate between those who, in a non-positivist manner, seek to 
carry forward some elements of the more sensitive Enlightenment approach to science 
(e.g. herself) and those (the'Telativists") who eschew any notion of a universal scientific 
rationality in any terms 47
This has been a central theme also in other Scientific Realist literature. An 
interesting variation on it is to be found in Roy Bhaskar's work. For the past decade or 
so Bhaskar has developed an argument in favour of a "restructured" science of social 
reality which goes beyond positivist dichotomy but which continues to acknowledge "real
Harre, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, p.8; see also Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science 
pp. 120-138.
4^Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions, pp. 170-174.
47See Hekman's discussion of this point in, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge, pp.44-45.
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world" structural conditions which predate social interpretation and which exist 
"independently" of them.48 In Bhaskar's terms, accordingly, to understand reality in 
human society'is to understand something about the underlying structures which allow 
for the social conditions of understanding. In this context Bhaskar has insisted that all 
knowledge is socially constructed, via distinct interpretative vocabularies, but that the 
existence of societal structures (i.e. of learned, pre-existing social knowledge) impose 
limits and constraints upon knowing and speaking. These structural constraints can be as 
understood as equivalent to (social) scientific "laws". Treated as such they can become a 
new, non positivistic, "scientific" basis for social inquiry.49 Bhaskar, has, in this sense, 
proclaimed an independent realm of structural being - a social foundationalism that is 
similar, in effect, if not in intent, to Popper's notion of independent "sociological laws". 
This has led to an attempt to construct an emancipatory "critical naturalism" from the 
premises of Scientific Realism based on "knowable emergent laws" of social life.50
The lingering structuralism evident within much Scientific Realist literature has led 
its critics to conclude that while it has added a valuable and ingenious dimension to the 
attempt to escape the problems of modemist thought, and of positivism in particular, it 
has not actually escaped either. This is a conclusion reached by Susan Hekman in her 
assessment of this particular "post-positivist" claimant.51 While acknowledging Scientific 
Realism's general sophistication Hekman has maintained that it has "little affinity to the 
anti-foundationalist position".52 Instead, she proposed, Scientific Realists do not reject 
the "sacredness" of modem science and its methods, as they claim, but seek to redefine 
science in order to claim more territory for its domain.53 Accordingly, there are at least
^Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism. Chapter 1.
49Ibid, pp.45-83.
5^See Bhaskar, "Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation", p.27.
5 iSee Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge.
52Ibid, p.39.
5 3 Ibid, pp .46-47.
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three major continuities between Scientific Realism and the mainstream modernist 
approaches (including positivism) it purports to have superseded.
Firstly, though there is much made of the hermeneutic nature of the natural
sciences by Scientific Realists, what is advocated "is not the extension of the hermeneutic
thinking of the social sciences into the natural sciences, but rather, the extension of the
scientific method into the social sciences".54 Instead, therefore, of acknowledging the
hermeneutic character of all knowledge, as does someone like Gadamer, there is, in
Critical Realism, still a commitment to the scientific character of all real knowledge.
Secondly, throughout the Critical Realist literature there is a notion of a single,
independent "real world" that limits and constrains the interpretative efforts of human
social actors. This, maintained Hekman:
reveals the [Scientific] realists' failure to transcend the Enlightenment 
conception of knowledge [and is evidence] that the realists continue to seek a 
foundation for their conception of knowledge provided by the 'real world'.55
Thirdly, and most paradoxically perhaps, while ostensibly accepting the interpretive 
nature of scientific thinking, Scientific Realists fail to pay heed to the issue of the 
"hermeneutic circle". Or, in Hekman's terms, "they overlook the fact that the 
investigator's position as well the position of the investigated is [also] socially 
determined".56 Consequently, they take for themselves the very Archimedean position 
they are so dismissive of in relation to positivism. For all its sophistication, therefore, 
Scientific Realism remains bound within the confines of the positivist articulation of 
modernity, and its paradoxical foundationalism.
This as we shall see is a trait very evident also within the new "scientific" Realism 
(neo-Realism) of the 1980s and 1990s in International Relations. And it is a trait also 
within that multifaceted approach known as Analytical Philosophy, one of the most
54Ibid, p.46.
55 Ibid, p.47, emphasis added. 
^Ibid.
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important modern attempt in Anglo-American social theory to deal with the issues of 
knowledge and human society and the question of language. Analytical Philosophy 
themes are discernible now in some of the most sophisticated "post-positivist" arguments 
in International Relations and as such require comment here.57
Bevond Modernism and Positivism? (iv): Analytical Philosophy and the
"Linguistic Turn"
The Analytical Philosophy approach emerged from critiques of the logical atomism and 
crude inductivism associated with Logical Positivism. In this sense, as John Thompson 
has said, it represented the "second stage" of a modem attempt to distance Western 
philosophy from the impurities of metaphysics, and ground thinking unequivocally in a 
science of human society and most particularly, linguistic practice.58 The works of two 
figures, in particular, epitomise the Analytical position in this regard, those of W.V. 
Quine and his critique of the empiricist "dogmas" underlying Logical Positivism59 and of 
the "later" Wittgenstein whose recantation of the logical atomism of his Tractatus sparked 
off a"linguistic turn" in Western philosophy.60
57See Friedrich Kratochwil, "Regimes, Interpretations and the "Science" of Politics: A Reappraisal", 
Millennium 17 (1988), pp.263-284; and John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World 
Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", World Politics 35 (1983), pp.261-285.
5^See Thompson's comments in Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and 
Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.9-35. In recent times the works of 
Davidson, Dummett, Putnam and Searle have been associated with the Analytical position, while others 
such as Frege, Strawson, Ryle and Wisdom have, over the years, and in their different ways, been 
prominent contributors to its development and its twin concerns with logical rigour and "language". For 
a contemporary summary of the literature and its debates, see Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy eds., After 
Philosophy: End or Transformation?: and Rajchman and West eds., Post Analytic Philosophy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
^9W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in Can Theories Be Refuted: Essays on the Duhem- 
Ouine Hypothesis edited by Sandra Harding (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976); Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 3rd ed., trans. G. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968).
6^0n the linguistic turn in all its complexity see Jay, Marxism and Totality, p.88.
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Quine repudiated the twin pillars of post-Kantian empiricist based thought - the
notion of a fundamental distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (between
logically true knowledge received via experience and that which is produced via
verificationist procedures) - and the nominalist principle which reduced the conditions for
real knowledge of the world to a universe of atomised contingent "things". Instead,
Quine pronounced all knowledge "synthetic", in the sense that all knowledge, including
scientific knowledge, was derived from "man made fabric". Accordingly:
The totality of our so called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual 
matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics 
or even of pure mathematics, is a man-made fabric which impinges on 
experience only along the edges...But the total field is so undetermined by its 
boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to 
what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.
No particular experiences are linked to any particular statements.61
Wittgenstein, in his later works, made a major contribution to the Analytic 
position in instigating a broader, more tolerant tendency in Anglo-American thought and a 
fundamentally revised understanding of the nature and role of language in constructing 
social reality .62 In explaining his shift in thinking Wittgenstein confronted what post­
modernists might now refer to as the "hermeneutics of suspicion" perspective. In 
reflecting upon his earlier search for foundational certainty, Wittgenstein acknowledged 
that:
my notion in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was wrong...because I too 
thought that the logical analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as 
chemical and physical analysis does).63
The significance of this statement was that it went beyond the question of whether, via 
protocol sentences, one could "discover" the real knowledge of modernity and society. It
61 See W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", pp.59-60, emphasis added.
62On Wittgenstein's contribution, see D.L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A 
Sociological Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977); Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics; Giddens, 
Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1979); Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and 
Relativism: and D. Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
^W ittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar (1974), p.210; cited in Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, p.14.
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questioned the whole notion of a reality, "out there" waiting to be discovered. This led,
in Philosophical Investigations, to a broad critique of the reductionism and essentialism
associated with the positivist approach to language, particularly the proposition, dominant
since Hobbes, of an atomised, contingent, linguistic universe in which words were
accorded singular, essential meanings that "corresponded" to real things. This view was
repudiated by Wittgenstein in terms which emphasised not the homogeneity and
singularity of language but its heterogeneity and social diversity. In short he rejected the
essentialism of language in favour of a notion of socially constructed and applied
"language games", which emphasised the way that language was actually used, in
different times and places, and how it constructed reality as part of a "speech act".64 It
was in this sense that, following Philosophical Investigations, for many within Anglo-
American philosophical circles the search for reality became the attempt to understand the
way that grammatical rules were used in various societies to give meaning to their
(linguistically constructed) real worlds. Moreover, on the centuries old notion of a
correspondence between reality and language, Wittgenstein had this to say:
Grammar is not accountable to any [external] reality. It is grammatical rules 
that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not 
answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary.65
In this way Wittgenstein undermined the Logical Positivist understanding of 
language and reality at its metatheoretical core; its (given) empiricist epistemology. More 
specifically, he undermined the phenomenalist logic of an approach to knowledge which 
took as given the atomistic nature of the relationship between the "objects" of the world, 
and their meaning, as expressed in elementary linguistic propositions. Concerned to 
explain the way that such sentences are actually used in social activity, Wittgenstein 
concluded that to understand reality through language was to engage in complex social 
practices which defied the atomised logic and positivist/empiricist explanations of the 
empirical moment in "understanding". It was, he argued, necessary to concentrate not on
^W ittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, section 23.
65Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, cited in Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, p.23.
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the logical independence of things, but on the systemic relationship between them which 
invests them with social meaning.66
This critique of atomism was complemented by W ittgenstein's attack on 
essentialism in Logical Positivism. He argued that a general theory of language which 
sought to reduce everyday understandings of terms to a singular essentialist meaning 
missed the point, about the multiplicity of meanings to be found in social activity. 
Accordingly, the meaning of a term/word/symbol could not be assumed to correspond to 
some essential (and externally derived) foundation or object, but was dependent upon the 
particular constitutive role it had in particular socio-linguistic systems or "language 
games." 67 Wittgenstein's later position, pregnant with implications for Critical Social 
Theory perspectives across the disciplines, was centred thus on a set of interlocking 
propositions which maintained that:
There are no independent or objective sources of support outside of human 
thought and human action...There is no standard or objective reality (always 
fixed, never changing) against which to compare or measure a universe of 
discourse...nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be 
used to justify, for example, a statement's truth or falsity. The only possible 
justification lies in the linguistic practices which embody them: how people 
think and speak, and how they live.68
To conceive of language in this way - not as an exclusively descriptive medium but as a 
"form of life", a process intrinsic to human social activity - is, in effect, to convert nouns 
into verbs. To "speak" in this sense is to "do": to engage in a speech act is to give 
meaning to the activities which make up social reality. Language thus no longer describes 
some essential hidden reality, it is inseparable from the (necessarily social) construction 
of that reality. In this context, the starting point for any investigation of reality is the
^W ittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, section 65.
6 7Ibid, section 65; see also J. Austin, Philosophical Papers edited by J. Urmson and G. Wamock 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
^Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge, p.30.
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relationship between the rules and conventions of specific "language games" or "forms of 
life" and their socio-historical and cultural meaning.69
The Wittgensteinian dissent against Logical Positivism opened up for critical 
inquiry much that had been effectively closed off under the intellectual imperialism of the 
modem (post-Cartesian) approach to knowledge and society. His sociology of language 
perspective represented (like post-modernist discourses) more than a discourse of 
"words", somehow detached from the non-discursive realm. It maintained, instead, that 
the rules which govern the way that speech acts take place represented a specific 
understanding and organisation of social life. Consequently, the study of language and 
its rules of grammar become, simultaneously, an investigation of reality in the world. 
Importantly too, in casting doubt upon the "correspondence theory" of truth, and the 
relationship between the thinking subject and the (external) object, analytical attention was 
focused away from individual cognition and "psychological" processes and toward a 
theory of action set upon the way that, in social circumstances, people describe and enact 
their reality.
The insights of Quine and Wittgenstein, therefore, have acted as a catalyst for 
much of the critical reassessment of Anglo-American thinking on knowledge and society 
in the contemporary period.70 More obviously perhaps than any other post-positivist 
approach touched upon here it has prefigured the Critical Social Theory perspectives of
6°This is a theme very evident in post-modernist literature, of course, although often more directly via 
Sassure than Wittgenstein. It is a theme also that in Chapter Four will be accorded more attention in the 
works of Critical Social Theorists seeking to re-formulate some of the "givens" of linguistic philosophy. 
On this see Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy eds., After Philosophy.
^Stressing the undeterminancy of (empirical) data in social life and the insights of the "linguistic turn", 
Analytical Philosophy has confronted mainstream modernism with at least three major challenges. The 
first has concentrated on the Enlightenment view of reason, articulated in terms which privilege either 
objects or subjects as the foundation of knowledge. Against the universality of this approach there have 
been various expressions of the notion of "language games" and/or "forms of life" emphasising the 
irreducible plurality of truth, argument and validity. The second challenge, has concentrated attention on 
the modernist agent of "reason", the atomised, sovereign subject. The counter argument here has been 
couched in terms of social structures of consciousness, and the proposition that the subject of knowledge 
is always intrinsically and practically engaged with the world, and that our thoughts and language are 
representations of that intrinsic engagement. The third Analytical challenge has problematised the 
"correspondence rule" intrinsic to modernist thought. In its place has come the notion of "objects" as 
always interpreted elements of social, historical and linguistic "meaning".
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the present. Which begs the question of why it been the voices of Habermas and 
Foucault that had most impact upon Anglo-American critique in this regard and not the 
more direct heirs of Quine and Wittgenstein (i.e. why not Davidson or Dummett or 
Putnam or Searle?). There are a number of reasons that might be advanced for this, one 
of which suggests that for all its critical potential and insight, Analytical Philosophy has 
not broken free of the repressive impact of modernism. At one level, of course, this 
might be explained in relation to the "conservative" tendencies within the seminal works 
of figures such as Quine and Wittgenstein.
Quine, for example, did a "Hume" in the sense that having effectively illustrated 
the inadequacy of positivist approaches, and indeed any notion of realism based on 
empiricist principles, he then continued to advocate an empiricist basis for logical 
analysis. As Aronowitz has noted (in terms which re-emphasise the Cartesian anxiety) 
Quine, and many of those who followed him in the Analytical Philosophy school 
decided, ultimately, to hold on to the "boundary's edge" of science, and the traditional 
logic of language, rather than confront the possibilities beyond that boundary.71 
Wittgenstein’s "conservatism" was articulated in another way. In Philosophical 
Investigations, for example, in discussing the purposes of his new philosophy of 
language, Wittgenstein proposed that:
philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in 
the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves 
everything as it is.72
Commentators such as John Thompson have focused on this statement as 
important in understanding why Analytical Philosophy, as a whole, has not carried 
through the critical enterprise it seemed set to perform for Western social theory. The 
point, Thompson argued, is that while post-Wittgensteinian scholarship, in general, has 
stressed the "meaningful and social character of human action" it has often effectively
71 Aronowitz, Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modem Society (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), pp.242-243.
72Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p.49.
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"disregarded considerations such as power and repression, history and social change" 
and has failed to emphasise strongly enough the connection between the "problem of 
understanding" and "considerations of explanation and critique". The problem, in short, 
is that "language" based analysis of the Analytical Philosophy variety does not always 
ground its inquiry strongly or unequivocally enough in the everyday practices of political 
society.73 As another commentator has suggested, in much Analytical Philosophy, 
"theory and criticism, explanation and enlightenment disappear together, and give way to 
a conservative descriptivism".74 On the question, therefore, of why Habermas and 
Foucault are at the forefront of Critical Social Theory in the 1980s and 1990s, and not 
Analytical Philosophers, the answer perhaps lies the (modemist) conservatism of a "post­
positivist" claimant which does not emphatically enough connect knowledge to power.
But there is another, more precise, reason for the suspicion about Analytical 
Philosophy in Critical Social Theory circles. It has to do with its continuing and 
paradoxical commitments to modernist foundationalism. These commitments were 
evident in a recent article written by Michael Dummett, which complained about the 
continuing "scandal" of a modem philosophy "that through most of its history [has] failed 
to be system atic".75 This "scandal", opined Dummett, emanated from a basic 
misunderstanding of the "real" nature of philosophy, and the "repeated illusions" 
associated with the post-Kantian attempt to find a foundation for human knowledge. 
Thus:
Husserl believed passionately that he at last held the key that would unlock 
every philosophical door; the disciples of Kant ascribed to him the 
achievement of devising a correct philosophical methodology; Spinoza 
believed that he was doing for philosophy what Euclid had done for
73Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, pp.4-8.
74Hans Albert, cited in Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p. 137.
75Dummett, "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?", in After Philosophy eds. 
Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, p.212. The significance of the article is enhanced by Richard Bernstein's 
view that Dummett is regarded by some as the leading British philosopher of the contemporary period, 
Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.5, and by Dummett's own view of the closeness of British and 
(North) American thinking on the issues he raised, "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic?", pp.193- 
194.
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geometry; and before him, Descartes supposed that he had uncovered the one 
and only proper philosophical m ethod76
So far so good, but in response to these "illusory" enterprises Dummett then spelt 
out what philosophy really is, and what its systematic method ought to be. This he did in 
relation to one unequivocal proposition and "three tenets...common to the entire analytical 
schoo l" .11 The proposition was that "Only with Frege was the proper object of 
philosophy finally established"; the first of the tenets was that "the goal of philosophy is 
the analysis of the structure of thought"; the second, that the study of thought must be 
"sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking"; and the 
third, that "the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of 
language".78
This was the kind of reasoning that led to Richard Rorty's criticism of Analytical
Philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In this work Rorty repudiated the
proposition that philosophy can only be "real" when it is "logical", or more
precisely,when it is reduced to the rigours of the formal mathematised logic associated
with Frege. This, for Rorty, was a perfect example of the continuing commitment within
Analytical Philosophy to the modemist tradition of Descartes, Locke and Kant, that it
ostensibly sought to supersede.79 It was, in Rorty's view, consistent with the:
kind of philosophy which stems from Russell and Frege...[and] classical 
Husserlian phenomenology [which is] simply one more attempt to put 
philosophy in the position which Kant wished it to have - that of judging 
other areas of culture on the basis of its special knowledge of the 
"foundations" of these areas.80
76Ibid, p.215.
77Ibid, emphasis added.
78Ibid.
79See Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp.8-9. 
80Ibid, p.8.
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Consequently, he concluded, Analytical Philosophy, for all its insights, had betrayed any 
critical potential that scholars such as Quine and Wittgenstein had given it and had become 
just:
one more variant of Kantian philosophy, a variant marked principally by 
thinking of representation as linguistic rather than mental, and of philosophy 
of language rather than "transcendental critique" or psychology, as the 
discipline which exhibits the "foundation of knowledge.81
From this perspective, Analytical Philosophy, whose claim to "post-positivism" and 
"post-foundationalism" is centred on its notion of reality as socio-linguistically produced, 
is perceived instead as paradoxically committed to the modernist search for a "permanent, 
neutral framework for inquiry.82 It stands, in this regard, not as a genuine alternative to 
ahistorical foundationalism, but as an "attempt to escape from history - an attempt to find 
nonhistorical conditions of any possible historical [and philosophical] development".83
Rorty’s perspective will receive further attention in Chapter Four. It is, however, 
the final theme he raises here that is of more immediate significance for the present 
discussion, because the question of history as the locus of philosophical discourse is a 
theme integral to hermeneutic scholarship and hermeneutic insight has, to one degree or 
another, informed all of the "post-positivist" perspectives discussed thus far. Something, 
consequently, needs to be said at this point about hermeneutics, as a "post-positivist" 
perspective. In the chapter to follow some of the more critical manifestations of 
hermeneutic thought will be discussed (e.g. of Gadamer) and its influences on Critical 
Theory and post-modernism emphasised. For now my major aim is to connect the broad 
hermeneutic tradition to its more specific influence on orthodox Anglo-American social 
theory, evaluate its "post-positivist/post-foundationalist" status and then, via an
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. 
83Ibid, p.9.
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introductory discussion of Max Weber's hermeneutic perspective, connect it to the "great 
texts/great men" Tradition of International Relations.
Bevond Modernism and Positivism? (v):
Hermeneutics - From Von Humboldt to Dilthev and Weber
The hermeneutic approach has a long and distinguished pedigree in Western philosophy. 
It was integral to both Greek and Roman attempts to "interpret" reality in the ancient 
world. In the post-Reformation period, in Europe, it was articulated most commonly in 
philological texts, in jurisprudence, and increasingly, as pan of a German based 
Protestant reformism, which maintained that the new world of scientific rationality could 
be understood most profoundly by reference to historical and cultural tradition (e.g. as 
interpreted through the Christian scriptures) .84 In the full flush of the Enlightenment, 
however, the gap between the increasingly influential scientific approach and the 
hermeneutic philosophy of textual interpretation began to widen as logical calculation and 
empirical analysis gained ascendancy over cultural tradition and scriptural exegesis.
The Enlightenm ent, nevertheless, was the catalyst for a new form of 
"philosophical hermeneutics" which understood itself as a humanist alternative to 
"mechanical" modernism. In this period hermeneutic scholars, such as Wolff and 
Chladenius, began to shift their attention away from a primary concern with philology 
and jurisprudence and toward the construction of a philosophy which rested, not on the 
certainties of natural science, but on "certain generally applicable rules and
^ S e e  the discussion of the development of hermeneutic theory and practice in Karl Mueller-Vollmer, The 
Hermeneutics Reader Texts of the German Tradition From The Enlightenment to the Present (New York: 
Continuum, 1985). Other useful overview works include William Outhwaite, Understanding Social Life 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975); Fred Dallymar and Thomas McCarthy eds., Understanding 
Social Inquiry (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Hekman, Hermeneutics and 
the Sociology of Knowledge: Hekman, Weber, the Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory (South 
Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory; 
and David Boucher, Texts in Context (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985).
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principles...valid for all those those fields of knowledge which rely on interpretation".85 
By the Nineteenth century this hermeneutic perspective was articulated increasingly as 
part of that broad Romanticist movement which held significant sectors of the central 
European intellectual community in its grasp. Consequently, in the atmosphere of the 
(anti-modernist) new aesthetics of Fichte, Schelling and the Schlegels, German thinkers 
such as Schleiermacher, and later, Von Humboldt, began to reformulate elements of 
Kantian thought into an approach to knowledge and society which focused on human 
rationality in the socio/cultural process of understanding - Verstehen. Following the lead 
of the historian/theologian, Schleiermacher, this hermeneutic approach sought to oppose 
what it saw as positivism's one sided ahistorical perspective with an explanation of reality 
emanating from a historical and cultural dialectic, as expressed in textual language. This, 
it was argued, was not a process in which a passive subject received and ordered sense 
data, but in which a language tradition represented an individual's "life process". As Von 
Humboldt put it "language is never a mere tool of communication, but an imprint of the 
mind and the world-view of the speaker".86
Conceived of (by Droysen) as the "Bacon of the historical sciences",87 Von 
Humboldt became a significant figure in the hermeneutic story, both for his direct 
intellectual contribution and for his influence upon the work of scholars such as 
Troeltsch, Droysen, Cassirer, Meinecke, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer.88 Von 
Humboldt insisted that we come to "know" and give meaning to the world not through 
some passive encounter with external sense data, but through a creative social process in 
which the human mind is shaped by, and shapes, cultural reality in language. He 
explicitly rejected a trait that was to characterise later hermeneutic thinking (e.g. from 
Dilthey to Collingwood) which maintained that language was a neutral means of
8^See Mueller-Vollmer, The Hermeneutic Reader, p.4. 
86Ibid, p.12.
87 Ibid.
88Ibid, p.13.
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"transferring" meanings from one mind to another. Rather, argued Von Humboldt, there 
is nothing "in" the mind, as such, to transfer. Instead, and here his influence upon 
Gadamer and Habermas is evident, "meaning", he argued, is a matter of active linguistic 
competence (Sprachkraft) which arises from the human social process - from the 
dialectical interaction of mind and the social use of grammar. Language in this sense (as 
it was for the later Wittgenstein) is produced from and by the relationship between 
"things" (e.g. individual minds/language structures) rather than an essence or property of 
"things", as it was for positivism.
This for Von Humboldt was the basis of an alternative "objective" science of 
social life, which did not reduce human existence to the mechanistic scientism of 
positivism. Consequently, while he stressed the differences between languages (as 
social/cultural "life processes") he stressed also that in the process of understanding these 
differences, one goes beyond the limits of one's own (social, historical, cultural) being, 
and connects (via speech, writing, texts) with a broader, shared process of human 
understanding per se. In short, one engages in "elementary forms of linguistic 
understanding and communication which [occur] in all human societies".89 Von 
Humboldt believed it possible to derive from this hermeneutic format a mediated science 
of human history and culture, centred on an interpretation of temporally and 
geographically diverse language forms, which, in an important sense, existed 
"independently" of time and space (in socio-cultural meaning, art and literature) and were 
susceptible, accordingly, to social scientific inquiry.90 In Von Humboldt's terms this
89Ibid, p.14. This is a notion that in recent times has been re-convened in the work of Gadamer (and 
Ricoeur), I will say something of this in the next chapter.
°°Here too are obvious connection points with later Wittgensteinian themes and those of Winch. At the 
same time there is a "transcendental" neo-Kantian theme here that has been utilised in various ways over 
the years, most notably by Popper in his nouon of an objective "third world" of theories and in another 
sense by Weber, in distinguishing the "objective" residue of the means/ends process. I will return to this 
latter theme at the end of the chapter.
143
was a scientific approach without the kind of foundationalism he perceived in positivism 
and in the teleology of Hegel and Marx.91
It was against this background, and with Comtean influence sweeping through 
European and North American intellectual communities that, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the hermeneutic approach sought to repudiate what the historian, Droysen, 
described the "crass positivism which unfortunately if finding great support in the 
development of the German sciences".92 Droysen's response was to reject the notion of 
writing "objective" history or recreating the past, as it "really" happened. Rather, he 
argued, the historian deals with the "things" of the past (ideas, institutions, texts, 
practices) in the present, and the interpretative practices of the present can never be 
detached from the "objective" happenings of the past.93
Having made these important incursions into modernism and positivism, 
however, Droysen, it seemed, sought the same kind of foundationalist certainty that has 
characterised modernist thought since Descartes. The "Cartesian anxiety", in this case, 
was to have a decisive impact upon later hermeneutic approaches. This is because - in 
reformulating the work of Von Humboldt - Droysen shifted hermeneutic thought, 
increasingly, toward a (rationalist) concern with "psychological, emotional and spiritual 
themes". Seeking to go beyond the ambiguities and differences of a reality based on
9 in d eed  he explicitly distanced his historical analysis from that of Marxism (and the historical 
objectivism of Von Ranke) on the basis that such approaches search for "final causes" and the "ideal 
whole" where none existed, ibid, pp.15-16. As Mueller-Vollmer points out Von Humboldt was sensitive 
here to the issue of the "hermeneutic circle" or "double hermeneutic" issue. He stressed in this regard that 
the events of the past do not exist as real independent objects in the positivist sense but that it is the 
historian that "must supply the inner coherence and unite the individual events without which [such] 
events would be meaningless". The point of course is that in interpreting individual events as part of 
cohesive explanatory whole by which they are to be understood (including the notion that there is no 
'whole') there can be no meaningful distinction drawn between individual, contingent parts and the 
interpreted whole which positivism in all its variants, insists upon.
92Ibid, p. 19.
9^Ibid, p.19. In terms of the "hermeneutic circle" thus: "the part is understood within the whole from 
which it originated, and the whole is understood from the part in which it finds expression".
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culturally expressed language, he sought a more profound "internal" locus of 
understanding, centred in "the attitude, intention or state of mind of its originator".94
At the height of (explicit) positivist influence, in the late nineteenth century, this
"internal" focus in hermeneutics was central also to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, who, in
developing further the "psychic" theme, sought to counter mechanistic explanations of
knowledge and society by emphasising some fundamental differences between the natural
and human sciences. Ultimately, argued Dilthey, the knowledge of the human sciences
was independent of that of the natural sciences and for this reason alone the positivist
quest was an illusory and inappropriate one. The "post-positivist" result, however, was a
hermeneutic approach resonant with modernist influences and implications which stressed
an extreme form of individualism (albeit of the psychic rather than the utilitarian kind)
with major solipsistic tendencies. In Dilthey's terms this approach was inherently
superior to any form of positivism because (in neo-Kantian fashion) it went beyond the
passive reordering of externally given "fact" and instead:
[ejxamined manifestations of human creativity and intentionality...[by] 
recapturing in past documents and past records the original spirit that 
animated their authors.95
In his later works the extreme psychologism of Dilthey's approach was mediated 
somewhat by the impact upon it of Hegel and the phenomenology of Husserl.96 
Consequently, the attempt to secure a foundation for human science in a psychologically 
based theory of knowledge was presented more in terms of a socio-cognitive dialectic in 
which outer "extemalisations" of language always correspond to an "inner" (and basic) 
understanding of everyday life. In other words, and in a way similar to the (later) 
Wittgenstein, there was in Dilthey's hermeneutics (albeit faintly) the notion that reality is 
not independent of language, but that language and the social practices it gives meaning to
94 Ibid. 
95Ibid, p.23. 
% Ibid, p.25.
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is reality. Interpreting "meaning" in texts, therefore, was to engage in a process by which 
reality is constructed and reconstructed across time and culture.
It was via this later perspective of Dilthey that the hermeneutic approach began to 
influence Anglo-American, particularly British scholarship, in the first quarter of this 
century. Its impact upon Collingwood, Oakeshott, Greenleaf and the British history of 
ideas school has been documented by David Boucher, who has identified the hermeneutic 
approach in this way:
Its central concern [was] with the search for the author, for the understanding 
that historical actors had of the situation in which they found themselves. It 
concerned itself with the integrity and autonomy of cultures and the authors 
who wrote within these confines. It assumed that the meanings which 
individuals hoped to convey were somehow fixed in the artifacts they 
produced, or in the languages they used. Sensitive intelligent research 
exegesis, it was believed, guided by hermeneutic principles, would enable 
the student to recover, re-enact, or even re-experience the original meaning, 
or at least come very close to this ideal.97
This Anglo-American hermeneutic approach has had a chequered history in 
relation to social theory, in general, and International Relations in particular. At one level 
- as expressed in Collingwood's work - it has had little influence on either. At another 
level - via Weber (and to a lesser extent Mannheim) - it becomes a significant issue for the 
discussions to follow, particularly in Chapters Five to Nine. The impact of Weber's 
thinking upon the exemplar Realist, Hans Morgenthau, is an issue for specific debate in 
Chapter Six. But the broader significance of Weberian thought can be signified at this 
point by touching briefly on an adaption to hermeneutic thinking contained within his 
work, as it was transferred to Anglo-American social theory.
The primary distinction here centred on the mediating influences of neo-Kantian 
scholars, such as Rickert and Simmel, who sought to shift Verstehen scholarship away 
from its psychological emphasis (Geisteswissenschaften) to a more specific study of 
cultural issues (Kulturwissenschaften). This shift in emphasis was characterised by a 
more thorough attempt to integrate social and psychological factors than had been the case
97Boucher, Texts in Context, p.5.
146
even in Dilthey's later work. Its aim was to overcome the narrow egocentrism associated 
with Dilthey's approach while retaining his basic distinction between the "cultural" and 
"natural" sciences.98
Weber sought to employ this adapted Verstehen approach in the quest for the great 
synthesis of the age - the bringing together in a coherent theoretical matrix of a Germanic 
interpretivist approach and British and French positivist/empiricism. In so doing, he 
confronted, in a highly sophisticated manner, the problems of inductivism and solipsism, 
and in particular the notion of a logical separation between fact and value. What Weber 
proposed (like Popper later), was that though fact was always culturally derived and 
value laden, it was nevertheless possible to perceive of it in independently verifiable 
(scientific) terms. The contradiction seemingly inherent in this conclusion was explained 
away by Weber in terms which saw him reformulate the knowledge process and radically 
limit the capacity of the "social" sciences.
His ultimate perspective was a classically modemist one in which the old 
philosophical questions of epistemology and methodology were reduced to an 
instrumental relationship between a scientifically deduced "is" and a culturally derived 
"ought". In this way Weber sought to answer the question haunting modernist thought 
since Descartes and Hume: how is it possible to speak scientifically of reality in human 
society when, in that context, understanding of reality is dependent upon intersubjective 
meaning bestowed upon it by subjectivised objects?. The solution was provided by 
Weber's notion of a limited scientific objectivism, and a means/ends logic of technical 
rationality.99 More specifically, Weber limited his critical scientific attention to the 
"object" of inquiry, assumed to be an individual actor acting in a "rational" manner (i.e.
^D allm ayr and McCarthy eds.. Understanding Social Inquiry, pp.1-25.
99On this point see May Brodbeck ed., Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: 
Macmillan, 1968), pp.14-34, 85-97; Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory; An 
Analysis of the Writing of Marx. Dürkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971), p. 135; Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, pp.90-3; Hekman, "Beyond Humanism", 
pp.24-30.
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that which was purposeful in relation to the attempt to attain particular interests or ends). 
Given this important assumption, the scientific problem associated with overcoming 
intersubjective meanings was effectively dissipated by a perspective that conceived of 
"meaning" as an irreducible quality generated through the pursuit of individual (pre­
given) ends or interests. From this theoretical position it became possible to calculate and 
predict (in a limited scientific fashion) the behaviour of actors following culturally 
constructed interests or ends.100
By assuming a means/ends rationality for all actors (either observing subjects or 
observed objects in the social sciences) a (positivist) distinction is thus drawn between the 
process by which the value laden, socially constructed premises of the observer are 
derived (the process by which an observer selects and prescribes as valuable a particular 
fact/event/object) and that process by which the actions of those observed are ultimately 
described and evaluated. 101 Consistent with Weber's means/ends logic, values, ethics or 
normative theories of all kinds, in either the observed or the observer, are taken as given 
and deleted from useful scientific discourse. The social scientific enterprise accordingly 
is one which can only make judgement upon the behaviour associated with pre-given 
ends.
In this way W eber solved the modernist epistemological conundrum for 
contemporary social theory and Anglo-American political science in particular. And, as 
we shall see, this is precisely the way the Weberian Verstehen perspective has been 
utilised by Realist theorists in International Relations. 102 Here, the behaviour of the 
observed actors (individual states) is taken as "given": i.e. perceived as motivated by the 
rational pursuit of pre-given (and culturally determined) ends or interests. As a
1 ^ G iddens, Capitalism and Modem Social Theory, pp. 133-6; Giddens, Studies in Social and Poliucal 
Theory, pp.80-95; Hekman,"Beyond Humanism", pp.18-26,153-161.
1^* 1This is the basis of Popper's and Lakatos' claims to have gone beyond the Humean paradox.
^A shley,"T he Poverty of Neorealism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.225-286, at pp.250- 
3.
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consequence, the observing scholar is relieved of the tiresome task of scholarly reflection 
upon the theoretical nature of either object or subject. 103
Some of the direct implications of this Weberian connection will be addressed in 
Chapters Five to Nine. Emphasised at that time will be the continuing faith in the "unity 
of science" thesis, in Weber's work, and its methodological individualism and rational 
choice themes. It will be argued, ultimately, that the transplanted and very sensitive 
Weberian image of "reality" has, if anything, increased the tendency towards positivist 
closure in International Relations. This might seem a rather strange judgement given the 
undoubted sophistication and insight of Weber’s hermeneutic approach. Susan Hekman, 
however, has illuminated the issue in a useful way with her discussion of Verstehen 
themes in social theory generally.104 The problem with Verstehen approaches, argued 
Hekman, lies not so much in what they say but in their silences and omissions. More 
explicitly, in seeking to distinguish the human from the natural sciences many of the most 
influential "post-positivist" approaches under the Verstehen rubric fail to confront the 
foundationalism which affords positivism its objectivist logic and which, in turn provides 
its social science legitimacy. Verstehen approaches, accordingly, for all their critical 
insight on the problems of objective knowledge in the social sciences, remain effectively 
uncritical on the objectivity question in the natural sciences (e.g. Weber’s faith in 
empiricism).
Indeed in continuing to accept the validity of the (natural) scientific model many of 
the most prominent "post-positivist" approaches continue to privilege the epistemological 
and methodological tenets of empiricism and positivism as the foundation for all 
knowledge, even while repudiating positivism's applicability for the knowledge of human
^ S e e  the discussion of Waltz in the chapter to follow.
^ H ek m a n , Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. Hekman uses the term Verstehen in a 
broader sense than my usage in this chapter. The term Verstehen (process of understanding) in Hekman's 
work refers to a range of approaches, associated (broadly) with a Sociology of Knowledge perspective, 
which have in their diverse ways, challenged the notion that there can be objective scientific knowledge of 
human society akin to that in the natural sciences. The Weberian approach, derived from the hermeneutic 
tradition outlined here is part of this Verstehen tradition.
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society. As such in continuing to acknowledge a fundamental epistemological 
assumption "the opposition of subject and object" (and fact/value etc) Verstehen 
approaches, like Weber's, "represent the other side of the positivist coin".105
This is a point well made by Roy Bhaskar with his insight that:
hermeneuticist and neo-Kantian philosophies of social science tacitly 
presuppose positivism - first in their acceptance of it as the essentially 
unquestioned truth about the world known by natural science; second in their 
reproduction (in transposed forms) of characteristically positivist 
philosophical positions in their accounts of the knowledge of the social 
world .106
The point, to reiterate it, is that the dominant hermeneutic tradition in Anglo- 
American social theory remains, like so many of its counterparts in the "post-positivist" 
debate, discursively committed to the modernist regime of framing so effectively 
represented by positivism across the disciplines. This, of course, is what Mervyn Frost 
was getting at with his proposition that Realist scholarship in International Relations 
remains, for all its professed "difference", captured by the "positivist bias" at its 
metatheoretical core. Frost noted that in both its Traditionalist and more explicit 
"scientific" variant, the Verstehen connection was crucial to the Realist image of the 
world. As the "other side of the positivist coin" it allowed for occasional hermeneutic 
insight (and claims for "post-positivism") whilst retaining for Realism the basic positivist 
dichotomies of subject/object and fact/value, so important for disciplinary identity, the 
means/ends rationality of power politics and an image of the world "out there".107 The
105Ibid, p.99.
1 ^ Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, p.306. The broader significance of this 
theme, for International Relations, has been noted, by Regis Factor and Stephen Turner in Max Weber 
and the Dispute Over Reason and Value, who have concentrated on the relationship between Weber's work 
and that of Morgenthau. This, they argued, is a connection that goes well beyond any generalised 
intersection of Anglo-American and Germanic influences in Morgenthau's approach, to the extent that 
every major idea in Morgenthau's power politics is derived from Weber's hermeneutic perspective. This, 
of course, to some extent explains the tensions in Morgenthau's work which sees him crudely propound 
the existence of "objective laws" at one moment and at another engage in more subtle hermeneutic tones 
on the issue of textual interpretation. In Chapter Six there will be a more comprehensive discussion on 
the implications of this for International Relations.
107Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations. Chapter 1. See the discussion of this 
issue in Chapter One of the thesis, footnotes 24 and 53.
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hermeneutic (Verstehen) perspective, therefore, like all the other "post-positivist" 
approaches addressed in this chapter, is an integral issue in any discussion of 
International Relations, in the 1990s, that seeks to confront the "unwritten preface" in the 
search for "thinking space".
Summary
This chapter has sought, from a number of angles, to develop further some themes 
introduced in Chapters One and Two. These chapters established the framework within 
which a discussion on the "unwritten preface” in International Relations might usefully 
take place. They did so in locating the modemist discourse and its framing regime based 
on a paradoxical foundationalism, as central themes in the "unwritten preface". They 
focused also on the development of positivism as the primary conduit of modemist theory 
and practice in contemporary social theory. Both chapters emphasised the limitations and 
closure associated with this discursive situation. In this chapter the aim was to illustrate 
that it is a situation that remains at the core of Anglo-American social theory scholarship, 
even in the era of "post-positivist" and "post-foundationalist" disavowal of the 
disciplinary past. More specifically, this chapter focused on five "post-positivist" 
approaches which are influential both in the broader social theory context and in the 
extended International Relations agenda of the Third Debate.
The chapter dealt, initially, with the most influential of "post-positivist" claims, in 
this regard, that promoted by Karl Popper and articulated across the Anglo-American 
intellectual community for the past generation. The argument here was that while 
Popper’s contribution has undoubtedly added a degree of sophistication to the (social) 
scientific quest over the years, his Critical Rationalism with its hypothetico-deductive 
method, does not represent a post - positivist position because it remains metatheoretically 
committed to the "empiricist metaphysic" and to the (foundationalist) "unity of science" 
thesis. The rigidity and closure of Popper's approach was illustrated by Thomas Kuhn in
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the early 1970s and Kuhn's paradigm approach gained adherents as a genuinely "post­
positivist" perspective. The chapter turned briefly to this issue. It acknowledged the 
"thinking space" opened up by Kuhn's critique but maintained that its "post" status was 
somewhat problematic given the basic structure of a paradigm logic which understands 
discursive relations in terms of autonomous, hermetically sealed sociological entities - or 
"language communities". This, it was indicated, smacked of the atomised logic of 
modemist thought and of a neo-Kantian positivist universe of "things in themselves". 
The mainly British Scientific Realist perspective was also addressed. Here it was 
recognised that in the work of scholars such as Mary Hesse much interpretivist progress 
has been made within philosophy of science scholarship. It was argued, nevertheless, 
that there are tendencies within Scientific Realist literature that cast serious doubt on its 
claim to have cast off the modernist influences of positivism. In particular, it was argued, 
the lingering influences of a "unity of science" position, and notions of independent 
"structural" element in social reality undermine the "post-positivist" perspectives of 
Scientific Realism.
The contribution of Analytical Philosophy to the breaking down of modemist and 
positivist dominance in social theory is undoubted. In this context Wittgenstein's 
significance was noted and the "linguistic turn" theme acknowledged as an important 
aspect of Critical Social Theory literature of recent years. It was noted too, however, that 
some of the most influential of Analytic arguments over the years - pronouncing the social 
nature of language, the linguistic construction of reality and the end of dichotomised 
thinking in general - have also invoked basic empiricist premises and a "detached" notion 
of philosophical purpose. This, plus the evidence of a continuing zeal for "correct" 
method on the part of major Analytical Philosophers of the present day has led to the 
conclusion that a modemist frame of reference still prevails. This was the conclusion on 
the last of the perspectives addressed in this chapter, that which represents its "post­
positivist" approach as part of the hermeneutic tradition, transferred from (mainly) 
German scholarship in the early years of this century. The discussion here concentrated 
on one of the main avenues of that transference, that via the Verstehen perspective of
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scholars such as Von Humboldt, Dilthey and Weber. The argument here was that 
Verstehen insight has contributed significantly to alleviating some of the cruder aspects of 
positivist based social theory, but that its lingering psychologism and more importantly its 
W eberian based representation of social science objectivism has, if anything, 
strengthened the power of modernism and positivism in Anglo-American social theory, as 
the (hidden) "other side of the positivist coin".
Like much before it in this thesis, this has been a rather truncated discussion of 
some very complex themes. It has not meant to condemn or dismiss, but to problematise, 
in as many ways as possible, one of the major "givens" of recent years in social theory 
and International Relations - the "given" that assumes that positivism is an anachronism 
and that contemporary theory and practice has sloughed off its "primitive" discursive 
characteristics and with it the power of post-Cartesian modernism. The chapter to follow 
seeks to illustrate, more directly, some of the implications of the illusion associated with 
this "given" and then indicate how some of the most interesting of Critical Social Theory 
approaches have sought to overcome its enduring influence, thus opening some "thinking 
space" for critical scholars in International Relations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY AND THE SEARCH FOR THINKING SPACE
Some of the implications of the situation discussed in the previous chapter were
highlighted by Anthony Giddens and Johnathon Turner, in 1987, in a work which
reflected upon the contemporary nature of Anglo-American social theory, and which, in
so doing, affirmed an important thematic connection between the larger interdisciplinary
debates and International Relations.1 This connection concerned the conventional
wisdom, in both contexts, on questions of disciplinary development. Or, as Giddens and
Turner emphasised, it concerned the self understanding of scholars, across the Anglo-
American social theory spectrum th_ theirs was an enterprise marked by pluralism,
intellectual diversity and theoretical tolerance, in the "postpositivist" era. Not so,
suggested Giddens and Turner, because Anglo-American social theory remains
dominated by "a particular set of views influenced by logical empiricism [positivism] in
philosophy" that is concerned, above all, with:
[T]he status of the social sciences, especially in relation to the logic of the 
natural sciences; the nature of the laws of generalisations which can be 
established; the interpretation of human agency and its differentiation from 
objects and events in nature; and the character and form of social 
institutions.2
In more specific terms, Giddens and Turner described an dominant interdisciplinary 
perspective characterised by:
a suspicion of metaphysics, a desire to define in a clear cut way what is to 
count as 'scientific', [and] an emphasis on the testability of concepts and 
propositions and a sympathy for hypothetico-deductive systems.3
ISee Giddens and Turner, Social Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
2Ibid. p .l.
3 Ibid.
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For Giddens, this was confirmation of an earlier judgement.4 In 1982 he concluded that
Anglo-American social theory had not progressed in any fundamental way from the
Logical Positivism of the early Twentieth century, but was now encompassed within a
disciplinary "orthodox consensus". This "orthodox consensus" he characterised as a
static impasse between an often unacknowledged but still potent positivism (e.g.
expressed in Liberal and/or Marxist terms) and an illusory "alternative" derived from the
hermeneutic scholarship of a figure such as Weber, in particular.5 Subsequently, in
1987, Giddens and Turner were able to record that an "orthodox consensus" remained
dominant (if no longer entirely secure) within Anglo-American social theory, while its
mainstream remained committed to a "spectator" theory of knowledge and an
epistemological regime which limited inquiry to questions of:
What is 'out there' in the social universe? What are the fundamental 
properties of the world? What kind of analysis of these properties is possible 
and/or appropriate?6
The discussions in Chapters Two and Three, in particular, sought to explain in 
more detailed fashion, how this has come to be the case in Anglo-American social theory, 
and why, in turn, it is so important that the Realist "orthodox consensus" in International 
Relations be challenged. This chapter is concerned, more directly, with the question of 
what such a challenge should encompass. It seeks, in this regard, to highlight the 
"celebratory" perspectives of much Critical Social Theory literature in the broad social 
theory debate, in order to furnish the discussion of the "unwritten preface" in 
International Relations with a sense of what an alternative critical agenda might look like.7 
It focuses, initially, on a range of critical literature which locates the continuing closure of 
social theory as part of the modernity question, and it then takes a more specific look at
4Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1982).
5Ibid, p.3.
^Giddens and Turner, Social Theory Today, p.7.
7See the discussion on "celebratory" scholarship in Chapter One of the thesis, pp.46-66.
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the two most influential Critical Social Theory perspectives - Critical Theory and post­
modernism. Both approaches will be discussed, initially, in general terms, and then 
something will be said about the tensions between them, on the modernity question. 
Finally, having outlined my concerns about Critical Theory in this context, I will indicate 
my reservations about some aspects of post-modernist scholarship, and conclude the 
chapter by returning to the broader issue of a Critical Social Theory agenda in 
International Relations, and the significance to that agenda of the Critical Theory/post- 
modemism relationship.
Prising Open The "Orthodox Consensus": Some General Perspectives
In the face of the enduring power that is modemist knowledge, the Critical Social Theory 
challenge has emanated, largely, from what Bernstein has described as a "growing sense" 
that "something is wrong with the ways in which the relevant [social theory] issues and 
options are posed" and, increasingly, with a desire to change the "the categorical structure 
and patterns within which we think and act".8 Bernstein, of course, is not the only 
commentator to have represented the critical challenge in these terms. Others too have 
emphasised its connection with a broader sense of crisis in modem life, while, 
simultaneously, recognising the potential for change (and conservative resistance to it). 
Examples of this critical insight have come from a whole range of intellectual locations in 
recent times. The two to follow have particular thematic significance for the discussion in 
later chapters, given their concern with the crisis of modernity and the post-Enlightenment 
pursuit of certainty.
The first comes from Robert Bellah, who in 1985, spoke of some of the
paradoxes of modem life, in these terms:
There is a widespread feeling that the promise of the modem era is slipping 
away from us. A movement of enlightenment and liberation that was to have 
freed us from superstition and tyranny has led in the twentieth century to a
^Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.
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world in which ideological fanaticism and political oppression have reached 
extremes unknown in previous history. Science, which was to have unlocked 
the the bounties of nature, has given us the power to destroy all life on earth. 
Progress, modernity's master idea, seems less compelling today when it 
appears that it may be progress into the abyss. And the globe today is divided 
between a liberal world so incoherent that it seems to be losing the 
significance of its own ideals, an oppressive and archaic communist statism, 
and a poor, often tyrannical third world reaching for the first rungs of 
modernity.9
These are themes that have been taken up, even more profoundly, by Jane Flax, who has 
captured the sense of the Critical Social Theory challenge to modernity, with her 
proposition that:
Something has happened, is happening to Western societies. The beginning 
of this transition can be dated somewhat arbitrarily from after the First World 
War in Europe and after the Second world War in the United States. Western 
culture is in the middle of a fundamental transformation: a "shape of life" is 
growing old. The demise of the old is being hastened by the end of 
colonialism, the uprising of women, the revolt of other cultures against white 
Western hegemony, shifts in the balance of economic and political power 
within the world economy, and a growing awareness of the costs as well as 
the benefits of scientific "progress". Western intellectuals cannot be immune 
from the profound shifts now taking place in contemporary social life.10
For Flax this is a crisis of contemporary society that goes beyond the "sense" that 
something is wrong with the way we ask our questions. It is, more specifically, a 
growing recognition that the Enlightenment dream is over, that, for all its promises, the 
"Enlightenment has failed". Most importantly, argued Flax, in language appropriate for 
the discussion thus far in the thesis:
The political and philosophical aspirations and claims typical of 
Enlightenment thinking appear to have been falsified by that which it was 
supposed to predict yet cannot account for: the subsequent course of Western 
history . 11
Particularly vulnerable in this regard, she suggested, was the scientific philosophy of the 
Enlightenment and its historical narrative of reason, knowledge, progress and freedom.
9R. Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life as cited in D. 
Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel. Heidegger and After (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), p.273.
^ T h ese  are Jane Flax’s insights in, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism, and 
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.5.
11 Ibid, p.7.
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Accordingly, and from all angles, there are fundamental challenges to the "self-certainty
of reason and its science", and, for many in the current period:
It is no longer self evident that there is any necessary connection between 
reason, knowledge, science, freedom and human happiness. Indeed the 
relation between these now appears to be at least partially and irresolvably 
antagonistic. The escape from tutelage through reason and knowledge that 
Kant believed was also the path to freedom may, it seems now, lead instead 
into an even more terrifying enslavement to the products of that 
knowledge.12
This is an important theme in a Critical Social Theory context concerned to open up 
closed theory and practice. At one level, as Flax noted, it has allowed for (effectively) 
silenced voices to be heard again, as those associated with anti-Enlightenment sentiments 
(e.g. Nietzsche) now seem, to many, more like prophets than "cranks".13 It is important 
too because it connects the broader social theory debate starkly and directly to an 
International Relations context
It does so when the developmentalism of the post-Enlightenment period, projected 
via the concepts of progress and rational science, is confronted with some of its sinister 
implications, concerning, for example, the connection between the ascent of the rational 
modem subject and the questions of Hiroshima and Auschwitz. The point here, of 
course, is that a celebration of the age of rational science and modem technological 
society cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass slaughter, of the 
techniques of genocide. Nor can the language and logic of liberty and emancipation be 
easily detached from the terror waged in their names, by, for example, the major Cold 
War foes, each proclaiming itself the natural systemic heir to the Enlightenment dream. 
And while many in the 1990s celebrate the "end" of the Cold War, as the victory of one 
Enlightenment based economic doctrine over another, the other side of this particular coin 
must also be confronted, in the poverty of so much of the world, and in the growing 
underclasses in "developed" societies where neo-classical and neo-Marxian "scientific" 
approaches have dominated the economic debates.
12Ibid, p.8. 
13 Ibid.
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One more point, made towards the end of Chapter One is also now of direct 
significance in this context. It is that the Critical Social Theory approach under 
discussion here, and which informs this thesis, is characterised, above all, by a sense of 
its limitations and by the integrity with which its carries out its critique. There can be, 
accordingly, no retreat to simple formulae, and/or respectable polemic. Hence, the 
reluctance of a scholar like Flax to simply condemn the Enlightenment (or more precisely 
its dominant scientific project) in favour of some ready made alternative "realism", 
unfettered by its distorting influences. The alternative she offers, consequently, is 
predicated not on the regurgitated certainties of intellectual/institutional conventional 
wisdom, but on a willingness to confront the "intellectual vertigo" of an approach which 
acknowledges the ambiguities, paradoxes and uncertainties of everyday life .14 More 
precisely, any Critical Social Theory approach of this kind must represent itself in 
ambivalent terms for, just as we cannot separate the terror that is modernity from the 
liberty that is modernity, neither can we, the products of modernity, simply detach from it 
our alternative suggestions for the future.15
This perception, of course, is no source of comfort for contemporary thinkers, 
critically inclined, or otherwise. Indeed, as Flax has put it, "the more the fault lines in 
previously unproblematic ground become apparent, the more frightening it appears to be 
without ground" .16 Hence the "intellectual vertigo"she speaks of. There are, however, 
many who have taken up the challenge of modernity in a positive, constructive manner: 
still suffering from "vertigo" to be sure, still shaken by both the extraordinary 
achievement and colossal brutality that is their heritage, but now no longer willing to 
celebrate the former while remaining blind to the latter. This has meant more than a 
surface level consciousness of the need to think and act in more sensitive and tolerant
14Ibid, p.6.
15Making Marx's (Hegelian) point again in a different circumstance, Rax thus acknowledged that "even 
revolutionary philosophies bear the mark of the tradition out of which they arose and against which they 
rebel", ibid, p.10.
16Ibid, p.6
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ways. It has meant a more profound willingness to critically confront the way we think 
and act, to strip bare the very basis of thinking and acting, to reinterrogate its meaning 
and the ways we legitimate the social and intellectual "givens" that for so long have been 
reality - the way the world is, "out there". It has provoked the widespread Critical Social 
Theory challenges to modernity and positivist social theory in recent years, as scholars 
from a range of disciplinary backgrounds have sought different ways to understand the 
world and speak of change within it. This has been an attitude evident, for example, in 
debates over contemporary philosophy, where Critical Social Theory perspectives have 
prompted a significant reassessment of some intellectual and institutional sacred cows.
Questioning the "Perennial Questions": Reassessing Contemporary Philosophy
The nature of the Critical Social Theory challenge to philosophy is exemplified in a 
number of recent works. Prominent among them is Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, and two edited collections concerned with developments in Post 
Analytic Philosophy and the nature of Western thought After Philosophy.17 The overall 
thrust of these works is that the dominant (foundational) reference points for mainstream 
philosophical inquiry are now under more severe and fundamental challenge than at any 
time since Descartes introduced the "deep assumptions, commitments and metaphors" of 
modern philosophical rationality .18 The general tone of the works is perhaps best 
summed up in the proposition that, for many in the contemporary period "philosophy is at 
a turning point, that things philosophical cannot simply go on as they have".19
^R orty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); John 
Rajchman and Cornell West eds., Post Analytic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985); Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy eds., After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation? (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1987). Another in this idiom is John Dunne s 
Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
^Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.
19This is in the Introduction to Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, After Philosophy, p.2.
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There are many variations on this theme among contributors to these works, but 
the arguments tend to focus on three aspects of "things philosophical". The first concerns 
the rationality premise as it has been most influentially projected in post-Cartesian 
philosophy. The more specific critical target, in this regard, is the formalism associated 
with rational inquiry, which, following Hume and Kant, allowed modem conservatives 
and radicals alike to represent their philosophical discourses in terms of certain invariant 
principles of meaning. The second critical focus, interwoven with the first, concerns the 
sovereign, rational subject of modem philosophy. Represented principally in atomised, 
disengaged terms (e.g. the autonomous "individual" in market Liberalism and/or 
intuitivist Conservatism) or as partially "completed" (e.g. the Marxian class actor coming 
to consciousness) the modem subject is projected as the transparent human agency of a 
universalised rationality, which can be (epistemologically) "known".20 The third focus of 
critique makes more explicit the philosophical idiom within which this notion of reason 
and its transparent subject have been most commonly "known" in modem philosophy - 
the language idiom. Here, it is argued, even following the "linguistic turn" in Analytical 
Philosophy, the modem subject has remained effectively detached from an independent 
world of (corresponding) objects, which in rational terms are represented through 
language. In this context, the task of the philosopher seeking to "know" this objective 
reality is to determine the truth content, or otherwise, of "speech acts".
This modernist regime of framing, with its universalised notion of rationality, has 
now been confronted by the notion of the "irremediably local character of all truth, 
argument and validity".21 The totality, unity and certainty associated with post-Kantian 
philosophy has been countered with arguments exposing its fallibility, its historical and 
cultural variability and its heterogeneity. Consequently, foundationalism has been
20()r, o f course, as the sovereign individual state of International Relations. 
21 Ibid, p.4.
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rejected, in any form .22 The central figure of modem philosophy - the rational subject - 
has been confronted with its "other" side - as articulated in the works of scholars like 
Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Emphasised, also, has been the proposition that 
"mind" will be "misconceived if it is opposed to "body", as will "theory" if it is opposed 
to "practice". Accordingly:
the subject of knowledge is essentially embodied and practically engaged 
with the world: and the products of our thought bear the ineradicable traces of 
our purposes and projects, passions and interests...[Consequently] it is no 
longer possible to ignore the intrinsically social character of the "structures of 
consciousness," the historical and cultural variability of categories of thought 
and principles of action [and] their interdependence with the changing forms 
of social and material production.23
This perspective, of course, has implications for any understanding of the nature
and place of language in the world. Consequently, there is repudiation of "linguistically
naked" objects in the world, and notions of disengaged subjects observing and
(retrospectively) representing such objects in linguistic terms. Rather, it is suggested:
the condition of our forming disinterested representation of the world is that 
we be already engaged with it. And the kinds of representation we form will 
depend on the kind of dealings we have with it.24
Or, this more emphatic statement of language as an inexorably social phenomenon:
Man makes the world, and the world means nothing which man has not made 
it mean, and that only to some other man.25
At one level, then, and in reiterating forgotten and/or ignored themes from the later 
Wittgenstein in particular, the critical debates in philosophy have charged that the objects
22Ibid. My commentary here is generalised, and I am aware that some of the contributors to these works 
are not always consistent in their application of these principles. This of course is strikingly evident in 
relation to Rorty who in so many ways is the epitome of the anti-foundationalist scholar, while as David 
Campbell has shown a crude foundationalist when it come to Cold War issues. See Campbell, "Global 
Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", Alternatives XV (1990), pp.263-286 at 
p.265. The general themes are nevertheless, I think, an accurate representation of the new philosophical 
position, at least in intent
23Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, After Philosophy, p.4.
24Ibid, p.5.
25These are the words of the Pragmatist philosopher Charles Pierce as cited in Rorty's, "Pragmatism and 
Philosophy" in ibid, p.34.
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of real knowledge in the world are always pre-interpreted, always, "textually" located and 
formed. Similarly, the subjects of real knowledge - the interpreters and namers of objects 
- are always in and of the text, themselves interpreted and named by it. Language, in this 
sense, can never be a neutral tool by which the thinking subject describes (the subjects 
and objects of) reality, nor can such descriptions be simply or objectively evaluated for 
their linguistic truth content. Rather, language is the medium by which reality is "made'’ - 
by which, over time, the real nature of subjects and objects are textually framed and 
reframed in the particular social, cultural and linguistic discourses within which notions 
of evaluation and truth are constructed.
An important and related theme in this reassessment of philosophy is the notion of
philosophical knowledge as social practice. In Rorty's terms, thus:
if we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather 
than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to envisage a 
metapractice which will be the critique of all possible forms of social 
practice.26
Rorty's point here is significant in any attempt to "reframe" the modem, in that once the 
"meaning" of "real" knowledge is released from its dominant representation in the modem 
philosophical story, there is space for a "conception of philosophy [and social theory] 
which has nothing to do with the quest for certainty".27 This is an exiting prospect for 
Rorty because in breaking down the "urge to see social practices of justification as more 
than just such practices" the possibility arises for a more profound understand of 
humankind which recognises that "knowledge" and "language" have no ultimate referents 
but are socio/cultural tools for coping with constructed (and therefore changeable) 
reality .28 This might allow different questions to be asked of a closed regime of 
understanding. Thus, instead of constraining theory and practice to the structured 
relationship between universalised categories - a given subject and a given object - the
2^Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p.171. 
27Ibid, p.171.
28Ibid, p.390.
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task of understanding becomes a historical inquiry into the multifarious vocabularies of 
meaning across different cultures, epoches and social practices, in the search for a 
practical knowledge concerning the:
relations between alternative standards of justification [for social practice] 
and...actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual [and 
social] history.29
It is in this context that Rorty has appealed for a reassessment of the work of 
Wittgenstein - as a bridge into a non-determined space where the closures of modernism 
give way to a genuine pluralism and a different set of attitudes to intellectual and social 
conflict. Rorty has called too for a new philosophy, acknowledging pragmatist themes, 
which re-establishes a broad hermeneutic approach to knowledge and society. 
Recognising the problems of his position Rorty has explained that the term, 
hermeneutics, used in this way is:
not the name for a discipline, nor for a method of achieving the sort of results 
which epistemology failed to achieve...[but] an expression of hope that the 
cultural space left by epistemology will not be filled - that our culture should 
become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no 
longer felt.30
More concisely, the call for a critical hermeneutic philosophy by Rorty is an appeal for a 
contemporary perspective which escapes from the modernist urge toward homogeneity, 
unity, and sovereignty and the foundationalism that acts as the (ultimate) justification for 
power politics. It is an appeal for a new more profound conversation among 
contemporary peoples, a conversation which recognises the problems of different, 
competing discourses but presupposes no independent constraints and considers that the 
"hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation lasts".31 It is in regard to this 
kind of "conversation" that something needs to be said also about the contribution of
29Ibid.
30Ibid, p.315. 
31 Ibid, p.318.
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Hans Georg Gadamer to a Critical Social Theory approach concerned to overcome the 
modemist way of framing.
Gadamer and a Critical Hermeneutics of Praxis.
Gadamer's hermeneutic approach differs from those that preceded it in a number of 
important ways. It shares a legacy with Schleiermacher and Von Humboldt, but it draws 
its influence also from figures such as Heidegger, and from classical Greek scholarship 
(e.g. via the Aristotelian notion of phronesis).32 Gadamer, in Truth and Method, for 
example, defined his critical hermeneutics as a universal approach to understanding which 
comes to know the world through the interpretation of texts in history, as they express 
their "Dasein" - their "basic being in motion...[a] being that can be understood is 
language".33 This marked Gadamer's attempt to redefine the Western philosophical story 
in terms which saw it as an ongoing conversation, and which recognised no distinction in 
understanding between the scientific and the social world.34
32See Gadamer. Truth and Method trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Sea bury Press, 
1975). Importantly also Gadamer's hermeneutics takes an unequivocal stand on the question of the 
subjective objectivism of scientific hermeneutics. It rejects the very notion that all social thinking is 
"subjective" on the basis that such a position merely continues the modernist dichotomy of subject/object 
and the quest that sees a search for the latter in the pure methods and principles of science. In Truth and 
Method, first published (in German) in 1960, Gadamer indicated his alternative position by proposing 
that:
I [do] not remotely intend to deny the necessity of methodological work within the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Nor [do I] propose to revive the ancient dispute on 
method between the natural and the human sciences...[instead] the question I have asked 
seeks to discover and bring into consciousness something that methodological dispute 
serves only to conceal and neglect, something that does not so much confine or limit 
modem science as precede it and make it possible.
Ibid, p.xvii. Gadamer in this passage points to a notion of hermeneutics with ambitions far beyond those 
of its earlier advocates which seeks to understand the "truth" of the human sciences beyond questions of 
method. Indeed in prescribing this task for his study Gadamer proposed that hermeneutics was concerned 
with questions beyond those of (conventionally understood) epistemology - it was he suggested concerned 
with questions of (ontological) "being" that are intrinsic to human life per se.
33Ibid, pp.xxii-xxiii.
34This made his hermeneutics distinctly different of course. In acknowledging no special status to 
scientific knowledge Gadamer intersects with scholars such as Hesse and Bhaskar, but unlike those who 
also perceive of a unity of hermeneutic knowledge Gadamer's position contains no privileged place either 
for a "structural" foundation.
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From this perspective, Gadamer pronounced the modemist story a particular 
image of the world derived from the "unbroken tradition of [Western] rhetorical and 
humanist culture" which had been metamorphosed into a universalised and "objectivist" 
framework of understanding via positivist scientism, in particular.35 In this way, he 
suggested, a latent Cartesianism had transfixed earlier hermeneutic thought, trapping it 
within a dichotomised metatheory. Similarly the notion of reason and rationality in 
"scientific" (e.g. Dilthey's) hermeneutics, for all its commitment to historico-cultural 
inquiry, was still set in terms which posited a distinction between (universal) reason and 
(cultural) tradition, between (foundational) rationality and (socio-historical) prejudice. 
Importantly, however, Gadamer considered it possible to reclaim this story for those 
written out of it, by serious interpretative regard for the humanist anti-modernism in, for 
example, art and literature.
Consequently, and in terms which link him to Habermas, post-Wittgensteinian 
thought and (with qualifications) to post-modernism, Gadamer insisted on a historically 
and culturally situated "reason" which, in its various language traditions, exhibited its 
essentially human quality. It was in this context too that Gadamer sought to overcome the 
legacy of foundationalism. This, strange as it might seem, is where Gadamer returned to 
the Greek Classical texts in order to reconvene a practical philosophical perspective set in 
terms of "praxis" rather than "techne". This "praxis" for Gadamer was closely identified 
with the Aristotelian notion of phronesis. For Aristotle and for Gadamer (and in modified 
form for Habermas) the importance of phronesis is that it represents an alternative 
knowledge form and way of understanding from both episteme (scientific knowledge) 
and techne (technical knowledge). In contrast phronesis is concerned with practical- 
ethical knowledge, with understanding the human world and learning how to live in it.36
35Ibid, p.23.
3^See the discussion in Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp.283-290.
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Phronesis too is about difference rather than unity, about diversity rather than
homogeneity. Whereas scientific and technical knowledge forms deal with foundations,
with independent "things" and formulas of given means and ends, phronesis knowledge
is about concrete, particular, knowledge of social situations. By pursuing phronesis
knowledge, therefore, the "scientific mystification" of modernity might be broken down
and the "false idolatry of the expert" reassessed in favour of a critical hermeneutics of
praxis concerned with a knowledge of human society, which is:
not of a general kind of knowledge, but of its specification at a particular 
moment. This knowledge also is not in any sense technical knowledge...The 
person with understanding does not know and judge as one who stands apart 
and unaffected; but rather, as one united by a specific bond with the other, he 
thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with him .37
This, for Gadamer, is a more profound process of understanding than any derived 
from an "objective" knowledge, or even that which seeks "empathy" between individual 
minds in history. It is the basis of all genuine understanding which sees a "fusing" of 
horizons between the interpreter and that which is interpreted. And it is not a 
foundationalist position, for while the text and its language contain "universal" human 
themes, texts are not given - to be understood "as such and only afterwards used...for 
particular purposes". Rather the interpreter seeks to understand "what this piece of 
tradition says, what constitutes the meaning and importance of the text". In so doing the 
interpreter must not seek detachment from the concrete hermeneutical situation, for it is in 
the "fusion" of time and mind that we become conscious of the "I" as the "thou".38
There is in Gadamer's concept of "Dasein", obvious influences of Hegelianism 
and the historical movement of "consciousness". There is also a sense of holism, 
reminiscent of Hegel and suggestive of a universal process of understanding in 
Gadamer’s "fusion" notion. But Gadamer has stressed the distinction between the 
dialectic of the "Geist" and the dialectic of historical "fusion". In the former, he
37Ibid, p.288. 
38Ibid, p.485.
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acknowledged, the Hegelian movement of consciousness heads towards a "scientific" 
totality, towards "the certainty of itself in knowledge."39 This notion of "being", coming 
to know itself in history must end for Hegel in "absolute knowledge, i.e. in the complete 
identity of consciousness and object".40 Gadamer's critical hermeneutics, however, is 
oriented towards ever opened conversation, not ultimate closure. This notion of 
hermeneutics, accordingly, "always contains an orientation towards new experience". It 
represents a:
dialectic of experience [which] has its own fulfilment not in definitive 
knowledge, but in the that openness to experience that is encouraged by 
experience itself.41
For obvious reasons Gadamer's critical hermeneutic perspective has been taken 
seriously in Critical Social Theory circles. Much of its influence, however, has been 
indirect, in modified form, for example, via Habermas 42 And it is towards Habermas, or 
more precisely, Critical Theory in general, and then post-modernism, that the chapter 
now turns, in order that something be said about the two most influential Critical Social 
Theory approaches that have sought to confront modernism, positivism and the 
foundationalist paradox.
39Ibid, p.318.
4^Ibid.
41 Ibid, p.319. The term "experience" used here is not of course that used by empiricists. Rather it 
relates to the Hegelian use of the term denoting the movement of consciousness. A more appropriate 
term in German is "Erfahrung".
4^The relationship between Habermas and Gadamer is a social theory debate in itself, of course. See 
McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), pp. 187-193; and 
Martin Jay, "Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?: Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer 
Debate", in Modem European Intellectual History edited by Dominick LaCapra and Stephen Kaplan 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982)
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Confronting Modernity: (i) The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School43
It is perhaps a tautology to suggest that an understanding of Critical Theory is dependent 
upon an understanding of "Western" Marxism in the years since Marx's death.44 But in 
the present context, to help locate the Critical Theory approach, it is necessary to touch, 
briefly, on one theme in Marxist literature relating to this issue. It concerns the complex 
and enduring question of whether there was an early "philosophical" Marx and a later 
"scientific" one. Both interpretations have held sway within Marxist literature in the years 
since Marx's death.45 For the majority of that time, however, as Western social theory 
has grappled with issues of scientific philosophy, of positivism and of hermeneutics, 
Marxist orthodoxy was gripped by a fiercely held "scientific materialism" set in dialectical 
terms.46
4^I refer here, initially to the first generation of Frankfurt School school scholars, such as Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. For a good overview of their works see The Essential 
Frankfurt School Reader, edited by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Urizen, 1978); Martin 
Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: a History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research. 
1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973); Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a 
Concept From Lukacs to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and David Held, 
Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980). More specific contributions include, Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1972); Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972); Adorno, Negative Dialectics trans. E. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973); and 
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
^ O n  "Western Marxism" see the discussion in Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a 
Concept From Lukacs to Habermas, pp.1-20; and for a more critical angle, see Perry Anderson, 
Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976).
45The French experience is a microcosm of this interpretative struggle with direct relevance to the 
emergence of post-modernism. Here the discursive pendulum has swung between the "philosophical" 
interpretation (e.g. Sartre and existentialism) and the "scientific" (Althusser and structuralism). For a 
useful discussion of some of the implications of this for the present discussion see Mark Poster, Critical 
Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
4^It might be argued of course that in the hands of "eastern" polemicists such as Plekhanov and Lenin, 
and given the actual revolutionary circumstances which Marxist theory and practice confronted, it was not 
surprising that highly complex and ambiguously presented positions were simplified and sloganised. But 
as other Marxist scholars have noted there is plenty of scope for the view that in the "great texts" of Marx 
and Engels it is possible to find crude positivist understandings of knowledge and society. In Engel's 
work this is less ambiguously the case. His Dialectics of Nature (Moscow, 1972) published 
posthumously contains the most definitive statement of the notion that there were universal (dialectical) 
laws which applied both to nature and society. More significant however is his Anti Duhring (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1975) published during Marx's life and containing a chapter from Marx. Whatever 
the case it was Anti Duhring which according to Plekhanov gave "final shape" to a Marxist philosophy of 
science that directed orthodox Marxist thinking until perhaps the 1960s. This is Plekhanov's view in
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But in the years since Marx's death there has also been another prominent 
approach to this issue which has insisted that Marxism is an anti-empiricist, anti-positivist 
philosophy of knowledge and society which understands "objective" reality and the post- 
Kantian emancipatory project in social and "interpretivist" terms.47 The relations between 
objects and subjects in this sense are intrinsic to the dominant relations of power at a 
given historical period. In a modem "class" context, therefore, that which appears 
"external" to social consciousness, (scientific fact) is regarded, rather, as a reified 
expression of the ruling ideas of the class that rules - an ideology of bourgeois scientism - 
designed to alienate modem peoples from an understanding of their (class) reality, by 
detaching the story of class power from its human source.
This was a theme integral to the attempts of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, 
from the 1920s on, to shift emancipatory thinking away from the reductionism of its 
scientific orthodoxy (particularly its tendency toward a determining "economic" sphere) 
and recapture the philosophical kernel of Marxism in human society and culture.48 The 
argument, broadly put, was that social progress was not dependent upon the scientific 
discovery and application of universal laws - o f the consciousness of a mechanised 
dialectical materialism - but of concrete social practice associated with critical reflection on 
the dominant power relations and the "reality" of its knowledge form. Positivism from
Fundamental Problems of Marxism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969), p.23. It is also the view from 
a leading dissident quarter as expressed by Lukacs in History and Gass Consciousness (London: Merlin 
Books, 1971), p.3 who spoke of the "decisive influence" of Anti Duhring upon the later course of 
Marxist theory.
47For a thinker such as Lukacs for example the holism and theory of historical development in Marxist 
thought precludes any notion of a radical separation of object and subject. In, History and Class 
Consciousness he argued instead that any dialectical laws that might exist were socially and historically 
grounded in the relationship between the self-conscious activity of subjects and the (objective) social 
conditions produced by prior human activity. In this sense the "object" world is always an alienated or 
reified form of social relations of production. He draws particularly upon Marx's "early" works for this 
view, particularly Poverty of Philosophy (1847). See Lukacs comments in History and Class 
Consciousness, pp.5-10.
^Critical Theorists sought in this way to re-emphasise the socio-cultural (superstructural) elements of 
Marxist theory and practice as something other than as mere epiphenomena of the (natural laws) of the 
economy. See the discussion in Max Horkheim er, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, pp.205-250; see also 
Adorno's introductory remarks in, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: Heinemann, 
1976), pp.1-10. This became increasingly the case as 'Western" Marxists became aware of the Soviet 
state and Stalinism and some of the unexpected implications of the universal "law of contradictions".
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this perspective had transformed a particular "technique" (scientific empiricism) into a 
social and intellectual "universal" force which now "circumscribes an entire culture...and 
projects a historic totality - a "world".49 This mechanistic thinking - the reduction of 
reason to instrumentalist ends - was the basis of the social logic that reified "techne" over 
"praxis", and which ceded power to the "objective" knowledge of the expert.50
In other words if modernity had demythologised the natural world, as both 
Marxism and Liberal theory stressed, then the bourgeois capitalist world had 
mythologised it again by detaching the thinking subject from the process by which 
meaning was given to the objects of reality. Knowledge, in this sense, is very definitely 
power, and the language of bourgeois power was the language of "instrumental 
rationality" - the language of natural science (e.g. positivism) applied uncritically to social 
life. Accordingly, the logic and language of the post-Enlightenment philosophy of 
science - of modernity - were deeply implicated in the subjugation and distortion of the 
critical potential within modernity upon which "progress" (self-reflective, social 
emancipation) depended. This applied to so called "revolutionary" societies (e.g. the 
USSR) as well as to the Liberal states of Western Europe and North America, indeed to 
any society which understood its "reality" in rational-scientific terms. The most 
immediate problem for Critical Theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, was 
that the ideology of instrumental-rationalist knowledge had become so pervasive in the 
heartland of industrial capitalism that it had become the (illusory) reality for the industrial 
working classes - the supposed proletarian agents of radical change.51
Consequently, in the works of Adorno and Horkheimer, in particular, there was 
little left of the optimism that characterised earlier Marxist analysis. Indeed the whole
49See Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p.154.
^Alienated from itself, then, the human capacity to think critically was now reified in the (external) 
power of scientific rationality which now, in turn, subordinated human self understanding to its (class) 
will. The result: "the domination of human by human through the mediation of the of the domination of 
[alienated] nature", see Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modem Society 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 130.
51 See Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: and Adorno, Negative Dialectics.
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modemist tradition, set upon linear notions of progress and emancipatory consciousness, 
was now perceived in a different, more sombre, light.52 It was in this circumstance that 
early Frankfurt School scholarship focused on the "totalitarian" dimensions of a particular 
form of reason - instrumental reason - which, it was argued, dominated modem thinking 
with its technological fetish, and its reduction of social complexity and nuance, to simple 
"problem solving" techniques. Exposing the positivist project at the heart of the 
(ostensibly) neutral knowledge process was, in this sense, an emancipatory enterprise 
with direct political implications. But, in the period between the two World Wars, the 
emancipatory project seemed utopian in the extreme for many Marxist oriented scholars. 
Gone was any faith in the revolutionary potential of the industrial proletariat, as the 
welfare state and mass consumerism gave material sustenance to the claims that 
"ideological" struggle was indeed at an end. If there was space for difference, for 
questioning, for self critique, for emancipation, it was at the margins of modem society 
among the artists, writers and creative avant-garde. Hence, the shift in Critical Theory 
literature towards "cultural" themes and away from traditional Marxist concerns with 
proletarian class struggle.53
But for all the pessimism associated with the works of the first generation of 
Frankfurt School scholars, the "thinking space" bequeathed to those who followed was
^Horkheimer articulated this mood in "The Authoritarian State", in The Essential Frankfurt School 
Reader eds. Arato and Gebhardt; also cited in Jay, Marxism and Totality, p.217, in this way;
According to Hegel, the stages of the Weltgeist follow one another with logical necessity 
and none can be omitted. In this respect Marx remained true to him. History is represented 
as an indivisible development. The new cannot begin before its time. However the 
fatalism of both philosophers refers to the past only. Their metaphysical error, namely, 
that history obeys a defined law, is cancelled by their historical error, namely, that such a 
law was fulfilled at its appointed time. [However] the present and past are not subject to 
the same law.
Not all Frankfurt School scholars were as resigned to the hopelessness of the present as Horkheimer's 
perspective implies. Marcuse, for example, remained committed to the search for an emancipatory 
politics in modem societies which he acknowledged as "totalitarian" in its suffocation of critical self 
reflectivity beneath the vested interests of instrumental (or technical) rationality. Marcuse nevertheless 
continued to search for spaces within "one dimensional" modem bourgeois society within which its 
"other" dimensions might be understood and radically utilised. Ibid, pp.221-2.
^3And hence the attack on "Western" Marxists by more orthodox scholars like Perry Anderson in 
Considerations on Western Marxism.
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one which framed the possibility of rational emancipation in a social praxis which went
beyond the dichotomised logic of a positivist dominated modernity. This, as Horkheimer
explained in a passage that remains integral to the contemporary debate, was because:
The intervention of reason in the processes whereby knowledge and its object 
are constituted, or the subordination of these processes to conscious control, 
does not take place...in a purely intellectual world, but coincides with the 
struggle for certain real ways of life.54
This principal, which asserted the historical and political nature of all knowledge as 
power, and which understood "theory” as inexorably connected to "practice", has 
remained at the core o f the contributions of the second generation of Frankfurt School 
scholars in the years since the death of Adorno, Horkheimer and Adorno. The most 
prominent figure in Critical Theory in this period has been Jurgen Habermas, and 
Habermas' influence has been integral to the Critical Social Theory challenge of recent 
years and to its transference to International Relations.55
Jurgen Habermas and the Emancipatory Project Revisited
A central feature of Habermas' wide-ranging analysis of contemporary society has been 
the attempt to find emancipatory and transformational elements in the theory and practice
54Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.245.
55Works by Habermas include, Knowledge and Human Interests trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971); Theory and Practice trans. J. Viertal (London: Heinemann, 1974); Legitimation Crisis trans. T. 
McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1975); Towards a Rational Society trans. J. Shapiro (London: 
Heinemann 1976); Communication and the Evolution of Society trans. T. McCarthy (London: 
Heinemann, 1979); Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1 trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984); Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2 trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1988); and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). For a range of 
discussions on Habermas' works see T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas: Jay, 
Marxism and Totality and The Dialectical Imagination: David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: 
Horkheimer to Habermas: John Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul 
Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Held and Thompson eds., 
Habermas: Critical Debates. (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1982); R. Geuss, The Idea of Critical 
Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and 
Bernstein ed., Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1985). One of the best (i.e. 
most accessible) works on a complex subject is Mark Poster's Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In 
Search of a Context.
173
of modernity. But the Habermasian project, emerging in the Cold War years, developing 
in the brief and heady days of new left radicalism, and maturing during an age which has 
seen something of a flight from Hegelian/Marxism among European scholars, has, by 
necessity, differed in important respects from earlier Frankfurt School approaches.
On the question of emancipation, for example, Habermas has sought to expose 
the idealist and utopian elements of earlier Hegelian/Marxist thinking, which produced 
both grand universalised theories of revolutionary change and, in the wake of 
revolutionary failure, a philosophical cul-de-sac of pessimism and despair. Habermas 
rejected this latter tendency, (epitomised for him by Adorno's Negative Dialectics) as a 
one-sided and negative interpretation of the dialectical legacy of Hegelian and Marxist 
thought, which has resulted in an understanding of modernity that was a "left counterpart 
to the...theory of totalitarian domination".56 In order, thus, to rekindle the positive 
emancipatory element in Critical Theory, while rejecting its universalist totalising 
tendencies, Habermas has engaged in a long-term restructuring of Hegelian/Marxist 
thought in terms of a radical communicatory rationalism, influenced by post- 
Wittgensteinian notions of "ordinary language" and the symbolically-mediated interaction 
between "speech communities".57
In particular, and here his response has been aimed at both (early) Critical 
Theorists and post-modernists, Habermas has argued that there is nothing conceptually or 
historically inevitable about the suppressed nature of the "will to question" in modem 
societies. Rather, for Habermas, "thinking space" still remains in post-Enlightenment 
modernism, beyond the restrictions placed upon it by a particular (positivist) knowledge 
form in its association with capitalist social relations. Habermas' Critical Theory project,
^Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p.72.
57This shift towards linguistic based analysis was recognition on Habermas’ part that a defence of 
Enlightenment reason could no longer be predicated upon a notion of underlying and unfolding 
"consciousness". On this recognition and its implications see, in particular, Mark Poster, Critical Theory 
and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context, p.76.
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accordingly, is aimed at resuscitating the (modernist) critical faculty in the face of those 
who no longer acknowledge such a possibility.
The problem with earlier forms of Critical Theory, he insists, is that it failed to
distinguish between the spheres of instrumental reason, and communicative reason, and
the "rational" activity associated with both. Consequently, early Critical Theory
misunderstood the emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental
reason in all spheres. Its pessimism and sense of resignation (and/or its resort to
Hegelian totalism) was inevitable thus because it sought not only the transformation of
social relations, but also of relationships with nature and its productive forces. The point,
suggested Habermas, in Toward a Rational Society was that scientific rationality per se
was not an ideological force, nor the instrumental action it produced. What was
repressing emancipatory thinking and action was the power of social theories such as
positivism which transferred the logic of instrumental rationality, from its appropriate
sphere, to the sphere of everyday communicatory activity, where it distorts the categories
of practical social life and reduces questions that ought to be open to political and ethical
discussion into closed issues of technical formula. The result was the:
depoliticization of the mass of the population, which is legitimated through 
technocratic consciousness...[as] the reified models of the sciences migrate 
into the socio-cultural life world and gain objective power over the latter's 
self understanding. The ideological nucleus of this consciousness is the 
elimination of the distinction between the practical and the technical.58
It is in these terms that Habermas has sought to go beyond the Critical Theory of the 
original Frankfurt School and acknowledge, more broadly, some of the omissions and 
silences in Marxism. His argument, in this regard is, that a contemporary Critical Theory 
requires something more than a blanket and indiscriminate rejection of modem scientific 
knowledge as ideological, or of appeals to some form of Hegelian totalised consciousness 
as an emancipatory alternative. It requires, for example, an appreciation that it is no 
longer just the (traditionally) oppressed parts of society which are ideologically pacified 
Instead the focus of Critical Theory attention must be on those spheres of humaneness
58Habermas, Towards a Rational Society, p. 112.
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that are excluded from , and repressed by, the transference o f scientific principles into 
social life. It must, in this regard:
penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests to disclose the 
fundam ental interests o f m ankind as such, engaged in the process o f self 
constitu tion.59
Leaving aside, for the moment, the notion o f the fundam ental interests o f m ankind 
"as such", this perspective o f Haberm as' has prefigured an im portant them e in a Critical 
Social T heory  con tex t, in that it led him  to a concern  w ith "language" and the 
em ancipatory possibilities therein. This was a theme evident in his work well before the 
"linguistic  turn" o f  the 1980s. A s he explained  in T ow ards a R ational Society  the 
problem  with m odem  scientific ideology, as articulated in positivism , in particular, is that 
i t
violates an interest grounded in one o f the two fundam ental conditions o f our 
cultural existence: in language, or m ore precisely, in the form of socialisation 
and individuation determ ined by com m unication in ordinary language. This 
in te res t ex tends to  the m ain ten an ce  o f  in te rsu b je c tiv ity  o f  m utua l 
u nders tand ing  as w ell as to the c rea tion  o f  com m un ica tion  w ithout 
dom ination . T echnocratic  consciousness m akes this practice  d isappear 
behind the interest in the expansion o f our power o f technical control.60
This passage draw s together m any o f the concerns, them es and issues o f the large and 
com plex H aberm asian project. H ere, for exam ple, is a concern about the legacy of 
Logical Positivist linguistic analysis and its association with the m odem  urge for social 
control. Here is a herm eneutic concern for a "hum anness" derived from  a discourse of 
intersubjective com m unication, and here too, albeit in different form , is a concern o f the 
Frankfurt School to overcom e technocratic consciousness in favour o f the creation of a 
rational mode o f com m unication free from  (ideological) domination.
T hese w ere them es ev iden t also  in the 1970s, in K now ledge  and H um an 
Interests, a work more than any other that has assisted in the transference o f H aberm asian 
them es to In ternational R elations, and a w ork that exem plifies the am bition (and the
59Ibid, p. 113. 
öOlbid.
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problems) of Habermas' contribution to Critical Social Theory.61 This work sought to 
establish an open ended dialectic of communicative rationality (a contemporary praxis) 
upon a series of socially grounded "cognitive interests".
The first of these "interests" - the "technical-cognitive interest" - reflected the 
fundamental human interest in survival and material existence. It promoted a knowledge 
form aimed at more effectively manipulating and controlling an objectified environment. 
In the modern period this "interest" found its foremost philosophical expression in 
positivism, via which it had become reified into an "object" in itself, constituting a 
"reality" beyond socially based communicative knowledge. But, argued Habermas, 
while this knowledge form was important, it represented only one aspect of human social 
life. Just as important, though effectively marginalised in modernity, was a "practical 
cognitive interest" in social understanding, interpretation and "rational" communication. 
This was associated with the (broad) hermeneutic knowledge form, which emphasised 
the need for inquiry into the way that social and cultural "meaning" became transposed 
into (scientific) "fact". The third "interest", in many ways the most important in the 
Habermasian schema, constituted the generative capacity for change. This, the 
"emancipatory cognitive interest", was associated with the most repressed knowledge 
form in modem society, the "critical" knowledge form inherent in the post-Enlightenment 
urge to - to question - to reflect - to reason.62 This, for Habermas, is as natural an aspect 
of human social being as is the interest in survival and communication. It is the keystone 
of the "rationalism" that he has sought to resuscitate in a modernity which has distorted 
the "meaning" of rational action. Indeed it is this notion of a "will to reason" which, in
The primary transference of Habermasian themes has been by Richard Ashley, in "Political Realism 
and Human Interests", International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981), pp.204-236; and "The Poverty of 
Neorealism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.225-286, and I will say more about the 
implications of this in Chapter Eight.
^2For Habermas' discussion of these "cognitive interests" see the Appendix to Knowledge and Human 
Interests. The point of Habermas' argument here, of course, was to re-ground (Critical) theory in practice 
(human interests). This, however, for Habermas' critics, was the weakness of the argument, with many of 
them unhappy about the actual status of the "interests" in question. In the Postscript to Knowledge and 
Human Interests Habermas confronted his critics. For an interesting discussion of this issue see Jay, 
Marxism and Totality, chapter 15.
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the face of his critics, Habermas had maintained is the kernel of the emancipatory
radicalism of Critical Theory in the contemporary period. Thus, he has argued:
while again and again [the will to reason] is silenced...in fantasies and deeds 
it develops a stubbornly transcendental power...it is renewed with each act of 
unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in 
solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving emancipation.63
To gain emancipation from the ideological structure of modernity, therefore, is for 
Habermas to re-connect "rational” knowledge to human interests, to regenerate the critical 
potential of modernity in terms of an ideologically unhindered communicatory process. 
In this quest Habermas has drawn upon a variety of intellectual sources in the 1980s in 
his quest for a "theory of communicative action".64 Two of the principal influences upon 
this theory have been the hermeneutics of figures such as Gadamer, and elements of the 
broad Analytical Philosophy approach inspired by Wittgenstein.65 And for all the conflict 
of the Habermas-Gadamer dispute Habermas has integrated into his reformulated Critical 
Theory the Aristotelian distinction between techne and praxis which underpinned the 
refusal of Gadamer to reduce politics to administrative technique, or power to force.66 
Moreover, in accepting (albeit with reservations) the Aristotelian concept of phronesis as 
the basis for social communication, Habermas has sought to uncover what he regards as 
the "universal conditions that are presupposed in all communicative action".67 In short, in 
the 1980s, Habermas has continued to insist that there are dimensions, possibilities, and 
potentials inherent within the Enlightenment tradition of modernity, that offer 
opportunities for critical reflection and political dissent, and which must not be dismissed
^ S e e  Held and Thompson, Habermas: Critical Debates, p.221.
^Haberm as, Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1: and Theory of Communicative Action 
Volume 2.
^5For a discussion of this See Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality. Thomas McCarthy The Critical Theory 
of Jurgen Habermas: Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, pp.83-100; and Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism 
and Relativism, pp.40-49.
6^See McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, pp. 187-193; and Jay, "Should Intellectual 
History Take a Linguistic Turn?: Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate"; see also the discussion 
in Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, parts 1 and 4.
67Bemstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism, pp.40-48 and p. 185.
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in an age which has lost its faith in the human capacity for creative, radical, thought and 
action.
For a whole range of reasons, however, there are many within the Critical Social 
Theory community who feel decided’v uneasy about Habermas' attempts to resuscitate 
this "rational" critical theme of post-Enlightenment philosophy. Notions of "universal 
conditions" of communication, and "human" interests, associated with "rational" theory 
and practice, have obvious and negative connotations for contemporary scholars seeking 
to break free of the power of the modernist framing regime, of foundationalism, and of 
the "Cartesian anxiety". Consequently, Habermas and contemporary Critical Theory, in 
general, have come under concerted attack, from post-modernists, in particular, 
perceiving in the new rationalism of the 1980s, the old rationalist illusion (and dangers) 
of the modemist "meta-narrative".68 This tension, between Critical Theory and post­
modernism, is an issue I regard as crucial for the nature of Critical Social Theory 
scholarship in the future, particularly in International Relations, and I will return to it 
shortly, after making some general remarks about post-modernism which develop further 
the introductory comments in Chapter One.
68 A good example of this critique, which claims that ultimately, like Lukacs, Habermas is engaged in 
prioritising the "subject", is provided by Joel Whitebook in, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," 
Telos 40 (Summer, 1979), pp 50-62. Whitebook says:
By introducing a dualistic framework to overcome the shortcomings of his predecessors, 
Habermas is following Lukacs earlier in this century. Whereas Habermas introduces his 
dualistic framework to correct the monism of Horkheimer and Adorno, Lukacs introduced 
his to correct the monism of Engels...In both cases the goal is to "save the subject".
Ibid, pp.53-54.
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Confronting Modernity (iri The Post-Modernist Perspective69
As indicated in Chapter One, it is difficult to speak of post-modernism, in general terms, 
without violating what is perhaps its primary characteristic - its concern for heterogeneity 
and difference. For all its diversity, however, it is possible to discern a corpus of 
attitudes, themes, concerns, (values even) shared by scholars as different as Foucault, 
Derrida, Kristeva, Lacan, Lyotard and Rorty, etc. Framed as a series of questions asked 
by scholars such as these, a post-modern critical agenda includes: (i) the question of 
modem Western society and culture. Or, more precisely, the question of the legacy of 
Western modernity for contemporary understandings of the real world and the real self; 
(ii) the question of knowledge and power, in particular the how question concerning the 
socio-linguistic conditions of the construction of dominant knowledge forms, and their 
disciplining and re-presentation in contemporary life; (iii) the (more precise) question of 
history and philosophy - of the Western "meta-narrative" - of the impact of the 
Enlightenment and the subsequent pursuit of a modem scientific philosophy; (iv) the 
question of the modem subject - of the sovereign rational actor of modernity; (v) the 
question of closure, exclusion, power politics, and life on the margins, the question of 
dissent and resistance.
^^For a broad range of works on and by post-modernists see William Connolly, Political Theory and 
Modernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); J. Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After 
Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Jaques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Derrida, Positions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981); V. 
Descombes, Modem French Philosophy trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. Harding (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); H. Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester Books, 1982); Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge trans. 
A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972); Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of 
the Human Sciences trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Foucault, The Birth 
of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1975); Foucault, Discipline and Punish trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979); Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, trans R. Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980); 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge ed. and trans. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984); A. Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche. Heidegger. Foucault and Derrida (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985); P. Rabinow ed. The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1984); H. Silverman and D. Walton eds., Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988); R. Young ed., Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); and J. Rajchman, Michel Foucault; The Freedom of 
Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
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Derived from these major headings are a number of analytical sub-themes which 
give "meaning" to the post-modernist critique of modernity. Important in this regard, as 
the discussion in Chapter One illustrated, is the notion that reality is not a unified, 
systemic whole, understandable in objectivist terms. Rather, from a post-modern 
perspective, the objects and subjects of reality are socio-linguistically constructed - their 
meanings are not "given", but are made and remade by people in different times and 
places, representing themselves and their world as part of discursive practices. As 
indicated in Chapter One, also, a discursive practice is not reducible to a single "great 
text", or even (necessarily) to a dominant tradition or discipline. It represents, rather, the 
embodiment of a particular way of framing questions and answers, of distinguishing truth 
and reality in social and political institutions, in the dominant technical processes, and in 
the general behaviour of people in their societies. This connects together language and 
society in a way that defies dichotomised representations of their relationship, in the sense 
that it is the discursive practices which construct the subjects and objects about which 
language speaks. Any discursive inquiry, therefore, is simultaneously an investigation of 
the socio-historical conditions under which language, meaning and social power intersect 
As the preceding chapters have sought to show this has obvious implication for some of 
the most revered themes in post-Enlightenment philosophical folk lore: the notion of the 
modem subject, of history, of scientific knowledge, power and the notion of a reality 
"out there".
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the post-modem critical agenda, in this 
regard, is its proclamation of the (metaphoric) "death of man". The post-modernist target 
here, of course, is not humankind per se - it is not an anti-human perspective - but the 
particular idea of "man" and/or "human nature" that has been privileged in modem 
Western philosophical discourse. The proposition here is that because human "being", 
and nature, is a social, historical and linguistic construction - not a "given", the mirrored 
reflection of some external realm of pure essence - there can be no essential "man" whose 
fundamentally transparent character can be "known" via the correct knowledge/language
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form. Hence, the proclamation of the "death" of, or more commonly, the decentering of 
the modern heroic figure of Western philosophy (e.g. the author, the sovereign 
individual, the class conscious citizen) .70 Hence, the (Nietzschean inspired) suspicion of 
a modem story of "man" set upon the unfolding capacity for rational thought and action, 
and increasingly enlightened structures of power. Hence, the genealogical approach to 
history, derived from Nietzsche, which aims to expose the power/knowledge connection 
in modem theory and practice, by critically analysing the ways in which we have 
constructed the knowledge of ourselves, as modem subjects and objects.
Post-modem scholarship, not surprisingly, has also been at the forefront of the 
critiques of modernist philosophy (at least in big "P" institutionalised terms) .71 The 
argument here is that because knowledge is not a homogeneous entity, but discursively 
produced and legitimated, there can be no foundational (philosophical) "knowledge" that 
underpins all other knowledge forms and which can act as a criterion of truth and 
meaning for them (e.g. as in Analytical Philosophy). Accordingly, the notion of a 
philosophy of language which can arbitrate on truth claims is repudiated by post­
modernists. Knowledge (including philosophical knowledge) is socially and historically 
constituted; there can, therefore, be no neutral, transparent (realm of) philosophical 
knowledge or language against which philosophy can make "rational" judgements 
concerning the "reality" of its meanings.
This critical insight is applied also to the rational-scientific knowledge of social 
theory in general. Thus, while acknowledging the moderated tones of contemporary 
knowledge claims - e.g. the notion of "law-like" descriptions of "laws" - rather than 
"laws" per se, this, from a post-modernist perspective, disguises an important dimension 
of the modernist power/knowledge nexus. The point is that the "descriptive" knowledge 
of mainstream social theory is always inherently and powerfully "prescriptive". This is
7^Most famously perhaps by Roland Barthes, see for example, Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1973).
71On the problems of big P philosophy see Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
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because it is the knowledge form that gives (rational-scientific) "meaning" to the decision­
making procedures, policy formulations and general rules of thought and behaviour in the 
modem world. Consequently, those who deviate from that "meaning" or question and 
disregard official decisions and policies, do so in the face of a knowledge form and its 
procedural techniques that are, by definition, rational, ordered and corresponding to the 
reality of human nature and society.
From a post-modernist perspective this is just one example of the relations of 
power that emanate from the struggle of discursive practices. Power, in this context, 
cannot be reduced to its traditional sites (class, gender, the state system). Rather, power 
operates in every site. It cannot, as such, be overcome; not by revolutionary means, nor, 
by the freeing up of modem emancipatory potentials (e.g. as in Habermasian Critical 
Theory). Power, instead, is integral to all discursive practices, to the way we think and 
act, to the way that we are defined as thinkers and actors. The discursive politics of 
power, consequently, is at its most reprehensible for post-modernists in societies which 
understand reality in the most homogeneous, unified and orderly of ways, for here the 
subjugation of difference, of heterogeneity, of alternative discourses of reality, have been 
most successful - and thus most brutalising of both "mind" and "body".
A post-modernist politics of dissent, accordingly, seeks to disrupt and erode the 
theory and practice of these "realities", which, in celebrating the ascent of some in the 
post-Enlightenment period have, for the sake of identity, unity, coherence and order in 
their world, suppressed the (human) difference, ambiguity and "otherness", integral to i t  
Post-modernism, in this regard, seeks to illuminate the "enabling" as well as repressing 
elements of power politics, by exposing the process by which it is constituted and 
represented and opening space for resistance to it. This it does in relation to the "woman" 
who, from Aristotle to Freud, has been represented as the negative side of "man", to the 
people of the Third World, defined and named as the negative side of the (developmental 
story) of the First (and Socialist) world. This it does, not in absolute terms, but in
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support of approaches to knowledge and society which disrupt the closure associated 
with all forms of absolutism.
In Chapter Nine I will return again to this post-modem politics of dissent as it has 
been articulated in the Critical Social Theory literature in International Relations. At this 
point, however, I want to say something about another dimension of the post-modem 
agenda, that concerning its relationship with Critical Theory on the question of 
modernity. Here, the conflict with Habermas, in particular, has provided some 
stimulating and occasionally vitriolic exchanges.
The Modernity Question Revisited: Habermas and Post-Modernism
There are perhaps two phases in the Habermasian contribution to the modernity debate 
with post-modernism. The first, which takes in the period up to and including The 
Theory of Communicative Action (1980) is that characterised by a rather uncompromising 
approach to post-modernism as "neo-conservatism".72 In the second period, since the 
early 1980s, and including his Discourse of Philosophical Modernity (1985) there has 
been a more measured response to post-modernist thought, though some major 
differences clearly remain. Indeed in a recent debate with his critics Habermas reflected 
on this early antipathy toward post-modernism in a way that continued to represent his 
distaste for "theories of totalitarian domination", derived from Nietzsche in particular.73
72See Habermas, "Modernity Versus Post-Modernity", New German Critique 22 (1981), pp.3-22. For a 
general overview of this debate see Richard Bernstein ed., Habermas and Modernity: and Poster, Critical 
Theory and Poststructuralism.
73See Habermas, "Questions and Counterquestions", in Habermas and Modernity ed. Bernstein, pp.192- 
216. There are clear biographical and historical reasons for the shift in tone and subtlety over this period. 
Until "Modernity Versus Postmodemity" there is little evidence that Habermas had seriously grappled 
with the post 1968 shift in French social theory. This had to do with the (perhaps understandable) 
aversion of a German leftist to the German forerunners of post-modernism (e.g. Nietzsche and Heidegger) 
and his primary interest in emancipatory post-Enlightenment theory.
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Habermas here had two important statements to make to his contemporary critics
on the modernism issue. The first, saw him acknowledging that, to a substantial degree,
they are engaged in a shared project, that of exposing logocentrism and opposing:
the ontological privileging of the world of beings, the epistemological 
privileging of contact with objects or existing states of affairs, and the 
semantic privileging of esoteric sentences and propositional truth.74
The second, marked out Habermas' rejection of the broad conclusions reached by French 
scholars such as Derrida and Foucault, and their Anglo-American counterparts, such as 
Rorty. Just like the early Critical Theorists, suggested Habermas, and even more 
ironically, these thinkers have become victims of the totalising tendencies within 
modernity, which has seen a "single thread of propositional truth and theoretical 
reason...stylized into the monopoly of humanity".75 His point was that post-modernists 
have seized on "a single thread" of post-Enlightenment experience - its pessimistic 
dimension - and have transformed it into an inevitable and all encompassing "counter 
narrative" which inevitably dissolves into violence and terror and systematically excludes 
any space for creative, radical change. In contrast, in the 1980s, Habermas continued to 
maintain that the Enlightenment tradition offers "thinking space" - space in particular to 
reflect upon and resist the dualised and dichotomised strategies of metatheoretical 
meaning that gave such "rational" credence to the philosophy of the subject and (social) 
scientific inquiry. He suggested, therefore, that in the face of a logocentric "meta- 
narrative":
Instead of following Nietzsche's path of a totalising and self-referential 
critique of reason, whether it be via Heidegger to Derrida, or via Bataille to 
Foucault, and throwing the [modemist] baby out with the bathwater, it is 
more promising to seek this end through the analysis of the already operative 
potential for rationality  contained in the everyday practices of 
communication.76
74Ibid, p. 197.
75Ibid.
7^Ibid, p.196, emphasis added.
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Post-modernists confront Habermas, and the modernity question, on somewhat 
different premises, in rejecting either the possibility or desirability of retaining the 
emancipatory spirit of the Enlightenment dream. Or, more precisely perhaps, post­
modernists emphasise that the emancipatory spirit of the Enlightenment was always 
nothing more than a dream, that notions of a universal emancipatory theory and practice 
capable of freeing people from the ideas and structures which oppressed them, was 
always and inevitably the "will to power" of certain actors, in a power matrix designed to 
privilege certain discursive practices. The "rationality" of the Enlightenment, from this 
perspective, was always, simultaneously, the power and domination of (for example) the 
Western imperialist, the Stalinist apparatchik, the Cold War technician and nuclear 
strategist, the (humanist) agent of power politics.
This theme has been addressed, in incisive fashion, by Mark Poster, as pan of his 
general discussion of the dispute between Habermas and post-modernism, in the 
1980s.77 Habermas, suggested Poster, disturbs post-modernists most with his insistence 
that the modem critical project should seek to resuscitate those elements of (genuine 
emancipatory) reason in contemporary bourgeois society.78 The problem with this 
proposition, from a post-modernist perspective is that it misses the point about the 
relationship between knowledge and power, theory and practice. The point being that 
post-modernists:
do not dispute that there are "elements of reason" in liberal culture. What 
they dispute is the lens that discerns "reason" in law and democracy but not 
in gas chambers and atom bombs.79
The point, to reiterate it in terms of Jane Flax's concerns in Thinking Fragments, is that 
Habermas seeks to privilege the positive aspects of a modernist discourse while silencing 
its negative, oppressive dimensions. In seeking, therefore, to resuscitate the
77Poster, Critical Theory and Poststmcturalism. 
78Ibid, p.22.
79Ibid.
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emancipatory potential in modem human life he effectively promotes its potential for mass 
destruction, for social control, for domination at all levels. Summarising the post­
modernist concern on this issue, Poster proposed that:
When Habermas defends with the label of reason what he admires in Western 
culture, he universalises the particular, grounds the conditional, absolutizes 
the finite. He provides a centre and an origin for a set of discursive practices.
He undermines critique in the name of critique by privileging a locus of 
theory (reason) that far too closely resembles society's official discourse.80
But there is another dimension to the post-modernist critique of Habermas and 
modernity that need to be emphasised here if the profundity and "difference" of its 
challenge to modem theory and practice is to be appreciated. This concerns the earlier 
Critical Theory perspectives of Horkheimer and Adorno, in particular. Their Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, for example, was marked by a deep sense of pessimism about the nature 
of modernity, and disenchantment in particular with the emancipatory promise of 
Enlightenment rationality, in either its Liberal or Marxist guise. In this regard, 
accordingly, there are obvious and significant thematic similarities between some of the 
first generation of Frankfurt School scholarship and contemporary post-modernism. The 
differences, however, are more important in the present contest. They relate to the 
reasons for the disillusionment felt by Adorno and Horkheimer which, for them, centred 
on the demise of and/or "distorted" nature of the post-Enlightenment emancipatory 
project.
Post-modernists do not share this disillusionment. Instead, and following 
Nietzsche's view of modernity, rather than that of Kant, Hegel and Marx, the 
emancipatory project is perceived as "distorted" in the first instance. There is from a 
post-modernist perspective, therefore, no sense of once great liberating ideas and 
practices becoming agencies of repression and domination. The proposition, rather, is 
that all discourses centred on unified notions of humankind and society, privileging 
"given" subjects and objects (the autonomous individual, the class, :he tradition, the 
religion, the developmental process) are already and inexorably implicated in relations of
80Ibid, p.23.
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domination, control and power. Thus, while it might be suggested that the (scientific- 
rationalist) foundations of modernity have been undermined and/or "distorted", a post­
modernist approach maintains that it is this very foundationalism that is at the core of the 
problems of modem theory and practice, in the first place.
This is why the question of "rationality" becomes for post-modernism an integral 
feature of modem theory as practice, because since Descartes the "rational" voice has 
been the universal voice, the voice of the autonomous subject of modem life that "knows" 
itself, that speaks of, and for, universal reality. The voice of "reason", however, was/is 
never innocent. The voice of "reason", of modem truth, is also the voice of modem 
biology, chemistry and physics, of technocracy, of multinational capital, of warfare, of 
the power politics state. It is, as such, the institutional voice of both freedom and 
oppression, of liberation and domination, of openness and closure. To theoretically 
privilege one "side" of modernity, in this situation, is to engage in the practice of 
exclusion (and sometimes terror) that is the experience of the "other" side, that which has 
no (rational) voice.
Accordingly, and to return to Poster's point, above, this is why post-modernists
were so disturbed, when in the late 1980s, Habermas in his Theory of Communicative
Action propounded the view that (at its best) modem scientific rationality "is governed by
ideals of objectivity and impartiality secured through unrestricted discussion".81
Habermas, of course, is not suggesting here that this is how science "happens" as such.
He is more interested in providing examples of the spaces in which the potential for
"unrestricted discussion" are most evident. But, as Poster makes clear, post-modernists
have a right to be concerned about a (relative) privileging of such space because:
[mjodem science largely operates with an exclusion of women and minorities 
form its discourse, and exclusion that is legitimated precisely by the apparent 
procedural neutrality of "unrestricted discussion".82
8* Habermas, cited in ibid, p.24. 
82Ibid.
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Having said all this and, accepting the significance of it, I want now to go against 
the grain of the discussion a little and argue that, nevertheless, post-modernism must 
remain engaged with the Critical Theory perspective of Habermas, and indeed with the 
Critical Social Theory "conversation" in general if it is to have the critical impact upon 
International Relations that its insights warrant. I take this position for two reasons. The 
first is that for all the emphasis placed on the problems of a Habermasian position, 
outlined above, there are dimensions of the Critical Theory project (and other modernist 
approaches) that do allow substantial "thinking space", and that might not, necessarily, 
add up to foundationalist closure in the traditional sense. There are, in other words, 
critical opportunities and tensions in modernity, and particularly Critical Theory, that 
should not be dismissed in any Critical Social Theory enterprise. The second reason for 
raising this issue, in this way, concerns my reservations about some elements of post­
modernist scholarship and a tendency within it for simplistic dismissal, and for the kind 
of "detachment" that renders it no more connected to political practice than the positivist 
objectivism of so much modemist literature.
In this latter context I have in mind the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard and The 
Postmodern Condition (1984).83 More precisely, it is the tendency within this work to 
"escape" modernity that is of concern. David Kolb has made the point well in his 
commentary on Lyotard's proposition that, like the great modemist artists (e.g. Joyce, 
Schonberg and Cezanne) we must seek to counter modernity's repressive features by 
going "outside the great self-enforcing cultural systems" and "starting new language 
games...new forms of life".84 The problem with this position, Kolb argued, is that it 
"pictures the modem world as more unified than it is, with the consequence that the 
postmodern gesture becomes too stereotyped".85 Kolb might have reflected on the more
83See Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. G. Bennington and B. 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
^ K olb , The Critique of Pure Modernity, p.258. 
85Ibid, p.259.
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profound problem associated with a post-modern perspective that creates a dichotomy
between one hermetically sealed unity - modernity - and another - post-modernity, but his
point is, nevertheless an important one. It suggests that Lyotard's post-modernism is
effectively detached from the modernity it seeks to counter, in seeking "new language
games" (in Analytical Philosophy style) rather that "taking advantage of the multiplicity of
tensions already constituting the domains we find ourselves within". The point,
developed further is that which I also want to make in relation to post-modernism, Critical
Theory and the Critical Social Theory enterprise in general. As Kolb has put it:
There is internal tension and multiplicity even within what threatens us. Lyotard 
resists what needs resisting but perhaps he expresses too much concern to stay 
ahead of the language of the tribe and belong to the true avant-garde. [However] fif 
the elements of our multiple inhibitions are themselves internally multiple and 
tense, there is room for freedom and creativity without the need always to be out 
ahead .86
It is this tendency towards avant-gardism, this sense of "detachment" within some 
post-modernist scholarship that Habermas, quite rightly, has pointed too as a 
conservative and stultifying aspect of its character.87 It is this tendency, I suggest, that it 
must confront and overcome if it is to remain the most potent voice within a Critical 
Social Theory conversation searching for "thinking space". It must, in this regard, heed 
Kolb's advice and acknowledge that modernity, for all its closure, is also a complex 
matrix of tensions and critical potentials with the capacity for something other than 
unreflexive complicity.
This does not require compliance with a (unified) "meta-narrative" as a Lyotard 
would have it, nor is it a simple "hermeneutics of suspicion" position, assuming deep 
within the Western philosophical tradition, some essential, transhistorical, transcultural 
theme (individualism, rationality, logic, emancipation, Spirit, alienation) just waiting to 
be recovered, and applied to the problems of the age, in grand theorised form. It does 
require, however, that in recognising the problems of modemist thinking, one recognises
Stilbid.
^7See Rorty on this in "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodemity", in Habermas and Modernity ed. 
Bernstein.
190
also, that the complex "interpenetration" of ideas, themes, and concepts acknowledged by 
Hegel, or the "intersection of narratives" recognised by Derrida, or the multiplicity of 
"language games" described by Wittgenstein, or the "Dasein" perspective outlined by 
Gadamer, represent space for something more than a unified conformist set of modernist 
practices. It represents space also for critical dissent, the potential for resistance. It is in 
this space, and upon this potential, that post-modernism must expose closure and 
confront the exclusionary repressive aspects of modernity.
This, it seems to me, is a position congruent not only with Habermasian attempts 
to refocus a disillusioned radicalism on the continuing presence of the potential for 
"rational" thought and communicative practice, but of a Foucauldian concern to locate a 
Nietzschean resistance in a "rational"world. Nietzsche, of course, is often represented as 
the great cynical voice of Western thought, the relentless exposer of the "will to power" at 
the core of all modem theory and practice. At another level, seen perhaps as sceptic 
rather than cynic, Nietzsche does indicate the potential for another scenario - not beyond 
relations of power - but arising from a space for resistance within the relations of power. 
This, of course, is where a genealogical approach to knowledge and society, and its 
"power as enabling" theme is such an important element of a post-modernist perspective. 
As William Connolly has explained:
Genealogy aims at a kind of self examination: a rethinking of how one has 
been formed historically which encourages one to experience the dissonance 
in the form one has become; a rethinking which encourages the self to 
endorse, modify or oppose each contingent formation...[i]t clarifies cloudy 
formations on familiar horizons by placing them under a different sky.88
It is in this sense that a (broad) Nietzschean approach to modernity allows for chinks of 
critical light, for the potential for seeing through the foundationalist "cloudy formation". 
It is in this sense that in Nietzschean (and Foucauldian) terms, the most repressive of 
modernist power relations and socio-intellectual closures can produce a whole range of 
resistances which allow for the possibility of non-foundationalist critical perspectives and 
actions. The enhanced tension between the "will to knowledge" and "the will to mastery"
^ S e e  W. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.150.
191
is, consequently, an important theme in the potential for resistance. Thus, on the one 
hand:
the more completely the quest for transparency governs the self - in its 
prayers, confessions, disciplines, therapies and self intellectualizations - the 
more precisely the conscious interior of the self mirrors the norms, standards 
and aspirations of modem society [in this sense] the drive to self knowledge 
is the drive to render the self more 'predictable' and 'calculable'.
On the other hand, however:
even as the self is drawn into its own entrapment...[it] continues to resist, 
oppose and subvert this drive to unity, transparency and calculability.89
This perspective is articulated powerfully by the Foucault of "What is Enlightenment"
(1984) who, in moderating much of the earlier vitriol against all aspects of modernism,
emphasised that while he retained a deep suspicion of Enlightenment rhetoric and
ambition, it was important to understand that:
the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to 
doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation o f an attitude - that 
is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of 
our historical era.90
My suggestion, in this regard, is that it is worth taking seriously Foucault's insight 
concerning the potential for something other than "faithfulness to [the] doctrinal 
elements", in the modernist tradition, and that a genuinely "critical" social theory must 
continue to explore this possibility, albeit on the excluded and often silenced margins of 
modernity.
This is not just to acknowledge the historically and culturally obvious - that we 
cannot simply detach ourselves from the Enlightenment and its influences. It is to 
acknowledge that we cannot simply disengage our alternative critical perspectives from it. 
It is to acknowledge that a scholar such as Berki might have something more to offer than 
Hegelian totalism, it is to suggest that an Adorno, a Gramsci and a Robert Cox represent 
something other than conventional Marxist closure, it is to think seriously about the
88 9Ibid, pp. 151-152, emphasis added.
9^Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in The Foucault Reader edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984), p.42, emphasis added.
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proposition that dialectical logic need not be teleological, it is to critically, rather than 
dismissively, confront the complex Habermasian claim, that there still might be space 
within modernity for a more open critical theory and practice, that the modem meta- 
narrative is not bereft of the potential for non foundationalist theory and practice. It is, in 
short, to reject the paradox associated with some post-modernism which, projecting the 
spirit of tolerant critical theory and practice, engages in the cliched, polemical closure that 
characterises so much of the modernism it eschews. It is to define a post-modem politics 
of dissent as the attempt to go beyond the dominant "meanings" and practices of 
modernity, not as "detachment" from modernity per se.
This is not to ignore the problems (and dangers) of a Habermasian perspective, it
is to take seriously those elements of his thinking which defy simplistic categorisation.
There is, for example, the question of the "subject" in Habermas (and in Hegelian
Marxism in general) which might easily be dismissed in "hermeneutics of suspicion"
terms - thus closing off any useful conversation. And yet there is clearly something more
than this going on in Habermas' thinking, as is evidenced in his reflections on
Hegelianism in Theory and Practice (1974). Here, concentrating on the notion of Spirit,
in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Habermas stressed that this particular "being in motion"
(Dasein) is unequivocally the product of human social interaction, as mediated through
language (symbolic representation) Labour (control of nature) and the struggle for
"recognition".91 Consequently, in stressing the interpenetration of these elements in the
social construction of the subject, Hegel explained, that:
Spirit is not the fundament underlying the subjectivity of the self in self 
consciousness but rather the medium within which one T communicates 
with another T, and from  which, as an absolute mediation, the two mutually 
form each other into subjects.92
The point of course is that this interpretation of Hegel (or more precisely of 
Hegel's reading of Kant) problematises the notion of a unified (transparent) ego T which
91 See the debates in Theory and Practice, and Knowledge and Human Interests in particular. 
^Haberm as, Theory and Practice, p.145, emphasis added.
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comes to know its "objective" self through self reflection, in favour of a heterogeneous, 
historico-social notion of the subject in which knowledge, of self and other selves, is 
grounded in the (constructed) reality of social interaction. Accordingly, Habermas goes 
on to conclude that:
Kant proceeds from the identity of the "I" as an original unity of 
transcendental consciousness. In contrast to this, Hegel's fundamental 
experience of the "I" as an identity of self consciousness is not an original 
one, but can only be conceived as one that has developed...The (Hegelian/ 
Marxist) critique of knowledge...consists precisely in relinquishing the 
viewpoints of a "ready made" or "completed" subject of knowledge.93
And there is the question too of Habermas' universalism, again a seemingly obvious 
aspect of a modemist"meta-narrative" of the Kantian "emancipatory" variety. But is it? 
It certainly did not appear so in Communications and the Evolution of Society (1979) 
where Habermas stressed his opposition to the teleological tendencies in Kant, Hegel and 
Marx, and argued for a progressivist approach which privileged "neither unilinearity nor 
necessity, neither continuity nor irreversibility".94
The point here is not that it is possible to find passages in the work of a 
sophisticated scholar like a Habermas (or a Foucault) that problematises the general 
categorisation of them, it is, rather, that a post-modernism engaged with a world of 
complexity, paradox and ambiguity, should never be engaged in simplistic categorisation 
and closure, but always open to critical "conversation", particularly with those it 
opposes. This, to reiterate, is not an argument/or Habermas, as it were, nor is it in any 
way an argument in favour of some sort of synthetic fusion between Critical Theory and 
post-modernism. It is, an argument for openness and positive, constructive theory and 
practice over polemic, detachment and closure 95
93Ibid, p.156.
^Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p.140.
It is in this context, and for all that has gone before in this chapter, that I regard Foucault's work and 
that of a scholar like Habermas (the two most important influences on a "celebratory" response in the 
Third Debate) as aspects of a broader shared project, as indicated in the discussion of Critical Social 
Theory in Chapter One. For all their differences, I suggest, theirs is a positive attempt to open up the 
closure in modem Western theory and practice in order that its reflective, critical potentials for resistance 
be explored and utilised. This is not, of course, the common reading of the relationship between the most
194
This is an issue far too complex for any comprehensive treatment in this thesis. It 
is introduced at this point both because it is integral to the contemporary debate in Critical 
Social Theory, and because as the thesis is now about to turn more directly to the 
literature of International Relations, it is integral to any "postpreface" future in that 
context. The point, in short, is that as in the larger interdisciplinary debate, Critical 
Social Theory scholars in International Relations must, if they are to take advantage of 
available "thinking space", take seriously the questions raised in the conversation 
between Critical Theory and post-modernism. My concern is that, to this point, this has 
not been a trait evident in the Third Debate, where, to this stage at least, there has been no 
equivalent to the works of scholars such as Mark Poster, Michael Ryan or Jane R ax .96
Generally, however, the post-modem scholarship in International Relations has 
not been guilty of the Lyotardian over statement and avant-gardism. For the most part the 
tendency has been toward a kind of intellectual apartheid, with Critical Theorists and 
post-modernists invoking strategies of exclusion, and/or marginalisation similar to those 
which have had such a detrimental effect upon debate in International Relations, 
generally, in the era of Realist dominance. The tendency toward simple dismissal and 
closure is evident, nevertheless, often, ironically, in otherwise very powerful and 
sophisticated post-modernist works. In his "Living on Border Lines" argument, for 
example, there are times when Richard Ashley's rather cavalier attitude to modernist 
philosophy sometimes sees him come very close to the Lyotardian perspective. In this 
work, consequently, as part of a Foucauldian inspired reading of the "Kantian turn" and
influential Critical Theorist of the age and his most illustrious of post-modernist counterpart. More often 
than not the two are presented as two ends of a modernist spectrum: Habermas, the German heir of Kant, 
Hegel and Marx, desperately seeking to retain an Enlightenment faith in rationality, progress and 
emancipation; Foucault the heir of Nietzsche, and a post-1968 pessimism in French intellectual circles, 
propounding an extreme antipathy to modernity in all its dimensions, particularly its rationalist/ 
emancipatory one. This is a position easily enough defended. Within the works of both scholars over the 
years there are many passages which suggest that the popular reading is the most accurate. My point, 
simply, is that simple conclusions of any kind are singularly inappropriate in relation to projects as 
complex and contentious as these.
^ T h is  is not to suggest that post-modernist are unaware of the issue. Der Derian, for example, makes 
this clear in his, "Boundaries o f Knowledge and Power in International Relations", 
Intemational/Intertextiial Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics edited by Der Derian and M. 
Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp.3-11.
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the emergence of modem "sovereign man", the contribution of Habermas is simply 
lumped together with that of "Christian humanists", Liberal notions of the "rights of 
man" and a Marx, who it is claimed appealed to something called "dialectical 
materialism".97
I have indicated, above, my reservations about treating Habermas in this
simplistic way, and nothing of value can be achieved by developing the point further
here, except perhaps to suggest that to dismiss Habermas on the basis of Knowledge and
Human Interests (and I know of no post-modem work in International Relations that
seriously confronts any other of his works) is, surely, contradictory to the spirit and
critical integrity of the post-modernist enterprise set down by a Foucault? Similarly, there
is more at stake than mere pedantry on the issue of Marx as a "dialectical materialist".
For anyone even sketchily aware of the complexities and controversies associated with
Marx's work on this point (i.e. its relationship to Engels' later works) this is an issue that
goes to the heart not only of the "scientific" debate in Marxism but to the question of
whether Marx's Historical Materialism was ultimately foundationalist, in a modernist
sense, or whether it was emphatically grounded in human history and society. A more
sensitive approach would, surely, have left space open for this question. Likewise, an
approach concerned with openness over closure would, surely, take more care with the
issue of "totalised" history in Marx. For Ashley in "Living on Border Lines", however,
Marx's sketchy image of a future Communist society is effectively reduced to a simplistic
"end of history" scenario. Thus, approaches such as Marxism, it is contended:
can imagine the end of the state only when the sovereign subject it invokes 
finally achieves total knowledge and total freedom - only that is when history 
is totally subordinated to man's sovereign will. It can imagine the end of the 
state, yes, but only at the end of time.98
The point here is that while it might well "fit" a (rather overstated) Foucauldian 
argument to read Marxism in this way, a very serious doubt remains as to whether Marx
97Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in International/Intertextual 
Relations, eds. Der Denan and Shapiro, p.266.
98Ibid, p.269.
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really did see a Communist society as the "end of time", as the moment of "total 
knowledge and total freedom". It would be just as simple, and just as inappropriate, to 
reduce Neitzsche's insights on modernity to a "grand theory" of the human psyche - a 
"hermeneutics of suspicion" concerning the "given" inadequacies and blindness of the 
"herd". It could mean this, but it could (and does) mean a great deal more, and it is in 
that space, beyond the simplistic, beyond the polemical, that Critical Social Theorists and 
post-modernists, in particular, must be engaged." A post-modernist politics of dissent, 
in this regard, is posr-modem in the sense that it seeks to confront, at every level, those 
aspects of modernity that undermine any potential people might have to produce in their 
everyday lives critical understandings and resistances to power relations which silence, 
demean and oppress them. To achieve this a post-modernist approach cannot become a 
negative philosophy of "disintegration" as some critics perceive it,100 nor dare it close off 
the possibility that within post-modernism there are the very modernist tendencies that its 
own critical insights expose so starkly.101
I will return to this issue again in Chapter Nine, primarily in regard to R.B.J. 
Walker's One World. Many Worlds which represents a rudimentary statement of a post­
modern politics of dissent of the engaged, constructive kind alluded to above. For now a
°^This has been the space where Ashley has worked, almost exclusively, over the years, and no one has 
contributed more to a Critical Social Theory perspective of the kind advocated here. His "Living on 
Border Lines" argument, for example, will be featured in Chapter Nine as a major example of post­
modernist scholarship which opens up previously closed space on the sovereignty issue. My point here, 
critically made in relation to aspects of that work, is a more general one, it is that post-modernism cannot 
afford closure in its own works while exposing it in others. On a related point there is more than a little 
arrogance associated with the notion that the Kantian imperative is so powerful that only post-modernists 
can resist it - that only post-modernists can understand the power of metatheoretical framing, and resist it 
- that only post-modernists can understand the significance of the Kantian turn in Western philosophy, 
and resist the spell of the "meta-narrative".
iO^See Peter Dews, The Logic of Disintegration: Poststructuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical 
Theory (London: Verso, 1987).
In this context, the appeal here to acknowledge the complexity in Marxism, for example, is not made 
on behalf of some "anything goes" relativism, but, on the contrary, because not everything goes (e.g. 
"closure" of thinking space and creative life opportunity doesn't "go"). Accordingly, a post-modernist 
politics of dissent must, in its intellectual dimension in particular, be always capable of withstanding 
criticism of its own positions as a counter narrative based on a simple reification of modernism's "other 
side". To do this it must remain engaged in a serious and sensitive conversation with modernism and be 
willing to accept, for example, that "hermeneutics of suspicion", like beauty, can be in the eye of the 
beholder.
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final, more generalised comment is necessary to bind together the discussion above and 
introduce its relevance to the discussion to follow in Chapters Five to Nine. It is this: 
contrary to the view of a Lyotard, attempts within modernist theory and practice to order 
and control the past, present and future, have never been totally successful. Modernism's 
hegemony has never been complete, it has never been totally able to suppress the tensions 
within it - the space for doubt, for asking how and why, for self critique. Modemist 
thought, for all its desire to foundationalise, to squeeze diversity into unity, heterogeneity 
into homogeneity, has never been fully able to cope with the autonomous "individual" 
who cannot be defined except in social terms; the independent object that is 
simultaneously subject; the word that goes beyond its singular meaning; the absolute 
truths that are interpretations; the pluralism that is reductionist; the science that is 
sociology; the rationality that is metaphysics; the relentless "differences" intrinsic to 
patterned social life. Accordingly, whenever modemist thought has proclaimed a "grand 
theory" of the secular good life, based on singular, foundationalist themes, there has 
always been the voice of modernist critique to proclaim its limitations.102
The point, to reiterate it, is that within modernist thinking, for all its domination 
by rational scientific modes of knowledge, its cogito subjectivism, its "will to power" and 
"will to mastery" there has, as Habermas points out, also been the tensions, the nagging 
voice of the "will to question". This is a theme undervalued by those who search the 
blurred horizons for signs of "golden age" certainty, or those convinced of the critical 
inadequacies of the "herd". It is a theme, conversely, which is over-valued by those who 
would celebrate modernity in terms of the linear progress of the "conscious" subject, of 
unfolding rationality, or of scientific discovery.
h^ A s Connolly, for example, has suggested as modernity has striven to perfect its strategies of "change 
and progress", the very ewe of its strategies have come under question. The debate continues to rage for 
example as to the "right" agent of change - the individual, the community or the class? And how is that 
which is to be changed - the past and present - to be understood? Are the techniques used in the "natural" 
sciences adequate, or must human history be approached in a different, more tolerant, less restricted way? 
Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.3.
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This thesis seeks neither to undervalue or overvalue this theme, but to 
acknowledge it as a space within which questions, debates, and issues, integral to 
modernity can be returned to the forefront of the debate, particularly in regard to the study 
of International Relations. It is a space in which the insights of a diversity of scholars can 
be utilised as points of entry into effectively closed arenas of theory and practice. In the 
present context the chinks of modemist light associated with the insights of figures such 
as Carr, Morgenthau, Vasquez and Stanley Hoffmann, will be of significance at different 
times during the discussions to follow, as this thesis now seeks to enter the "thinking 
space" of critical modernism, and more latterly, post-modernism, and apply the major 
themes of the discussion thus far directly to the tradition and discipline of International 
Relations.
Summary
This chapter has sought to bring up to date, as it were, the broad debate over the question 
of modernity and its continuing influence upon Anglo-American social theory, which in 
the context of this thesis has represented the outer discursive framework of the "unwritten 
preface" in International Relations.103 It added a dimension to the "philosophical" section 
of the thesis by introducing some Critical Social Theory themes and approaches that have 
genuine claims to have confronted modernity, positivism and the foundationalist paradox. 
It argued that the approaches at the forefront of the search for "thinking space" have 
sought a "concrete", and particular knowledge of the social world, rather than a
103To refresh the memory: Chapter Two defined the modernity issue in terms of the metatheoretical 
regime of framing bequeathed (primarily) by Cartesian rationalism and a paradoxical foundationalism 
which, in its positivist formulations (via Hume and neo-Kantianism) in particular, has continued to 
constitute "real meaning" in Anglo-American social theory and International Relations. Chapter Three 
confronted a counter-proposition on this issue - the proposition that questions of modernism and 
positivism are no longer of major relevance in an era which has solved the Humean problem, closed the 
Kantian dualism and absorbed the essence of the modernist preface. The discussion in Chapter Three 
sought to render this proposition problematic in broad social theory terms, but with one critical eye on 
the "post-positivism" of contemporary International Relations scholarship (e.g. neo-Realism).
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universalised and idealised image of reality predicated on one variant or another of the 
"empiricist metaphysic".
It emphasised the attitude and insight of a scholar such as Jane Flax, in this 
regard, with her sense of "intellectual vertigo", and her understanding of the need for 
"ambivalence" in a contemporary situation of danger and opportunity, as a dominant way 
of life "grows old" and resists its decline. It looked, also, at the contribution of 
contemporary philosophers seeking to overcome the legacy of "correspondence rule" 
logic and foundationalism in general, and at Gadamer, wrestling with the residues of 
foundationalism in hermeneutics and Analytical Philosophy and, in the process, offering 
important glimmers of post-positivist meaning in a notion of a historical "fusion" between 
thinking subjects and a textualised past.
Special attention was paid to the contribution of Critical Theory scholarship, 
described, rightly, by Mark Poster, as representing "the best of what remains in the 
shambles of the Marxist and neo-Marxist theoretical positions" .104 Here, emphasis was 
placed on the Frankfurt School critique of positivism and modernity and a post- 
Enlightenment Weltanschauung which has transformed creative potential for social 
change into the self-centred rituals of "one-dimensionality". The contribution of 
Habermas was noted and, in particular, his argument against his critics that to turn away 
from the potential for rational communication is to become complicit in the destruction of 
a crucial human capacity - the capacity for critical reflection upon the world and for 
informed practical decisions in it.
Major emphasis was placed on post-modernist approaches to the question of 
knowledge and power and modernist foundationalism. Themes introduced in Chapter 
One were discussed again, from another angle, and post-modernist discursive 
perspectives on questions of reality, power and the modem sovereign subject were given 
further ventilation. The purpose here was to indicate, more explicitly, the thematic nature
104Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructiiralism. p.3.
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of an approach increasingly influential in Critical Social Theory debate, while prefiguring 
a major source of critique in International Relations that is to inform the discussion from 
now on, most directly in Chapter Nine. The chapter ended with a brief discussion of an 
issue that requires a great deal more thought and time than it was accorded here. It 
concerns the relationship between Critical Theory and post-modernism, or, more 
profoundly, perhaps, the whole notion of post-modem politics of dissent in the future.
Something more will be added on this issue in Chapters Eight and Nine and at the 
completion of the thesis. The more immediate task, at this point, is to illustrate how the 
discussions of the first half of the thesis (Chapters One to Four) are intrinsically 
connected to the second half (Chapters Five to Nine) and how some of the major themes 
in the broader Critical Social Theory debates have become integrated into the International 
Relations agenda. This process now begins, in the chapter to follow, as part of a 
discussion which connects the issue of the modernist regime of metatheoretical framing to 
the more conventional literature and idioms of International Relations, and illustrates 
some of the implications and dangers of this connection in the period since the Cold War.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM MODERNIST 
TRADITION TO COLD WAR DISCIPLINE
This chapter is concerned, primarily, to illustrate the direct discursive connections 
between the broad social theory debates over modernity and positivism, and the literature 
most commonly associated with the study of International Relations. More precisely, the 
aim of this chapter and, indeed, of the thesis from now on, is to utilise Critical Social 
Theory perspectives in order to open up for questioning some of the pivotal concepts, 
themes and premises of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations, effectively 
closed off under the narrow regime of interpretation and analysis discussed in a variety of 
ways in the preceding chapters. Particular attention will now be paid to the dominant 
intellectual Tradition of International Relations as outlined by a diversity of scholars down 
the years. Attention too will fall on the more recent disciplinary manifestations of this 
Tradition which emerged in the wake of two World Wars.
It will be argued that, for all the (professed) detachment from the broader 
theoretical flow of "domestic" life, the Tradition and discipline of International Relations 
has understood itself and its subject/object matter in a manner consistent with the 
development of contemporary Western social theory as presented in the first section of 
this thesis. 1 Accordingly, the dominant Tradition of International Relations will be
^ o r  a good overview discussion of the Tradition/discipline issue see John Vasquez, The Power of Power 
Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983) ch.2; Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of the 
Theoretical Revolution in International Relations", International Studies Quarterly 18(1) (1974), pp.41- 
74; William Olson and Nicholas Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed", in International 
Relations: British and American Perspectives edited by Steve Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); 
Michael Banks "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", in Conflict and World Society: A New 
Perspective on International Relations edited by M. Banks (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984); 
R.B.J.Walker, "The Prince and The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the Theory of 
International Relations", in Intemational/Intertextnal Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics 
edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989); Mervyn 
Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986); and Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", International Organization 38 (1984), pp.225-
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understood as part of the larger modernist discursive practice discussed in earlier 
chapters, as resonant with the problems, tensions, paradoxes and potentials intrinsic to 
such discourse. These include: a dualised frame of reference at all levels (e.g. 
subject/object, fact/value, is/ought, self/other, domestic/intemational, Realist/idealist); an 
objectivist, linear sense of (Western) history; essentialist reading practices and logocentric 
strategies of categorisation, definition and exclusion; and in the age of "post-positivism", 
the continuing commitment to a (largely) unquestioned positivist foundationalism.
To speak of a Tradition of International Relations, at all, is to speak, primarily, of 
a particular disciplinary representation of it, in embryo after World War One, but at its 
most influential in intellectual and policy making circles after World War Two, in the 
United States. It is in this sense that the International Relations Tradition is 
representative, by and large, of an American social science (positivist) reading of some of 
the "great texts" of Western history and philosophy. While, therefore, as Stanley 
Hoffmann noted, E.H. Carr’s British text, Twenty Years Crisis is considered the "first 
scientific treatment of world politics" it was in the United States that "International 
Relations became a discipline".2 More significantly for the present discussion it was 
under United States social science tutelage that International Relations became focused on
286. The mainstream of the Tradition and discipline have rarely reflected upon it in the way that more 
critically inclined scholars have. As R .BJ. Walker has said, International Relations scholars have 
"absorbed the unfortunate habit, characteristic of political science in general, of treating ""the tradition" as 
both somehow naturally given in the "great texts" and largely irrelevant to the analysis of modem human 
affairs", Walker, "The Prince and The Pauper'", p. 26. Nevertheless, the general sense of a singular, 
developmental narrative can be gleaned from a perusal of, for example, F.H. Hinsley, Power and the 
Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963); Ian Clarke, Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980); Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969", in 
The Abervstwvth Papers: International Politics. 1919-1969 edited by B. Porter (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1972); and Kal Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in 
International Theory (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985). When speaking of the Tradition in this context I 
will distinguish the term from the broader use of the term with a capital T.
^Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", Daedalus 106(3) (1977), 
pp.41-60, p.43.
203
a disciplinary "quest for [scientific] certainty" based on modernist principles of 
knowledge and (behaviouralist) methodological premises.3
Consequently, the questions asked and (historico-philosophical) issues raised by 
International Relations scholarship have been severely limited, to the extent that complex 
epistemological/ontological debates over knowledge, meaning, language and reality - the 
issues of how we think and act in the world - have been largely confined to one 
dimension or another of the "crass positivism", that the German historian Droysen was so 
perturbed about in a broader context.4 The dominant post-World War Two Realist 
approach, accordingly, has resonated with one variant or another of a "spectator" theory 
of knowledge, in which knowledge of the real world is gleaned via a realm of external 
facts (e.g. of inter-state anarchy) which impose themselves upon the individual 
scholar/statesman, who is then constrained by the policy/analytical "art of the possible". 
In its (mainly) North American variant, infused with (primarily) Popperian insight and 
behaviouralist training rituals since the 1960s, this has resulted in a Realism set upon the 
enthusiastic invocation of falsification^ scientific principles.5 The (mainly) British 
alternative, meanwhile, has invoked a species of "intuitionist" inductivism often more 
sensitive in tone to the various critiques of positivism, but, ultimately, no less committed 
to its perpetuation. These particular variants of modernism, which scholars from Hume 
to Vasquez have shown to be incapable of providing the kind of (scientific) knowledge 
advocated for them, and which scholars such as Berki, Hekman, Hesse and Gadamer 
have proclaimed philosophically and historically "primitive", represent, nevertheless, the 
socio-intellectual backdrop for this chapter.
3 Ibid, p.57. This, of course, and not uncoincidentally, replicates the broader "quest for certainty" that 
Rorty pointed to as the major quest of Western modernist philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (Oxford- Basil Blackwell, 1980), p.61.
4Droysen, cited in Karl Mueller-Vollmer, The Hermeneutics Reader Texts of the German Tradition from 
the Enlightenment to the Present (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1985), p.19. For a discussion that 
connects this theme to its broader discursive context see Chapter Three of the thesis, pp. 140-150.
5For a discussion of some of the broader implications and problems of this commitment see the 
discussion in Chapter Three of this thesis and the commentaries, among others, of Vasquez in, The Power 
of Power Politics: and Stanley Hoffmann in "An American Social Science: International Relations".
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Consequently, the task of the thesis from now on is to explain, more precisely, 
how and why International Relations must acknowledge this situation and confront its 
"unwritten preface" via the Critical Social Theory challenges that, elsewhere, have begun 
to change the "primitive" nature of contemporary Western thought. The analytical 
structure of the earlier chapters will be re-convened to assist in this task. Initially, 
therefore, the discussion in this chapter will seek to locate International Relations as pan 
of a modernist way of framing - as indeed a microcosm of the dominant Western tradition 
of interpretation and understanding. The focus will then fall more generally on the 
process by which International Relations has been constructed and defined in the period 
since its institutional inception following World War One. It will do so in a way that 
integrates Critical Social Theory themes with a reformulated approach to the discipline’s 
folk lore regarding its "stages" of intellectual growth and "great debates".
This well rehearsed format will be altered somewhat in the attempt to provide a 
broad genealogical approach to contemporary International Relations set upon four inter­
related phases, which, while broadly chronological, represent not the successively greater 
understanding of a complex reality, but more accurately, and paradoxically, the consistent 
repression of such understanding. Stanley Hoffmann's insights are useful here, 
particularly his commentary on the literary development of the Realist "quest for 
certainty" in the Cold War years. This "quest", argued Hoffmann, has been articulated in 
"three waves" of Realist literature.6 The first "wave" emanated from the publication of 
Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations in 1948 and Realist responses to it until the late 
1950s; there was a "second wave", distinguished by a shift in Realist research 
orientation, from the late 1950s to around the end of the Vietnam War, which saw the 
discipline dominated by behaviouralist problem solving approaches to Cold War strategic 
issues; and a "third wave", noted by Hoffmann, in embryo form, in 1977, which saw the
^Ibid, p.48.
205
"quest for certainty" oriented towards a post-Vietnam International Political Economy 
approach concerned with Realism's increasingly evident anomalies.7
Keeping these broad themes in mind this chapter, and those to follow, will seek to 
add detail and a more contemporary critical edge to Hoffmann's Traditionalist-Realist 
perspective on this issue. In reformulating the "three waves" proposition it will deal with 
the "quest for certainty" in International Relations as various phases of a modemist 
regime of metatheoretical framing. These phases, are: (i) the neo-Kantian phase: most 
influential in the inter war years; (ii) the Realist-positivist phase: centred on the E.H. 
Carr's "great text"8 which, in the Cold War years evolved into (iii) the positivist-Realist 
phase, with its own (North American) "great text":9 a more precise positivist 
epistemology (rational-scientific), language mode (representational), methodology 
(falsificationist) and analytical orientation (problem solving). The discussion then moves 
to (iv) the (equivalent) "post-positivist" phase of the 1980s and 1990s in social theory, 
the phase of neo-Realism, Regime Theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory, the phase of 
the Third Debate. The present chapter will concentrate in particular on the first two of 
these phases, taking the somewhat reformulated story of the Tradition and its 
contemporary discipline to the early years of the Cold War. My initial concern, however, 
is to thematically connect this discussion of the International Relations Tradition and 
discipline to earlier chapters by briefly establishing its modemist character.
International Relations and Modernism: Some Broad Discursive Connections
At its most obvious the modernist legacy in International Relations is represented in the 
way the discipline has read and interpreted its "history" and framed its "philosophical"
7The "wave" that prompted Tooze’s concern in "The Unwritten Preface".
^E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939 3rd edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
9Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th edition (New York: 
Knopf, 1978).
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stances. As in the broader context great texts and great men punctuate a meaning script 
set (largely) unproblematic ally in dualised and dichotomised terms.10 Logocentrism is 
the dominant structural theme as "history" is reduced to the incantations across time, 
culture and language of those whose enduring wisdom corresponds with that which is 
universally and foundationally real. A major characteristic of the International Relations 
historical narrative, consequently, has been its particularly modemist reading of a:
single body o f thought, incorporating both the pre-modem work of classical
Greece and the middle ages, and also writings from the 1648-1914 period.11
Not surprisingly, what philosophical debate there has been concerning the historical 
development of International Relations has also has been framed within classically 
modernist terms. Accordingly, as R.B.J. Walker has noted, the dominant International 
Relations Tradition has resonated with themes evident in modernist "intellectual traditions 
in general" complete with their textual "myth of origin".12 The problem, here, both 
generally and in relation to International Relations, is that in reifying the teleologies of the 
Greeks, the march to Christian salvation, the Liberal path to sovereignty and rationality, 
the Hegelian trek to universal consciousness, the timeless, universal pattern of 
"recurrence and repetition" and/or the Marxian route to classlessness, there is, inevitably, 
so much which is excluded - that "embarrassment of subtexts" encompassing, for 
example, "ethnocentricism, racism, the arrogance of empires, the butchery of wars and 
extermination camps". More pertinently, as Walker noted, the problem is that this
^O n the "great men" tendency see R.B.J.Walker,"77t£ Prince and The Pauper'"; Lijphart,"The Structure 
of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations; and "Stephen George, "The Reconciliation of the 
Classical’ and the 'Scientific' Approaches to International Relations", Millennium 3-5 (1975), pp. 28-40. 
On this issue it is worth noting George's perception about the "great man" reading of "history" by 
Traditionalist scholars trained in Britain in particular. George says: "The values which were dominant in 
the cloistered atmosphere of Oxford, Cambridge and the London colleges and their provincial fascimilies 
were translated into a history which saw individuals as the motive forces in world affairs, concentrated on 
Great Men and focused on the foreign policies of particular states". Not surprisingly, as George noted, 
the general result was a scholarship characterised by "dry narrative accounts with little depth of 
analysis...[which was] indistinguishable from high-class journalism", ibid, pp.35-36.
11 Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.5.
12Walker, "The Prince and The Pauper"', p.26.
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universalised "meta-narrative" of Western modernity continues, in the 1990s, to inform 
"the most basic categories through which we understand and act in the world".13
International Relations, for example, continues to be characterised by a crude 
"essentialist monologue" complete with its cast of "theatrical figures" which has 
dominated the reading and writing of International Relations down the years. The leading 
voices in this particular monologue are Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, 
Hegel, Morgenthau and Carr.14 Their "script", as interpreted by the International 
Relations mainstream over the years, has been marked by a coherence and self affirming 
logic concerning the "perennial questions" of power, state sovereignty and national 
interest, underpinned by an enduring wisdom on issues of "human nature or political 
necessity, structural determinism or the tragic condition of human existence in general".15 
As in the broader modernity context, the Tradition of International Relations has been 
represented as a homogenised, cumulative narrative, in which, via a further process of 
interpretative selectivity, certain "great texts" of Western philosophy are accorded a 
"meaning" that corresponds with the real world while others are marginalised or 
dismissed altogether using logocentric strategies of exclusion.
In the Realist narrative, for example, the Platonic contribution is considered 
highly problematic, not because, as critical social theorists have argued, it began the 
(textual) separation of subject and object in Western thought, but because it did not
13Ibid, p.27. I understand Walker here to be saying that for all these reasons we should be 
problematising the very notion of a Tradition which is unproblematically used as the foundation for 
analysis. I have no problems with this position. For the sake of the debate here, however, my position 
is that this is precisely how the Tradition continues to be understood. I speak of the Tradition therefore in 
the way that the discipline until very recently has spoken of it - but always for a critical purpose - that is 
for the purpose of opening up what has Traditionally remained closed.
14Ibid, p.31. See also Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics ch.2; Lijphart, "The Structure of the 
Theoretical Revolution in International Relations"; and Richard Cox, "The Role of Political Philosophy 
in the Theory of International Relations", Social Research 29(3) (1962), pp.261-293, at p.267; F.H. 
Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Ian Clarke, Reform and Resistance in the International Order: 
Bull, "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969"; Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, ch. 2; and 
Robert Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics" in Neorealism and its Critics 
edited by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
13Walker, "The Prince and The Pauper"', p.31.
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separate them enough. Thus, as E.H. Carr maintained, while Platonic insight might well 
be significant for "domestic" theorising, when confronted with the problems of 
knowledge and human society at the international level, Plato’s contribution was merely 
to, "advocate highly imaginative solutions whose relations to existing facts was one of 
flat negation" .1 *6 Thucydides, on the other, hand is commonly deemed to have understood 
the "existing facts" very well. His "Melian dialogue" is, in particular, accorded a 
universal, ahistorical quality with its enduring wisdom that "among neighbours 
antagonism is ever a condition of independence" .17 Later, within the millennia of 
theological dominance in the West, Augustine is generally perceived as having got it right 
with his pessimistic incantations on "fallen man" .18 And, in the Renaissance, modem 
Realism finds its exemplar scholar and text in Machiavelli and The Prince as the modem 
world begins, in systematic form, to distance itself from the religious and social myths of 
its past. 19
1^ Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, p.6.
17Thucydides as cited in Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International 
Relations", p.44. In Chapter Nine the place of Thucydides in this narrative will be problematised 
somewhat via a range of alternative readings of his "essential" Realist position.
^T he Augustinian influence upon Realism has been very significant, albeit implicitly so in many cases. 
Of the more explicit representations of a Christian pessimism in Realism see Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner's, 1953); and there are explicit
Augustinian themes in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, particularly in its opening pages with its 
perspectives on the unchanging egoistic power lust of "human nature". Kenneth Waltz had some
interesting things to say about the Christian "reductionism" of Niebuhr and Morgenthau, in Man, the
State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) and this will be an
issue returned to in Chapter Seven. The Augustinian influences were evident also within the British
Realist community, primarily via scholars such as Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight On Butterfield
see Christianity. Diplomacy and War (London: Epworth Press, 1953) and on Wight, Power Politics edited
by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); and together,
Diplomatic Investigations (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966). On the Christian pessimism theme
more generally, see Bull’s comments in "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations", British
Journal of International Studies 2(2) (1976), pp. 101-116. This is an interesting issue in relation to the
continuity of the great classical dualisms in contemporary thought. On the more specific connection
between Christianity and rational-scientific based approaches such as positivism see Margaret Jacobs, The
Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), ch. 4; and
Leszek Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972) has some interesting comments
on the way that Christianity made its peace with positivism.
19The problematic nature of this particular piece of essentialism will be illustrated in Chapter Nine via 
the work of R.B.J. Walker in, "The Prince and The Pauper’".
209
Leaping across cultural, historical and linguistic voids Hobbes' insights into the 
anarchical world are then usually introduced to the narrative, often via the proposition 
that:
in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority because of their 
authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousies and in 
the state and posture of gladiators...which is the posture of war.20
Rousseau too is presented as a major Realist contributor to the International Relations 
tradition, particularly to its understanding of the security dilemma faced by all states in an 
anarchical world, in which a state's:
safety and preservation demand that that it makes itself stronger than its 
neighbours. [Because] it cannot increase, foster, or exercise its strength 
except at their expense.21
Closer to the present, any number of commentators are represented as carrying on the 
Tradition - as understanding in the contemporary world what their forebears had so 
incisively understood in the past - about "human nature" (Morgenthau, Neibuhr) the 
structural reality of interstate competition under anarchy (Waltz), the "art of the possible" 
concerning an international society (Wight, Bull) and the enduring character of the system 
in an interdependent world economy (Keohane, Krasner).
The contemporary punch line to the Realist story - the post World War Two 
power politics approach - the most obvious and influential manifestation of this modernist 
way of framing the classical Western tradition - has been variously articulated over the 
years. But there are a number of "fundamental assumptions" which continue to form 
this, the "hard core" of Realist theory and practice and which, for the great majority of 
contemporary scholars, continue to define it in the 1990s. They are: firstly, that 
individual, sovereign, states (and/or their official diplomatic representatives) are the most
^C ited  in Lijphart, "The Structure of Theoretical Revolutions", p.44.
21 Cited in ibid. The notion of Rousseau as a Realist is perhaps most famously represented in Waltz, 
Man, the State and War: see also Clarke, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, where 
Rousseau is represented as the "pessimistic" side of a Realist/idealist dualism (with Kant on the other 
side).
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important actors on the world stage and must therefore be the primary units of
International Relations analysis. Secondly, that the International arena is the site of
endemic anarchy and is therefore fundamentally different from the domestic one
(accordingly, its theory and practice must be understood in fundamentally different
terms). Thirdly, in both historical and contemporary terms the "essence" of inter state
behaviour is the struggle for power. Fourthly, that this struggle for all its anarchical
consequences follows a "rational" pattern - the (utilitarian) pursuit of self interested
"ends" on the part of all actors. Fifthly, that while there are "societal" cooperative
tendencies evident within the state system (e.g. regime behaviour) this should not be
understood as a fundamental systemic characteristic .22 This is an approach,
consequently, that for all its posturing towards an International Political Economy in
recent times, has continued to represent the world in terms of:
mankind as divided into separate, sovereign states, each keeping law and 
order within its borders by the application of force from the centre, and also 
using force to keep secure against other states. Relations between states [are] 
conducted by diplomacy, against a background of military preparedness and 
alliances, and within a limited code of international law of which states, not 
people, [are] the subjects. The whole system of states [is] sustained against 
overthrow by the balance of power.23
The most important concepts of the Tradition, therefore, remain those of "state 
sovereignty and its logical corollary, international anarchy" .24 The concepts 
"sovereignty" and "anarchy" are in this context of relatively recent vintage. The former, 
was formulated in the late Renaissance and articulated broadly in the "individualist" age of 
the Eighteenth century, the latter derived, primarily, from debates about a "state of nature" 
and a (domestic) "social contract" in Britain in the Seventeenth century. Their
am sensitive here to the problems of providing "check lists" such as this, but these themes are taken 
from a spectrum of sources and discursive positions, including Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: 
Structural Realism and Beyond", in Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane; Vasquez, The Power of 
Power Politics, ch. 2; Justin Rosenberg "What's the Matter With Realism?", Review of Intemauonal 
Studies 16(4)(1990), pp.285-303; and Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory".
23Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.5.
24Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations", p.43. As Chapters 
Seven, Eight and Nine will seek to show, in a variety of ways, nothing has changed since Lijphart wrote 
this in 1974.
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dichotomised presence in modem thought is, at one level, as Robert Cox noted, to do 
with the projection of the bourgeois state/civil society antinomy to International Relations, 
and as Ashley has more recently illustrated, with the continuing logocentrism of a neo- 
Kantian philosophy in neo-Real ism .25
The most potent metaphor in the vocabulary of the International Relations
Tradition is the concept of "balance" of power. Here, again, however, a historically,
culturally and linguistically specific theme has been accorded a timeless, universalist
status in International Relations. Thus, the most celebrated modem figure in the tradition,
Hans Morgenthau, has asserted in deterministic fashion that "balance" in the international
system is a "natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for power"; that, therefore,
the "balance of power" is a "self regulatory mechanism".26 This (positivist) determinism
is continued in the work of one of Morgenthau's most influential heirs (and critics)
Kenneth Waltz, whose influence on neo-Realism will receive more attention in Chapter
Seven. On the "balance" issue, specifically, Waltz's amalgam of Traditionalist Realism
and utilitarian positivism has seen balance of power rearticulated as a "system" of external
constraints - as a matter of (structural) cause and (systemic) effect. Theorising about the
"system", consequently, is regarded (in classically positivist fashion) as a "retrospective"
enterprise. The metaphor of balance of power thus becomes a fully blown:
theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated action of individual 
states. It is [therefore] not a theory of state policy, but rather a theory about 
environmental constraints. The environment is produced by the actions and
See Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism"; and in his later (post-modernist) mode, "Untying the 
Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique", Millennium 17(2) (1988), pp.227- 
262. For Cox's views on this issue see, "States, Social Forces and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory", in Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane.
^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.22. This is not the only way that the concept has been used, 
indeed it has had a variety of "meanings" over the years but Morgenthau's "mechanical" one has been 
evident throughout Realist literature, particularly in the United States. See Vasquez, The Power of Power 
Politics on this and for a general discussion of the balance of power theme in Realism see Inis Claude, 
Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962); Martin Wight "The Balance of 
Power", in Diplomatic Investigations eds. Butterfield and Wight; and the special issue on the Balance of 
Power, Review of International Studies 15(2) (1989).
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the interactions of states, but that environment then appears like a market in a 
competitive economy, as a force that no state acting alone can control.27
This "systemic" dimension has been one of the most influential reconceptualisations of 
the basic premises of the Tradition in the post World War Two period.28 But as a whole 
range of contributions to the Third Debate have maintained, in their different ways, the 
modernist metaphor of "balance", presented either in Traditional power politics form or in 
structural terms, remains central to "the common image of the world" that has continued 
to direct the way that the great majority of International Relations scholars have 
understood and explained the world throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.29
As intimated in Chapter One, for Critical Social Theory scholars of the Third
Debate, it is this International Relations Tradition that has been the conduit for the simple,
albeit powerful, caricature of history, politics and society that remains dominant in the
Realist dominated discipline to the present. The modernist character of this caricatured
approach is never more evident, of course, than in its "myth of origin" - the supposed
dichotomy between Realism and idealism. The crudity of this approach has been noted
by Richard Cox, who has critically responded to the Traditional International Relations
tendency to "separate all political thought into what are alleged to be its two fundamental
antithetical types". Such a strategy, for Cox, resulted in a rather bizarre understanding of
knowledge and history which grouped together:
Plato, Grotius, Locke, Kant and Woodrow Wilson as "idealists", and 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Churchill and Lenin as "realists". [In this 
context] the idealists tend to be "rationalists" who deny or greatly 
underestimate the "power" factor in politics, and elevate absolutist moral 
principles into ultimate realities. Conversely, the "realists" tend to be 
pragmatists who place their emphasis on the power factor as the real basis of 
political action.30
27Waltz, "Theory of International Relations", in Handbook of Political Science Volume VIII edited by F. 
Greenstein and N. Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p.41, emphasis added.
^^And as such will receive extended attention in Chapter Six.
2^Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations", p.49.
3^Richard Cox,"The Role of Political Philosophy in the Theory of International Relations", p.267.
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The sheer arbitrariness of this logocentric strategy was both puzzling and troubling, for 
Cox. He was puzzled, for example, by the oppositional regime which "opposes Locke to 
Machiavelli, but places Thucydides in the same category as Machiavelli" without 
(seemingly) considering the possibility that "Locke ultimately had more in common with 
Machiavelli than with Plato".31 He was troubled by the analytical consequences of 
lumping together figures of vastly different times, places and capacities, such as Plato and 
Woodrow Wilson. Here, for example, he pointed out the problem of assuming that their 
"utopianism" was basically the same:
in spite of the fact that Plato specifically makes his Socrates speak of the 
impossibility of making the best regime actual, whereas Wilson conceived of 
the actualisation of a world of democratic states as both possible and 
necessary.32
An earlier theme requires reiteration here: it is that the crudity of a dichotomised 
format such as this has not to any great extent inhibited its influence within the 
International Relations discipline. Indeed, for broadly the same reasons that the Humean 
(self) critique was ignored by his successors (the overwhelming desire to find an 
irreducible foundation for knowledge of reality) the Realists of the post World War Two 
period, in particular, have constructed their own identity and the parameters of the 
International Relations tradition in dichotomised, logocentric terms at all levels. And 
while the problems of dichotomised thinking have been occasionally acknowledged, the 
general response to the broad underlying philosophical issues associated with reading 
history and philosophy in this way has, to say the least, been disappointing. One 
influential response has been to suggest that the problem lies not so much in privileging a 
power politics reading of history and philosophy but in not privileging it enough. Thus, 
as Traditionalist historians have told the story, the lessons of the "great texts" (e.g. The 
Prince) and the wisdom of the "great men", have not always been heeded well enough. 
Consequently, the development of a genuine Realism in modem International Relations
31 Ibid, p.268. 
32Ibid.
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was somewhat diverted as other (e.g. rationalist/Kantian) influences proliferated and as 
early Realist thinking veered off toward reformism (e.g. in the works of the Abbe de 
Saint Pierre), moralism, plans for "perpetual peace" (Kant) and legalism (e.g. Grotius) .33 
These utopian irritations (remnants of a metaphysical past) are, in Realist narratives, 
traced right up to the present century, in the (futile) post World War One efforts of 
Western liberal scholars and statesmen to subvert the theory and practice of power 
politics.
This is a position articulated powerfully in Hedley Bull's condemnation of those 
"idealists", who sought to challenge the wisdom of the early Realists and their insights 
into the universal and enduring reality of International Relations down the ages. In Bull's 
view, thus:
The "idealists" were not remarkable for their intellectual depth or powers of 
explanation, only for their intense commitment to a particular vision of what 
should happen. [However] in their disparagement of the past they lost sight 
of a great deal that was already known; in some respects their work 
represented not an advance but a decline in understanding in international 
relations, an unlearning of old lessons which a later generation of writers 
found it necessary to restate. In their assessment of the present and the future 
they were guided more by their hopes than by the evidence in hand.34
What Bull refers to here, of course, is an important element of the modernist connection 
in International Relations - that which connects the present broad discussion of Tradition 
to a more precise theme - the historical and intellectual circumstances surrounding the 
institutional establishment of International Relations as a discipline after World War One. 
Or, as it is to be presented here - the neo-Kantian phase in the modernist "making" of 
International Relations.
^ S e e  F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace.
34 Bull, "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969”, pp.35-36.
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Neo-Kantianism and the Discipline of International Relations
The discipline of International Relations was institutionally formulated in the wake of the 
carnage that was World War One. It developed, accordingly, in an atmosphere charged 
with a fervent desire to more adequately understand and more effectively control the 
seemingly endemic hostility within the international arena in order, above all, to prevent 
war on such a scale occurring again.35 It was in this context that International Relations 
scholarship was seized with a Liberal reformist zeal which owed much in tone and 
intellectual commitment to the European Enlightenment and its rebuttal of the theory and 
practice of the Ancien Regime.
More explicitly, the early years of the discipline’s development saw a concerted 
attempt to overcome the mistakes of the past - of the old world of European great power 
dominance, imperialism, balance of power strategies and the closed, elite diplomacy 
associated with the Concert of Europe. In its place the scholars and statesmen of the 
inter-war years introduced to International Relations "new world" ideas and structures set 
upon modem scientific-rationalist premises. The solutions proffered were often of an 
(Anglicised) neo-Kantian ilk, predicated as they were upon the institutionalised 
application of the values of democratic Republicanism, and a reformulated "unity of 
nations" structure centred on the cooperative efforts of individual, sovereign states, most 
obviously expressed in the League of Nations and associated institutions such as the 
International Court of Justice.36
In short, this neo-Kantian phase of the discipline's development, brief though it 
turned out to be, "constituted the first effort by intellectuals and statesmen alike to apply
35 See Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, ch.2; Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical 
Revolution in International Relations"; Olson and Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed"; and 
Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory".
•^^The reference here is to the Kant of Perpetual Peace, edited by L.W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 
1957): the Kant generally known to International Relations specialists. See also Clarke, Reform and 
Resistance in the International Order.
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ideas of enlightened [rational] self-interest to international politics".37 This is not to 
suggest that prominent scholars of the period, and political figures such as Woodrow 
Wilson, entirely rejected the strategies of power politics. Their aim, rather, consistent 
with the progressivem  of their approaches, was to intellectually and structurally 
reformulate the nature of modem relations between states in line with actual (rationally 
derived) "reality" as opposed to the "irrationality" of the past.
These orientations were articulated in a variety of ways by the scholars and 
statesmen of the era. In the inaugural address of the first Chair of International Politics, 
for example, in the early 1920s, the recipient bemoaned the lack of rational scientific 
principles in the study of the state system, reflecting that if an "ordered and scientific 
body of knowledge did exist in 1914...perhaps...the catastrophe might have been 
averted".38 Another influential dimension to the debate was added by the most prominent 
advocate of the new Liberal internationalism on the political stage, Woodrow Wilson, 
"the [political] prophet of the new era" who "symbolized the idea that the anarchy of 
power politics should be ended by the injection into international relations of the highest 
values evolved by [Western] political man".39 Wilson was perhaps the most explicit 
advocate of a neo-Kantian approach to the questions of war and peace in the inter-war 
period, advocating collective security principles and a commitment to progressivem 
centred on the superiority of modem democratic forms of government and rights of 
individual sovereignty. Understanding world history through the dominant modernist 
prism the Wilsonian approach assumed that, for all its tragedy, the events of World War 
One, in sweeping away the last vestiges of the Anden Regime had brought forth the age 
of democratic thought and politics to the international arena. Accordingly, International 
Relations was now set to enter the next "stage" of its rational development, in which the
37Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.8 .
^ T h is  was the view of C. K. Webster, cited in Olsen and Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline: 
Reviewed", p.6.
3^Inis Claude. Swords Into Plowshares 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), p.51.
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language and structural principles of the domestic (democratic) realm became directly 
appropriate.
Emphasis was thus placed on the importance of "objectifying" the spirit of the age 
via the institutionalisation of democratic structural principles. The League of Nations 
was, in this sense, the institutional vanguard of the post-war liberal age in international 
affairs, the forum in which a new modern rational elite of sovereign states might 
progressively distance themselves from the inadequate theory and practice of the past. It 
was against this background that Wilson appealed to the unfolding (universal) 
consciousness - the "general judgement" - of the world's peoples, maintaining that in the 
new objective circumstances (democracy rather than autocracy) the "conscience of the 
world" would decide what was "right" in post-war political life. Giving grist to the mill 
of those who, later, were to ridicule the ethnocentric arrogance of his position, Wilson 
propounded, further, that in the new age of Western rationality "a bad cause will fare ill, 
but a good cause is bound to be triumphant...You dare not lay a bad cause before 
mankind".40
The most accomplished scholarship of the period, it has been argued, emanated 
from the works of Alfred Zimmern, particularly his The League of Nations and the Rule 
of Law (1936) and a brief comment on this and other of his works indicates perhaps most 
clearly its modemist legacy and its consequent limitations.41 In his discussion of the 
League, for example, Zimmern promoted its establishment as "in harmony with the 
[historical] nature of things"; and as a cause which, "whether in the long or the short run 
...would prevail".42 In the same vein the years following the first World War were
40Cited in ibid, p.52.
41Zimmem, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan, 1936). This 
is the view for example of Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson eds. in Principles and Problems of  
International Politics: Selected Readings (New York: Knopf, 1950), p.18, where they describe Zimmern 
as the "most polished" of the writers of time and "the most influential representative" of the newly formed 
International Relations discipline.
42See D. Markwell, "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On", Review of International Studies 12 
(1986), pp.279-292, at p.283.
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understood as "a period of transition" in which the old traditional resort to power politics 
was to be transcended in favour of the politics of cooperation and "responsibility".43 In 
the mode that later was to prove so irresistible to critics such as E.H. Carr, Zimmern 
exhibited the kind of faith in modem legal-rational forms of order that he equated with the 
British model of society, in particular, and towards the end of his life, with the "moral" 
leadership of the USA in its struggle with the Soviet Union.44
Like many scholars of the period Zimmern resisted the "old" power politics image 
of the international arena set in stark Hobbesian terms and a fundamental conflict of 
interests between individuals in the state system. In rejecting such an image, as that 
"wicked theory of the mutual incompatibility of nations", Zimmem’s arguments paralleled 
those of Liberal economists gaining influence at the time.45 Zimmern, however, paid 
little attention to economic issues per se: his was a Traditionalist perspective for all its 
reformist inclinations. Rather, the solution for Zimmern lay in the establishment, at the 
international level, of the rationality inherent in (British) law, which, at the domestic 
level, had overcome the worst excesses of "market" conflict and created a "community 
interest in preventing and punishing breaches of the peace".46 If such a structure were in 
place at the international level, antagonisms might be brought to the surface for rational 
debate. In the new atmosphere of diplomatic/legal cooperation, states could "negotiate 
freely about their rights, in a spirit of mutual confidence and respect".47
On the question of Fascism and the frailties of legal rational solutions in this 
context, Zimmern explained the problem in rather predictable (dichotomised, logocentric)
43Ibid, p.288.
44Ibid, pp.286-288.
45Ibid, p.289. There was in this context no fundamental conflicts between the world's peoples, but 
cooperation depended upon finding ways of ameliorating the struggle for scarce political and economic 
resources that characterised a modem state system, and which had resulted in the collision of the major 
competing actors in 1914.
4^Zimmem, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, p.231.
47Ibid, p.350.
219
terms. The world, he suggested, in its "transition" period, must be understood in
dichotomised terms - as divided between "good" and "bad" states, between "old" and
"new" systems, between "traditional" and "modem" societies, between "them" and "us".
On the one hand, more explicitly, there were modem "welfare states" such as Britain, the
USA and France, where individuals mied through democratic structures and the rule of
law prevailed. On the other hand, there were "power states", such as Germany, Italy and
Japan, where individual freedom and a healthy community consciousness was still
subsumed beneath the legacy of the old absolutist state system.48 The synthesised answer
to this problem, for Zimmern, lay in the transference of the value system of the "welfare
states" to the rest of the world, in order that individuals in all states could control and
direct foreign policy as they did in "good" societies. Zimmem's individualist perspective,
and the universalism associated with it, was thus expressed in the view that:
it is the common man who counts in international relations...and who decides 
the issues of peace and war...It is to the common man that we must address 
ourselves if we would make progress towards the establishment of the Rule 
of Law in world affairs.49
It was this kind of statement, of course, which provoked Realist (state centric) 
critiques of positions such as Zimmem's as rather ridiculous liberal "idealism". On the 
broader "welfare states - power states" dualism, moreover, Zimmem's approach was 
wide open to E.H. Carr's charge that it amounted to an unselfconscious avowal of 
Enlightenment grand theory. The most obvious analytical implication of this, argued 
Carr, was that it blinded "idealist" thinkers to the fact that the "welfare states" were 
themselves part of the "power state" matrix. The appeal for a (universalised) 
consciousness of the "common [liberal] man" and for an international community based 
on the rule of law was, in this context, no more than the polemic of the "satisfied" allied
^M arkwell, "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited", p.286. 
49Cited in ibid, p.287.
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powers of 1919 concerned to further strengthen a set of power relationships which 
advantaged them.50
Carr's critique of the neo-Kantians, of course, was designed to establish the 
credentials of his own analysis of the actual "reality" of the inter state period, and I will 
turn to this issue directly in a moment. The more immediate point of the discussion above 
was to illustrate how, from its very institutional beginnings, the theory and practice of 
International Relations has been framed in modemist terms. But there has been another 
theme also associated with the discussion to this point, one which has sought to 
emphasise the continuity between the (modemist) Tradition of International Relations, its 
disciplinary beginnings in the "idealism" of the neo-Kantian phase, and the fully blown 
positivist-Realist phase which superseded it.
One final note on Zimmern might indicate the nature and complexity associated 
with this modernist continuity in an International Relations context. It concerns, at one 
level, Zimmem's explicit commitment to the "scientific" study of politics and to the 
scientific tradition which, at Oxford, "has been the home of such studies since the days of 
Occam in the thirteenth century".51 At another level it relates to Hedley Bull's proposition 
that Zimmern was the first "classical" (Traditionalist) scholar of the International 
Relations discipline.52 The point here, of course, is that for Bull the work of scholars 
such as Zimmern was perceived as as an earlier stage of the rational development towards 
"real" knowledge of International Relations.
This modernist progressivism concerning the neo-Kantians and their later Realist 
counterparts, might become more evident in the discussion to follow, which introduces
5^It failed in other words to understand a different interpretation of post-war reality held by those states 
whose (rational) interests (and to a large extent those of its "common" people) were served by destroying 
the Liberal/rational status quo so unproblematically supported by scholars like Zimmern. See Carr, The 
Twenty Years Crisis, part Two.
51Markwell, "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited", p.289. 
52Ibid.
221
the contribution of another major "classical" scholar, E.H.Carr, and the first (scientific) 
Realist "great text", The Twenty Years Crisis.53
The Making of a Discipline: Towards a Realist Science of International Relations
Perhaps more than any other Realist scholar, before or since, Carr, in The Twenty Years 
Crisis, sought to confront head on some of the broad philosophical issues that connect 
International Relations to the broader tradition of Western modernity. In so doing the the 
first "great text" of the Realist-positivist discipline in International Relations resonated 
with a major modernist tension - between Anglo-American positivism (i.e. as in British 
historiography) and themes drawn from the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Mannheim's 
Verstehen approach) - the "other side of the positivist coin".54 This tension was obvious 
enough from the beginning of Twenty Years Crisis when Carr made it clear that he 
sought to build upon the "science of international politics" which is in its "infancy".55 
Carr's (positivist) building block approach was represented, however, in terms of a 
theory of the state set in dialectical terms. Consequently, in promoting the idea that the 
nature of the state, and political reality in general, are constructed upon the 
"contradictory" nature of the human actor (as both egoist/individual and sociable/ 
communicator), Carr contended that:
The [political] State is built up of these two conflicting aspects...[therefore] 
utopia and reality, the individual and the institution, morality and power, are 
from the outset inexorably linked.56
5^On Carr's significance to Realism, in this regard, see Vasquez Power of Power Politics. Chapter 2; and 
from another angle Graham Evans, "Some Problems With a History of Thought in International 
Relations", International Relations 4 (1974), pp.720-732.
^Carr's debt to Mannheim has been hinted at over the years. More work in this area might prove fruitful 
in explaining Carr's theoretical and historiographical approach. On Mannheim’s Verstehen approach and 
its limitations see Susan Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1986); and on the British historiographical tradition see G. Steadman-Jones, "History: The Poverty of 
Empiricism", in Ideology in the Social Sciences edited by R. Blackburn (London: Fontana, 1972).
55Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, p .l. 
5^Ibid, pp.95-96.
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An adequate Realism, on this basis, must be understood as the sum of a complex 
dialectical interaction involving the inexorably linked behaviour of "creative" individuals 
within a broad socio/cultural context (i.e. as in a sociology of knowledge approach). 
Ultimately however, this valuable, if rather rudimentary, insight was effectively neglected 
and the original dialectical format progressively transformed into a one-sided positivist 
approach to knowledge and society. In The Twenty Years Crisis, resultingly, the 
potential for genuinely open-ended theoretical dialogue at the heart of Realist scholarship 
is quickly stifled, with the introduction to the debate of a series of hard and fast 
categorical distinctions set in logocentric terms. Thus, the nature of political reality (as 
opposed to the "idealism" of the inter-war years) was not now centred on any "inexorable 
links" between subjects and objects, theory and practice, but rather on the absolute 
distinction between:
An inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is [and] an 
inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should 
be .57
Having introduced this classical Humean dichotomy - between "is" and "ought" - 
Carr then claimed that it "determines opposite attitudes towards every political 
problem".58 Consequently, if inevitably, in The Twenty Years Crisis there appeared a 
dazzling variety of dichotomies and dualised categories of analysis that have since 
continued to afford Realist scholars a theoretical shorthand with which to identify the "is" 
from the "ought", etc., in every facet of their inquiry. In the logocentric fashion that was 
later to take on epidemic proportions within Realist scholarship, Carr thus shifted from an 
original position emphasising the complex dialectic of "subject" and "object", to a power 
politics Realism which insisted on the factual independence of some "inexorably linked" 
aspects of existence over others. Indeed, for Carr (as it was for Weber, Popper and 
Morgenthau in similar circumstances) Realist analysis was ultimately dependent for its
57Ibid, p.ll. 
58Ibid.
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explanation of the world upon the positivist detachment and privileging of "fact" over 
"value", "is" over "ought" and "object" over "subject".
This became more evidently the case in The Twenty Years Crisis when Carr 
turned to the issue of Realist methodology. Here, he insisted on an approach to study 
which rejected idealist/utopian attempts to transform "wish" and "need" into reality, in 
favour of a rigorous concentration on "the observation and collection of facts".59 Can- 
developed this theme further in explaining the theoretical bankruptcy of "idealism", 
which, he asserted, was identified by:
Its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct 
of international affairs.60
Carr's lurch into positivism can to be gleaned also from his discussion of one of the
central theoretical issues in modernity - the question of the relationship between the
natural and social sciences. On this point, Carr's analysis (like that of Realists/neo-
Realists later) drifts inexorably toward the very "empiricist metaphysic" it sought to
reject. In dichotomised fashion, consequently, Carr sought to distinguish the "natural"
from the "political" sciences on the basis that the latter was dominated by the theoretical
purpose and interests of the analyst (i.e. the "ought" factor) while the former "because of
the nature of the object of study", defied the corrupting influences of such analysis.
Thus, in the study of the physical sciences:
Purpose is in the strict sense irrelevant to the investigation and separable from 
it...[the physical scientist's] conclusions can be nothing more than a true 
report on facts. It cannot help to make the facts other than they are: for the 
facts exist independently o f what anyone thinks about them.61
The major implication of this rather crude inductivist approach to the factual world "out 
there" was, that as part of the positivist "scientific model", it now became the basis upon 
which a Realist identity and analytical purpose was framed.
59Ibid, p.10.
60Ibid, p.88.
Ibid, p.3, emphasis added.
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For E.H. Carr, accordingly, the superiority of a Realist approach was centred on
its capacity to overcome (historical, cultural, theoretical/interpretivist) purpose, in favour
of (objective) factual analysis of the kind associated with the "natural" sciences. Can-
proposed, consequently, that while in its early stages the science of International
Relations suffered from "idealist" theorising:
Realism in its mature stage places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and 
on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the 
role of purpose [value based theory] and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly 
that the function o f thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is 
powerless to influence or alter. [Moreover] realism tends to emphasise the 
inesistible character of existing tendencies and to insist that the highest 
wisdom lies in accepting and adapting oneself to these forces and these 
tendencies.62
The first pan of this statement I have referred to previously as one of the most imponant 
and classically unselfconscious statements in the history of International Relations 
scholarship .63 The point, at this juncture, is that one does not need to reject Carr's 
critique of the neo-Kantians to recognise the paradoxical and inadequate nature of his own 
related modernist position, with its equally one-sided positivist determinism 
acknowledging a sphere of reality "out there", independent of the function of thinking, 
which the observing subject is "powerless to influence or alter". In detaching the subject, 
as a creative force, from the Realist analytical equation in this way, Carr introduced to 
Realist scholarship a positivist logic which David Hume in the Eighteenth century had 
shown to be an entirely inadequate basis on which to understand or explain the reality of 
human existence. And yet, fifty years after Carr's contribution to the discipline, Realist 
scholars of both the British and American schools continue to objectify the "irresistible" 
character of existing (anarchical) tendencies, while "wisdom" continues to be most 
associated with those who detach themselves from the theoretical process and merely 
accept and adapt themselves to the external "givens" of an independently existing reality.
62Ibid, p.10, emphasis added 
^3See Chapter One p.53.
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Lest my position on Carr's contribution be misunderstood, on this point, one 
further comment is necessary on it. It is that for all the "crassness" of its subsequently 
privileged element, there is much that is incisive and valuable in The Twenty Years 
Crisis. This is not just a matter of the more sober and cautious passages to be found there 
on the nature of Realism, but of the more immediate analysis of the inter-war period 
contained within its pages. Carr was, in this sense, correct to attack the one sidedness of 
the neo-Kantians and their blindness to the (non-progressivist) forces at work right at the 
heart of their progressivist "history". He was correct, also, to emphasise the dangers of, 
and potential for, "irrationality" in the neo-Kantian "rational" universe, and to warn of the 
dangers of power politics behaviour among European states still, in one way or another, 
living in the shadows of the most destructive war ever recorded. I cannot imagine any 
Critical Social Theory scholar in the 1990s who would not acknowledge Carr’s insight on 
these issues.
The problem, however, is that because those who followed Carr in the Realist 
pursuit have never seriously confronted his or their own one-sidedness, their own 
blindness, intolerance and analytical silences, a potentially critical analysis in the 1930s, 
has been increasingly transmuted into a universalist, ahistorical, uncritical and dangerous 
"catechism" since. This is one of the reasons why a "preface" needs to be written and 
taken seriously in International Relations and it is a theme that will receive more attention 
in the chapters to follow, particularly in Chapter Eight where something will be said about 
Critical Theory attempts, in the early 1980s, to highlight the "repressed" potential for 
critical analysis in the works of Realists such as Carr. 64
Before this, however, more needs to be added on the issue of the developing 
International Relations discipline, which by the late 1950s, was increasingly captured by 
power politics Realism, and a harder edged modernism expressed in a more explicitly 
"scientific" approach to theory and research.
***In the work of Cox in "States, Social Forces and World Orders"; and Ashley, in "The Poverty of 
Neorealism".
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The Discipline Consolidated: The Cold War and the Construction of a 
Positivist-Realist International Relations
If the disciplinary seeds of positivist Realism were sown in the responses to the 
"anarchy" of the inter-war years, it was in the shadows of World War Two, and more 
directly in the glare of the Cold War between the nuclear superpowers, that positivist 
Realism became the dominant institutional and intellectual mainstream of International 
Relations. The literature on the Cold War is, of course, the stuff that mainstream 
disciplinary training in International Relations is made of. And rightly so given its 
significance for contemporary theory and practice.
However, the question I want to raise here, albeit briefly, concerns the way in 
which the Cold War has been represented in the International Relations context. It is, I 
argue, a perfect example of a modemist based "orthodox consensus" at work, in that both 
orthodox and alternatives approaches are framed in fundamentally the same way, thus 
disallowing the need for either side in the dispute, or those looking on in the broader 
community, to seriously question the foundations of their "great debate". The end result 
was a post-war discursive practice in U.S. intellectual and policy making circles that 
helped significantly to "make" International Relations what it is today. More specifically, 
in relation to the Cold War issue, the "making" of International Relations was articulated 
in an enhanced and sometimes hysterical affirmation of Western modernity, expressed, 
for example, as opposition to a Soviet "other": in an analytical environment projecting 
(primarily) North American social scientific attitudes and rituals (i.e. positivist problem 
solving): and in the largely uncritical acceptance (bordering on reification) of a particular 
kind of power politics wisdom, most influentially expressed in Hans Morgenthau's, 
Politics Among Nations, first published in 1948.
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The Cold War debate in International Relations is commonly represented as a 
clash between Realist and "revisionist" interpretations of the "facts".65 The Realist case, 
it is acknowledged, is not a homogeneous one as such. Instead two major variants of 
Realist argument are considered significant. The first (the official U.S./Western 
approach) suggested that the Cold War was an inevitable outcome of the post Second 
World War power structure, in which the victorious democratic powers were confronted 
by the Soviet Union - an erstwhile ally - now ideologically committed to the destruction 
of Liberal-Capitalist principles and ultimately to world domination. The second Realist 
variant also blamed the Soviet Union for the Cold War and also understood its emergence 
and development in deterministic terms. This perspective, however, brought a more 
Traditional power politics wisdom to bear on the story, maintaining that it was not so 
much the ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism that was driving the Soviets 
towards conflict with the "Western" powers, but the expansionist desires inherent to great 
powers in the state system. This desire, according to influential realists such as 
Morgenthau and Kennan, was particularly strong within Russian history and national 
character. And, ideologies aside, faced with the unparalleled strategic opportunities in 
1945, Stalin was concerned above all to fulfil the historical/strategic ambitions of the 
Czars.66
The "revisionist" perspective is also generally regarded as having two main 
variations. One, associated with "radical" scholars such as William Appleman Williams, 
suggested that it was, if anything, US desire and opportunism that was at the core of 
Cold War tension rather than Soviet expansionism. From this perspective it was the 
desire of U.S. foreign policy and a Corporate elite for world wide market penetration that 
was the keystone to Cold War conflict. The problem for U.S. ambition, of course, was 
the post-war existence of another superpower disinclined to allow capitalist penetration,
For a good discussion of this issue see D. Larson, Origins of Containment; A Psychological 
Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); see also J.L. Richardson, "Cold War 
Revisionism: A Critique", World Politics XXIV(4) (1972), pp.579-602.
^Larson, Origins of Containment, pp.7-9.
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particularly in its newly acquired sphere of influence.67 The second "revisionist" 
perspective had similar characteristics, but a harder, Marxian based critical edge. 
Articulated via the works of scholars such as the Kolko’s, the Cold War was understood 
as part of broader developments in a worldwide class struggle, with the U.S. seeking, 
above all, to eradicate any challenge to its power from Socialist states.68
There is, undoubtedly, valuable insight associated with all of these perspectives. 
The problem, for the discipline of International Relations, and for a generation forced to 
live within the confines of Cold War theory and practice, is that this insight was projected 
in terms that reduced it to its most basic (ontological/epistemological) common 
denominator. Excluded from the Cold War debate, consequently, in both academic and 
more "popular" spheres were other insights that, while they might not have prevented 
conflict per se, might have alleviated its effects long before Gorbachev and his followers 
woke up from their particular experience of the Enlightenment dream-cum-nightmare.
On this theme, Charles Nathanson has noted that for all their obvious differences 
the Realists and their opponents in the Cold War debate all assumed into their analysis a 
single, external world of fact ,"out there", against which the reality of post war 
International Relations could be understood. Thus, for the Realists, "Soviet actions were 
there to be read transparently as unambiguous signs of a threat to the national security of 
the United States".69 For the "revisionists", on the other hand, "the interests and 
prejudices of US policy-makers were equally transparent, flowing directly and 
unproblematically into anti-Soviet policies and actions".70 Both sides, in other words, 
were locked into positivist metatheories which limited the kinds of questions they could
67Ibid, pp. 10-13. On Williams see, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishers, 
1959).
68Ibid, pp. 11-13. See Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States 
Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1968).
6°See Charles Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of 
Representation", Alternatives 13 (1988), pp.443-483.
70Ibid, p.444.
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ask and allowed them to exclude from their analysis important self-reflective themes. 
Within Realist accounts the orthodox "historical narratives"71 of the "official" US 
Government perspective most clearly expressed this positivist approach. On the other 
side, as it were, the work of the Marxist scholars, was also clearly centred in positivist 
grand theory (i.e. the unfolding class struggle).
The "revisionism" of scholars such as Williams (portrayed as "idealist" by 
Marxists)72 is a little more complex in terms of its positivist archaeology. As Deborah 
Welch Larson has attested, this is because Williams followed basic Verstehen principles 
of knowledge and explanation, articulated most directly through a Mannheimian 
Sociology of Knowledge prism.73 This of course allows for interpretative analysis at one 
level but not at another, particularly concerning the notion of an independent world "out 
there" and the scientific model in relation to it. Accordingly, the most influential Cold 
War alternative to positivist Realism was framed in terms of contemporary social science 
methodology and the postulation of "covering laws".74 I will return to this issue shortly 
as it relates to the general position of Morgenthau, the most influential Realist scholar of 
the Cold War age and beyond.
Firstly, however, something briefly needs to be said about the broader analytical 
implications of this example of the modemist framing of the Cold War, concerning the 
question of what was excluded in order that the "givens" of a modernist discourse might 
dominate. Here, Nathanson's contribution is useful, even if his appreciation of some of
71 Larson, Origins of Containment, p.9.
72For an example of the Marxist attack see Eugene Genovese, "William Appleman Williams on Marx 
and America", Studies on the Left 6 (1966), pp.70-86; cited in Larson, Origins of Containment, p. 13
73Larson. Origins of Containment, pp.10-11.
74Ibid, p. 12. The Verstehen connection was discussed in broad terms in relation to the hermeneutic 
tradition in Chapter Three, and its influences have been noted at different times in the more explicit 
International Relations context of Chapters Four and Five. Its most influential site in realist terms was 
in Morgenthau's work and this connection will be the focus of attention in the chapter to follow. On the 
problems of Verstehen as the "other side of the positivist coin", see Hekman, Hermeneutics and the 
Sociology of Knowledge.
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the nuances of the Cold War debate is a little sparse at times.75 Nathanson's argument, 
set primarily within post-modernist premises, sought to illustrate how the orthodox Cold 
War debate excluded questions about the discursive construction of the Cold War, in the 
United States, in particular.
Accordingly, he argued, after 1946, the Soviet "threat" became the central plank 
in U.S. foreign policy and the central obsession in US society, not because of any radical 
change in Soviet behaviour (i.e. the external facts) but, because "policy makers had found 
a new language, or script, for interpreting the meaning of Soviet behaviour".76 Until 
1946, Nathanson suggested, there was a great deal of ambivalence within the United 
States about the nature of the Soviet Union and an ambiguity about its future direction and 
strategic ambitions. And, he noted, "as long as [this] ambiguity was recognised, 
negotiations were also seen as reasonable and necessary".77
After 1946, however, this ambiguity dissipated, to be replaced by the kind of 
foundational certainty that underlined the rise of positivist Realism in intellectual and 
policy circles, and the often hysterical anti-Communism throughout the United States. At 
this point, with ambiguity gone (and any potential for "thinking space" closed off) 
genuine attempts at understanding and negotiation were no longer considered "reasonable 
[or] necessary", particularly for a nation possessing the ultimate in modem technological 
achievement - the Atomic bomb. At the forefront of the resultant "threat" scenario that 
followed was George Kennan's (initial) reading of Soviet character and intent, articulated 
in secret correspondence with the Truman Administration.78 The significance of this
7^I refer here to his judgement that all sides of the debate assumed that "actions, interests or prejudices 
speak for themselves, requiring neither interpretation nor translation", in "The Social Construction of the 
Soviet Threat", p.444. The more nuanced point I think is that many in the debate acknowledged 
interpretivist themes but that it was a particular kind of interpretation that allowed facts to "speak for 
themselves". Nathanson's work draws extensively on Daniel Yergin in, Shattered Peace: The Origins of 
the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).
^Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat", p.445.
77Ibid, p.454.
7^This was the (in)famous "Long Telegram", that remained classified information until 1971.
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particular process of closing down "thinking space", emphasised Nathanson, was that it 
had little to do with any "observation" of Soviet behaviour in the post-war period, 
because U.S. intelligence, in general, had acknowledged that there was little evidence of 
expansionary capacity or ambidon at this time.79 Rather, the foundation of Kennan's 
analysis was his Traditional power politics understanding of "history", especially the 
"given" nature of Russian and Soviet history. Accordingly, sweeping interpretative 
ambiguity aside, the Soviet future was analysed as determined both by the Soviet "past", 
and implicitly, by relations between traditional and modem societies in general.
The Russians/Soviets were, on this basis, a "neurotic" people, with an 
"instinctive sense of insecurity" that, in the post war era, had become heightened by their 
interaction with "the more competent, more powerful...economically advanced West".80 
Such a power could not be rationally dealt with because it was "[i]mpervious to the logic 
of reason [and] seemingly inaccessible to considerations o f reality" } 1 On this basis, all 
the Russians/Soviets understood was force, because, it was argued, throughout their 
"history" their leaders had learnt that security only comes via "patient and deadly struggle 
for total destruction of rival power[s], never in compacts and compromises with it".82
With this "historical" analysis established, the Cold War scenario had its 
(external) "factual" foundation. From this foundation all other logic flowed. The Soviet 
desire to expand was, in this discursive context, both predictable and a source of great 
danger to the West, in general, and the US in particular. This was because the modem 
attempt to alleviate Russian "neurosis" were now combined with a Marxist ideology 
which preached world domination and the destruction of capitalist democracy. Indeed, 
for Kennan, empirical evidence of Soviet expansionism was already "fact". The Soviets, 
he recorded, were already engaged in securing "certain neighbouring points" conceived of
79Ibid, p.459 
80Ibid, p.455.
^From  Kennan's "Long Telegram", cited in ibid, p.456, emphasis added.
82Ibid, p.455.
232
as being of "immediate strategic necessity" (e.g. Iran, Turkey) .83 However, warned 
Kennan, "other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet 
political power is extended to new areas" (e.g. Persia, Spain, Gibralter).
Following Kennan's report, noted Nathanson, a major change in attitude occurred 
in policy making circles in particular. Now, U.S. foreign policy analysts had a way of 
"reading" the Soviet Union which accorded them the certainty they craved. Now, backed 
by the wisdom of the expert, they had a language and a logic which allowed them to 
synthesise (totalise) the ambiguity, give identity to the fragmentation, transform mere 
interpretations into fact. Consequently, even while intelligence reports continued to 
indicate that the Soviets were not engaged in any threatening activities (or at the least that 
these activities could be understood in a different ways)84 U.S. officials began the 
process of constructing the "self-generating, self-confirming reality" that became the Cold 
War for Western societies and for International Relations.85
In this context Truman's top ranking civilian and military advisers lost their sense 
of uncertainty and a "remarkable agreement" emerged about the Soviets and the world 
"out there". The subsequent reality, complete with historical and empirical evidence, was 
that the Soviets:
believe that war with the United States...is inevitable. [The Soviets]...are 
increasing their military power...and are seeking to weaken and subvert their 
potential opponents...The language of power politics is the only language 
which [the Soviets] understand...The main deterrence to Soviet attack is the 
United States ...The United States...should entertain no proposal for 
disarmament...as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists...The 
United States should support and assist all democratic countries which are in 
any way menaced or endangered by the Soviet Union.86
^From  Kennan's "Long Telegram", cited in ibid, p.455.
^Ib id , p.462.
85Ibid, p.445.
^ T h is is taken from a memo to the President in September 1946 as cited in ibid, p.460.
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Two points drawn from Nathanson's work require reiteration before moving on. 
The first is that Nathanson's approach, following post-modernist perspectives, did not 
seek to dismiss as irrelevant or invalid (and certainly not "unreal") those conventional 
accounts of the Cold War debate outlined earlier. What it sought to do was to illustrate 
that there were other ways of understanding the reality of the Cold War that were not 
encompassed within the orthodox discourse. It sought, moreover, to illustrate that there 
were other options available in practice to the policy makers at the time which were 
excluded from serious consideration or marginalised by the particular discourse that 
"made" Cold War reality for them. The point here is that it was the discursively produced 
reality that the policy makers and intellectual sectors responded to, not some external 
world "out there" that imposed its real knowledge upon them. As Nathanson put it, 
"[w]hat had changed was not Soviet behaviour but the US method of interpreting it".87 
And while anyone aware of the literature of the period will know of Kennan's more 
nuanced and empathetic observations in later times, Nathanson's overall point on his 
early contribution remains valid. It is that the "Long Telegram" of February 1946 created 
an "interpretive straightjacket" from which neither Western nor Soviet analysts could 
escape for forty years.
Another question flows from all this, of course, which asks: why was it that 
Kennan's discourse, in particular, was privileged over the others? On this question 
Nathanson's argument has more in common with some of the "revisionists" than with the 
Realists. He suggested, for example, that Kennan's discourse complemented a desire on 
the part of U.S. capitalists and Corporate planners, to tame a workforce which had 
become more militant as it understood the opportunities inherent in a burgeoning US 
economy after World War Two. In an intensely anti-communist atmosphere, this 
"taming" process became decidedly easier, even more so when allied with a direct Soviet
87As Nathanson noted, "at the very time that the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were being framed, 
the Military Intelligence Division was observing that the Soviets had limited their involvement in the 
Middle East, diminished their ideological rhetoric, and given only moderate support to Chinese 
communists”, ibid, p.462.
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"threat.". At the same time, among the Government and intellectual elites, the end of the 
war bought a measure of uncertainty and directional confusion to U.S. thinking and 
research. Kennan's Soviet "threat" thesis, and the identity it now helped construct for 
U.S. (domestic) leadership - and U.S. foreign policy - helped overcome that uncertainty 
and provided strategic political and moral direction for the new leaders of the "free 
world".
This issue of U.S. identity construction will receive more direct commentary in 
Chapter Nine, but the more immediate issue, and a second important point derived from 
Nathanson's work on the Cold War, is that it focused attention not so much on the 
conventional why question, but more on the (post-modernist) how question. 
Acknowledging that each major approach to the Cold War has an answer as to why it 
happened (complete with objective, verifying evidence) the orientation in Nathanson's 
work was toward the question of how the Cold War was constructed from the struggle 
between competing discourses on its "real" nature.
As this thesis has sought to emphasise, to begin to come to grips with this 
question (and an important element of the "unwritten preface") it is necessary to break 
through those powerful cultural and conceptual boundaries that have been dominant in 
International Relations for so long. Hence the need for a Critical Social Theory 
perspective concerned to provide "thinking space" for a Tradition and discipline in order 
than it can confront questions it no longer asks of itself, in order that, in re-asking them, 
it might become aware of both its process of exclusion and closure, and its potential for 
re-inclusion, openness and change.
It was with this issue (broadly) in mind that Nathanson suggested that the power 
of the Cold War Realist "script" (apart from its association with vested interests in U.S. 
society) was derived from a way of understanding the world dominant in the West since 
"the Bible taught the peoples of Christendom how to interpret what was going on 'out
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there"'.88 This, however, as earlier chapters of the thesis have indicated, is only pan of 
the (modemist) story. A more explicit rendition of it, in the Cold War context, would 
emphasise, not just the Judeao-Christian dualism, but those that followed it in the era of 
the "death of God", particularly since the Enlightenment, when the reality of knowledge 
gleaned from the world "out there" was sanctified by the new theology of scientific- 
rationalism - the religion by the 1950s of the American social sciences.
As a modem theology, of course, there was much more emphasis placed on 
questioning, on confronting the Traditional "givens". But as the earlier discussion has 
explained, there were, in the dominant positivist sect, certain questions on which 
"reflection" was effectively "disallowed". Within the ecumenical councils of the 
International Relations hierarchy this was particularly the case regarding the detachment 
of the observing subject from the object of reflection - the world "out there". 
Consequently, there has been little critical questioning of the capacity of an expert such as 
Kennan to understand the "facts" of Russian/Soviet "history", or the "real" meanings of 
Russian/Soviet cultural life, from a power politics perspective steeped in the assumptions 
and biases of Western modernity and positivist theory. The implications of not asking 
such questions were evident enough in the 1950s and 1960s as positivist assumptions 
and interpretive biases became an increasing source of closure on the Cold War and in 
International Relations generally. In this period the conservatism inherent in state centric 
analysis was now increasingly complemented by the "problem solving" theory of 
Western "scientific" scholars engaged in a struggle with the ideology of the Soviet Other. 
At the centre of the International Relations discipline, in the United States, the result was 
a static, uncritical, modernist framing regime, increasingly articulated in behaviouralist 
terms, which began to speak in more confident tones of its knowledge of the world "out 
there".
I want now to begin to address this issue and that period between the onset of the 
Cold War and (roughly) the war in Vietnam, when the modernist legacy - via a fully
88Ibid, p.457.
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blown positivist Realism - increasingly "made" International Relations in terms of the 
opposition between a unified Cold War "Western" identity and the "difference" and 
danger of an anarchical world "out there" - the realm of the Soviet Other. Initially, at 
least, I will address this issue in the way that the discipline usually does when it speaks of 
its "development", that is via the scholarship of its first disciplinary "heroic figure", Hans 
Morgenthau, particularly in Politics Among Nations. My treatment of Morgenthau's 
work, however, is concerned to open up the debate rather than close it off. Accordingly 
at the beginning of the next chapter Politics Among Nations will be spoken of in terms 
that Morgenthau refused to speak of it, in terms, that is, of Max Weber's major Verstehen 
influence upon its basic concepts and conclusions.
Summary
This chapter was concerned, above all, to illustrate a discursive connection between the 
broad historical and philosophical discussions of the thesis in Chapters One to Four and 
the more explicit inquiries into the theory and practice of International Relations which are 
the primary focus of attention from now on . It sought, initially, to illustrate how the 
Tradition of International Relations was derived from that broader discursive tradition of 
Western history and philosophy which, since the Enlightenment has provided a story of 
unity, identity and (positivist) certainty, for modem social theory. In this regard it 
emphasised the story of the development of International Relations - its Traditional story - 
as the site of a rather crude logocentric narrative, in which a selective cast of "heroic 
figures" (unproblematically) speak the eternal wisdom of power politics across the 
complexity of time, histories, cultures and linguistic practices, culminating in the 
disciplinary rhetoric that is contemporary Realism, in all its variants. Concentrating on 
the early disciplinary articulation of the Tradition, in the inter-war years, the chapter 
emphasised the explicit modernism associated with its neo-Kantian phase in which a 
rationalist progressivism reigned when a broader, more sensitive approach to theory and
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practice was crucial. A less obvious modernist connection was then addressed - that 
between the neo-Kantianism of the "idealists" and the Realism which superseded it
Here, it was argued, the modernist framing regime was not fundamentally 
changed. Whereas the "idealists" had understood reality in terms of the rational unfolding 
of democratic consciousness in dialectical confrontation with a power politics world "out 
there", the Realists now retained the dichotomised structure of understanding in 
"observing" a world "out there" characterised not by post-Kantian emancipatory 
opportunity, but by the stark realities of (all) human history which as Carr made clear 
represented a "sequence of events which [creative thought/re-interpretation] is powerless 
to influence or alter".89
The discussion then sought to more directly confront the theory/practice, 
knowledge/power issues, integral to Critical Social Theory analysis, by shifting the focus 
of attention to the most "concrete" of International Relations themes, the Cold War 
between the "West" and the Soviet Other. The arguments here were significant both for 
the immediate issue of the development of power politics Realism and also for the notion 
of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations. The major proposition was that our 
understanding of the Soviets and of the Cold War more generally - which for forty years 
dominated the lives and minds of contemporary peoples - was severely limited by the 
questions excluded from Realist (i.e. Western) theory and practice, and from the 
perspectives of its major "alternatives" in the disciplinary spectrum. It was argued more 
precisely - and here the modemist connections were re-emphasised - that just like the 
"idealists" and the Realists in their variation on the positivist/foundationalist theme, 
International Relations scholarship in the early years of the Cold War could not question 
itself - it could not reflect upon the way it "knows" the world or the process by which 
(real) "meaning" is given to it, incarcerated as it was/is within a positivist metatheory. In 
relation to the early Cold War Realist discourse that helped considerably to "make" the 
subjects and objects of International Relations for a generation to follow, it could not, for
89Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, p.10.
238
example, reflect upon the process by which a figure such as Kennan could extrapolate 
from an essentialised "history” the "reality" of Soviet ideological intent in the post war 
years. It could not more specifically breach the "positivist bias" at the core of Anglo- 
American thinking which left unquestioned the process by which the subject (e.g. 
Kennan) engaged with the object of inquiry (e.g. the Soviet Union).
Accordingly, ignoring at least a century of "preface" on alternative approaches to 
interpretive complexity, the "mature" Realism of the Cold War International Relations 
discipline followed the modemist mainstream narrative in obliging the observing subject 
to merely "describe" the values, ends, cultural norms, interests and moral and ideological 
perspectives of a particular social practice, which it then treated as t/they were objective, 
non-normative "facts", beyond the interpretive/theoretical realm. As the earlier chapters 
indicated this severely limits the capacity of modemist thinkers to seriously reflect upon 
important questions of modem life. Most significantly in relation to the Cold War it 
limited any "Western" potential for critical (self) reflection upon the meaning of Soviet 
action in that crucial period before the prophecies of the Cold Warriors on both sides, 
were (self) fulfilled.
It might be argued of course that this is simply too esoteric a point to make in this 
context, that foreign policy "practitioners", particularly in times of crisis, are less 
interested in the complexities of "theory" and more concerned with quick, problem 
solving, "practice". For a range of reasons, hopefully now apparent in this thesis, this is 
not an acceptable proposition - its practical implications are simply too dangerous to 
accept. But even if, for argument's sake, this was an acceptable proposition, it still does 
not explain how or why the theoretical crudity of the Cold War became, and (largely) 
remains, the "catechism" of International Relations in those sites of intellectual/academic 
analysis where "reflection" and critical inquiry is purportedly the raison d'etre.
This was the kind of question which underlay the final connection the chapter 
sought to make, very briefly, at its conclusion - between the early post-war discipline set 
upon a modemist Tradition and energised by Carr's call for a "scientific" International
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Relations - and the influence of Hans Mogenthau's Politics Among Nations, which, from 
1948 on gave the Cold War "quest for certainty" a Weberian hermeneutic imprimatur. 
The discussion now to follow seeks to explain the implications of this connection for the 
way we continue to think, speak and act in International Relations.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE POSITIVIST-REALIST PHASE: MORGENTHAU. BEHAVIOURALISM AND
THE "QUEST FOR CERTAINTY”
The direct connection between Weber's thought and that of Morgenthau has been rarely 
acknowledged by International Relations specialists. Its influence, nevertheless, has 
been important and powerful.1 In the early years of the Cold War this was particularly 
the case in regard to Morgenthau's fundamentally Weberian defence of Realism 
constructed upon the textual wisdom of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Richelieu, Hamilton 
and Disraeli: those who understood "the [real] nature of international politics as an 
unending struggle for survival and power".2 More specifically, as Regis Factor and 
Stephen Turner have illustrated, Morgenthau's famous propositions concerning the 
difference between "utopian" and Realist thinkers were derived directly from Weber's 
theory. Accordingly, "utopianism corresponded to Weber's category of persons who 
have chosen ends that cannot be achieved in the world by any known means". Realists 
meanwhile, were those who, according to Weber, recognised that "to act in international 
politics entailed the doing of evil".3 Realists, in other words were those who
1This is not purely due to any lack of theoretical introspection on the part of the discipline. It has as 
much to do with the reluctance of Morgenthau to acknowledge Weber's influence upon him until late in 
his life. While, therefore, as Regis Factor and Stephen Turner have illustrated, Weber’s ideas were to 
form the backbone of Morgenthau's work, and while the structure of Morgenthau's argument in his major 
International Relations texts were taken directly from Weber's writings, Morgenthau consciously avoided 
any direct association with him. Turner and Factor have explained this situation in sympathetic terms, 
stressing that in the 1940s and immediate post war years, Morgenthau was reluctant to emphasise his 
indebtedness to a "German theory of Politics". Consequently, Morgenthau adopted a long term strategy, 
"which permitted him to present Weber’s views with their full polemical force, without the disability of 
their origins", Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1984), p. 169; see also pp. 167-173.
2Ibid, p.170.
3See ibid, p. 172. The "utopian" basis of liberalism, therefore, was for Morgenthau, as it was for Weber, 
(and for Carr) the non-recognition that, in following (value based) "interests" in the world, inter-state 
political action was always potentially at risk of doing evil. Weber’s scepticism aboufutopianism" here 
was prompted not only by the influences of Dilthey and Rickert, et al, but by a much older image of 
reality prompted by influences in Machiavelli. See Footnote 7.
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acknowledged the necessity of accommodation to the real (anarchical) nature of 
International life.4 The notion of "interest" derived from Weber, and reformulated slightly 
by Morgenthau, has also become a crucial theme in Realist thinking. For Weber (if rather 
vaguely) the notions of "values" and "interests" were grafted together in order that the 
Verstehen social scientist could objectively evaluate the social and political facts of life 
seen as competing "interests" (ends).5 For Morgenthau, likewise, it was possible for the 
analyst of International Relations to speak in "objective" terms about the reality of the 
international arena (the struggle for power defined as interests) while accounting for value 
laden subjectivity. In this way, Weber gave to Morgenthau (and to a whole generation of 
Traditionalist-Realists) a Verstehen based synthesis which appeared to overcome the 
"moralism" of the liberals, the progressivism of the "idealists" and the crude inductivism 
associated with conventional scientific approaches.6
This chapter is concerned with some of the implications of the modernist 
connection here - between Morgenthau's Verstehen based approach to the world "out 
there" - and the fully blown positivist Realist phase in International Relations which 
developed from it - in the era of the "behaviouralist revolution" and the scientific "quest 
for certainty". The discursive power of the Weber-Morgenthau perspective was evident 
at two levels of Cold War theory and practice. Intellectually, the Verstehen influence 
assisted, significantly, in the transference of behaviouralist attitudes and methodological 
principles to International Relations, in that it allowed (North) American Realists (in 
particular) to maintain the Realist disciplinary quest for scientific analysis while 
(ostensibly) overcoming the problems of the first (Traditionalist) attempts to provide 
coherent explanation of reality via inductivist empiricism.
4This was the characterisation of Realism introduced at the beginning of the thesis via the work of R.N. 
Berki, On Political Realism (London: J.M. Dent, 1981). See Chapter One of this thesis, pp.23-28.
5See Factor and Turner, Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason, p. 173. See also the broader discussion 
on this point in relation to Weber in Chapter Three, pp. 146-149.
^Marxism of course remained an "ideology” - its image of reality therefore distorted by extreme value 
based analysis and thus not worth taking seriously.
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In this regard, Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism, with its moderated scientific 
ambitions and precise methodological conventions, intersected nicely with the power 
politics images of Weber and Morgenthau - images invoking age old European wisdom 
about a world of "warring gods" - of irreconcilable value systems - of endemic conflicts 
of "interests".7 In its "new world" reformulation, Morgenthau's modified Weberianism 
was of significance also because of the direction and enhanced legitimacy it afforded to 
post-war Realism in U. S. foreign policy circles. In particular, with its stress on the 
"means/ends" logic of international life and its Traditional focus on diplomatic statecraft, 
it signified for the policy planner and "practitioner", a (deceptively) simple and flattering 
account of who and what was fundamental to contemporary power politics existence.
These are themes that will now be explored further in using the Weber- 
Morgenthau connection as a point of discursive entry into a broader discussion of 
International Relations in its most explicitly modemist phase. Following an initial inquiry 
into Morgenthau's textual legacy to the post-war discipline, its implications will be 
explored in a brief discussion of the Modernisation Theory attempt to impose the 
certainties of the Western "meta-narrative" upon the Third World, and then attention will 
focus on the major mainstream articulation of Realism in the 1960s, that associated with 
security and strategic discourse.
7The influence of Machiavelli upon Weber is an interesting connection here - particularly concerning the 
"warring gods" principle (irreconcilable value systems) and Weber's reformulated notion of a power 
politics based on cultural antagonisms. For a discussion see Giddens, Capitalism and Modem Social 
Theory: An Analysis of the Writing of Marx. Dürkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), pp.135-137; and Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber (London: 
Macmillan, 1972); see also Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. 
(London: Methuen, 1976), pp.45-51. For a broader debate on Machiavelli and the "warring gods" theme 
see Isiah Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli", in Studies on Machiavelli edited by J.M. Gilmore 
(Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1972), pp. 147-206. The connection here with Morgenthau's deep Augustinian 
perspectives is also obviously significant in his understanding of the contemporary "art of the possible" 
in International Relations. The importance of the Weber/Popper intersection here, of course, was that the 
insights of the former allowed for the possibility of "scientifically" evaluating the clash of "interests" 
(ends) while the latter indicated how, precisely, it was to be done.
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Politics Among Nations: the Verstehen Dimension
The Verstehen tensions in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations are, if anything, even
more apparent than in Carr's earlier scientific "great text" The Twenty Years Crisis.
Accordingly, within its opening pages, Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, is both
classical hermeneuticist and hard-nosed positivist. In the former mode he provided for
Realist scholarship perhaps the most famous hermeneutic statement in the history of the
discipline. Echoing the injunction of hermeneutic scholars down the years to get "inside"
the text Morgenthau pronounced thus that Realists must, above all:
Retrace and anticipate as it were the steps the statesman - past, present and 
future - has taken or will take on the political scene. We [must] look over his 
shoulder when he writes his dispatches: we must listen in on his 
conversations with other statesmen; we [must] read and anticipate his very 
thoughts.8
In this mode at least, Morgenthau's Realism implied that the text analogue - the world of 
statesmen - is the primary social and linguistic practice to which Realist theory must relate 
itself. An adequate Realism must, on this basis, seek to understand and explain the 
norms, rules, ideologies and competing interests of diplomatic statecraft. Realist analyst 
must attempt to get "inside" the world of the diplomat, the foreign policy-maker, the 
strategist and the power broker. Realism must, in this sense, correspond with the actual 
practice - the reality - of statesmanship. It is validated when it has meaning for the 
practical man of affairs, the diplomat statesman, the human agent of power defined as 
"interest".
Taking a slightly wider angle, Realist scholarship, following (broad) hermeneutic 
principles of study, must seek to interpret the "inner" nature of the world of States. It 
must do more, for example, than simply reaffirm the anarchy of the system, or make 
more rigorous and systematic the evidence of an endemic struggle for power and 
influence. It is interested, rather, in a more profound kind of historical and cultural
^Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th ed. (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1978), p.4.
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understanding of the relationship between states, emphasising modes of communication 
between them through the use of "intersubjectively understood symbols within the 
context of rule governed institutions".9 Realist scholarship of this kind is not (ostensibly) 
restricted to a "problem solving" ambition, but is concerned with "the attainment of a 
possible consensus among actors in the framework of the self understanding derived 
from tradition" .10
Such a task, it might be argued, could only be carried out with the total
involvement of the creative (and self-critical) analyst. But for Morgenthau, seeking the
authority of the scientific method for the study (and political practice) of International
Relations, the value laden scholar is magically detached from the analytical equation via a
Weberian derived (means/ends) conjuring trick, which, forty years later, remains part of
the of the Realist repertoire as expressed in neo-Realist perspectives. This Verstehen
influence was evident as Morgenthau, in underwriting the "catechism" of the Cold War
"Prince", gave focus and purpose to his power politics Realism. In a statement which
encompassed so much of Morgenthau's perspective, and underlined his contribution to
the "quest for certainty" within International Relation, he explained that to understand the
world realistically, and solve its problems, we m ust:
put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem 
of foreign policy under certain circumstances and we ask ourselves what the 
rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose...and which of 
these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these 
circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing o f this rational hypothesis 
against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts 
o f international politics and makes a theory o f politics possible .n
This orientation became more explicit in Politics Among Nations as Morgenthau insisted 
that Realists understand that "[international] politics is governed by objective laws", the 
operation of which are "impervious to our preferences". Moreover, he proclaimed, the
9See Richard Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests", International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981), 
pp.204-236, at p.212.
10Ibid, p.210.
1 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.5, emphasis added.
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task of the Realist was to distinguish what was:
true objectively and rationally...and what is only a subjective judgement 
divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful 
thinking.12
Now, even in a discipline not noted for its critical theoretical tendencies, it might 
be supposed that anomalies of this magnitude within its exemplar text would provoke 
serious intellectual debate. This has rarely been the case.13 Instead, in largely uncritical 
terms, the foundationalist tendency in Morgenthau's thought became integral to the 
Realist perspective in the post-war years. This was particularly evident with regard to the 
debate over the nature and purpose of theory and the manner in which Realist theoretical 
statements must be judged or "tested". On this issue Morgenthau insisted that Realism 
must meet both an empirical and logical test. It must, he stressed, be "consistent with the 
facts and within itself'. Consequently, the central question asked of any Realist analysis 
must be: "do the facts as they actually are lend themselves to the interpretation the theory 
has put on them?" Moreover, and with the "empiricist metaphysic" looming large, he 
warned that Realist theory:
Must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept 
unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass 
of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and 
unintelligible.14
Theory, in this sense, as it was in Weber's "alternative" to positivist logic, is simply a 
means to a pre-given end. Its purpose quite clearly is to (retrospectively) bring "order 
and meaning" to a (factual) "mass of phenomena" which, in contingent and unique form, 
exist independent o f the theorist. Morgenthau's Realism was, resultingly, for all its 
interpretivist posturing, finally constructed upon a "spectator" theory of knowledge
^Ibid, pp.4-5.
l 3When it has been as in Waltz's, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959) it has been on the basis that Morgenthau's Realism missed the essence of 
"reality", (e.g. the structuralist essence) not in terms of any fundamental questioning of the notion of 
"essence" or of Realist "reality". A larger discussion on Waltz and the implications of this for the 
discipline in the 1990s is to follow in the next chapter.
14Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp.4-5.
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which rendered the subject a passive receiver of independently existing reality "out 
there". As such, it represented the "primitive" understanding of reality spoken of in 
Chapter One and, which throughout the discussions since has been shown to be an 
entirely inadequate basis for coping with a complex and multi-dimensional international 
environment in the 1990s.
As much of the critical literature of the Third Debate has emphasised, however, 
the inadequacy of this approach has once again been no hindrance to its influence or 
popularity. Consequently, as the International Relations discipline increasingly closed 
down the focus of its analysis during the 1950s and 1960s, the "memory" of positivist- 
Realist inadequacy became increasingly dulled. In this period the discipline of 
International Relations was dominated by the power politics Realism introduced, most 
famously, by Carr, and given a more formalised legitimation by Morgenthau in the Cold 
War period. As Robert Keohane has put it, in terms which link together some of the 
themes touched on above:
During the postwar years, political realism swept the field in the United 
States. Its opponents may have been overwhelmed as much by the exigencies 
of the Cold War as by the rhetorical brilliance of the leading realists or the 
power of their argument. Yet for the most part, discussions of foreign policy 
have been carried on, since 1945, in the language of political realism - that is, 
the language of power and interests rather than of ideals or norms.15
Speaking of this period, in retrospect, one of the most illustrious of post-war Realists,
John Herz, confirmed this theme, indicating that:
We proposed...to start from the givens o f international reality and to build 
theory on the foundations of the nation state as prime actor, the recognition of 
the role of power in pursuit of the national interest, the concept of security, 
the security dilemma, and so forth.16
In tones more consistent with the critical aims of this chapter it might be more 
accurate to say that, with Morgenthau, and confirmation in intellectual circles of the way
15Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Neorealism and its Critics edited 
by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.9.
^John Herz, "Political Realism Revisited", International Studies Quarterly. 25(2) (1981), pp. 182-197, 
p.183, emphasis added.
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one must respond to the (Cold War) world "out there", the heterogeneity, ambiguity and 
potential openness within the modemist narrative of the International Relations Tradition, 
was more and more closed off in favour of determinist rhetoric, reductionist method and 
the narrowed focus of the "problem solver". In this vein, as Vasquez has noted, the 
power of Morgenthau's, Politics Among Nations, was that it "provided a synthesis of 
what a generation had been trying to express"17 and while some were to re-assess the 
more assertive elements of his approach18 Realist scholars since have continued to accord 
seminal status to Morgenthau and the positivist elements of his Cold War perspectives.19
This is an an issue discussed at length in Stanley Hoffmann's famous article in 
1977, which connected the development of a post-war International Relations discipline 
with the broader movement towards social scientific analysis in the United States, in the 
age of the "behaviouralist revolution".20 Morgenthau here is, unequivocally, the 
"founding father"21 of the International Relations discipline, in its scientific (positivist) 
Realist stage, primarily because in "boldly positing the existence of a field of scientific 
endeavour, separate from [Traditional concerns with] history and law", Morgenthau 
prompted an already existing "national ideology" in the United States, to "magnifly] and 
expand eighteenth century postulates" drawn from the Enlightenment.22
Committed, therefore, at the policy level to a world view centred on the crudest 
form of logocentric logic (e.g. free world/closed ideology) the United States policy elite 
turned increasingly to those willing to speak to the "Prince" in terms supportive of a
17Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p.49.
^For example Stanley Hoffmann, in "An American Social Science: International Relations", Daedalus 
106(3) (1977), pp.41-60; and from another angle,Waltz in Man. The State and War.
19Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, pp. 16-38.
20See Hoffmann "An American Social Science: International Relations". See also Robert Cox, "Social 
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in Neorealism and its Critics 
ed. Keohane, which, from a (broad) Critical Theory perspective, makes the same general point.
21Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", p.44.
22Ibid, p.45.
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Realist Cold War perspective and the "American (scientific) way". More explicitly it was
the voices of (North) American scientific-rationalism that were heard proclaiming, what
Stephen George has called the "three analogies", which, their advocates claimed, "formed
the pillars of American power".23 The first analogy, not surprisingly, was with the
natural sciences. From the post-war perspectives of the scientific Realists thus:
it was through the application of of the knowledge derived from the natural 
sciences that the United States was able to control nature [accordingly] 
...what was needed was a science which would allow it to control 
international relations in the same way that it controlled nature.24
Secondly, and echoing the new technological age of (North) American consumer society, 
there was the analogy with cybernetics. Here, suggested George, a "materialistic concern 
with machinery" produced mechanistic outlooks, which saw humankind as machines, in 
psychology, society as a mechanism, and International Relations as a system of 
communication flows, "controllable, as are all machines, in principle".25 The third post­
war analogy was with (neo-classical) economics and business management techniques. 
The objective here was to construct a set of policy principles for International Relations 
which would:
give American policy-makers the same ability to control the international 
environment as American businessmen had to control their labour force, 
production process and markets.26
It was against this immediate discursive background that the growing discipline of 
International Relations began to speak more confidently of its (rational-scientific) 
"knowledge" and of the correct means/ends method by which the enduring Realist 
wisdom of Western history must be transposed to the reality of the world of nuclear 
weapons, deterrence and the Third World "problem". Now, as part of the "can do"
2 3 See Stephen George, "The Reconciliation of the "Classical" and "Scientific" Approaches to 
International Relations", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 3-5 (1975), pp.28-40, at p.29.
24 Ibid.
25Ibid, p.30.
^Ibid.
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generation, International Relations scholarship became more explicitly part of the 
"orthodox consensus" of Western social theory as it increasingly represented itself at that 
intersection of neo-Kandanism and Anglo-American positivism, articulated in the broader 
forum by (Popperian based) behaviouralism .27 Now, the "master concepts"28 of (North) 
American social thought - progress and science - were applied to International Relations 
with the kind of confidence that in the broader social theory context, saw 
positivist/behaviouralists attacking the (non-scientific) "metaphysics" of more traditional 
approaches to the "perennial questions".29 Accordingly, those who urged a more 
scientific approach to International Relations did so in terms which echoed the positivist 
ambitions of the Enlightenment and its post war re-articulation in behaviouralism.
It was in this context that the Morgenthau inspired "first wave" of scientific
Realism, gave "both the new intellectual enterprise and the new diplomacy the general
[theoretical] foundations they needed".30 More specifically, as Hoffmann put it, after
World War Two and Politics Among Nations. International Relations became committed
to the "applied Enlightenment" view that:
all problems can be resolved, [and] that the way to resolve them is to apply 
the scientific method...and to combine empirical investigation, hypothesis 
formation and testing - and that resort to science will yield practical 
applications that will bring progress.31
27Now of course any Marxist influence was even more excluded from serious debate. As Vasquez has put 
it Marxism became the "whipping boy" in International Relations scholarship rejected as "ideology", 
"idealism" and dangerous, see Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.50.
^ T h is is Bernard Crick's phrase from, The American Science of Politics (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1959), p.38; as cited in Richard Little, "The Systems Approach", in International Relations: British 
and American Perspectives edited by Steve Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p.76.
29See the discussion on behaviouralism in Chapter Two, pp. 104-110. In the context of the times, as 
David Easton put it, the behaviouralist goal was the exemplary modernist one concerned to construct "a 
science of politics modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences"; cited in John 
Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Sub-Field", in Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline edited by A. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), p. 19. 
In this atmosphere, as now in International Relations, those not engaged in "concrete" empirical research 
were attacked for their "abstraction" and irrelevance".
3^Hoffmann, An American Social Science: International Relations", p.57.
31 Ibid, p.59.
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Following this dictate, International Relations specialists as (social) scientists:
were depicted as problem solvers, moving diligently and systematically to 
uncover the mysteries of the natural world. An important aspect of problem 
solving [in this regard] was the ability to predict behaviour, and closely 
associated with prediction was the capacity to manipulate and control?2
Never was this amalgam of modemist characteristics more evident than in the literature 
which, on this basis, now sought to solve the problems of the Third World by recourse 
to models of Western developmentalism and Modernisation Theory.33
Modernisation Theory: The Modernist Knowledge/Power Nexus Epitomised
Modem Western industrial societies, it was asserted, had, by the 1960s, effectively 
overcome most of the problems (poverty, unemployment, ideological struggle) that beset 
"traditional" societies. In Western industrialised modernity, the argument went, those 
problems that remained were essentially matters of a technological incrementalism. 
Buoyed further by the successes of the "Free World" over Fascism and in its 
confrontation with Stalin's "closed society", Western, primarily North American problem 
solvers turned their attention and their rational scientific techniques to the task of 
"developing" the post-colonial societies of the Third World. To this issue they brought
3^See Little, "The Systems Approach", p.76, emphasis added.
33For a useful introduction to this literature see Richard Higgott, Political Development Theory (New 
York: St. Martins Press, 1983). For a range of works that confront the Modernisation issue, see Robert 
Packenham, Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973); Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); 
Donald Rothchild and Robert Curry Jr. Scarcity. Choice and Public Policy in Middle Africa (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978); Barrington Moore Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Andre 
G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); 
S. Eisenstadt, Modernisation. Protest and Change (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966); D. Apter, The 
Politics of Modernisation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965); Apter, Choice and the Politics of 
Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: 
A Non-Communist Manifesto 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); S. Huntington, 
Political Order and Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). From an entirely 
different angle which will receive more attention in Chapter Nine, see Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and the 
Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his work to the Third World", Alternatives 
10 (Winter, 1984), pp.377-400.
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an "ideology of developmentalism" centred on:
an essentially dichotomous approach...based on the work of nineteenth- 
century evolutionary theorists, and the comparison of the ideal-typical 
variables, tradition and modernity.34
More explicitly in the age which celebrated the "end of ideology" they brought a
grand theory of development set upon a model of modernity which represented it as a:
process of change toward those types of social, economic and political 
systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the 
seventeenth century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European 
countries.35
Integral to this Modernisation Theory, in the decades after World War Two, was the 
"rediscovery" of (neo-classical) economics and of rational choice theory, in particular, 
which became the new orthodoxy not only in the universities but in the policy making 
sectors also.36 This is an issue of continuing significance for this discussion and for the 
broader issue of International Relations as a modernist discourse. Hoffmann indicated 
why, in connecting post-war Realism to the broader social theory context, where, at the 
end of World War Two:
a new dogma appeared, [in that] One of the social sciences, economics* was 
deemed to have met the expectations of the national ideology, and to have 
become a science on the model of the exact ones; it was celebrated for its 
contribution to the solution of the age-old problem of scarcity and 
inequality.37
The attempt to emulate the scientific achievements of economics was irresistible among 
Realists who proposed that, as in economics and political science, the focus in 
International Relations was:
not on on the origins and effects of culture, nor on the structures of 
community or of voluntary associations but on the creative and coercive role 
of a certain kind of power, and its interplay with social conflict.
34Higgott, Political Development Theory, p. 17.
35Eisenstadt, Modernisation. Protest and Change, as cited in Higgott, Political Development Theory. 
p.16.
36Ibid, p.22.
37Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", p.47, emphasis added.
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Accordingly, the analogy was drawn between the new science of International Relations 
and "that other science of scarcity, competition and power, economics".38
The connection made here between the new "dogmatism" of scientific economics
and Cold War Realism is, ultimately, consistent in a modernist sense. The textual
connection point rests again with Morgenthau and Politics Among Nations. More
precisely, as Keohane has recognised, Morgenthau in Politics Among N ations
established his central premise of rational state interaction, upon a notion of rationality
"that is standard in neoclassical economics". Consequently, at the textual core of power
politics Realism was an image of (analogised) human behaviour set within the conceptual
boundaries of utilitarian rational-action. In this sense:
to say that governments act rationally...means that they have consistent, 
ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all 
alternative policies in order to maximise their utility.39
Keohane emphasised that Morgenthau was more subtle in his appreciation of this formula 
than it might appear, acknowledging that it was "not descriptively accurate". The 
rationality notion was, in this sense, for Morgenthau a "baseline", which could be "tested 
against the actual facts".40 Either way the legacy of Morgenthau is important here. The 
point is that for a generation of less "subtle" Realists the utilitarian formula has been 
understood as "descriptively accurate", while, on Keohane's own account, the mark of a 
more "subtle" Realist scholarship was the attempt to "test" Morgenthau's rationality 
postulate "against the actual facts". Some of the implications of this limited frame of 
reference will be discussed later in this chapter and in the one to follow. For now its 
impact upon 1960s Modernisation Theory requires some further comment
38lbid, p.46. For a broader discussion on the intersections of economics and positivism see L. Boland, 
The Foundation of Economic Method (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); and B. Caldwell, Bevond 
Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).
^Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", p.12.
4^Ibid. Indeed, according to Keohane, Morgenthau's "sophisticated" notion of rationality represented one 
of the Realist enduring wisdoms. Consequently, in waving the universalist wand, he pronounced it 
"consistent both with the [rationality assumption] of Thucydides and...later realists and neorealists, 
including Waltz", ibid.
253
In this context, the "dogmatic" status of neo-classical economic theory, and its 
rational choice theme, in particular, underlay the "quest for certainty" of prominent 
behaviouralists-cum-Modemisation Theorists, such as David Apter, for whom the key to 
progress and modem development in the Third World was an "improvement in the 
conditions of choice and the selection of the most satisfactory mechanisms of choice".41 
Similarly, for Gabriel Almond, the aim for scholars of development centred on the 
pursuit of "rational choice models of political growth" 42
Some of the crudest, albeit most influential work of this genre, emanated from the
new economics of growth, as prescribed by figures such as W.W. Rostow, "the architect
of modernization theory" 43 Rostow's major text, The Stages of Economic Growth: A
Non-Communist Manifesto, resonated with modernist doctrines projected in terms of a
"theory about economic growth, and a more general...theory of modem history as a
whole".44 The title of the work indicated its linear, progressivist tenor and, as an explicit
"alternative to Karl Marx's theory of history", its status in the modernist "orthodox
consensus" of Anglo-American social theory.45 So too its emphasis on the "transition"
between traditional societies and modem ones. On this issue Rostow asserted:
It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying 
within one of five categories [i.e the five stages of growth] the traditional 
society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and 
the age of high mass-consumption 46
Rostow's modernist credentials were never more explicit than when developing this
41 Apter, The Politics of Modernisation, pp.9-11.
4^Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science", cited in Higgott, Political Development Theory. 
p.25.
43Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO", International Studies Quarterly. 
34(3) (1990), pp.311-326, at p.315.
44W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p .l.
45Ibid, p.2.
46Ibid, p.4.
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"stages" theme. Here, a crude logocentrism informed the "father of modernisation
theory" of the differences between traditional (backward) societies and their modem
(rational-progressive) counterparts, and of the historical process by which the former
were superseded by the latter. Thus, proposed Rostow:
In terms of history...with the phrase 'traditional society' we are grouping 
together the whole pre-Newtonian world: the dynasties in China; the 
civilisation of the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the world of medieval 
Europe. And to them we add the post-Newtonian societies which, for a time, 
remained untouched or unmoved by man's new capability for regularly 
manipulating his environment to his economic advantage.47
It is hard to imagine a more explicit celebration of Western modernity and its
central sovereign figure - rational man (the user and controller of all things - natural and
social) than this. Here, is confirmation of Bacon's ubiquitous postulate about knowledge
and power, here starkly put is the doctrine of utilitarian "usefulness" and the theory and
practice of control that continues to inform neo-Realist scholarship until the present
day.48 Here too, of course, the other side of the modemist coin, "the dark underside of
the development process" becomes increasingly evident.49 Here, the "knowledge" of
Western Modernisation Theory becomes the power politics of Cold War political practice
- the "theoretical" justification, for example, of US strategy in the Third World,
legitimating the support of indigenous elites and their military regimes (i.e. the order
priority) in the attempt to defeat "revolutionary labor movements in the name of creating
favourable climates for international investment and wage assembly work" .50
Developing this theme, Bradley Klein has emphasised the narrow ethnocentric and
ideological framework of Modernisation approaches centred upon a:
process of enforced changes, implemented from above by a secular state 
system, that strategically alter the social landscape and prepare the way for a
47Ibid, p.5.
48In Waltz's, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979) in particular. 
49Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO", p.316.
50Ibid, p.316.
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capitalist, market oriented political system.51
Another insight into the "ideology of development" of the 1960s explained the logic of its
"quest for certainty" in more explicit ideological terms, wherein:
an underdeveloped country must first create a stable (read non-Communist) 
government. This will then lead it to develop an economic base through the 
intelligent application of foreign aid and domestic investment. As the 
economy develops, a middle class will emerge which automatically shares the 
political values of the Western middle class. With this process of 
embourgeoisification will come democracy and property.52
Integral, therefore, to Modernisation Theory was an image of reality in which any 
"freedom to choose" was dependent upon and determined by, a particular kind of social 
order, an order that in a Cold War context (Western order vs the anarchy of Soviet 
inspired disorder) could only be instigated and guaranteed by adherence to the politico- 
economic values and interests of the "West", represented by United States foreign policy, 
and the intellectual certitude of the "American way". This was a theme then already 
evident well before its 1980s variation in the works of North American Hegemonic 
Stability Theory and/or neo-Realism explaining how and why the U.S.A. is Bound To 
Lead.53 For Apter in 1971, for example, the aim was to "identify systems of order that 
do not penalise development and patterns of development that do not jeopardise 
order...our point of departure is choice".54 A much more explicit avowal of the order 
theme is to be found in the works of a figure such as Samuel Huntington, who in 
reformulating some of the Modernisation perspectives of the early 1960s, in less 
sanguine times, placed less emphasis on development as a linear, progressivist unfolding
^1 Ibid, p.315.
52In Leigh and Richard Kagan, "Oh Say Can You See?: America's Cultural Blinders on China", in 
America's Asia: Dissenting Essays On Asian-American Relations edited by E. Freidman and M. Seiden 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp.32-33. This is a theme that will be returned too in slightly 
different terms in Chapter Nine, in relation to Michael Shapiro's, "The Constitution of the Central 
American Other: The Case of Guatemala", in The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in 
Biography. Photography and Policy Analysis ed. Shapiro (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987) in order to illustrate that in U.S. foreign policy, in particular, nothing much has changed in 
"theory" as "practice".
S^See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990).
54 Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, p.6.
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of freedom to choose, and more on a minimalist Realist "art of the possible", in which 
social progress was dependent upon strong institutionalised order and the power of 
political and military elites.55
It might be argued, of course, that Modernisation Theory, with its 1960s 
ethnocentricity, was itself a "stage" in the development of the Western cultural awareness 
of "otherness" and "difference" - a theoretical anachronism in an age of post colonial 
innocence. And, after all, Rostow's proposed "theory of economic history" was fairly 
swiftly exposed as both inadequate economics and crude ahistoricism.56 But to dismiss 
the Modernisation debate in this way would be to miss an important point about it, and its 
enduring significance for the more mainstream of International Relations literature in the 
1980s and 1990s. The point, in short, is that many of the themes integral to the 
Modernisation literature of the 1960s and 1970s - its ethnocentrism - its crude essentialist 
reading of "history" - its techno-rationalist bias - its positivism, and more directly - its 
twin conceptual pillars of (Western capitalist) order and (individualist) choice - continue 
to be central to the way that the discipline, and its North American centre, in particular, 
has understood explained and legitimated its representation of global politics until the 
present. The order priority, for example, remains as part of the great (either/or) 
dichotomy throughout Realist literature (e.g. the order/anarchy theme from Bull to Waltz) 
while the order/choice theme remains at the heart of neo-Realist perspectives in the 
1990s, which also continue to legitimate their Huntington like advocacy of strong 
(hegemonic) power, via an essentialist reading of Western history and Philosophy.57
Consequently, I want now to develop further this discussion of the positivist
55See Huntington, Political Order and Changing Societies. This is a theme at the forefront of de Sola 
Pool's concerns in 1967: ”[i]t is clear that order depends on somehow compelling newly mobilised strata 
to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism from which they have been aroused by the process of 
modernisation. At least temporarily, the maintenance of order requires a lowering of newly acquired 
expectations and levels of passivity." In I. de Sola Pool ed., Contemporary Political Science: Towards 
Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p.26.
^H iggott, Political Development Theory, ch. 2.
57See the discussion, for example, in Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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Realist phase of the discipline by concentrating more specifically on that period which 
gave enhanced credibility to Modernisation Theory and the more general projection of 
modernist thought in the Cold War projection of U.S. foreign policy. This is the period 
(approximately) between the early 1960s, and the enthusiasm of the "behaviouralist 
revolution", and the early 1970s, when faith in the "American way" began to dissipate 
somewhat in the face of the debacle in Vietnam. In the more immediate context this is the 
period, when in Hoffmann's terms, the "first wave" of the "quest for certainty" in 
International Relations, gave way to a "second wave" which saw Strategic Studies 
become the dominant sub field in the Realist led discipline.58
The "Second Wave" of Positivist Realism: Behaviouralism and Strategic Discourse
It was during this "second wave" period that the discursive character of the International 
Relations discipline increasingly replicated the broader social theory context. 
Consequently, as Vasquez has noted, behaviouralist scholarship in International 
Relations (connecting Morgenthau via Weber and Machiavelli to Popper) did not 
challenge the fundamental assumptions of power politics Realism, but sought instead, 
(like neo-Realists two decades later) to make it more "scientific".59 Rhetorically, 
nevertheless, there was a new critical edge within the discipline as the "scientific" Realist 
community articulated its increasing antipathy towards Traditionalist preoccupation with 
"history, exegesis and methodological conservatism".60 What the Traditionalists did not 
understand, argued those advocating behaviouralist solutions to contemporary problems, 
was that the old inductivist approaches of the Realist past were out of step with 
movements in the natural and the social sciences, now drawing upon themes from 
"theoretical physics and economic theory [which] are clearly distinguished from the
^Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", p.48.
59Vasquez, Power of Power Politics. Chapter 2.
^ T h is  was the view in the broader behaviouralist context of Deutsch and Reiselbach, cited in John 
Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Subfield ", p.20.
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history of past theories".61
In particular, it was argued, the "non theoretical-empiricism"62 of the 
Traditionalist past must give way to a more formal, systemic approach to theorising based 
not on the (naturalist) misunderstanding of the scientific method but on Popper's 
deductivist reformulation of it in which real science progresses via the falsificationist 
process .63 Hence, the exclusion and/or marginalisation of some aspects of the 
International Relations Tradidon and its disciplinary "great texts" by those who now 
sought to establish their own more mature Realist credentials. Hence, the attempts to 
"test" major Traditionalist themes (e.g. balance of power) against hypothetico-deductive 
models.64
The sense of a linear, progressivist continuity of (real) knowledge in International 
Relations was clear enough in J.D. Singer's discussion of the dichotomy between 
"prescientific and scientific approaches" to International Relations. The parallels with 
Popper's work were obvious here in Singer's proclamation of the Traditional Realist
61 Ibid.
^ T h is  is a term used by David Truman in his discussion of the linear development of (North) American 
political science, cited in Gunnell, ibid, p.20.
^3See the discussion on Popper and this issue in Chapter Three, pp.117-124. Some of course like J.D. 
Singer wanted to distinguish his optimistic scientism from the negativity of the Popperian approach, 
while at the same time stating rather strangely that he agreed with Popper’s logical argument on the 
problems of verification. See "The Incompleat Theorist: Insight Without Evidence", in Contending 
Approaches to International Relations edited by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969), p.65.
^*A good example of this is the critique of some aspects of Morgenthau's approach by Rosenau in, The 
Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1968) which while acknowledging the 
"correctness" of Morgenthau's power politics insights, bemoaned the lack of scientific rigour and "testing" 
procedures in Politics Among Nations. See also Rosenau ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. (New 
York: The Free Press, 1967); and J.D. Singer, "The Incompleat Theorist; Insight Without Evidence", 
pp.62-86. For a broader view of the Realist literature of the period which sought to construct models for 
testing the basic Traditionalist assumptions see, for example, Morton Kaplan, System and Process in 
International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957); and Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International 
Relations (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968). For a discussion of statistical testing see J.D. Singer, 
Quantitative International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1968) and M. Small and J.D. Singer, 
"Formal Alliances, 1815-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data", Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), 
pp.257-282. And for a work that sought, like many at this time, to introduce other dimensions of social 
science research to the International Relations field at this time see H.C. Kelman ed., International 
Behaviour A Social-Psvchological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1965).
259
approach (e.g. Carr, Bull, Wight) as inductivist and therefore "prescientific".65 Singer's
proposition, accordingly, was that Traditionalist Realism and its inductivist past,
represented an earlier stage of scientific Realist analysis. Thus:
we cannot confirm or disconfirm a proposition [hypothesis] until it has been 
formulated, and the first draft of any such formulation almost invariably finds 
its expression in the classical mode.66
Singer's proposal, more explicitly, was that while scholars, from "Thucydides through 
Carr, Wolfers, Claude and Morgenthau", had provided a great deal of "careful 
empiricism", this was not enough, because "these scholars have actually pinned down 
very little in the way of verified generalisations".67 Building upon this "careful 
empiricism" the scientific Realists of the behaviouralist era attempted to "pin down" the 
facts of International Relations indicated in prescientific (first draft) fashion by the 
Traditionalists. Gaining their theoretical sustenance from mainstream social theory 
debates the new scientific Realists scholars sought, in particular, to construct 
hypothesised models of interstate behaviour which could be "tested" and/or falsified 
against historical and contemporary "fact". Important here were Morton Kaplan's 
System and Process in International Politics which drew on a cognitive systems 
approach, and works by Karl Deutsch which introduced communication theory and 
cybernetic approaches to the discipline.68 Taken together, it is suggested, the 
contributions of Kaplan and Deutsch set the pattern for the behaviouralist reformulation 
of power politics Realism during the 1960s. Within this context many sought to more 
rigorously "verify" central power politics themes derived from Carr and Morgenthau. 
This broadened the research scope of the discipline considerably, adding significant sub-
ä^The reference here is to Popper's strategy in detaching himself from (Logical) positivism, by 
emphasising its inductivism in contrast to his deductivist falsificationism. See the discussion in Chapter 
Three, pp.117-124.
^Singer, "The Incomplete Theorist; Insight Without Evidence", p.68, emphasis added.
67 Ibid.
^D eutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1953).
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fields to the dominant power politics disciplinary heartland.69
Some, for example, concentrated on issues of national interest and national 
power, important, if rather vaguely presented concepts in the Realist ’’great texts". The 
question of power, in particular, was confronted in a manner that has continued to 
characterise disciplinary scholarship in general to the present day. As Vasquez has 
pointed out the this was a question framed with an "operational" principle and strategy in 
mind. Accordingly the debate over the real meaning of power was reduced effectively to 
competing aspects of its Weberian reading. Was it, in this sense, "the same as capability, 
influence, coercion, force, or just another word for cause?"70 Ultimately, power was 
represented as a national capability and/or resource, a representation designated as most 
applicable to precise explanation and predictive analysis.71 The works by the Sprouts in 
the 1950s and the Organski's in the 1960s exemplified the attempts to give operational 
verifiability to the "power as capability" notion.72 Scholars such as Guetzkow and 
Rummell, meanwhile, brought social psychology themes to bear on the issue, while 
Rosenau's "pre-theory" continued to find adherents.73
Another major research orientation among behaviouralist scholars was that 
concerned to elaborate the central Realist notion of the state and to understand in more
^V asquez, The Power of Power Politic??, p.47.
70Ibid, p.55.
71For an overview of this debate at the time see R. Bell, D.V. Edwards and R. Wagner, eds., Political 
Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1969) and for a broader 
retrospective review see R. Hopkins and R. Mansbach, Structure and Process in International Politics 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
7^See H. and M. Sprout, Foundations of National Power (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1951); and A. 
and K. Organski, Population and World Power (New York: Knopf, 1961).
73See Geutzkow, et al Simulation in International Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and RJ. 
Rummell, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behaviour", in 
Quantitative International Politics edited by J.D. Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968). On Rosenau, 
see "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in Approaches to Comparative and International 
Politics edited by R.B. Farrell (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Rosenau, "The Premises 
and Promises of Decision-making Analysis", in Contemporary Political Analysis edited by J. 
Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967); and Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.
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specific terms the location and nature of decision making at the international level. Works 
by the Hermann’s, for example, employed simulation techniques to test hypotheses on 
the capacity for rational decision making in times of extreme crisis and the (potential) 
outbreak of nuclear war.74 Charles McClelland studied patterns of "interaction" in pre 
and post crisis situations and others developed theories of war based on perception and 
misperception of the "facts" under crisis conditions.75 This is a line of inquiry that has 
retained its influence in the works of Robert Jervis from the 1970s on.76 In the 1960s 
too Neustadt's theory of "bureaucratic politics" emerged to stimulate later influential 
images of state decision making based on struggles between Governmental elites (e.g. 
Allison).77
The "mechanistic" and systemic orientation of the period was perhaps most 
obviously expressed in relation to the major concept of the International Relations 
Tradition - the balance of power. Morgenthau, as earlier indicated, talked of this concept 
as a natural mechanism of power politics relations between states. Many, following him, 
sought to add more precision to the concept and, via a verifiable general theory,
74See C.F. Hermann and M.G. Hermann, "An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I", 
American Political Science Review 61 (1967), pp.400-416; and Charles Hermann, "International Crisis as 
a Situational Variable", in International Politics and Foreign Policy edited by J. Rosenau (New York: The 
Free Press, 1969). Here the social psychology work of Guetzkow was important again concerning the 
rational actor model. See "Some Correspondences Between Simulations and Realities in International 
Processes", in New Approaches to International Relations edited by Morton Kaplan (New York: St. 
Martins Press, 1968).
75See McClelland, "The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crisis", in C. Hermann ed. 
International Crises (New York, The Free Press, 1972); See also the works on World War One by O. 
Holsti, R. Brody and R. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: 
Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis", Peace Research Society Papers 2 (1965), pp.170-190; 
and O. Holsti, R. North and R. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in Quantitative 
International Politics edited by J.D. Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
^On Jervis see: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1976); "Deterrence Theory Revisited", World Politics 31 (1979), pp.289-324; "Security 
Regimes", in International Regimes edited by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); 
and Jervis, J. Lebow, and S. Rosen, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1985).
77See Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", American Political Science 
Review 63(1969), pp.689-718; Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); and M. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM", World Politics 25 
(1972), pp.62-95.
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operationalise it.78 Arthur Bums, for example, sought a "pure theory" of power 
politics79 centred on the balance of power principle that illuminated its transhistorical and 
universal applicability.80 Kaplan, meanwhile, created complex systemic models in order 
to test competing explanations of the balance concept and how to to explain change in 
relation to it.81 Closely related to the attempt to scientifically theorise the balance of 
power concept was the attention paid to alliances. Here, coalition theory and the theory 
of collective goods were utilised to explain the behaviour of allied partners.82 Influenced 
by game theory assumptions and techniques it sought also to account for systemic state 
behaviour over time.83 Indeed, "Game Theory was [to become] the major conceptual 
innovation provided by the [strategic] subfield in articulating the realist paradigm" .84
Consequently, some Realist scholarship was oriented toward the search for a
7^See Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, p.81.
79Ibid, p.81.
80a . Bums,"From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis", World Politics 9 (1957), pp.494-529; 
Bums, "Prospects for a General Theory of International Relations", in The International System edited by 
K. Knorr and S. Verba (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968); see also his larger work, Qf 
Powers and Their Politics: A Critique of Theoretical Approaches (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968).
81 See, for example, Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics.
82see Bruce Russett, "Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 12 (1968), pp.85-301; Russett, "Methodological and Theoretical Schools 
in International Relations", in A Design for International Relations Research: Scope. Theory. Methods 
and Relevance edited by N.D. Palmer (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 
1970).
83see M. Kaplan, A. Bums and R. Quandt, "Theoretical Analysis of the Balance of Power'", Behavioural 
Science 5 (1960), pp.240-252; G. Modelski, "Agraria and Industria", in The International System eds. 
Knorr and Verba; and F. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System", in The International 
System eds. Knorr and Verba.
84Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, p.100. See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1960); and Anatol Rapoport, Fights. Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1960). Works by Snyder and Paige also introduced decision theory from 
(neo- classical) economics and (Pluralist) public administration to the issue of the Korean War and crisis 
management See R.C. Snyder and G. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: 
The Application of an Analytic Scheme", Administrative Science Quarterly 3(1958), pp.342-378. See 
also Glenn Paige's further work on the issue in The Korean Decision: June 24-30. 1950 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1968); and J.A. Robinson and R.C. Snyder, "Decision-making and International Politics", in 
International Behaviour: A Social Psychological Analysis edited by H. Kelman (New York: Holt, 
Reinhardt and Winston, 1965).
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scientific theory of International Relations in terms of a macro-systemic focus on the 
(anarchical) environmental circumstances in which the sovereign state actor operated. 
This was not yet the fully blown positivist-structuralism that was to become so influential 
within neo-Realist circles in the decades to follow, but in the early systems theory of 
Singer and McClelland the seeds of an Anglo-American positivist based structuralism 
were evident in International Relations.85 Kenneth Waltz, integral to the Structuralist- 
Realism of the present, made an important contribution in the 1960s also, on the question 
of which systemic structure provided most order and stability.86 The ensuing debate saw 
works employing ever more complex quantitative tools designed to correlate and test 
hypotheses about balance of power systems down the ages.87
The question of war, and its causes, was another given a more systemic treatment
in this period. Whereas Morgenthau and earlier power politics scholars had been
generally pessimistic (often fatalistic) on this issue, the behaviouralists were buoyed by
the progressiveness inherent in their approaches. This led, from the mid 1960s to a:
systematic effort to search for the causes of war, with the hope that in the 
distant future a truly empirical and scientific understanding of war (not like 
the normative, uncorroborated theory of the idealists) would make a world at 
peace possible.88
The most significant research project to flow from this disciplinary orientation, of course,
^ Singer, "Threat-perception and the Armament-tension Dilemma", Journal of Conflict Resolution 
2(1958), pp.90-105; Singer, "Inter-nation Influence: A Formal Model", American Political Science 
Review 57(1963), pp.420-430; McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: Macmillan, 
1966); and McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963", in 
Quantitative International Politics ed. J.D. Singer.
^ S e e  Waltz, "The Stability of the Bipolar World", Daedalus 93 (1964), pp.907-982 and his argument in 
favour of bi-polarity.
^7See for example K. Deutsch and J.D. Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", 
World Politics 16 (1964), pp.390-406; and R. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 (1966), pp.314-327.
^ S e e  Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.89. And just to reiterate the notion of an "orthodox 
consensus" once again, as Vasquez point out the peace research movement in International Relations also 
largely sprung from this progressivist, positivist based approach to the evidence, as for example in the 
mathematical modelling of the physicist Lewis Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1960). See also the earlier pioneering work of data collection by Quincey Wright, A  
Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
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has been the Correlates of War project which has provided a data source for scholars ever 
since seeking more precise models of what causes war and how it might be prevented.89
Throughout the behaviouralist period the issue of nuclear war loomed large. So
too did the question of nuclear deterrence.90 Influential works by Herman Kahn
introduced new levels of complexity to deterrence logic while prompting International
Relations scholars to think the "unthinkable" - i.e. the use of nuclear weapons as an
ultimate deterrent.91 Among nuclear strategists, however, it was the "rationality" premise
associated with game theory that proved most appealing as the basis for scientific
theorising about human behaviour and decision making processes in the nuclear age. Via
game theory techniques, it was argued, strategic problems could be reduced to "a
manageable form in which the dilemmas and paradoxes of the age could be bared and
solutions explored". At the broader level (echoing Logical Positivism) the aims of
nuclear strategic analysis were to construct a:
Nuclear strategy as a science [in which, firstly] the logic, dynamics and 
management of nuclear war and its deterrence can be explained and controlled 
by precise, quantifiable methods and policies. In this science of nuclear 
strategy only "hard" quantifiable variables of of military capabilities, 
technological param eters, and economic resources are relevant... 
[while]..."soft" variables as historical patterns, cultural traditions, political 
practices, and personality traits are not particularly relevant because they 
cannot be accounted fo r in meaningful terms92
Throughout the 1960s, accordingly, the literature of International Relations specialists
^ S e e  for example J. D. Singer, The Correlates of War: II (New York: The Free Press, 1980).
9^See, from a number of angles, L. Bloomfield and A. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 
1970's (New York: Knopf, 1969); B. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966); Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973); A.L. Bums, Of Powers 
and Their Politics: A Critique of Theoretical Approaches: C.F. Fink, "More Calculations About 
Deterrence", Journal of Conflict Resolution 9 (1965), pp.54-66; A.L. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence 
in American Foreign Policy Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); P. 
Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbia: Ohio State University Press, 1966); 
Jerivs, Perception and Misperception in International Politics: H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: 
Horizon, 1962).
91 Kahn, On Thermonuclear War: Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable.
92See Roman Kolkowicz ed., The Logic of Nuclear Terror (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p.26, 
emphasis added.
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resonated with rational deductive approaches and game-theorised models derived largely 
from neo-classical economic theory and utilitarian assumptions about human nature and 
behaviour. As far as deterrence theory was concerned, the works of Thomas Schelling 
were, perhaps, the most sophisticated in their attempt to build into the equations 
theoretical dimensions not allowed by the more formalised approach to "gaming".93
There were, nevertheless, a number of scholars unimpressed with the outcomes 
(if not the methodological inputs) of the dominant articulation of the strategic/security 
discourse. Bruce Russett, for example, instigated major statistical studies concerned to 
illustrate that, the question of its theoretical sophistication aside, deterrence did not 
deter.94 Others, such as the mathematician Anatole Rapaport, also cast doubt upon 
deterrence logic and its assumptions, particularly its one dimensional commitment to 
coercive behaviour and its rigid zero-sum utilisation of the rationality premise.95 From 
more conventional perspectives also a range of analysts began to critically "test" 
deterrence hypotheses against historical evidence, finding the deductive logic of orthodox 
strategic thinking often unsound.in its own (empiricist) terms 96
In more recent times this and other dimensions of the discipline's "quest for 
certainty" has attracted broader and more profound criticism, and I just want to touch on 
some of these critical themes before moving on to the "third wave" of the disciplines 
development. Vasquez, as indicated earlier, has been particularly devastating in this
93See Schelling The Strategy of Conflict: and Arms And Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966).
94See Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence", Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963), pp.97-109; 
Russett, "Pearl Harbour: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory", Journal of Peace Research 2 (1967), 
pp.89-105. This is a theme confirmed by R.N. Lebow and J.G. Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I 
Think Therefore I Deter", World Politics 41 (1989), pp.208-24.
95 A. Rapaport, Fights. Games and Debates: Rapaport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1964); see also in this vein Phillip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence.
^ S e e  Oran Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) which looked at 
Cold War flashpoints including the Cuban missile Crisis. See also the updated work in this tradition in 
the work of A.L. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy Theory and Practice: the 
contribution of G.Snyder and P.Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining. Decision-making and 
System Structure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); and of course Jervis.
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regard and at this point it is worth reiterating some of the conclusions he reached on the 
positivist Realist approach of the 1960s and 1970s.
In relation to behaviour in foreign policy making, deterrence and bargaining
procedures, for example, Vasquez's found that Realist literature provided, at best,
ambiguous evidence in support of its claims, while, at worst, it stood as a dogmatic and
narrow representation of reality, replete with danger and paradox. He had some critical
things to say, for example, on the rationalist presumption that: (i) decision makers will act
in similar ways, responding as they do to a single "external" reality; and (ii) that these
decisions can be deduced in terms of utilitarian model of rational self interest.97 This
universalised and essentialist perspective was found wanting, he argued, immediately one
confronted it with a range of studies not encompassed within its narrow analytical
boundaries (e.g. social psychology). In particular, argued Vasquez, Realists have
effectively ignored alternative approaches which maintain, for example, that, "decision
makers process information in terms of images they have developed of other actors and
of the environment" and which illustrate that, under conditions of crisis:
new information that conforms to existing images tends to be emphasized, 
and information that is dissonant with the images is often not seen, ignored 
or explained away.98
Moreover, in stressing that, "overreliance on images and analogies to what worked in the 
past" tended to dominate in situations where Realism has projected a (singular, utilitarian) 
rationalised logic at work, Vasquez concluded that hypothetico-deductive models of 
foreign policy action:
based on the assumption of selfish interest and/or calculation of costs and 
benefits, are too simplistic either as description or prediction of behaviour, 
and certainly as explanation.99
Ultimately, he proposed, "foreign policy is not based on a rational calculation of the
"V asquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.206. 
" ib id .
" ib id , p.207.
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national interest" and, more generally:
rational actor models cannot account for behaviour in the two circumstances 
in which realist explanations would be expected to be most applicable - crisis 
interaction and the onset of war. 100
This final point has particular significance for the seminal neo-Realism of 
Kenneth Waltz to be discussed in the next chapter. In the more immediate context it has 
significance for that enormous literature which has explained issues of political crisis and 
war in terms of the game-theorised logic of deterrence for more than three decades. On 
this issue Vasquez found that, even in relation to the behaviour of the United States since 
the onset of the Cold War, this approach was inadequate in its own terms and, 
accordingly, "one cannot help but doubt its relevance for decision makers who have a 
different culture, history, language and ideology" .101 Similarly, he proposed, "War is 
not the rational or Machiavellian calculation and test of strength" that Realist analysis 
proclaimed it to be, but a much more complex phenomenon that required a more 
sophisticated analytical regime to understand its nature and implications.102 Finally, on 
the Realist assertion that International Relations is, at its core, the endemic struggle for 
power, Vasquez countered that while evidence exists that this is, at times, an accurate 
representation of "one type of behaviour found in the global political system" the broader 
Realpolitik explanation "does not provide a [universal] theory of world politics, but 
merely an image that decision makers can have of the world" .103
Some of the implications of this limited perspective Vasquez also illustrated in 
relation to alliance formation as the application of Realist "theory" to the "practice" of war 
and peace. Here, as indicated earlier, his conclusions are chilling, given the confidence 
with which alliance strategies (e.g. balances of power) have been prescribed as the only
100Ibid, pp.210-211. 
101 Ibid, p.212. 
102Ibid, p.213.
103 Ibid, 216.
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realistic response to an anarchical world "out there", in the period of Realist disciplinary 
dominance. In short, the findings were that, "balance of power and alliance aggregation 
generally do not prevent war, but are preparations for war". When the emphasis was 
shifted slightly to account for the more precise debate over the best systemic formation by 
which war might be avoided, Vasquez's findings had a similar ring to them. On the 
question, for example, of whether power parity or preponderance is the safest balance 
system, Vasquez found an interesting irony concerning Realist analysis. It was that, on 
occasions, both systemic structures have been associated with peaceful relations between 
the major states while, at other times, both have been associated with periods of warfare. 
The irony of course is that while Realist scholars might point to "factual" correlation of 
their hypotheses on this issue, they cannot do so in the terms that their (universalised) 
correspondence rule theory demands - that is in terms of a general theory of war and 
peace across historical time, cultural space and interpretive practice.104
On the systemic question, in general, Vasquez had this to say about positivist
Realist scholarship between the late 1960s and 1970s:
many scholars [in this period] debated whether a bipolar or multipolar system 
would produce peace. If the realist paradigm were an accurate guide to 
inquiry, at least one side would have been expected to be correct. Instead, 
both were wrong. The only major difference is whether one will pay the 
Grim Reaper all at once with a few severe wars, or on the instalment plan 
with many wars.105
Now, at least three qualificatory points can be made about the revisiting of 
Vasquez's mammoth study, just undertaken. The first is that his study ends at 1980. 
Consequently, something needs to be said about the continuance or otherwise of the 
themes he raised in the last decade or so, if the significance of his findings are to be 
connected directly to the debate on neo-Realism to follow. It will be shortly. The second 
qualification, as indicated in Chapter One, is that for all Vasquez’s insights, his is 
ultimately a modernist critique which, in its pursuit of a more genuinely scientific
104Ibid, p.221. 
105Ibid, p.220.
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paradigm for International Relations, paradoxically replicates the modernist discursive 
agenda at the core of positivist Realism. There is a need, consequently, to open up that 
which Vasquez leaves closed even in his devastating critique of the discipline, and this 
too will be increasingly attempted as the thesis progresses from here.
In so doing the third qualificatory point becomes important. It relates more 
specifically to the modernist limitations of the literature from which Vasquez derived his 
findings. The point, less obtusely, is that for the most part Vasquez drew his critical 
findings from scholarship which falls within a Realist framework of understanding. For 
some, of course, this indicates (correctly) that Realism is a complex intersection of 
approaches and perspectives that cannot be easily reduced to a single literary articulation 
of it. But there is another more profound issue that needs to be raised in this context. It 
is that the existence of "alternative" approaches within Realist literature does not 
undermine the proposition that it represents a dominant and effectively closed modemist 
discourse at work. Indeed, as indicated in Chapters Two and Three, one of the primary 
characteristics of a post-Kantian Western discourse is the range of "alternative" voices 
that might be heard within it. The point that needs to be reiterated here is that made in 
Chapters Four and Five (on the Cold War) which is that, to a very great extent, the 
"alternatives" are themselves part of a discursive "orthodox consensus". Hence, it is the 
foundationalism at the core of positivist/behaviouralism (the "empiricist metaphysic") 
which remains the primary reason for the basic inadequacies of strategic discourse, as 
exposed by Vasquez, and which continues also to limit Vasquez's critical 
"alternative" .106
The implications of this have been recorded in a slightly broader context in Philip 
Lawrence's recent updating of issues central to strategic discourse during and after the 
period of Vasquez’s inquiry.107 Connecting together some of the broader themes of the
106i win develop this point again later (in Chapter Nine) and bring the issue up to date by saying 
something about an "alternative" voice in the 1990s, Barry Buzan.
107Philip Lawrence, "Strategy, the State and the Weberian Legacy", Review of International Studies 13 
(1987), pp.295-310.
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thesis with the more immediate concerns of this chapter, Lawrence sought, in 1987, to 
illustrate the inadequacy of contemporary mainstream strategic analysis by confronting it 
with some of the philosophical questions that it has studiously and systematically ignored 
since the 1960s. Lawrence was particularly interested in the Weberian legacy at the core 
of strategic analysis and the impact (albeit unacknowledged) of Weber's mediated 
positivism upon the question of how strategists come to "know" and understand the real 
world. The most significant theme here was "the radical bifurcation between theory and 
practice", allowed for by Weber, which in turn has allowed an (ostensible) "value 
neutrality [which has] been virtually canonised as common sense" by a generation of 
strategic analysts.108 Rejecting this "common sense" proposition, Lawrence located the 
major problems of strategic discourse at its modernist core, in the "rationalism, 
empiricism and pragmatism" that have informed and directed i t 109 He noted the influence 
of rationalism, in projecting the "logical coherence of deductive arguments" and 
modelling techniques for empirical analysis (with game theory as its most obvious 
manifestation): of empiricism, in legitimating the process of "observation and experiment 
and the idea of truth...concretized in verification against data"; and of pragmatism, in 
invoking the "usefulness" criteria for analysis, the notion that "if a particular theory is 
useful then it can be regarded as true".110
All of these themes, as the following chapter will illustrate, are very evident in 
contemporary neo-Realism, but Lawrence sought to make two, more precise, points 
about them regarding strategic discourse since the 1960s. The first was that "strategic 
studies is woefully lacking in hard facts and verifiable theories",111 the second (echoing 
Michael MccGwire's misgivings) that, nevertheless, it has been the (non existent) "facts" 
and their "verifiability", that has "defined the agenda and provided the vocabulary of
108Ibid, pp.296-297. 
109ibid, p.297. 
110Ibid.
11 ^ id .
271
Strategie discourse throughout NATO", and indeed, throughout the international
community for the past generation.112 The result, suggested Lawrence, was a primitive
and ultimately dangerous perspective on the world "out there" which, for example, has
represented an "article of faith" (deterrence theory and practice) as a scientific postulate.
Moreover, in drawing on its modernist epistemological legacy, strategic discourse had
constructed its disciplinary image of the world on an illusory distinction - between policy
analysis and political and "normative" commitment (fact/value). Consequently, in typical
modernist form, those trained in strategic discourse since the 1960s have (ostensibly)
detached themselves from the "political" process on the basis that "scientific reason
cannot dictate ends of policy". From this perspective, it became possible (indeed
necessary) for strategic analysts to proclaim that,
the reality under scrutiny - in our case force and conflict - is an external 
reality which is independent of of the academic strategist who merely 
describes and explains what exists.113
The implications of this, aside from its closure and paradox, range from a 
systematic desensitising of the dangers of nuclear megadeath to encouragement of ever 
more lethal arms race, all in the name of value free policy analysis. At one level, 
resultingly, the "quest for certainty", in the discipline since the 1960s, has allowed for 
some at least "to live in psychological comfort in a world where there are 50,000 nuclear 
warheads with an explosive power of 20 billion tons of TNT".114
The logic of such a position is best summed up, perhaps, by Robert Tucker's 
proposition that a Western strategic posture based on deterrence theory has been 
empirically validated, because the nuclear superpowers have "behaved quite prudently for 
three decades".115 Whatever else such a statement represented, suggested Lawrence, it
112Cited in ibid, p. 295. In Chapter Nine something more will be said on the NATO issue, particularly 
in regard to its position in the security/strategy discourse at the end of the Cold War.
113Ibid, p.300.
114Ibid, p.298
115From Tucker, "Morality and Deterrence", Ethics (April, 1985), pp.461-478, at p.461; cited in 
Lawrence, "Strategy, the State and the Weberian Legacy", p.299.
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stood (paradoxically) as a "value" judgement on deterrence, which assumes that firstly,
peace has been determined by deterrence strategy, and secondly that "the development of
thermo-nuclear weapons, MIRV's, MARV’s and the strategic defense initiative are
examples of practical wisdom".116 At another level, regarding the role of scientific
strategic analysis in accelerating the arms race during the Cold War, the modernist
power/knowledge nexus is once again clearly and dangerously discernible. Accordingly,
in the late 1970s, at the time of the "second" Cold War it was the logic of scientific policy
analysis that gave legitimacy to the "window of vulnerability" thesis peddled, during the
Carter and Reagan Administrations. This scenario, which depicted the Soviets as having
both the intent and the capacity to destroy U.S. land based missiles in their silos, was
"hardly credible" given the existence of a TRIAD defence structure. And yet this very
scenario "represented a major input from strategy into the political arena".117 Explaining
how this was possible, Lawrence reiterated Nathanson's theme concerning the
"interpretive straightjacket" of U.S. Cold War thinking and its understanding of the
Soviets. Accordingly, Lawrence proposed:
what [was] really fantastic here [was] the political assessment of the Soviet 
Union which presumed the Soviet leaders could gamble on a lack of response 
from the B52's and submarines when 60 of the former or 15 of the latter 
could destroy the USSR's industrial base.118
When Lawrence turned to the question of why this "fantastic" scenario continued 
to gain credence in the 1980s the issue of modemist closure was returned to the forefront 
of the debate. Primarily, he maintained, the problems of International Relations 
scholarship, since the 1960s, has been its epistemological commitments and the resultant 
"quest for certainty", which has blinded it to its interpretive, value laden and ideological 
character. Consequently, "pragmatism which applies literally to the practical efficacy of 
strategy, is irrelevant to the practice of nuclear strategy [and] ...Empiricism, which 
demands verification against "facts", is also inapplicable because of the interpretive
l l6 Ibid. 
117Ibid, p.303. 
118Ibid.
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character of strategy". Moreover, the rationality principle at the heart of game theory, and 
the behavioural logic of the Realist international system, per se, had provoked an 
"abstraction" creating the "illusion of truth where none exists".119
As so often in the post-Enlightenment period, however, the inadequacies and 
dangers of the "quest for certainty" have been either ignored or effectively marginalised 
by an orthodoxy, concerned to create "an illusion of truth where none exists". In this 
case, consequently, the mainstream discourse on security and strategy remains, to the 
present, committed to the very assumptions, premises, themes and policy prescriptions, 
which since Morgenthau and the early years of the Cold War, have incarcerated Realist 
scholarship in an "interpretive straightjacket".
One final example of this incarceration will suffice here before moving on. This 
is a particularly important articulation of the modernist "interpretive straightjacket", 
because it was presented in 1991 with nuclear tensions dissipated, and because it was 
meant to illustrate the new, more insightful nature, of strategic thinking as the "West" 
looks beyond the "necessities" of the Cold War. It came from Stephen Walt and it 
proclaimed a "more rigorous, methodologically sophisticated and theoretically inclined" 
age of security discourse.120 Walt's primary aim was to establish that after the "golden 
age" of strategic discourse in the 1960s, when there was often "little reliable information" 
nor "systematic evidence supporting the authors hypotheses"121 the 1980s and 1990s has 
seen a "renaissance" in security and strategic studies based on "systematic social science 
research rather than on unverified assertion or argument".122
Acknowledging that these new perspectives still fitted "comfortably within the
119Ibid, p.306.
1 ^ Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991), 
pp.211-239, at p.211.
121 Ibid, p.214.
122Ibid, pp.211-212.
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familiar realist paradigm”123 Walt sought, nevertheless, to emphasise the qualitative 
difference between the earlier (behaviouralist) Realist perspectives and the more 
sophisticated contemporary variant. In this regard he pointed to the (perceived) 
fundamental changes which took place after the Vietnam War when "scholars in security 
studies beg[an] to abandon the relatively simple assumptions that had guided the first 
wave".124
Developing this notion further, Walt emphasised a new sensitivity on historical 
issues as "among the most important developments in security studies" in the 1980s and 
1990s.125 Chiding earlier scholarship for its "ahistorical" tendencies, he then proceeded 
to represent the "sophisticated" alternative in typically unsophisticated terms, in 
celebrating the use of "historical cases as a means of generating, testing and refining 
theories".126 The paradox associated with this position - which, in the era of "post- 
behavioural"/"postpositivist" scholarship saw "history" represented in typical 
behaviouralist/positivist form - (i.e. as an ahistorical "object" in the past "generating" 
facts which can then be tested to create "theory") - was seemingly lost on Walt who 
meandered on, in familiar terms, propounding the value of "focusing on concrete 
historical events" as part of a "more nuanced, policy relevant theory".127
The modernist continuity at the core of Walt's "new" thinking was most exposed 
when he sought to locate the new strategic debate as part of the broader "scholarly agenda 
among theorists of international politics" in the 1980s and 1990s.128 The omission here 
was not so much what Walt had to say about the Third Debate, but the limitations and
123Ibid, p.212. 
124Ibid, p.216. 
125Ibid, p.217. 
126Ibid. 
127Ibid.
128Ibid, p.219.
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silences of his representation of it. The problem for Walt, more precisely, was that his 
understanding of the current theoretical agenda stretched only as far as his (positivist) 
understanding of "theory" did. Accordingly, Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International 
Politics was praised, as a "powerful reformulation" of Realism, while nowhere was there 
any attention given to the more critically informed literature of the contemporary 
"scholarly agenda" which has fundamentally undermined Waltz’s work.129
The reason for an omission such as this is made clear enough when Walt, in
seeking to sum up his argument, exposed his own commitment to the crude positivism
which characterises Waltz's neo-Realism. Thus, remarkably, in 1991, the "newness" of
the security/strategic discourse was represented, by Walt, in terms of a three dimensional
positivist project concerned, initially with the process of "theory creation". This process,
explained Walt, was all about "the development of logically related causal propositions
explaining a particular phenomenon of interest". The focus then fell upon the process of
"theory testing", which, he explained, concerned" attempts to verify, falsify, and refine
competing theories by testing their predictions against a scientifically selected body of
evidence". And, finally, there was the question of "theory application" which,
encompassed "the use of existing knowledge to illuminate a specific policy problem.130
Summarising this new, more sophisticated, approach to security/strategic issues at the
end of the Cold War, Walt proclaimed its new purpose as the search for "cumulative
knowledge about the role of military force". This, he suggested, was an ambition well
within the reach of the new breed of security/strategic analysts of the 1990s, because:
the field [now understands that it] must follow the standard canons of 
scientific research; careful and consistent use of terms, unbiased 
measurement of critical concepts, and public documentation of theoretical and 
empirical claims.131
l 29Ibid, 219. Waltz's work will be the subject of discussion in the next chapter. At this point it is 
worth noting Alker's and Biersteker's proposition that Theory of International Politics does not even 
represent sophisticated positivism in its "search for 'value free' timeless laws...proposed with Olympian 
detachment". See "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International 
Savoir Faire", International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), pp 121-142, at p. 133.
130walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", p.221.
131 Ibid, p.222.
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At the completion of Chapter Six in a thesis such as this, there is, hopefully, no need for 
further comment on Walt's perspective, except, perhaps, to suggest that, in itself, it is a 
testament to the need for International Relations scholars to take seriously their "unwritten 
preface". One more theme from Walt's work, is, nevertheless, of significance here. It 
concerns his commentary on the Critical Social Theory contribution to the Third Debate 
and, not surprisingly, it was representative of the "despairing" response in this 
context.132
Consequently, Walt felt compelled (presumably on the basis of his close reading 
of such literature) to warn that:
security studies should remain wary of the counterproductive tangents that 
have seduced other areas of international studies of international studies, 
most notably the "post-modern" approach to international affairs.
This, he explained, was because:
Contrary to their proponents' claims, post-modern approaches have yet to 
demonstrate much value for comprehending world politics; to date these 
works are mostly criticism and not much theory...[moreover] issues of peace 
and war are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self 
indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world,133
On this note, with post-modernist scholarship being dismissed on the basis of the 
"real" world knowledge of a crude positivist of the Realist mainstream, the most 
constructive response might be to utilise Walt's perspective as a prime example of the 
continuing positivist domination of security/strategic discourse, and as evidence of the 
broader continuity between modernism and International Relations which this chapter has 
sought, again, to illustrate.
132Ibid, p.223. The issue of the "despairing” response to Critical Social Theory in International 
Relations is discussed in Chapter One, pp.47-50.
133Ibid, p.223, emphasis added.
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Summary
This chapter has sought to develop further, and from a number of angles, the notion 
introduced in Chapter Five of the fundamental continuity between the modernist 
discourse of Western theory and practice discussed in Chapter Two and the Tradition and 
discipline of International Relations. The previous chapter concentrated on the emergence 
and early development of a modemist framing regime in the discipline of International 
Relations as textually derived from the Realism of E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis 
and from the "interpretivist straightjacket" of the early Cold War years. This chapter had 
slightly different concerns and ambitions. It sought at one level to connect the positivist 
Realism of the 1950s and 1960s in International Relations to the broader discursive 
circumstances associated with Anglo-American social theory, in the same period. Its 
point of entry, in this regard, was the Weber-Morgenthau intersection and the Verstehen 
perspective which, for a century or more, has invoked in Anglo-American thought 
images drawn from that border area of hermeneutics and positivism.
Attention was paid to the "great text" which more than any other afforded post­
war Realism its confidence and policy status - Morgenthau's, Politics Among Nations. 
Consistent with the broader aim of the chapter, attention was also focused on a silence in 
Morgenthau's work, and that, subsequently, of the discipline, concerning the impact 
upon it of Weber’s Verstehen perspective - "the other side of the positivist coin". This, it 
was argued, was the discursive space within which International Relations engaged its 
scientific "quest for certainty" in the 1960s - a "quest" carried out, primarily, in 
Popperian falsificationist terms. The discussion concentrated on the implications of this 
for the questions and answers of those purportedly observing the "facts" of the Third 
World and of the nuclear stand off "out there" in the Cold War world. In both contexts, 
it was argued, the image of reality generated was derived primarily from the limiting 
modernism which constituted the discursive boundaries of Realist "reality".134 This was
134As in the discussion in the previous chapter, pp.230-238, which utilised Nathanson's work on the 
"interpretivist straightjacket" of the immediate post-war years, to make the same point.
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illustrated most starkly in the crude ethnocentric progressivem of Modernisation Theory 
and, from a different angle in the mathematised and formularised commitments of a 
generation of security/strategic analysis oriented towards a "scientific" articulation of 
Traditionalist, power politics "givens". And while, within the security/strategic 
community there were "alternative" voices occasionally heard (e.g. Russe«, Jervis) they 
spoke in modemist discursive terms. Vasquez’s valuable (critical modernist) insights 
were revisited, to indicate some of the "practical" implications and great dangers of this 
continuing discursive dominance in security/strategic thinking. The chapter came to an 
end with an attempt to illustrate how, right up to the present (beyond Vasquez's study) 
the modemist legacy spearheaded by positivist principles of understanding remains at the 
forefront of Realist theory and practice. Philip Lawrence's critique was utilised to 
indicate that the rationalist and empiricist perspectives of Seventeenth century European 
philosophy continue to direct International Relations research and policy prescription in 
the nuclear age, albeit in pragmatist terms. Stephen Walt's recent contribution to the 
debate indicated, even more profoundly, the desperate state of the intellectual art in the 
1990s.
In short, this chapter has been concerned to further, and more profoundly 
illustrate why it is important to locate the Tradition and discipline of International 
Relations as part of a modernist framing regime, and how, through the years of the 1960s 
in particular Realist scholarship was limited by its modernist commitments. In relation to 
the "quest for certainty" of this period and since, the chapter sought to provide a different 
angle on a literature which resounded with claims to have discovered the foundational 
basis of: (i) the reality (i.e. anarchical) of relations between states; (ii) the nature of the 
modem world of states and/or state "system" (with its independent, utilitarian structure 
and its inevitable security dilemmas); (iii) of the "art of the possible" (i.e. order under 
anarchy) associated with the "control" of modem International Relations; and (iv) of the 
correct method (positivist/empiricist) by which the world "out there" is to be understood.
The chapter now to follow has similar concerns in that its focus of attention is the
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replication of modernist and positivist commitments in the new orthodoxy of International 
relations in the 1990s - neo-Realism. It argues that there has been nothing original or 
even surprising in the response of Realists to the "anomalies" of orthodox theory and 
practice in the post Vietnam era, which appeared to undermine the "certainty" of their 
state centric, power politics, analysis. Like orthodox responses before them, across the 
social theory spectrum, the neo-Realist response has had all the hallmarks of a modemist 
discursive practice, albeit in updated and reformulated mode. There has, thus, been the 
resort to even more precise level of certitude, and a narrowing down of the "meaningful" 
principle (i.e. rational order under anarchy) which would have done the Logical 
Positivists proud. And, in replicating earlier paradoxes associated with the post war 
"quest for certainty", the neo-Realism of the (fully blown) "post-positivist"/"post- 
behaviouralist" era has been articulated in exemplary positivist terms, consistent with the 
behaviouralist attempt to make the Tradition of International Relations Realism more 
"scientific".
This is not to suggest that the neo-Realists of the 1990s have reverted entirely to 
the "high politics" scenarios of the past, or that their Traditionalism is represented, 
explicitly, in the "metaphysical" terms repudiated by behaviouralism. Rather, in seeking 
to accommodate some of the criticisms of the 1960s and 1970s, the more nuanced of the 
mainstream in the 1980s and 1990s have made selective forays into the behaviouralist and 
Traditionalist genres in reconstructing their approach to the "is" of the world in the 
contemporary era. The result is a fusion of Traditional Realist epithets and systemic 
"models" of behaviour derived primarily from the "scientific" insights of neo-classical 
economics, now re-presented as contemporary reality in the age of an International 
Political Economy. It is to this modernist hybrid and its continuing closure that the 
discussion now turns.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE REGIME DEBATE: 
FROM (RELATIVE) OPENNESS TO NEO-REALIST CLOSURE
Much o f the impetus for the International Political Economy approaches of the 
contemporary period, and for the emergence of neo-Realism, emanate from that period in 
the early 1970s when Realist theory and practice was confronted with crisis on a number 
of fronts - e.g. the Vietnam war, the failure of Modernisation Theory in the Third World, 
and a series of challenges to United States global hegemony.1 These crises provoked, 
among more sensitive commentators at least, attempts to go beyond the rigidity of the 
post-1945 "catechism" (either Traditionalist or behaviouralist) and confront Realism with 
some of the anomalies of its theory and practice. Consequently, after the impotent 
jousting of the second "great debate", and while the mainstream on both sides of the 
positivist Realist coin, "breathfed] a sigh of relief and [got] back with clear consciences to 
what they had been doing"2 some within Realist ranks began a rudimentary but long
*For a broad overview of this period and the impact it had on International Relations see Maghoori and 
Ramberg eds., Globalism versus Realism: International Relations Third Debate (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1982).
^This was a theme raised by Martin Indyk, "The Australian Study of International Relations", in Surveys 
of Australian Political Science edited by D. Aitken (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p.276. 
Interestingly Indyk was reflecting here upon the attitudes of Anglophile Traditionalists who, cheering 
from the Antipodean bleachers, hailed Hedley Bull's "victory" over the North American "scientific 
Realists", a "victory" that meant a great deal to those whose identity largely rested on their Traditionalism 
with its air of (British) superiority. See Bull, "International Theory: The Case for the Classical 
Approach", World Politics XVIII (April 1966), pp.361-377; reprinted in Contending Approaches to 
International Relations edited by K. Knorr and J. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). 
It is interesting too, in this regard, to ponder Indyk's proposition that if, instead of celebrating Bull's 
"victory", his supporters had critically evaluated his arguments, they might have noted that he didn’t argue 
a case "for" the Classical school at all, but merely reiterated some already existing antipathies toward the 
"scientific" approach. Going beyond Indyk, of course, its worth recalling Bull’s own commitments to the 
positivism which in its deductivist articulation he condemned with such relish. On this issue see Chapter 
One, footnotes 24 and 53. In a recent work I have hied to explain the complex nature of Bull's theoretical 
position by relating it to his major philosophical influence via John Anderson. See."Some Thoughts on 
the Givenness of Everyday Life in Australian International Relations: Theory and Practice", Australian 
Journal of Political Science (forthcoming). Whatever the case this episode marks another site at which 
International Relations scholars needed to think much more seriously about their perspectives, and didn't 
The implications of this were evident enough in the analysis of Australia's mainstream Realists on the
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overdue re-assessment of some fundamental premises and positions. At this point, and to 
varying degrees, the crisis in Realism began to overlap with that larger sense of crisis in 
Anglo-American social theory, discussed in earlier chapters.* 3
This is a theme of obvious significance for this thesis, and in this chapter it will be 
explored as part of a discussion which concentrates on the theory and practice of 
International Relations in the period between the 1970s and the present. In the broader 
social theory context this has been the period of Critical Social Theory and a "new 
conversation" within Anglo-American scholarship.4 It has also been the period when, for 
all the claims to the contrary, a positivist based "orthodox consensus" has continued to 
dominate.5 The tensions between critical thought and disciplinary orthodoxy have been 
replicated in International Relations, as the comments on the Third Debate, in Chapter 
One, indicated.6 Accordingly, as conservative forces elsewhere regrouped and responded 
to "revisionist" accounts of reality so, in International Relations, the "revisionism" of the 
Interdependence scholars of the early 1970s, and a liberalised or "Grotian" International 
Political Economy perspective, has been confronted by the neo-Realism of some of the 
most prominent figures in the discipline.7 The result is that International Relations in the
major foreign policy issue of the post-war period - the Vietnam War. See Indyk, "The Australian Study
of International Relations".
3See the discussion in Chapter One on the Critical Social Theory challenges to orthodoxies across the 
disciplines, pp.43-66 and in Chapters Three and Four.
4See Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism: Science. Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 1983), p.2.
5See Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: Macan, 1982), p.2; see also the 
discussion in Chapter Four, pp. 154-156.
^See Chapter One, pp.32-43.
7The Interdependence position at this time is associated primarily with the work of Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye. See Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971) which they edited and Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1977); and Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 2nd edition (Boston: Scott, 
Foreman and Company, 1989). The latter works reflect the shifting attitudes of the authors, away from 
the (relative) liberal openness of the period after Vietnam and the crises of the 1970s, and towards the 
resurgent (neo)Realism of more recent times. There were others too working in this Interdependence area. 
See, for example, Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic 
Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and Cooper, A Reordered World: Emerging International 
Economic Problems (Washington D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1973). The "Grotian" designation is that 
of neo-Realists such as Stephen Krasner toward the works of Figures such as Donald Puchala, Raymond
1980s and 1990s has again begun to resonate with the (illusory) certitude of a reasserted 
positivist-Realist "catechism".
The discussion in this chapter will be organised, primarily, around this theme of 
relative openness and subsequent closure. It seeks, in this context, to again illustrate the 
modernist continuity in International Relations in a period which, more explicitly than 
ever, has seen its Realist mainstream attempting to detach itself from the limitations of its 
(positivist, behaviouralist, Traditionalist Realist) "past". It argues that, for all the 
proclamations of post-positivism and post-Realism the most influential "alternatives" to 
Realism (and modernism) in the current period, are, like their counterparts in the broader 
social theory context, still very much located within modemist/positivist "orthodox 
consensus". And it indicates, in the most contemporary of terms, why it is so necessary 
that Critical Social Theory attitudes and perspectives become a significant part of the 
agenda, in a Tradition and a discipline which continues to ignore its "preface", and which 
continues consequently, to understand and "respond" to the world in "primitive" terms.
Vietnam. Interdependence and the Regime Debate
The debacle in Vietnam forced a re-assessment of United States security/strategic 
discourse, its understanding of some aspects of the world "out there" (e.g. South-East 
Asia) and its foreign policy perspectives in general. As part of this post-Vietnam crisis, 
Realists of all varieties were confronted with a range of "revisionist" critiques aimed at the 
inadequacies of their approach to knowledge and society.8 Boiled down to its basics, the
Hopkins and Ernst Haas. See Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables", in International Regimes edited by Krasner (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 
1983). The term "Grotian" has a broader connotation, of course, designating a via media position 
between Realist and Revolutionist positions in Martin Wight's scenario, see "Why Is There No 
International Theory?", in Diplomatic Investigations edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966); and Chapter One of this thesis, footnotes 24 and 53.
^See, for example, Robert Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in 
Rast Asia (New York: W.W. Norton,1982); Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War 
and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); David Halberstam, The Best and the 
Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972); Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The 
System Worked (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1979); Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, Roots, of
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charge, in the early 1970s, was that Realism represented a simplistic, ethnocentric and 
ideological articulation of Western (primarily North American) interests, which was 
unwilling and/or incapable of dealing with a complex international arena.
In terms of fundamental Realist assumptions, and its "quest for certainty", at least 
three precise criticisms can be gleaned from the critical literature on the Vietnam War. 
The first, pointing to the inadequacies of behaviouralist policy analysis, noted that for all 
the intricate modelling, mathematical posturing, systems theories and assertions about the 
patterned "recurrence and repetition" of inter-state life, Realists had no adequate theory of 
the state, no accurate insight into the history, culture and socio-political structure of 
Vietnam, its peoples or its struggle. Secondly, for all its proclamations of universality, 
and for all its game theorised accounts of means/ends behaviour and strategic 
predictability, derived from the "rationality" principle of neo-classical economic theory, 
Realism had no comprehension of the North Vietnamese capacity for "irrational" 
behaviour in regard to levels of "acceptable damage". Thirdly, committed to crude 
assumptions about the nature of "power" (e.g. as modem military/technological capacity) 
all the Realist "historical" and philosophical insight, and all its tech no-rational predictive 
capacity, could not account for the defeat of a modem Western state at the hands of a 
traditional society, utilising "backward" technological and intellectual resources.
In a rudimentary way, then, the crisis of the post-Vietnam period prefigured the 
Third Debate critiques of the 1980s and 1990s with their attacks on the theory and 
practice of positivist-Realism. The ensuing debate saw a degree of self reflective 
scholarship emerge which (to some degree) reflected a new awareness of 
theoretical/interpretive issues now becoming influential across the Anglo-American social 
theory spectrum. It evoked, as one commentator saw it, "a more profound and difficult 
shift in intellectual orientation rooted in increasing discontent with the scientific 
inadequacy as well as the unacknowledged ideological preconceptions of liberal
Involvement (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971); Paul Katlenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American 
Foreign Policy 1945-75 (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1980) and Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).
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development theory" and strategic analysis in general.9 Another view of the period
stressed that across the social theory disciplines the impression was growing that:
what was supposed to be objective scientific knowledge was in fact a 
disguised form of ideology that lent support to the status quo; that the most 
striking characteristic of the social sciences was not their ability to illuminate 
existing social and political reality, but their inability to provide any critical 
perspective on what was happening.10
It was in this general atmosphere that, in the early 1970s, scholars such as Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye began to prise open some critical space within International 
Relations, on themes previously closed off under the rigid framing regime of conservative 
Realist scholarship since World War Two. Their basic Interdependence argument was 
that, contrary to the commonly held Realist image of the state centric world "out there", 
actors other than sovereign states must be accorded significance in any contemporary 
power politics equation. To understand international order in the 1970s, consequently, 
was to understand a more complex matrix of power relations, not reducible solely to the 
crude power machinations of sovereign states, but influenced also by the activities of 
other (multinational, transnational) non-state actors and the politico economic connections 
between them, at both micro and macro levels.11
This is not to suggest that the Interdependence challenge of Keohane and Nye 
represented a serious effort to critically re-evaluate Realism in terms of its modernist 
legacy, or even its positivist inspired "disavowal of reflection".12 Rather, the purpose, as 
Keohane, in retrospect, recalled, was to supplement a "basic theory of state action"13 and
^From BJ. Berman, "Letter to the Editor", American Political Science Review 72(2) (1978), pp.207-9, 
p.208; also cited in Higgott, Political Development Theory (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p.9.
^Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Pittsburg: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1976), p.xi.
1 ^See Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics.
12Though for some the Interdependence approach "transformed the American discipline of international 
relations." Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (ftinceton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), p.xi.
13This is Keohane's view of the purpose of Power and Interdependence as articulated in Keohane ed., 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 158.
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construct "structural models of international Regime change" in order to "improve the 
ability of Realist or Neo-Realist analysis to account for [such change]".14 For all this, 
and for all the ambiguity with which the Interdependence themes were presented in the 
1970s, in questioning Realism's Traditional state centric premise, and in emphasising the 
significance of non-state (transnational) actors and issue based analysis, the work of 
Keohane and Nye opened some space for (moderately) critical and more pluralistic 
analysis at the American centre of the discipline which, since the Cold War, had largely 
recited the Realist "catechism".
It was in this space that the debate over the nature and role of politico-economic 
regimes became a significant theme in International Relations. The issue of regimes had 
been raised in the "integrationist" or "functionalist" scholarship of the 1950s and 
1960s.15 In the 1970s, however, when (among other things) the demise of Bretton 
Woods, the challenge to United States economic dominance by Japan, the OPEC crisis 
and the catastrophe in Vietnam, were increasingly represented as weakening U.S. power 
in the world and (in North America in particular) as nails in the coffin of the post-war 
order, the regime issue re-emerged as part of a reformulated disciplinary perspective on 
contemporary reality at the international level. And, it was on this basis that questions of 
order, sovereignty, and systemic power relations - central themes in the Realist lexicon - 
became inexorably interwoven with the regime issue and the question of United States
14Ibid, p.160.
^ S ee, for example, Ernst Haas, Bevond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and from a European perspective, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). In this period also others, such as John Burton, were developing 
alternative perspectives which did not centre on Traditional state centric analysis. Burton's alternative 
stressed integrative behaviour among a variety of actors and it was presented in terms of social 
psychology premises and with "systemic" ambitions. It has remained an influential approach in Britain, 
in particular. See Burton, Systems. States. Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968); and Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Vasquez's 
insight needs to be noted on this issue regarding the discursive continuity of this early regime (or 
integrationist) theory. Vasquez's point is that the work of Deutsch and Haas, for example, was always 
conducted "within the context of the [R]ealist paradigm" with neither Deutsch's communications and 
cybernetic theory, nor Haas’ functionalism, violating the "fundamental assumptions" of power politics 
Realism. See Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p.115. I will add a 
dimension to this issue shortly in the discussion on "Grotian" regime theory - the updated version of 
"integrationism".
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hegemony in an interdependent world. The regime debate has, subsequently, become the 
site of various attempts to "open" International Relations to approaches and 
understandings traditionally excluded from serious disciplinary concern. The discussion 
to follow looks briefly at a few of these attempts and neo-Realist responses to them.
Regimes and the "Grotian" Search for Thinking Space.
The definition of a regime is itself an issue of much debate. One influential definition
regards regimes as that set of implicit or explicit "principles, norms rules and decision
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area".16
Another definition represents regimes as "the set of rules, norms and procedures that
regulate behaviour and control its effects in international affairs".17 Explaining these
definitional components in more detail, Stephen Krasner indicated that:
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.18
Read positively, an approach such as this would appear to represent an important 
thematic shift in emphasis for International Relations scholarship indicating, perhaps, that 
"primitive" Realist notions of an anarchical world "out there" imposing its power politics 
essence upon passive receivers have been superseded. To some degree this has been the 
case. Working in the "thinking space" prised open in the early 1970s, scholars such as 
Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala and Ernst Haas, for example, have 
added interesting and useful dimensions to the regime debate. Their general perspective, 
designated "Grotian" by Realists such as Krasner, has maintained that the theory and
^Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences", p.l.
17Nye, "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes", International Organization 41(3) (1987), 
pp.371-402, p.374.
^Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", p.2.
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practice of regimes largely supersedes Realist understandings of the world, which are 
now perceived as "too limited for explaining an increasingly complex, interdependent and 
dangerous world".19
More specifically "Grotian" regime theory has sought to undermine the power 
politics explanatory matrix by suggesting that the "essence" of a Realist explanation of 
reality - the struggle for survival in an anarchical world via balance of power strategies - 
does not adequately address contemporary inter-state relations, even those involving 
"major-power rivalry, that are traditionally looked upon as clear cut examples of 
anarchy" .20 Going to the belly of the explanatory beast Puchala and Young have 
developed this theme by asking different sorts of questions about a seminal example of 
Realist power politics - the frantic grab for imperial possession in the lead up to World 
War One. Even here, they have suggested, something other than anarchical balancing 
was going on, when "the international relations of the imperial powers were regulated by 
a regime that prescribed certain modes of behaviour for metropolitan countries vis-a-vis 
each other and toward their respective colonial subjects".21
This "Grotian" approach does not dismiss Realism's focus on power politics 
behaviour per se. Its aim, rather, is to illustrate that the reductionist homogeneity of 
mainstream Realism blinds it to the complex and heterogeneous nature of international 
behaviour and to a more nuanced understanding of it. Accordingly, while it is 
acknowledged that the most common reason for regime compliance is, at one level or 
another, "calculated self interest", Puchala and Hopkins have argued that there is more 
analytical value in going beyond the obvious and investigating, "how regime participants 
calculate their benefits and costs".22 Of importance here, for example, are questions of
19Ibid, p.8.
^Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons for Inductive Analysis", in International 
Regimes ed. Krasner, p.86.
21 Ibid, p.67. 
22Ibid, p.90.
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how regime participants "assign weights to perceived "moral" benefits of acting in accord 
with norms, or perceived "moral" costs of acting against them".23 The significance of 
this reassessment of orthodox Realism, of course, is that it questions the utilitarian basis 
of Realism’s understanding of power politics state behaviour. It suggests, rather, that 
notions of individual self interest as a basis of understanding are limited and inadequate, 
that notions of rational action set upon market analogies must be placed in social and 
historical context and given normative dimensions.
Another critical suggestion to come from this quarter concerns the issue of change 
in International Relations and the rigidity of Realist understanding of it. Here, it is 
recognised that regime change "most often comes after changes in the structure of [inter­
state] power".24 But, seeking again to go beyond the obvious, Puchala and Hopkins 
have maintained that there are other sources and motivations for change, for example, 
"via cognitive learning [e.g. knowledge of environmental exigencies] and the recasting of 
goals among dominant elites". Contrary, therefore, to the essentials of Realism, there are 
explanation of change which occur without "significant changes in [the] power structure" 
between the major states.25
Ernst Haas is another for whom the study of regimes adds to a contemporary
understanding of the world, because it represents:
the interactions of homo politicus with nature and with culture ...[Moreover] 
it rests on the supposition that our collective understanding of our political 
choices increasingly depend on how we think about nature and about 
culture.26
23 Ibid.
24Ibid 
25 Ibid.
26Haas, "Words Can Hurt You: Or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes", in International 
Regimes ed. Krasner, p.24.
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The sense of a more sophisticated "thinking space" opened up in Haas' work is enhanced
with his proposition about the metatheoretical limitations of Realism, which, he
maintained, must give way to perspectives concerned with the:
ontogeny and phylogeny of consensual thought about interactions between 
man, culture and nature...[about] conceptualising a shared notion of what 
really exists - a reality that includes more than the familiar political conflict 
among states.27
Such a perspective, he argued:
implies that we cannot know the reality "out there" because our notion of 
what it contains changes with every twist of the scientific enterprise. Man- 
the-knower is the victim of his methods of acquiring knowledge and is 
therefore condemned to settle for successive approximations to reality.28
Others, less "Grotian" in attitude and perspective, have, nevertheless, centred on 
the regime issue in broadening the intellectual scope of their analysis. Most famously, 
perhaps, John Ruggie has insisted that to understand the "embedded liberalism" of the 
post-World War Two regimes is to extend the issue beyond (orthodox) Realist 
boundaries and understand regimes as "akin to language".29 Ruggie's point was that we 
"know" about international regimes:
not simply by some descriptive grammar of their concrete elements, but by 
their generative grammar, the underlying principles of order and meaning that 
shape the manner of their formation and transformation.30
Friedrich Kratochwil has taken this theme further. In a sophisticated discussion of the 
"fact'Vinterpretation" issue and regime behaviour, he has emphasised the need to go 
beyond:
the conception of 'science' which is derived from the development of physics 
and conceived of as consisting of a "third world" of objective knowledge"
27Ibid, p.25.
2^ Ibid.
29Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transaction and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order", in International Regimes ed. Krasner, p. 196; originally printed in International 
Organization 36 (1982), pp.379-415.
30Ibid, p.196.
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[and think of]...'science' as a practice in which validity claims are scrutinised 
among practitioners.31
Even from this brief perusal of it, then, it is clear that, to some degree, and at one 
level or another, regime literature since the 1970s has engaged with themes and questions 
earlier prescribed as central to the Critical Social Theory challenge to the discipline in 
recent times. Indeed, on the basis of contributions such as those touched on above - 
indicating an intersubjective realm of rules and norms as constitutive of contemporary 
international reality - an observer encountering the disciplinary literature in the 1980s, 
might be forgiven for thinking that it is has been Wittgenstein, Winch and Kuhn, rather 
than Popper and Weber, that have been most influential philosophically over the years - 
that International Relations is not the "backward discipline" some critics claim it to be. 
Forgiveness might also be forthcoming if it was also suggested that any crisis in Realism 
that might have existed in the past, has been largely overcome as International Relations 
scholars grapple seriously with the major philosophical issues across the contemporary 
Social Theory spectrum. It might also be concluded, in this context, that the Critical 
Social Theory challenge, with its charge of continuing "primitiveness" and calls for 
increased "thinking space", is inappropriate, exaggerated and even churlish.
This, I suggest is not the case. Rather, as in the broader social theory context, an 
"orthodox consensus" continues to reign in International Relations and seemingly genuine 
"alternatives" to its modernist discursive power continue to be framed in modemist terms. 
This can be illustrated, initially, by looking more critically at the nature of the "thinking 
space" opened up by "Grotian" regime theorists, and the focus on language introduced to 
the debate by Kratochwil and Ruggie.32 The discussion will then focus, more directly, 
on the most influential "alternative" of the post-Vietnam period - neo-Realism.
31 Kratochwil, "Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics: A Reappraisal", Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 17(2) (1988), pp.263-285, at p. 281.
32 A good general critique of liberal/"Grotian" regime theory is to be found in Richard O'Meara's, 
"Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory", Millennium 13(3) (1984), pp.245-264. 
O'Meara's article includes commentary on contributions not covered here (e.g. by Oran Young).
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My contention on "Grotian" regime theory is that, for all the genuine insight it 
brings to the contemporary debate it does not represent a fundamental break with the 
dominant discourse, but rather an adaption of it (hence the unintended appropriateness of 
the "Grotian" label bestowed upon it by Realists). Ernst Haas' contribution, for example, 
is clearly of contemporary significance with its concern to "illustrate the range of past and 
future choices about international collaboration in a context of changing self 
understanding".33 Such an approach seems clearly distinguishable from the positivist 
objectivism that has characterised Realist analysis over the years. Yet, some rather 
obvious similarities remain, between a Realism that bases its scepticism about co­
operative regime behaviour on an objectified world "out there", and an argument which 
invokes the significance of regimes on the basis of an "evolutionary epistemology".34 
The problem, in short, is that the insight which allows Haas to expose the externalised 
and thus limited "reality" of Realism is, itself, derived from the same (modemist) 
framework which understands the regime based alternative as "the politics of 
collaboration...seen as evolving alongside the evolution of consciousness itself'.35 
Suspicions that this useful rejoinder to positivist-Realism is predicated on a rather 
rudimentary progressivem  are only enhanced when Haas sets out his intellectual 
position, which, he revealed, "implies the permanent evolution of regimes and of 
knowledge about regimes".36
The contribution of Puchala and Hopkins is, like that of Haas', a valuable 
addition to the literature dominated by a "primitive" Realism over the years, but it too, 
under even mild scrutiny, is shown to be intrinsically linked to the Realism it seeks to 
repudiate. The problems here are, if anything, more immediately evident than in the case
33Haas, "Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What To Whom About Regimes", p.24. 
^Ibid.
Ibid.
3^Ibid, p.25, emphasis added.
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of Haas' "evolutionary epistemology". The major problem lies in the attempt to go
beyond the state-as-actor focus of orthodox Realism by focusing, instead, on the role of
elites in regime maintenance. This, in effect is an expanded version of the "bureaucratic
politics" model, which suffers from all the problems that have beset similar approaches
over the years.37 Moreover, while it might, as the authors intend, go beyond the "rarefied
abstraction" of the state38 it really only goes as far as Wight's and Bull's international
society approach did, that is, to the "rarefied" world of the state elite - the world of the
diplomat and statesmen, working on behalf of the state and its "national" interest.39
Consequently, while claims are made for a broader, more heterogeneous and
fundamentally different approach to International Relations from "Grotian" scholars such
as Puchala and Hopkins, the basic analytical attention remains focused upon hierarchical
power structures, decisions made from above by state-based actors. Summarising the
"Grotian" perspective, Richard O'Meara has come to a similar conclusion, finding that:
the Grotian and traditional [Realist] approaches are not incommensurable: 
both rely on the analytical concepts of power and self-interest and both are 
ultimately concerned with describing and explaining the behaviour of 
states.40
Consequently, maintained O'Meara, "Grotian" approaches "echo the explanation of 
regime formation offered by the Realist scholars in their attempts to accommodate 
regimes". Thus:
while there is certainly much to be gained from an analysis which focuses on 
the interactions of governments, bureaucracies and non governmental actors, 
the Grotians seem too timid to launch the necessary investigations [into their 
continued Realism] and to acknowledge the inevitable theoretical and 
paradigmatic consequences.41
370n  these problems see the discussion in Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p. 76.
38Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis", p.63.
30See John Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The Tyranny of 
Ahistorical Culturalism", Australian Outlook 41(1) (1987), pp.45-52.
4®0’Meara, "Regimes and their Implications for International Theory", p.257.
41 Ibid.
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This is a theme that also applies to the contributions of those, like Kratochwil and 
Ruggie who, while they might blanche at the term "Grotian” as applied to their work, 
have introduced to recent debates some sophisticated analysis of philosophical issues 
largely eschewed by the discipline in general. Here, however, the limits on critical 
inquiry are most clearly evident because they are self imposed. Accordingly, having 
emphasised the need for insights drawn from the "interpretive sciences"42 they then 
firmly close off the discussion by stressing that their position should not be taken as 
"advocating a coup whereby the reign of positivist explanation is replaced by exploratory 
anarchy".43 This example of the "Cartesian anxiety" on the part of Kratochwil and 
Ruggie is, when added to the limitations of "Grotian" regime theory, indicative of the 
situation which provoked the Critical Social Theory responses in the Third Debate. It 
indicates, primarily, that the "thinking space" of the 1970s did not stay open for long. 
Instead, since the late 1970s, the potential for a fundamental reassessment of the theory 
and practice of International Relations has been overhauled by a resurgent Realism 
(represented as neo-Realism) concerned, at the level of "practice", with the retention of 
the hierarchical status quo of the post-World War Two period (e.g. United States 
hegemony) and "theoretically" with an enhanced "pursuit of certainty".
By 1977 the Realist backlash was already evident in the work of Robert Tucker, 
who, reflecting upon the challenges posed by Interdependence scholars, regime theorists 
and "liberals" and "radicals" generally, sought to reaffirm the Traditional need for 
structural continuity and systemic order, albeit in terms of a basic inequality between 
states.44 Tucker's logic was simple, familiar and self-affirming. The international 
system, it was argued, has always been anarchical and relations between states have 
"always been in essence oligarchical (unequal) largely because it [the system] has been
42Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization: The State of the Art on the Art of the State", 
International Organization 40 (1986), pp. 753-775, at p.771.
43Ibid, p.768.
‘^ ‘h'ucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
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anarchical".45 Consequently, it has been the "self help" principle that has been the key to
order in an anarchical world. This principle, Tucker explained, is:
the right of the state to determine when its legitimate interests are threatened, 
or violated, and to employ such coercive measures as it may deem necessary 
to vindicate those interests.46
This, Tucker insisted, is a principle that must not be violated, because while it has its 
drawbacks (i.e. it might create greater inequalities) it is integral to the structural reality of 
the international system and, as the basis of systemic order, it is the only hope for any 
"progressive" change and/or any inter-state equalisation in the future.
In Tucker's refurbished representation of Realist "reality", therefore, the challenge 
of interdependence and regime cooperation was confronted with the Realist "given" that 
change (in an anarchical system) is only possible when it comes from the top, when it is 
in the interests of the major powers and when it does not unbalance the systemic order 
based on the "self help" principle. In Tucker’s terms, consequently, the dilemma of the 
contemporary age is that it is the "institution of self help that must be changed if 
international society is to become more egalitarian".47 The problem, in the 1970s, he 
argued, was that those advocating change simply did not understand the fundamental 
structural difference between the international state system and domestic society. In 
particular they failed to appreciate the "fundamental dilemma" of an international structure 
"marked by the absence of the elementary conditions that have attended, and made 
possible, the progression of equality within civil society".48 Tucker's response, 
accordingly, was to re-invoke another Realist "given" - the domestic/intemational 
dichotomy - emphasising that "in the absence of those conditions that give cohesiveness 
to [egalitarian] domestic society, and that permit order without tyranny, the decline of self
45Ibid, p.4. 
^Ibid.
47Ibid, p.170. 
48Ibid, p.172.
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help may bring increased disorder" in the international realm.49 Tucker's particular target
here was Interdependence scholarship, primarily because the "meaning that some read
into interdependence may encourage expectations of substantial equalisations of material
conditions". This, however, was an unreal expectation, because the structural reality of
an interdependent world can only be understood in terms of:
resentments and conflicting interests that result from present inequalities of 
wealth and power [that] will simply go largely unresolved in a system 
marked by the progressive erosion of the principal traditional institutions of 
order.50
Tucker’s Inequality of Nations is, ultimately, no better nor worse than any other 
contemporary incantation of the Realist "catechism". Its significance here is that, 
published in 1977, it stands as an early testament to the post-Vietnam resurgence of the 
Realist dogma. It indicated that, tiresome and ephemeral anomalies aside, the 
International Relations mainstream had, by the late 1970s, recovered their sense of 
certainty after a short period when a sense of ambiguity, ambivalence and difference 
threatened. Waltz's Theory of International Politics published in 1979, confirmed this to 
be the case, and generally within a few years, the potential "openness" of the early 1970s 
was effectively closed off as Realists (e.g. via Kindleberger)51 further integrated neo­
classical economics themes with their power politics, and articulated their "catechism" in
49Ibid, p. 175.
50Ibid, p.177.
5*The influences of the economist Charles Kindleberger have become evident in the neo-Realism of 
scholars such as Keohane, Gilpin, Krasner and Stein etc. Kindleberger, via the rational actor model 
associated with collective goods theory and a game theorised "history" of the last century or so, has 
provided much of the discursive raw material for the enhanced interest in "economic" themes in recent 
years, (and for Hegemonic Stability Theory). His basic argument is that economic stability at the 
international level is, by definition, a collective or public good, in that all actors benefit from the ordered 
and stable nature of international trade in such circumstances. The problem with the international 
"market", however, is that many actors will "free ride" in the pursuit of national interest rather than the 
public interest of the system as a whole. Accordingly, the goal of order and stability at the international 
level is dependent upon the power and public spirited motivation of the strongest power - a hegemon - 
who can underwrite and maintain the conditions under which order and stability can characterise the 
"market". Integral to this theory of order, for Kindleberger, is the need for a hegemonic power regime 
based on Western Liberal premises of market openness and (capitalist) freedom to choose. See 
Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and 
Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy", International Studies Quarterly 
25(3) (1981), pp.242-254.
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the moderated terms appropriate to the new age of "post-positivism", "post-Realism" and 
an International Political Economy.52
The result, I will argue, has been a moderated "primitivism" which has seen the 
rational sovereign figure of Western modernity unproblematically projected back to centre 
stage, and the complexity of human life, history and cultural difference, again reduced to 
the selfish, utilitarian image of human nature integral to a particular reading of Western 
Philosophy, as transposed to International Relations after the European Renaissance in 
the form of the sovereign state - the rational actor in the (analogised) market. It has seen, 
moreover, the resurgence of the pursuit of scientific certainty - centred on structuralist 
deductive modelling and game theory - as pan of an institutionalised "politics of 
forgetting" designed to insulate Realism from its interpretivist critics. To funher enhance 
the sense of discursive continuity associated with the neo-Realist replication of Realist 
"primitivism", the discussion to follow will continue to focus attention on the regime 
issue, but from now on in order to illustrate the closed disciplinary responses to it, by the 
new "dominant school of international relations theory" - neo-Realism.53
Neo-Realism: The New Orthodoxy in International Relations
Speaking of neo-Realist approaches in the regime context, Stephen Krasner explained that 
as the "modal position" within the discipline since the 1980s, it has insisted that, for all 
the proclaimed significance of regime behaviour, there are, in reality, structural factors, 
which determine the activities (cooperative or otherwise) of actors in the international
52Bom again Realists like Keohane, of course, have turned "moderation” into an art form in the 1980s, 
but already in 1977 Tucker was promoting his reformulated power politics perspective as that of a 
"moderate", confronted by the radical "visionaries" of the post-Vietnam era, for whom, "the imminent and 
radical transformation of the international system hold out the promise of utopia". Similarly, in the late 
1980s when Michael Sullivan reflected on the fact that the Globalist approach"may be at variance with 
the real world" it was all done with a linguistic (if not philosophical) caution bom of the post-Vietnam 
experience. See "Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contemporary International Politics", 
Millennium 7 (1978), pp.93-110.
53M. Zacher, "Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps: Regime Analysis and International Commodity Trade 
Regulation", International Organization 41(3^ (1987), pp.173-202, at p. 173.
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system .54 This "modal" position, furthermore, "elaborates a conventional structuralist
critique that rejects any significant role for principles, norms, rules and decision making
procedures" .55 Krasner was quick to point out that there were differences between
"conventional" structuralist approaches of this kind, associated with scholars such Waltz
and Susan Strange, and the "modified" (moderate) structuralism of his own work and that
of figures such Keohane, Robert Gilpin and Arthur Stein. In outlining these differences
Krasner indicated (unwittingly) just how powerful the concepts, premises, metaphors and
language of a modernist way of framing remain at the metatheoretical core of neo-
Realism. Thus, he suggested, a "modified structural" approach:
accepts] the basic analytical assumptions of structural realist approaches, 
which posit an international system of functionally symmetrical, power- 
maximising states acting in an anarchic environment. But they maintain that 
under certain restrictive conditions involving the failure of individual action to 
secure Pareto-optimal outcomes, international regimes may have a significant 
impact even in an anarchical world.56
My aim, from this point on, is to illustrate how both "conventional" and
"modified" dimensions of neo-Realist scholarship remain locked within the limited
confines of the Realist Tradition/discipline and how, in broader terms, its commitment to
the dominant modernist discourse continues to restrict its capacity to understand the
complexity of contemporary world politics. I will do so, again, in terms set by Krasner,
by taking seriously his proposition that the issue of regimes, and world order in general,
must, in the future, be confronted at a more sophisticated level than has been the norm in
the Realist dominated past. The point, as Krasner put it, is that:
The issue is not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles, 
norms, rules, and decision making procedures affecting outcomes and 
behaviour, as what one's basic assumption is about the normal state o f 
international affairs? 1
54Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences", p .l. 
55Ibid, p .l.
5^Ibid, pp.1-2.
5^Ibid, p.10, emphasis added.
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It is, therefore, in relation to the basic assumptions brought to images of the "normal state 
of international affairs" by neo-Realists that I now turn to some of the major literary 
contributions of the genre. In the first instance the seminal contribution of Kenneth Waltz 
will receive extended attention, albeit in a rather unconventional manner. Attention will 
then be directed to the works of figures such as Krasner, Gilpin, Stein and Keohane.
From Reductionism to Banality: Kenneth Waltz and Neo-Realist Structuralism58
Kenneth Waltz's contribution to International Relations spans four decades. In that time 
he has added influential dimensions to Realist scholarship. Since its publication in 1959, 
for example, his Man, the State and War, has been accorded the status of a classical text 
in the discipline.59 Moreover, Waltz's, Theory of International Politics (1979) has been 
promoted, by Joseph Nye, as the work which manages to reveal the logic of power 
politics Realism more profoundly than any other.60 It is difficult to argue with such a 
view, which unwittingly and ironically, vindicates the critical attitude taken toward Realist 
and neo-Realist theory and practice throughout this Thesis.
My own position on Theory of International Politics and (to a lesser degree) Man 
the State and War is that they stand as major indictments of an International Relations 
community which, closed to critical reflective capacity for so long, has accorded such 
high status to works of so little substance. They stand, in this regard, as a testament to 
the continuing legacy of a closed modernist discourse in the period of Realist dominance 
in International Relations. In comparing these works here I want to to add a dimension to
S^The "Reductionism to Banality" theme is taken from Justin Rosenberg's, "What's The Matter With 
Realism?", Review of International Studies 16(4) (1990), pp.285-303.
59Ibid, p.292.
^ N y e , "NeoRealism and NeoLiberalism", World Politics 40 (1988), pp.235-251, at p.235.
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this proposition and open to Critical Social Theory inquiry two more of the "great texts" 
of the Realist discipline.61
The differences between the two works, I suggest, is, ultimately, more a matter of 
tone and attitude than analytical quality. Man, the State and War, for example, had a 
certain charm and intellectual width, manifestly lacking from the later work, and in 1959, 
at the height of Realist confidence and influence, Waltz was willing to ventilate at least 
some of the philosophical and analytical givens of the Realist "catechism". Two decades 
later, however, in less favourable circumstances for U.S. Foreign Policy and Realist 
theory, his mood and ambition was narrower, more constrained and less philosophically 
tolerant.
In 1959, for example, Waltz sought to confront the theologically based 
dogmatism associated with Morgenthau's notion of human nature and its implications for 
Realism as the basis of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War years. Waltz, more 
specifically, sought answers to the "perennial questions" of International Relations - 
regarding the causes of war - that for Morgenthau and other major Traditional Realists 
(e.g. Niebuhr) were ultimately reduced to "original sin" notions concerning the inherent 
evil of "man". In Man, the State and W ar, the reductionist position was attributed 
(among others) to Augustine, Luther, Malthus, Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the keystone of 
this philosophy being that, "the root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of 
the specific evil, war". In an international context, maintained Waltz, this logic flowed 
into another which "explained] the great ills of war by the evil qualities of some or of all 
states".62 It proposed, further, that political strategies concentrated on the "balancing of 
power with power" is necessitated by the "the sinful character of man".63 This was the
Richard Ashley of course has done the same thing in "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism 
and War", in Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics edited by James 
Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and his specific commentary on 
Waltz will be discussed in Chapter Nine. My discussion here takes a different angle on the two texts and 
seeks to make some broader points more appropriate to the present work.
62waltz, Man, the State and War, p.3. 
63Ibid, p.28.
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logic which, in a famous passage from Politics Among Nations, led Morgenthau to 
explain the essence of international politics as the power lust of egoistic human nature 
which, he pronounced "has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India 
and Greece endeavoured to discover" the "laws" of political reality.64 From this 
perspective, accordingly, the inner nature of individual states represented the "inner 
nature" of humankind thus explaining the "external" world of inter-state conflict and the 
fundamental anarchy of the state system.65
This Realist image of the world Waltz found unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons, not the least being its connection to an "idealist" counterpart that based its 
essentialised, reductionist understanding of international life on the rational, progressive 
"goodness" inherent to humankind and the influence of "good" states over evil ones in the 
international system.66 Both approaches, he maintained, were simplistic and one sided 
and both were bound up in a metaphysics of human nature which resulted in largely 
meaningless assertion and inadequate analysis of what really is essential about 
international politics. Moreover, for Waltz, neither the "pessimistic" nor "optimistic" 
images assisted greatly in the search for the scientific Realism which Carr had urged and 
which (North) American behaviouralists had pursued after World War Two. But here 
too, argued Waltz, there was reductionism, with much behaviouralist scholarship reduced 
to a fact grubbing empiricism devoid of political analysis.67 For Waltz, in 1959, 
therefore, there was a need for a Realist approach which went beyond metaphysical 
assumption dressed up as analysis and which offered more than a detached empiricism
64Ibid, p.27.
65Ibid, p.5.
6^See ibid, pp.1-40. Most obviously of course that such a position might in some self affirming way 
explain actions prescribed as "evil" but it can say nothing of so many other characteristics of either 
individuals or sovereign states, ibid, pp.27-28.
67Ibid, pp.42-80.
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which "simply ignore[d] the role of politics and propose[d] apolitical solutions as though 
they were to operate in a vacuum".68
W altz's alternative was centred on another image of the world drawn from 
Rousseauan thought in particular. Rousseau's insight was crucial, argued Waltz, because 
it illustrated that the major cause of war emanated "neither in men nor in states but in the 
state system itse lf '.69 More precisely, Rousseau understood why, in the international 
context, politics was synonymous with relations of systemic anarchy. This was not 
because of the inherent goodness or badness of individuals or sovereign states, but was a 
necessity o f the system itself, a structural reality of inter-state relations which all states 
responded to. Just, therefore, as "man, in a state of nature...cannot begin to behave 
decently unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him" so an 
individual state:
might want to remain at peace [but] may have to consider undertaking a 
preventative war [because] if it does not strike when the m om ent is 
favourable it may be struck later when advantage has shifted to the other 
side.70
This Rousseauan insight, claimed Waltz, made possible a general theory of international 
relations "that explains the behaviour of all states, w hether good or bad".71 It 
represented, more specifically, and in more m odem  term s, the eternal wisdom of 
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes in understanding that, in inter-state behaviour, at 
any time and in any place, "reason is bound, in every case of doubt, to obey the 
promptings of self interest - which in itself would make war inevitable, even if all parties 
desired to be just".72
^Ibid, p.7. 
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
71 Ibid, p.183. 
72Ibid.
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In summary, Waltz, sought, in Man, the State and War to establish the principles 
of a general theory of International Relations which echoed the general behaviouralist 
"quest for certainty", but which emphasised, more explicitly, the political dimension of 
the anarchical "system". His utilisation of Rousseauan philosophy was, in this regard, 
useful in (reestablishing two Traditional Realist "givens" about International Relations. 
The first: that conflict is inscribed in any social system which lacks an "orderer"; the 
second: that the balance of power is an integral and necessary function of the resultant 
anarchy of the international system. This was an approach superior to Morgenthau's, 
Waltz claimed, because while it acknowledged the behaviour of individual states as the 
immediate cause of war, it established that, in reality, such behaviour was ultimately 
dependent upon "the general structure that permits them [states] to exist and wreak their 
disasters".73
In Man, the State and War, this thesis on structural anarchy was presented in 
terms that allowed for a modicum of interpretive space within which the dogma of the 
Realist "catechism" might be critically reviewed. In qualitative terms, however, the 
Waltzian "great text" was just as limited and theoretically unselfconscious as its 
mainstream Realist counterparts. Taking up this theme, Justin Rosenberg has noted the 
self affirming and circular logic of Man, the State and War and its continuing commitment 
to Realist logocentric logic, concerning, for example, the domestic/intemational 
antimony.74 In Waltz’s case this resulted in: (i) the establishment of the principle that 
autonomy and sovereignty were dependent upon an overarching authority, (a condition 
absent in the international system) and: (ii) the exclusion from "meaningful" analysis of 
the experience of domestic states that are "internally conflict ridden" and anarchical, even 
while fulfilling the conditions for "ordered" sovereignty.75 Like so many Realists before
73 Ibid, p. 185, emphasis added.
74Rosenberg, "What's The Matter With Realism", p.294.
75Ibid, p.293; see also O'Meara, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory
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him (and since) Waltz's was silent on the issue of "domestic" anarchy, orienting his 
attention instead, to "external" factors concerning the systemic constraints imposed upon 
states. This is an important site of silence and exclusion for Realists generally, because in 
this analytical space is located the "given" of the balance of power scheme - represented 
as the only realistic response to an "anarchical" world.
As Rosenberg has illustrated, however, while this logic might have impressed an
uncritical discipline since 1959, it is less than impressive when critically examined, even
in its own terms. This is particularly the case, he suggested, if one ponders Waltz's
attempts to project his structuralist logic in game-theoretical terms. In this context Waltz
acknowledged two major caveats to his theoretical enterprise that exemplified its
weaknesses. The first caveat recognised that the anarchical "systems game" was not
necessarily a zero-sum one. The second caveat allowed for the fact that states were
engaged in other "games" simultaneously with the security game. The problem with
these caveats, argued Rosenberg, are that they basically undermine the whole Waltzian
schema (and structuralist neo-Realism per se). This primarily is because they:
concede that within certain limits (which in practice turn out to be very wide 
indeed) the impact of anarchy on the behaviour of states varies according to 
determinations quite outside the purview o f a Realist theory. [For example] a 
state may choose or be forced to behave quite otherwise than predicted by the 
logic o f balance o f power: it may be prepared to countenance large scale 
retreat internationally in order to release resources for urgent domestic goals; 
it may undertake the military defence of a transnational socio-economic 
system which leads it routinely to exceed the requirements of the visible 
'national interest'; in extreme cases, where it contends with serious internal 
challenges, it may even fail properly to resist an external aggressor [while] 
certain security interests may simply be overridden because their pursuit is 
judged too costly in either domestic or international terms.76
On this basis, and in Waltz's own terms, even if all the "games" played by all the states 
were governed by the rules of structuralist anarchy, "we could still not predict the
7^Rosenberg, "What’s The Matter With Realism?", pp.293-294, emphasis added.
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outcomes a priori since the relative importance to each state of each game at any one time 
is contingent".77
This, of course, begs the question of what precisely Waltz's early structuralist 
"great text" did contribute in 1959, if the anarchy notion at its base, and the balance of 
power theme at its theoretical centre cannot account for international behaviour except 
occasionally and under certain circumstances and then only in retrospect. The charitable 
answer, is that it was an attempt "to account for why war persists in the international 
system without any claim to explain why any particular war occurs".78 It was, in this 
sense, an alternative Realist grand theory to that centred on Morgenthau's "original sin" 
proposition. This, it must be said, is hardly a major contribution, for, aside from 
flogging dead horses, all Waltz's "great text" ultimately established, as Rosenberg 
stressed, was that there is "a dimension of international politics, given by the absence of 
government, which conforms to Rousseau's parable".79 Or, put in the language of the 
(analogised) neo-classical market, which later was to be its location, Waltz's grand theory 
suggested, that:
where knowledge of others intentions is imperfect and the use of force is not 
ruled out...rational calculation cannot afford to assume...an assured harmony 
of interest.80
This then is the theoretical "molehill" brought forth by the Morgenthauan "mountain" in 
1959 which provoked Rosenberg's response that:
77Ibid, p.294; and Waltz, Man, the State and War, p.206, when he says "no sets of rules can specify how 
important the [security] game should be considered".
78Rosenberg, What’s The Matter With Realism?", p.294.
79Ibid, p.294. The parable in question here is the "stag hunt" parable used by Rousseau to emphasise the 
problems of a single notion of rationality in human affairs. It goes like this: five hunters agree to join 
together to hunt a stag and share the proceeds in order that their general hunger problem be overcome. 
They fan out and surround the stag. However, as they wait for the moment of cooperative action, a hare 
runs by, and one of the hunters grabs it, thus startling the stag who runs off. Rousseau’s point was that 
it was just as logical and rational for the hunter to take the hare as to leave it - because he could not be 
sure that someone else would not do the same. For Waltz the parable was used to represent the dilemma 
of states seeking cooperative relations in an anarchical system. It leads, of course, to a conclusion based 
on the "self help" principle, and the notion that individual state intentionality is not the basis of inter­
state behaviour.
80Ibid, p.294.
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having rightly dispensed with the reductionism of Morgenthau, Waltz's 
theoretical Realism is little more than a "banality" which merely reaffirms that 
inter-state behaviour can be understood as a recurring Prisoners Dilemma, 
particularly in regard to security issues.81
Put in the broader terms of this chapter Waltz, in Man, the State and War provided 
an "alternative" to mainstream Realism, which, like its Wightian Traditionalist 
counterpart, was little more than an embroidered re-presentation of Realist "primitivism". 
And like all of the Realisms which his structuralism sought to supersede, Waltz's 
arguments in Man, the State and War resonated with the metaphysics and abstractionism 
of modernist discourse. This is never clearer than in regard to the lingering (and 
paradoxical) individualism at the foundation of Waltz's structuralism.
The Traditional (modernist) articulation of individualism in International Relations 
is related to the behaviour of the atomised sovereign state in the anarchical system. For 
all Waltz's debunking of this scenario, this is precisely his own in Man, the State and 
W ar, where the detached, autonomous "individual" of modernity remains the 
(metatheoretical) foundation of logic and analysis. This is obvious enough in relation to 
the "stag hunt" parable, utilised by Waltz, where the actions of the selfish hunter are those 
of a (Hobbesian-like) actor in some presocial state of nature. Just as obviously (and 
again in Hobbesian rather than Rousseauan fashion) Waltz constructed his whole notion 
of an anarchical world "out there", upon this image of the presocial "individual". The 
result, a structuralist Realism based on "a set of external constraints which derive from 
the aggregate of individual, reciprocally calculated rational choices".82 The problems of 
this position are even more apparent when its silences are taken into account on central 
Realist notions of power and change. For example, in perceiving of the international 
system as a situation in which each state is forced to respond to "a set of external 
restraints given by the number and relative strength of the individual units comprising it", 
the state is (implicitly at least) defined as "ontologically anterior to the international
Ibid, emphasis added.
82 Ibid, p.295, emphasis added.
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system".83 Realist understanding of power and change are, on this basis, reduced to a 
circular simplicity in which "change" becomes the variations in the numbers (of states) 
involved in the system. In similar fashion, "power" simply becomes the relative 
distribution of weight (e.g. military strength) between the individual states.84
These are themes that have received critical attention from a variety of sources in 
recent times, and some of these critiques will be considered shortly.85 For now I want to 
illustrate the discursive continuity between Man.the State and War and the first "great 
text" of neo-Realism, Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979).
The similarities with Waltz's earlier "great text" are clear enough from the outset 
of Theory of International Politics, indeed from the moment that Waltz reiterated his 
intentions to "construct a theory of international politics that remedies the defects of 
present theories".86 The basic theoretical defect, he (re)asserted, was the continuing 
influence o f reductionism in International Relations when what was needed was a 
structuralist grand theory.87 Turning to the question of how his approach was capable of
83 Ibid.
84For an example of this see Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Chapter 3.
85I refer here not just to Ashley's commentary in "The Poverty of Neorealism", International 
Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.225-286, which will be discussed in Chapter Eight, but the critiques of 
Waltz's updated structuralism in Theory of International Relations (1979) by John Ruggie in, "Continuity 
and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis", in Neo-Realism and its Critics 
ed. Keohane; and by Alexander Wendt, in "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory", International Organization 41(3) (1987), pp.335-370. Something will be said on this issue after 
the immediate discussion on Waltz's neo-Realist "great text".
8^Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 1.
87In the 1979 version of Waltz's thesis, consequently, various "reductionists" are again put to the 
polemical sword. It goes without saying that this includes all "radical" perspectives. The theory of 
imperialism associated with Hobson and Lenin, for example, is inadequate because "what claimed to be a 
general theory turned out to be a partial one". And, as was the case twenty years earlier, Waltz’s targets 
included those Realists who remain committed to Traditional state centric analysis. Those, for example, 
like Stanley Hoffmann whose theory was "crude and confused" and "d[id]n't develop a theory" but merely 
displayed a "strong commitment to a particular intellectual approach". Then there were those like Richard 
Rosecranee whose approach was "not at all productive", and those like Morton Kaplan whose "language is 
loose and imprecise to the point of misleading the reader", who makes "extraordinary claims" for his work 
but whose "[theoretical] performance does not measure up to them". See Waltz Theory of International 
Politics, p.36 (on Lenin); p.49 (on Hoffmann); and p.50 (on Kaplan).
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remedying the reductionist defects he perceived, Waltz illustrated that mountains can 
indeed bring forth molehills, albeit twenty years apart.
If the implications of Waltz's efforts were not so serious his attempts to remedy 
Realist theory, and overcome its reductionism, would be an enterprise filled with 
(unintended) mirth. This is primarily because from the beginning of Theory of 
International Politics. Waltz's anti-reductionist position was presented in the most 
reductionist of terms - those associated with the singularity of the "unity of science" 
thesis.88 In Waltz's case, however, the defence of the scientific approach, in 1979, was 
less subtle than Popper's similar defence in earlier times. Accordingly, the "scientific" 
case in Theory of International Politics adds up to the kind of mainstream discussion that 
one saw in the aftermath of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, when Anglo- 
American "post-positivist" social scientists began to speak a little more sensitively (albeit 
just as narrowly) about debates that for years had been the staple diet of philosophy of 
science texts. In Theory of International Relations, for example, Waltz simply followed 
the Popper line in contrasting positivist Realism (reductionist, fact grubbing empiricism) 
with his deductivist structuralism which, he claimed, acknowledged the "theory" 
dimension in its search for systemic generalised explanations of reality.
In this context, Waltz's argument had three basic assumptions: (i) that it was 
necessary and desirable for International Relations to have a general theory characterised 
by the logic and rigour of theorising in the natural sciences: (ii) that this general theory 
could not be achieved while International Relations specialists remained committed to the 
"inductivist illusion" and its associated reductionism: (iii) that this general theory was 
achievable because there was a systemic order in International Relations that could be 
discovered if scholars began to think systematically about "the striking sameness in the 
quality of international life through the millenia".89 Waltz characterised the "inductivist
88Waltz thus replicated Popper's defence of a mediated scientific perspective in the same way that Popper 
did and with the same paradoxical consequences. On this issue see the discussion on Popper in Chapter 
Three of this thesis, pp. 116-124.
89Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.66.
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illusion" (at the core of Traditionalist Realism and behaviouralism) in exemplary 
Popperian terms - as the examination:
of numerous cases with the hope that connections and patterns will emerge 
and that those connections and patterns will represent the frequently 
mentioned "reality out there".
It was an "illusion", he continued, which:
apparently rests on the conviction that knowledge begins with certainties and 
that induction can uncover them. But we can never say with assurance that a 
state of affairs inductively arrived at corresponds to something objectively 
real.90
As with much of the moderated neo-Realist perspective of the 1980s and 1990s,
(and much "post-positivism" generally) this is fine as far as it goes. The problem is that
this is as far as it goes. Thus, while (ostensibly) acknowledging the problems of
inductivism and the notion of an external real world of "fact", Waltz followed this logic
anyway in repudiating "interpretative" approaches to theory in favour of his scientific
structuralism. On the issue of "theory" and (scientific) "laws", consequently, Waltz
followed the (modemist) route laid down by Carr and Morgenthau, and in broader terms,
by Western scholars, in general, in the post-Cartesian era. Thus, asserted Waltz:
"theories are qualitatively different from laws". Why? Because:
Each descriptive term in laws is directly tied to observational or laboratory 
procedures, and laws are established only if they pass observational or 
experimental tests.
Laws, on this basis, are derived from observation and testing, as per the natural scientific 
model. However:
theories, [unlike laws] contain theoretical notions [and] theories cannot be 
constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be 
invented not discovered 91
Anyone doubting the continuing power of positivism at the core of neo-Realism need 
only ponder Waltz's position here, as, like generations of positivists before him, he
^Ibid , pp.4-5.
91 Ibid, p.5, emphasis added.
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invoked the great dichotomy between "theory" and the "real" world - the former, the 
realm of "internally" generated "invention" - the latter, the "external" repository of laws 
which theories (retrospectively) explain, order and systematise. Ultimately, therefore, as 
Waltz explained, "theory, though related to the world about which explanations are 
wanted, always remains distinct from that world".92 This, it must be remembered, is a 
position seeking to remedy the defects in approaches to International Relations centred on 
the "illusory" relationship between inductivist observation and a "real" world "out there". 
It represents, instead, another confirmation of the "primitive" nature of Realist/neo-Realist 
thinking in the contemporary period, and a striking example of the continuing discursive 
power of a modernist regime of framing at the core of a discipline which has ignored its 
"preface".
The limitations, silences and omissions integral to this approach were as evident
when Waltz presented his structuralist Realist alternative in Theory of International
Politics as they were in its first articulation in Man, the State and War. The main
propositions were, nevertheless, just as confidently asserted. In 1979, thus, Waltz
argued that reductionist approaches, based on the empirical behaviour of individual "unit
level" (state) interaction, were inferior to structuralist approaches centred on deductively
engendered knowledge of the deeper organisational principles of international life.93 The
primary theoretical task, therefore, was to separate that which was essential to
understanding the international system - its unchanging foundational quality - from that
which was ephemeral, and susceptible to historical/cultural/ideological change. In more
classically modemist terms this was deemed vital, because the:
failure to mark and preserve the distinction between structure on the one hand 
and units and [historical] processes on the other, makes it impossible...to 
distinguish between causes and effects 94
92ibid, p.6. 
93Ibid, ch. 4. 
94Ibid, p.78.
310
A major requirement, Waltz stressed, was that certain "vague and varying" 
concepts and approaches must be omitted from Realist analysis before "useful" 
structuralist theory could be applied to the real world. These "vague and varying" 
concepts included, "environment, situation, context and milieu". Moreover, a whole 
range of questions must also be "left aside" in search of "useful" theory. Included here 
were "questions about the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and 
ideological commitments states may have". Also deleted from a structuralist Realist 
perspective, Waltz made clear, were other (presumably) non-useful "questions about the 
cultural, economic, political and military interaction of states".95 The point of all these 
exclusions, explained Waltz, was to "establish structure by abstraction from 'concrete 
reality"'. This was to be achieved:
by leaving aside the personality of actors, their behaviour, and their inter­
actions...[and by] ignoring how units relate with one another (how they 
interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how 
they are arranged or positioned).
This was deemed crucial to structuralist Realism, because:
[h]ow units stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or 
positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of the units is a 
property of the system.96
The sense of ahistorical staticity engendered by a statement such as this was
increased when Waltz spoke of precisely what a structuralist approach was set to achieve.
At this point, in 1979, the echoes of Man, the State and War, and a generation of Realist
conservatism rang out in Waltz's "great text" of neo-Realism, with the proposal that it is:
the structure of the system [that] acts as a constraining and disposing force, 
and because it does so, systems theories explain and predict continuity within 
the system.
95Ibid, p.80. 
%IbicL
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Above all, therefore, Waltz's structuralism was system oriented because, it is "within a 
system, [that] a theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change"?1
Twenty years on then Waltz's structuralism begins to sound rather like an updated
rendition of the "mountain" and "molehill" refrain noted by Rosenberg. Waltz confirmed
that this was indeed the case with his discussion in Theory of International Politics of the
essential organising principles by which the international system was to be understood in
structuralist neo-Realist terms. Here, almost incomprehensibly, he returned to the
domestic/intemational dichotomy for his theoretical inspiration. Thus:
[d]omestic systems are centralised and hierarchic...[while] international 
systems are decentralised and anarchic...Domestic political structures have 
governmental institutions...International politics, in contrast, has been called 
"politics in the absence of government".98
It was at this point that the "banality" theme attributed to Man, the State and War, 
became even more relevant to the neo-Realism of Theory of International Politics, written 
twenty years later. Unlike 1959, however, there was no attempt now to embroider the 
structuralist argument in interesting philosophical fabric. In the place of the Rousseauan 
parable, consequently, there was another - the parable of the capitalist market - presented 
as a microeconomic analogy for the endemic anarchy of the international system. In this 
context, Waltz insisted, two questions could be asked concerning the anarchical structure 
of both forums, with the answers allowing superior insight into the theory and practice of 
International Relations. The first question : how are markets formed?; the second: how 
do they work? Waltz's answer to the first question was that ”[t]he market of a 
decentralized economy is individualist in origin, spontaneously generated and 
unintended". Such a market, he insisted, "arises out o f  the activities of separate 
units...whose aims and efforts are directed not towards creating an order but rather 
toward fulfilling their own internally defined interest". This begs an answer to the second
97Ibid, p.69, emphasis added.
98Ibid, p.88.
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question - i.e. how does the system actually work?, how is order created in the system? 
Waltz's answer here was as simple and as unconvincing as that offered to the first. The 
answer? - the "hidden hand". Thus: "the individual acts for itself’, and consequently, 
"[f]rom the coaction of like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of 
them".99
Turning specifically to the other side of the analogy - the international market - 
the answers were as predictable. Accordingly, the basic insight of neo-Realism - the 
structuralist essence which set it aside from the "defects" of its Realist predecessor was 
that:
International political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the 
coaction of self regarding units. International structures are defined in terms 
of the primary political units of an era, be they city states, empires, or 
nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends 
to to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be 
constrained. 100
Rousseau thus meets Adam Smith. The result, rather incongruously represented in this 
context, is an ahistorical, depoliticised scenario replete with vague references to 
"spontaneously" generated markets and political structures that mysteriously 
"emerge".101 This is the keystone of Waltz's structuralist insight - the intellectual font of 
his frustration with the Hoffmanns and the Kaplans. This is what they didn't and don't 
know. This is what he "knows" about the international system that is so significant as to 
warrant his forceful critique of the disciplinary mainstream and its "radical" alternatives in 
Theory of International Politics.
" ib id , p.90 
l00Ibid.
!0 lT he point here is that like many neo-conservatives seeking to fuse a minimalist reading of Smith 
with a rigid Conservative traditionalism Waltz does no justice to either discourse by depoliticising and 
dehistoricising them.
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In order that it not be thought that Waltz's more recent promulgations on the issue
have been ignored here, it is worth just contemplating further his position in 1990 on the
"theory" question. Very little has changed, it seems, because as Waltz explained:.
A theory is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret 
them. The challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in ways that permit 
explanation and prediction. This can only be accomplished by distinguishing 
between theory and fact. Only if this distinction is made can theory be used 
to examine and interpret facts.102
And as a contemporary postscript to his structuralist position in 1979 he left little doubt in 
1990 that the mountain has indeed brought forth another molehill with his explanation of 
the fundamental difference between (state centric) Realism and neo-Realism, which was, 
that, "anarchy sets the problems that states have to cope with".103 Waltz’s position has 
not escaped criticism even from within the International Relations mainstream and I will 
briefly touch on two of these critiques at this point to indicate both their saliency and their 
limitations.
The rather dramatic lapses in logic in Theory of International Politics have been 
seized on, for example, by John Ruggie, alarmed at the crudity of Waltz's structuralism. 
Ruggie has argued that Waltz's structuralist theory is so inadequate that not only is it 
unable to explain where individual states came from, it cannot explain where the 
contemporary state structure came from.104 The point, maintained Ruggie, was that 
Waltz's general theory, for all his protestations to the contrary, is static and ahistorical. 
Accordingly, it:
provides no means by which to account for, or even describe, the most 
important contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the 
shift from the medieval to the modem international system.105
102waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of International Affairs 44 (1990), pp.l 1-23, 
at p.22, emphasis added.
103Ibid, p.36.
1 ^ R u ggie , "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis", 
pp.131-57.
105Ibid, p.141.
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Ruggie, significantly, did not question the anarchy theme at the core of Waltz's 
structuralism, but argued that Waltz's approach did not allow for the different forms of 
anarchical relations characteristic of different historical epochs during the development of 
the state system .106 Ruggie's claim, in other words, was that Waltz's assertion of a 
structuralist "recurrence and repetition", across space, time, culture and linguistic 
practice, misunderstood the heterogeneous and historically dynamic nature of 
"agents"/"structures" and political systems. This, to understate the case, is a rather 
damning criticism of a work that sought to "remedy" all that has gone before in the 
discipline, in systemic terms.
A similar sort of argument has come from Alexander Wendt who, taking up 
Scientific Realist themes developed by Hesse and Bhaskar, and popularised (as 
"structuration") by Giddens, has focused on the confusion and paradox of Waltz's 
approach to the "agent/structure" conundrum . 107 Waltz's argument, suggested Wendt, 
failed to deal adequately with this crucial issue because it was ultimately about a one sided 
structuralist determ inism . 108 Wendt's major concern was Waltz's failure to deal 
adequately with the nature of the "agent" - the individual state - in his structuralist matrix. 
Wendt's argument was that Waltz simply ascribed ontological priority to states without 
explaining their precise relationship to the structure as a whole.109 This, as the discussion 
above has sought to illustrate is precisely the way Waltz dealt with the state-as-"agent" 
issue, in proposing that "markets arise out of the activities of separate units", and that 
"from the co-action of like units [states] emerges a structure" .n 0  For Wendt, also, this
106Ibid,pp.l40-148.
1®7 See the discussion of this approach in Chapter Three of the thesis pp. 127-131. On Wendt's 
articulation of it see, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory".
lOS^altz, of course, was aware of the problem and sought to deflect it with vague references to a lack of 
correspondence between intentions and outcomes, see Theory of International Relations, p.90.
109Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem”, p. 342-344.
1 i^Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.90.
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added up to a pretty ordinary attempt to theorise structurally about International Relations, 
primarily because it could not offer a structuralist explanation for the existence of states! 
Or, in Wendt's own terms, "systems structures cannot generate agents if they are defined 
exclusively in terms of those agents in the first place".111
This said, it is worth recalling that for all the saliency of their criticisms of Waltz, 
there is in Wendt's "structuration" perspective, and Ruggie's structuralism, a continuing 
commitment to a "unity of science" thesis, and the attainment of a genuinely scientific 
theory of international reality based on positivist basic assumptions. Their critical 
"alternatives", in other words, reinforce arguments made throughout this thesis about the 
continuing (hidden, unwritten) power of the dominant modernist discourse in 
International Relations.112
And even when attempts are made to re-historicise the neo-Realist "catechism" the 
modernist discursive legacy continues to dominate proceedings. In Robert Gilpin's, The 
Political Economy of International Relations (1987), for example, this legacy is evident 
within a work presented in the tolerant, moderated tones of the "post-positivist" age in 
International Relations. As Roger Tooze as noted, however, the underlying positivism of 
Gilpin's approach limits, and ultimately renders paradoxical his attempts to add historical 
and philosophical sensitivity to neo-Realism.113 Gilpin's discussion of competing 
ideologies (e.g. Liberalism/Marxism) in The Political Economy of International Relations 
provides a good example of the problem in this regard.
111 Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem", p.342
112See the discussion of these issues in Chapter Three of the thesis, in relation to Wendt, between 
pp. 127-131 and Ruggie, concerning Analytical Philosophy perspectives, in pp. 131-140.
li:3 See Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface: 'International Political Economy' and Epistemology", 
Millennium 17(2) (1988), pp.285-293.
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At the surface level this does not appear to be the case. Indeed, at this level Gilpin 
bought a measure of Kuhnian inspired sensitivity to the ideology issue.114 At another, 
more fundamental level, however, Gilpin's positivist Realist commitment required a 
dichotomised frame of analytical reference to legitimate its superior logic. Consequently, 
as Tooze indicated, Gilpin defined ideology in a particular way which effectively reduced 
it to a "subjective act of faith or intellectual commitment" .115 Having constituted ideology 
in this (positivist) manner, Gilpin is then able to subtly detach himself, and his own 
understanding of the reality of the International Political Economy, from the interpretivist 
constraint imposed by his initial Kuhnian allusion. This allows, ultimately, for a neo- 
Realist perspective which assumes "that the [competing] ideologies can be tested against a 
separate and external reality, unconnected to belief and ideology" .116 This, as the 
following discussion will illustrate is a strategy characteristic of neo-Realism in the "post­
positivist" era. In Gilpins' case it resulted, on the one hand, in a sensitive "post­
positivist" acknowledgment of the problems of "proving" the superiority of one ideology 
over another, while on the other, as Ernie Keenes has indicated, it saw Gilpin seeking, 
via a positivist sleight of hand, to illustrate how a "theoretical" approach such as his was 
superior to mere "ideologies" .117
Stephen Gill has provided another dimension on Gilpins' "theoretical" approach, 
in this regard, in concluding that it represented a synthesis of:
114This is very much the spirit in which Gilpin establishes his position in the work, drawing on Kuhn 
in acknowledging the problems of theoretical reductionism. Here, accordingly, it is acknowledged that:
Although particular ideas or theories associated with one another may be shown to be false 
or questionable, these perspectives can be neither proved nor disproved through logical 
argument or the presentation of contrary empirical evidence.
Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 
p.41.
115Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface", p.291, emphasis added.
116Ibid.
117Keenes, "Paradigms of International Relations: Bringing Politics Back In", International Journal 
XLIV (Winter, 1988-9), pp.41-48.
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institutionalism, utilitarian rational choice analysis and a Realist framework of 
international relations, which is built upon the insights of Thucydides, 
E.H.Carr and Hans Morgenthau...[Accordingly] he is a methodological 
individualist who separates 'politics' and 'economics' and his ontology 
emphasizes states and markets.118
On this basis, suggested Gill, it was not surprising that the major substantive concern of 
Gilpin’s neo-Realist critique of (threatening) "ideologies" in the 1980s, was "the stability 
of the international economy in a period of American hegemonic decline".119 Gilpins 
"theoretical" knowledge was, consequently, intrinsic to the power politics image of the 
neo-Realist mainstream. It was a knowledge/power nexus from which Gilpin observed 
the world "from the 'top downward' through the lens of the dominant interest of the 
largest capitalist nations" and upon which he, and neo-Realists generally, seek a structural 
stability and order that serves such interests.120
The analytical implications of Gilpin's reformulated Realism were dealt with in 
interesting fashion by Gill, and in a way that further exposed the modemist continuity and 
attendant limitations of neo-Realism generally. On Gilpin's "theoretical" perspectives, for 
example, Gill noted that "Gilpin uses a rational actor model of the state which is seen (at 
least potentially) to defend the nation’s welfare and security: the national interest".121 On 
the basis of this assumption (the paradoxical reductionist assumption of Waltz also) 
Gilpin's "theory" moved in entirely predictable directions. Thus, as Gill indicated, the 
state system was understood in terms of a "utilitarian calculus of the costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of international action (or inaction)".122 In this (anarchic) systemic 
scenario, the focus for Gilpin, as it was for Waltz and for the Realist community in 
general, was order. But again, predictably, it was an order understood only in
^ S e e  Stephen Gill, "Two Concepts of International Political Economy", Review of International 
Studies 16 (1990), pp.369-381, at p.369.
119Ibid.
120Ibid, p.370.
121 Ibid, p.372.
122Ibid.
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Traditional terms, or in the reformulated Traditionalism of the neo-Realists. Thus, in 
Gilpin's understanding of the world "out there", "conflict is avoided by institutional 
mechanisms: e.g. a balance of power (as in the nineteenth century Concert system) or 
hegemony".123
Gilpin's insights on the Political Economy of International Relations were, 
consequently, of the same universalised and essentialised variety that has informed 
Realist scholarship from Wight to Waltz. In Gilpin's case, accordingly, "world history is 
depicted ...as a continuing cycle of hegemonies and balance of power systems".124 The 
contemporary period is very easily fitted into such a narrative, of course, as (initially) the 
story of post-World War Two U.S. hegemony and the resultant stability in the "balance", 
and (subsequently) the decline of U.S. hegemony since the 1970s and the resultant 
instability and disorder in the world system. For Gilpin, therefore, and for other neo- 
Realists of the "declinist" variety, the crucial issue of International Relations was the 
resuscitation of U.S. hegemonic power, and by definition, the resuscitation of 
international order and stability.125 The problem, for Gill, however, was not just the 
(continuing) U.S. centric propensity of Realist analysis but the increasing silences and 
omissions associated with it. In Gilpin's explanation of contemporary "reality", 
therefore, the EEC was not analysed at all, and "little attention [was] given to the USSR 
or Eastern Europe, or indeed China". The reason for this is an old one, it has to do with 
the restricted and inadequate representation of the world at the discursive core of Realism, 
in whatever guise. As Gill has explained it, the problem is that:
123Ibid, p.372.
124 Ibid.
1250 n  the hegemony question, in this regard, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperauon and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); in the chapter to 
follow another view of the issue will receive attention, that of Robert Cox, in Production. Power and 
World Order Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
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Gilpin's view of the 'East' is restricted by his ontology: the international 
political economy is understood in terms of power blocs, factor flows and the 
calculation of the relative power positions of states.126
The limitations and silences of Gilpin's neo-Realist approach to International 
Political Economy are, as Gill suggested, to do with questions of hidden and unspoken 
ontological commitments, as this thesis has sought to illustrate, in a variety of ways, 
throughout its chapters. The question of how and why these commitments continue to 
direct and restrict neo-Realism will be confronted from interesting angles in the chapters 
to follow, which concentrate specifically on Critical Theory and post-modernist 
perspectives on this issue. For now I want to conclude this more generalised discussion 
of these themes by illustrating, in more precise terms, how the modemist characteristics 
that continue to hinder the work of "modal" structuralists like Waltz (and "historians" like 
Gilpin) are just as evident in the literary contributions of the self proclaimed "modified" 
neo-Realist structuralists. I will do so in taking up Krasner's invitation to investigate the 
"basic assumptions" of some of the most prominent neo-Realists of the current period.
"Modified" Neo-Realism: Probing some "Basic Assumptions"
Stephen Krasner's proposition that the keystone of neo-Realism lies at the level of its 
"basic assumptions" was presumably made in line with his understanding of the new 
theoretical sensitivity of the "post-positivist" age. Whatever his motivation it is a 
proposition that invites a critical investigation of his own "basic assumptions", and 
which, once accepted, fmds them wanting, particularly on the central regime issue.
The first problem, in Krasner's case, arises when one ponders again the 
"modified" structuralist position he associates himself with. This position, as Krasner 
makes clear, does not accept that regime behaviour is the fundamental organising 
principle of the international system, even in an interdependent world of international
l^^Gill, "Two Concepts of International Political Economy", p.372.
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political economy. Rather, for Krasner, as it has been for Realists down the ages, 
"power-maximizing states acting in an anarchical environment" remain the foundational 
element of international reality.127 This being the case, and if regimes, defined by 
Krasner as "principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures", are not 
fundamental to international life, the question of what is fundamental becomes significant 
in Krasner's scenario.
More precisely, Krasner’s position begs two questions. The first, simply put, is 
this: if contemporary state interaction is not about principles, norms and decision making 
procedures, what, precisely, does affect "outcomes and behaviour" in the international 
system? On Krasner's own account, "principles" are "beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude". Norms of behaviour, meanwhile, relate to a set of social "rules and 
obligations". "Rules" relate to "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action", while 
"decision making practices" are defined as the "prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice".128 In the light of this, the proposition that this is not the 
fundamental issue in international life becomes more problematic. Indeed it is hard to 
imagine, theological images aside, how one does come to an understanding of regimes 
or, of anything else, if not through a process such as this. Putting the question a little 
differently would be to ask of Krasner this: if understanding is not derived via "beliefs of 
fact and causation", if it is not formulated in human societies with "rules and obligations" 
that mediate, define and police understanding in terms of socio-intellectual "prevailing 
practices", what on earth is it derived from? If, in other words, understanding is not 
derived from human social interaction and knowledge construction, where from? The 
answer, in Krasner's terms, is already given - i.e. from one’s "basic assumptions" about 
the normal state of international affairs. Which, of course, only serves to beg the second, 
and obvious question concerning the derivative source of these "basic assumptions" if
^ K ra sn er , "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", p.2. 
l2 8 Ibid.
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they do not emanate from the historical, societal and philosophical experiences 
encompassed in regimes.
For Krasner, and for those neo-Realists so confidently asserting the 
"concreteness" of their approach to the world, it is at this point that their paradoxical 
commitment to the "empiricist metaphysic" is exposed. Exposed also is the "basic 
assumptions" notion in neo-Realist structuralism - as part of a modemist epistemology 
which (like Waltz's) is paradoxically reductionist - and reliant upon positivist premises 
concerning the anarchic structure "out there". This became more evidently Krasner's 
position when he reflected that the "prevailing explanation" among "modified" 
structuralists, for regime behaviour, and indeed all other behaviour at the international 
level, was:
egoistic self-interest...[which is] the desire to maximise one's utility function 
where the function does not include the utility of another party.129
Another prominent "modified" structuralist, Arthur Stein, has developed this 
notion further, asserting that, "the same forces of autonomously calculated self interest 
that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundations for 
international regimes" .130 However, Stein insisted, at times "rational self-interested 
calculation leads actors [states] to abandon independent decision making in favour of joint 
decision making [i.e. in regimes]". In the resurrected jargon of order and choice in the 
neo-Realist age this cooperativist urge is explained in terms of "Pareto-suboptimal 
o u tco m es " . 131 But even leaving aside the jargon and (for now) the notion of 
"independent" decision making in this scenario, the question remains as to how different 
this perspective is from the Traditional Realist postulate that suggests that in the
129Ibid, p. l l .
13^Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", in International Regimes ed. 
Krasner, p.132.
131Ibid, p . l l l .
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"objective" circumstances - interstate anarchy - sovereign states sometimes join together 
for specific interests, albeit always ultimately in the "national interest".
The answer is that there is no more difference between Traditionalist and neo- 
Realists on this issue than there was between Traditionalists and behaviouralists in the 
1960s. Indeed for Stein, the fundamental "objective" circumstance applied in 
contemporary International Relations as significantly as it ever did for Realists of earlier 
times. Accordingly, the basic problem to be solved in the 1980s involved "grappling 
with the problem of trying to describe and explain patterns o f order in the anarchic world 
of international politics".132 In short the "basic assumptions" of neo-Realism (of 
Krasner, Keohane, Gilpin, Stein, Waltz etc) is the anarchy assumption - the same 
fundamental assumption that has informed Carr and Morgenthau, Wight, Bull, Kaplan 
and Tucker, and a generation of Realists about the real nature of the world "out there".133 
In the era of neo-Realism, "post-positivism" and International Political Economy, 
however, this Realist fundamental assumption has been re-packaged to take account of 
the enhanced "theoretical" sensitivities in some sections of the International Relations 
community. Consequently, when Stein applied his neo-Realist insight to the regime issue 
he did so, in his own terms at least, in theoretically explicit fashion. His discussion of 
the "theoretical" status of neo-Realism in comparison to "Grotian" approaches was 
particularly interesting in this regard, if only because it confirmed again the rather parlous 
state of mainstream thinking in International Relations in the 1990s.
Stein's argument was predictable enough. It was that approaches based on a 
structuralist understanding of the international system were superior because they were:
13^Ibid, p.115, emphasis added.
133In Chapter Nine via Ashley's discussion of the Anarchy Problematique, something more substantial 
will be said on this issue. See Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.227-262.
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rooted in the classic characterization of international politics as relations 
between sovereign entities dedicated to their own self-preservation, ultimately 
able to depend only on themselves, and prepared to resort to force.134
The great value of this approach, he argued, was that it provided an image of inter-state
behaviour which corresponded to "reality" per se. Thus:
The [systemic] outcomes that emerge from the interaction of states making 
independent decisions are a function of their interests and preferences. 
[Consequently] Such independent behaviour and the outcomes that result 
from it constitutes the working of normal international politics - not of 
regimes. 135
The implication of this argument is that "normal" International Relations takes place 
where actors make independent decisions in a "free market" of anarchical power politics. 
This was precisely Stein's point. He explained, accordingly, that regimes exist where 
"the interaction between the parties is not unconstrained or is not based on independent 
decision making" .136 Again then, and just as incongruously as in other neo-Realist 
scenarios, Rousseau (and/or Thucydides/Machiavelli) is joined in unholy union with 
Adam Smith (and/or Charles Kindleberger) and just as in Waltz's case, the old 
dichotomies are trotted out to add Traditionalist credibility to the new International 
Political Economy of neo-Realism. For Stein thus the "most common regime" is 
"domestic society", because:
even the freest and most open [domestic] societies do not allow individualism 
and market forces full play [therefore]...Domestic society, characterised by 
the agreement of individuals to eschew the use of force in settling disputes, 
constitutes a regime precisely because it constrains the behaviour of its 
citizens.137
The definition of regime, utilised here by Stein, owes something to another 
modemist theme that over the years has intersected with positivist utilitarianism - i.e. 
social contract theory - a perspective which David Hume found unconvincing when it was
l^ S te in , "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", p.l 16.
133Ibid. emphasis added.
136Ibid, p.l 17.
137Ibid. emphasis added.
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first used to project a set of bourgeois interests as a grand theory of human behaviour in 
the Eighteenth century.138 The more immediate problem of the definition, and of the neo 
Realist perspective from which it comes, is that it represents the crudest kind of Laissez- 
faire atomism that even liberal political economists have repudiated. Indeed, Stein's 
image of an unconstrained rational universe of competing (state) actors - "free to choose"
- represents not just a return to Traditionalist Realist reductionism, but to the crudest 
"billiard ball" articulation of it.139
Not all "modified" structuralists represent their position in quite the way that Stein 
does, even if the "basic assumptions" and their implications for analysis remain 
fundamentally the same. Robert Keohane, for example, takes a more measured approach 
to the regime issue as befits an erstwhile liberal Interdependence scholar of the 1970s. 
Speaking in the mid-1980s about the neo-Realist approach in general, and his own 
assumptions in particular, Keohane was the model of the new breed of theoretically 
sensitive Realist, gently chiding the policy analyst and/or the "practitioner" for perhaps 
thinking that "theory" was irrelevant to the real world of International Relations.140
Not so, soothed Keohane, because theory can be "useful" in understanding the 
real world.141 Indeed, he suggested, "theory does have implications for practice".142 
Outlining some of these implications Keohane explained the distinction between the 
"theories of world politics on which policymakers and commentators rely" and scientific 
theories such as Newtonian physics. The essential difference here, he explained, was
^ S e e  the discussion on this issue in Chapter Two, p.95.
^ 9The point is that while it is an entirely legitimate enterprise to question the nature, role and even 
perhaps the functional existence of regimes, an approach such as this is so devastatingly blinkered that it 
cannot possibly be a referent to an international arena which resonates with "constraint" for all its actors, 
particularly those dependent upon the institutional whims of an "open" liberal system (e.g. via the World 
Bank and the I.M.F.).
14^Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Neorealism and its Cnucs ed. 
Keohane, pp.1-3.
141 Ibid, p.3. 
142Ibid, p.2.
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that while the latter provided a "powerful, value-free explanations of outcomes" the 
former was invested with the "scholar's values, and their own personal experiences and 
temperaments".143 In the 1980s it might be expected that the odd "policy analyst" who 
had read Thomas Kuhn or pondered Heisenberg's conclusions about the interpretive 
nature of quantum physics, might want to question this particular rendition of the 
modemist story. But this aside, the positivist "primitiveness" of Keohane's theoretical 
understanding became increasingly evident when he turned to the question of the 
relationship between theory and reality.
Again the tone was moderate and impeccably 1980s, even if the substance reeked 
of Eighteenth century empiricism. Thus, intoned Keohane, on the question of 
understanding reality "[e]ven if one could eradicate theory from one's mind it would be 
self defeating to try". Why?, because "Reality has to be ordered into categories, and 
relationships drawn between events".144 For Keohane, then, as for so many in the line 
through Descartes, Locke, Hume, Comte and Popper, "theory" is represented as a 
cognitive reaction to reality rather than as integral to its construction. "Theorising", 
consequently, is understood as the the retrospective process by which reality is ordered 
into (interpretive) categories. "Theory" in this context takes place after the fact. 
"Theory", more explicitly, helps us understand the "relationship between events" which 
are prior to theory.
From this position, of course, the really meaningful question becomes that framed 
by Logical Positivism: e.g. how do we test/verify whether our "theories" are in fact 
congruent with reality as it is "out there".145 It is not necessary to call upon the work of 
critical "reflectivists" for confirmation that this is indeed Keohane's position. Stephen 
Krasner has confirmed it, in proposing that, for Keohane, international reality is framed
143Ibid, pp.4-5.
144Ibid, p.4.
145This raises the spectre of positivist paradox once again, of course, given that Keohane is seeking to 
distinguish his theory from the scientific model derived from Newtonian physics. This, however, is an 
issue that presumably does not warrant the attention of a "real world" researcher.
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in terms of two basic assumptions about the nature of the real world - two a priori "facts" 
against which the scholarly (theoretical) enterprise starts. The first, "fact", echoing 
power politics Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz, is that International Relations is all 
about "a world of sovereign states seeking to maximise their interest and power". The 
second, echoing "market" analyses from Smith to Kindleberger, is that the fundamental 
determinant of behaviour (including regime behaviour) is "egoistic self interest" .146
Consequently, for Keohane, taking his cue from the Logical Positivists, the issue 
(in this case the nature of regimes and the contemporary international arena) becomes 
essentially a matter of methodology - a process of "theorising" and falsifying the "facts" - 
of explaining their "implications for practice". Given that the major "facts" are already 
framed as the site of egoistic individualism and market anarchy, there is not much 
question of which methodology is the appropriate one. Keohane, accordingly, takes a 
position on regimes "that relies heavily on rational choice analysis in the utilitarian social 
contract tradition" .147
The analytical results, of course, are predictable enough. Because the world "out 
there"is made up of sovereign states following selfish interest - two conclusions must 
"logically" flow from this: (i) the cooperative/communitarian impulse within the state 
system recorded by regime theorists is, in reality, an illusion; and (ii) all "meaningful" 
international behaviour is, in essence, the pursuit of individual self-interest on the part of 
sovereign states following Traditional "self-help" principles. Regime behaviour can only 
be understood, therefore, as the pragmatic (rational-actor) response of self seeking actors 
to conditions in which utility maximising is sometimes best served by some sort of 
collective decision making scenario. Change, in other words, as the Realist tradition has 
always asserted, can only come from above - from the rational action of the major powers 
following rational self interest. The change to regime institutionalism in the post-World
i^^This is Krasner's view of Keohane in, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", p. l l .
147Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in International Regimes ed. Krasner, p.141.
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War Two period, celebrated by some as fundamental change, was no more than a 
pragmatic readjustment of power politics behaviour. Realism is thus saved from critical 
challenge by neo-Realism. The discipline can get on with doing what it has been doing - 
solving the problems of the world as it really is - not how some casts of reformulated 
(reflectivist) "idealism" would have it.
For many, however, this self-enclosed logic remains less than convincing. 
Richard O'Meara is one commentator unconvinced by Keohane's soft sell neo-Realism. 
Keohane's position, he argued, is ultimately "shallow" and "sterile" in its attempt to 
accommodate the certainty of market logic to Traditional Realism . 148 Consequently, 
O'Meara complained, Keohane's work is riven with silences and omissions on the very 
issues he purports to address, for example "regimes are ignored, rather than explained, 
and none of the traditional paradigm's shortcomings are addressed at all". O'Meara's 
views complement those expressed above, in that he perceives the major problems of 
Keohane's analysis as emanating in the basic assumptions he brings to it. In O'Meara 
terms, thus:
in order to apply his microeconomic analogy, Keohane must embrace states 
as coherent units which alone compromise the world political system. 
Although elsewhere Keohane has described states as 'multifaceted, even 
schizophrenic' he now assumes that states are not only 'billiard balls', but 
rational utility maximisers as well.149
Furthermore, argued O'Meara, by defining a regime as a structure designed merely to 
facilitate international agreement, Keohane simply disregarded "all of the basic questions 
concerning why regimes actually arise in the international system" .150 Consequently, 
while lip service is paid to the need to investigate the interpretive, social interaction within 
regimes, the liturgy of the Realist catechism remains all powerful to the extent that the 
demand for agreement between states - "the key motivating factor in the process of regime
14^0'Meara, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory", p.255. 
149Ibid, p.255.
150Ibid, p. 256.
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formation" - is treated as an "exogenous" variable in the anarchical struggle between 
them.
The point, suggested O'Meara, is that for all the moderation of Keohane's
argument he, and for that matter all other neo-Realists, simply ignore and/or marginalise
the important critical issues concerning the problems of accommodating the issues of
regimes with the basic assumptions of their Traditional (positivist) Realism. The question
of "anarchy" for example is never seriously confronted. Rather, it continues to be
asserted that the international system is anarchical because there is no central authority -
no orderer - as there is to control the anarchical forces at the domestic level. O'Meara
pointed to a simple flaw in this Realist "given" - the fact that:
one could identify many states which do have centralised authorities and yet 
appear to be even more "anarchic" than our decentralised international 
society. 151
Emphasising the heterogeneity in the system, in contrast to neo-Realist homogeneity, 
O'Meara added also that "deviance, compliance and order are all found to varying degrees 
in both types of social organisation" .152 And, making some simple points about the 
historical and social nature of decision making in the "market", he reminded neo-Realists 
that:
even in the supposedly anarchical world of international relations, national 
decision makers are always bound to some extent by past decisions that they 
and others have taken and by past commitments that they have made.153
This, stressed O'Meara, was an issue the "calculus of decision making cannot ignore", 
and it raised a broader problem for neo-Realists which suggested that "anarchy is not a 
proper description of contemporary world politics" because the agents of anarchy - the 
(supposedly) independent choice making states - are always constrained by historical and
l^ Ib id , p.251. This was the silence noted by Rosenberg on Waltz, which maintains the domestic/ 
international dichotomy and the anarchy "out there" so important to Realist identity "in here".
152Ibid, p.251. 
153Ibid.
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social factors.154 Moreover, he argued, to continue to reduce the issue of regimes to the 
Tradition of sovereign state analysis is to limit understanding of a more nuanced 
phenomenon. Here, O'Meara emphasised, "although regimes are implicit or explicit 
interstate agreements, the group of actors whose behaviour and relations are regulated by 
a regime is seldom limited to states alone".155
The value of O'Meara's critique, leaving aside its commitment to a paradigmatic
solution, is that it confirms, from yet another angle, the proposition put at the beginning
of this chapter which spoke of a fundamental continuity at the (meta)theoretical core of
Realism and neo-Realism, and which suggested that both were limited, positivist based
rearticulations of the "search for (scientific) certainty" in Western modernity. One final
confirmation of this is worth recording here. It comes from Susan Strange, whose own
"alternative" to neo-Realism is entirely consistent, in qualitative terms, with the other
"alternatives" discussed in this chapter.156 Strange, nevertheless, is incisive in her
commentary on the nature and problems of a neo-Realist perspective on the regime issue
and on its image of the world in general. A neo-Realist led discipline, in this regard:
leads to a study of world politics that deals predominantly with the status 
quo, and tends to exclude hidden agendas and to leave unheard or unheeded 
complaints, whether they come from the underprivileged, the disenfranchised 
or the unborn, about the way the system works. In short in ignores the vast 
areas of non regimes that lie beyond the ken of international bureaucracies 
and diplomatic bargaining.157
154Ibid.
155Ibid, p.252, emphasis added. Examples proliferate in contemporary literature even if ignored by neo- 
Realism. Integral to the deep sea mining regime of the the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, for 
example, are the "interests" of a "very vocal group of mining corporations" as well the state signatories, 
regimes constructed to deal with environmental issues - concerning the polluting of the Oceans - deal, 
likewise, with "both public and private ships and tankers", while the major monetary regimes around the 
world, created by states, are, nevertheless, intrinsic to the everyday reality of "banks, corporations and 
other financial institutions, not to mention individuals", ibid, p.252.
156see "Cave! Hie Dragons: A Critique of Regime Analysis", in International Regimes ed. Krasner. 
Here, Strange presents an "alternative" to neo-Realism set upon a Traditionalist Realist variant that 
claims to be both Marxist and to the "right of most liberal internationalists", see p. 338. It is very 
strange.
l5 7 Ibid, p.338.
330
Strange's explanation for why this is so raises themes that, in the chapters now to follow,
can be discussed in more profound terms. The point, she argued, is that neo-Realism
persists in looking for an all pervasive pattern of political behaviour in world 
politics, a "general theory" that will provide a nice, neat and above all simple 
explanation of the past and an easy means to predict the future. Despite all the 
accumulated evidence of decades of work in international relations and 
international history (economic as well as political) that no such pattern 
exists.158
Summary
This chapter returned the thesis discussion to its original locus of concern on the issue of 
the "unwritten preface" - the International Political Economy debate and the neo-Realist 
attempt to re-establish a Traditional Realist image of "recurrence and repetition" in a post- 
Vietnam period of politico-strategic crisis, interdependence and widespread challenges to 
the "American way". It focused, in particular, on neo-Realist responses to "Grotian" 
regime theory and the proposition that "something" was happening in the world that was 
not reducible to Traditional premises of power politics, global anarchy and the 
determinants of the security dilemma. The aim was not to argue for "Grotian" insight per 
se, but to illustrate the closure and inadequacy associated with neo-Realist responses to it.
At the forefront of these responses has been the theory of structuralist anarchy 
invoked by Kenneth Waltz, and the "modified " structuralism of figures such as 
Keohane, Krasner and Gilpin. The discussion sought to critically evaluate their 
positions, in their own terms, and from a variety of perspectives, some generally 
supportive of neo-Realism. The result was not very comforting, to say the leas t, given 
that neo-Realism is now the dominant approach to theory and practice in the 1990s. Any 
sense of a new, more sophisticated understanding in Realist ranks was found to be 
illusory the moment one critically examined the textual contributions of leading neo-
158Ibid.
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Realist scholars. On behalf o f anti-reductionist structuralism , for exam ple, the crudest 
reductionism  was seen to flourish (e.g. in W altz and Stein). At the centre o f a discipline 
which dism isses its critics as "abstract" theorists, the "em piricist m etaphysic" was seen to 
reign, the hidden font o f intolerance and rigidity (e.g. in Keohane, Krasner, Gilpin). The 
picture got bleaker. Leaving aside the problem s o f structuralists w ho can 't explain 
structure (e.g. W altz according to Ruggie and W endt); and analysts o f an interdependent 
w orld w ho leave the E .E .C , China and the Soviet U nion (as it was then) out o f their 
analysis (e.g. G ilpin); the neo-R ealist world view  was shown to be as narrow, silent and 
caricatured as it ever was on questions o f power, change and hum an "difference".
Thus, in the 1990s, the anarchical world "out there" rem ains contrasted to the 
rational, ordered m odel o f dom estic life, even while the experience o f so m any at the 
dom estic level is incontrovertib ly  and terrifyingly "anarchical". Thus, the enorm ous 
com plexity  and indeterm inancy o f hum an behaviour, across all its cultural, religious, 
historical and linguistic variations, continues to be reduced to the sim plicities o f utilitarian 
rational choice m odels and reform ulated im ages o f "billiard ball" logic. Thus, in an era 
which has seen W estern images of developm ent and weapons o f war increasingly resisted 
and in which other voices, perspectives and realities are beginning to be heard in the 
global arena, International R elations via its dom inant neo-R ealist m ainstream , continues 
as Susan S trange has put it, to " deal predom inantly  w ith the status quo" and leave 
unheard  o r unheeded" the appeals and com pla in ts  o f "the underp riv ileged , the 
d isenfranchised o r the unborn, about the way the system  w orks".159 As this thesis has 
sought to illustrate , in a num ber w ays, these are the "practical" im plications o f the 
"unwritten preface", and it has been in relation to im plications such as these that Critical 
Theorists and post-m odernists have sought, in recent years, to expose the dangers o f the 
"theoretical" silences and om issions associated with them. The final chapters now turn to 
the efforts o f som e o f the C ritical Theory and post-m odern ist literatu re  w hich has
159Ibid, p.338.
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attempted to go beyond neo-Realism and the Tradition it represents and open up some
"thinking space" in International Relations.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
OPENING UP SOME "THINKING SPACE” IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
m THE CRITICAL THEORY CHALLENGE
This chapter, and the one to follow, are concerned with the way in which questions of 
theory and practice, dealt with throughout this thesis, have been directly confronted in the 
1980s and 1990s in the new critical literature of the Third Debate in International 
Relations. They seek, more explicitly, to say something of the various ways in which the 
Tradition and discipline of International Relations, framed in modemist terms and 
articulated, primarily, within positivist-Realist principles of understanding, has been re­
written, re-spoken and re-conceptualised in recent years, in Critical Social Theory 
literature. Attention will be focused, in particular, upon five interrelated, but distinct, 
themes within this diverse body of work.
The first, and most general of these themes, involves the more profound 
philosophical conversation now going on within the International Relations community 
provoked, in large part, by the "celebratory" scholarship of the Third Debate. The 
second, more specifically, concerns the re-conceptualisation of the major "givens" of 
International Relations, particularly its notions of anarchy, sovereignty, order, hegemony 
and rationality, themes integral to neo-Realism. The third relates to those challenges 
aimed at the literary foundation of Realism's discursive power, centred, primarily, on a 
re-readings of the great Realist texts and a reassessment of the contribution of Realism's 
"heroic figures". The fourth emphasises the need to re-formulate our understanding of 
strategic and security issues in an era when the identity of " se lf  and "other" can no 
longer be unproblematically be represented in Cold War terms, and the fifth deals with 
some of the implications for International Relations of a re-constructed interpretivist 
attitude to global political life in the future.
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The major intellectual conduits of increased "thinking space" in the extended 
conversation of the 1980s and 1990s have been those that have been most influential in 
transferring the larger Critical Social Theory concerns to the Third Debate - Critical 
Theory approaches and variants of the emancipatory project and, in more recent times, 
various approaches invoking post-modernist principles of critique. The discussion to 
follow will be organised, primarily, around these two perspectives. In this chapter it will 
concentrate on that literature invoking (broadly) emancipatory themes, derived from 
Critical Theory sources, which characterised much of the challenge to the neo-Realist 
orthodoxy in the early 1980s.
The Emancipatory Impulse in the Third Debate. Habermas and the 
"Poverty" of Neo-Realism
Some of the most influential of the Critical Social Theory challenges of the 1980s 
highlighted that matrix of theoretical tensions connecting power politics Realism to the 
post-Enlightenment pursuit of a science of human society, in order that the emancipatory 
potential of such tensions be ventilated and positively invoked within the International 
Relations community. Primary among these tensions, it was charged, was that between 
the reductionism and closure derived from Traditional and neo-Realist positivism, and the 
historical sensitivity and critical openness discernible at the hermeneutic intersections of 
Traditional Realism, in particular.
The Habermasian influence on this literature was most explicit in Richard 
Ashley's "Political Realism and Human Interests" which, in 1981, employed concepts 
from Knowledge and Human Interests to illustrate how, increasingly, since the Cold 
War, Realism had systematically reduced understanding and explanation in International 
Relations to a single knowledge form (scientific-rationalism) a single methodology 
(deductive-empiricism) and a single research orientation (problem solving) in short, to a
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single "cognitive interest" - in a "technical" knowledge and a theory of control.1 
Rejecting this image of knowledge and the world, Ashley proposed the need to explore 
the "deeper relations between realist concepts, knowledge claims, and modes of inquiry 
and grounding, on the one hand, and the world of social action, on the other". His aim 
was not simply to condemn or dismiss Realism per se, but, in Habermasian terms, to 
expose some of the "critical tensions that make realism, at least potentially a vital, open 
ended tradition".2
This could only begin to happen, argued Ashley, if International Relations
scholars turned away from the analytical cul-de-sac of structuralist neo-Realism, and
rediscovered the interpretivist route traversed, however rudimentarily and sporadically,
by "practical" Realists such as Bull, Herz and Morgenthau. This "practical" strain of
Realist thought had critical potential because it sought a knowledge of International
Relations, not in order to more effectively control an objectified environment, but in order
to understand how, in the contemporary world of states, it is possible:
to be and behave as a worthy member of one's traditional community with its 
intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms, rights, meanings, 
purposes and limitations on what the individual participant can be and might 
become.3
With this conceptual space opened up, notions of power and national interest could be 
perceived as derivative of historical, political and cultural interpretation, rather than as the 
pre-theoretical "givens" of a "technical" Realism. Centred on the historical and political 
interests of human actors rather than the mechanical operation of systems or structures, a 
more progressive understanding of reality might then become conceptually possible. A 
Critical Theory approach, in this sense, (and in Habermasian terms) represented the 
potential for thinking and acting:
1 Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests", International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981), pp.204- 
236. For a discussion of Habermas and Knowledge and Human Interests trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1971) see Chapter Four of the thesis, pp.177-179.
2Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests", pp.206-7.
2Ibid, p.212.
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freed from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and [the] 
conditions of distorted communication that deny humans the capacity to make 
the future through free will and consciousness.4
These were themes at the forefront of Ashley's most powerful contribution to the 
emancipatory genre: "The Poverty of Neorealism" (1984).5 This work quickened the 
pulse of the Third Debate perceptibly and became something of a catalyst for the extended 
critical agenda of the past few years. As such it requires extended treatment at this point.
In "The Poverty of Neorealism", Ashley set his critical sights on the elite of the 
neo-Realist mainstream in reiterating the proposition that, in the name of scientific 
scholarship, they had "betrayed" the "rich dialectical content" of Traditionalist Realism6, 
in the same way that positivist structuralists (e.g. Althusser) had purged the emancipatory 
legacy of Marxism, reducing it to an ahistorical and depoliticised understanding of politics 
"in which women and men are the objects, but not the makers of their circumstances".7 
In this way, neo-Realists such as Waltz, Gilpin, Tucker, Keohane and Krasner, had 
reduced Realist thought to a:
positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits 
rather than expands political discourse, negates or trivializes the significance 
of variety across time and place [and] subordinates all practice to an interest 
in control.8
Borrowing some vitriol from E.P.Thompson, Ashley branded this neo-Realist 
approach "an orrery of errors" set upon a "self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, 
utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments".9 This, claimed Ashley, was the
4Ibid, p.227, emphasis added.
5 Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.225-286. Reprinted 
in Neorealism and its Critics edited by R. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
6Ibid, p.228.
7Ibid, p.226.
8Ibid, p.228.
9Ibid. At the heart of this orrery was a positivist/empiricist epistemology. As Ashley put it, "neorealist 
theory is theory of, by, and for positivists", ibid, p.248.
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(metatheoretical) foundation of neo-Realism's closure. Here, the "machine like" self 
enclosing unity of neo-Realism's framing regime "excludes all standpoints that would 
expose the limits of the given order of things" .10 This it did, at one level, by refusing to 
problematise its state-as-actor model. Rather, it treated as "given" the "existence, 
boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimations, interests, and capacities 
to make decisions" of modem states. * 11 And, for all its "scientific" posturing, neo- 
Realism effectively immunised its state-as-actor premise from any process of falsification. 
The state-as-actor approach, consequently, represented for neo-Realism precisely what 
neo-Realists claimed it did for Traditionalism: a "metaphysical commitment prior to 
science and exempted from scientific criticism" .12 This limited neo-Realist understanding 
to the extent that alternative behaviour (e.g. transnational regime behaviour, class 
relations) could only be comprehended when reduced to the logic of methodological 
individualism .13
Neo-Realism, accordingly, represented a normative, biased and ideological 
perspective which "implicitly opposes and denies recognition to those class and human 
interests which cannot be reduced to concatenations of state interests or transnational 
coalitions of domestic interests" .14 It also represented a significant problem of analysis 
for the Realist hierarchy in the more critically attuned atmosphere of the post- Vietnam 
period. Thus, seeking to deal with criticism of its state centrism in well worn modemist 
fashion - by relocating it to the realm of scientific objectivity - neo-Realists had embraced 
with enthusiasm a structuralist approach, which, elsewhere across the Social Theory 
spectrum, the positivist mainstream had largely repudiated.
10Ibid, p.237.
11 Ibid, p.238.
12Ibid, p.239.
13Just, therefore, as collectivist behaviour in general is understood (i.e. by Liberal Pluralism) as the 
aggregated expression of individual needs, interests etc, so, in the analogised fashion of the International 
Relations Tradition, all international behaviour is comprehended through the prism of the individual state, 
following its (given) self interest.
14 Ibid.
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Ashley focused on the "poverty" of Waltz's structuralism, in particular, stressing 
its tendency, on the one hand, to grant the anarchical structure of International Relations 
"a life of its own independent of the parts, the states-as-actors" while, on the other, 
seeking to establish "the independence of the structured whole from the idealized point of 
view of the lone, isolated state-as-actor".15 Ultimately, concluded Ashley, neo-Realism 
got the worst of both theoretical worlds, encompassing "atomism’s superficiality 
combined with structuralism's closure".16 As earlier discussions sought to illustrate, this 
projection of neo-Realism's limitations is relevant not only to Waltz but also to many of 
those who have sought to detach themselves from his "conventional" structuralist 
approach. This was a conclusion also reached by Ashley in the period before his thinking 
became totally oriented toward post-modernist discourse analysis. Accordingly, in 1984, 
the work of Waltz, Keohane, Krasner, Gilpin, Tucker, Kindleberger et al was 
represented as a "collective movement or project", characterised by "shared principles of 
practice, and observing certain background understandings and norms that participants 
mutually accept as unproblematic". This was the case, even though "the participants may 
not be conscious of (may merely take for granted the universal truth of) the norms and 
understandings integrating them as one movement".17
The basis of this unselfconsciousness was, for Ashley, underwritten by the 
impact upon it of positivist principles of knowledge.18 More precisely, and in more direct 
Habermasian terms, the problem was perceived as neo-Realism's commitment to a 
technical rationalist mode of knowledge that "aims to reduce all aspects of human action 
to matters of purposive-rational action".19 This was the crux of the "distorted
15 Ibid, p.255. 
16Ibid, p.256. 
17Ibid, p.228.
^A nd of the projection "on to the plane of explicit theory [of] certain metatheoretical commitments that 
have long been implicit in the habits of positivism", ibid, p.249.
19Ibid, pp.250-251.
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communication" of neo-Realism which professed itself to be a theoretical force that 
"demystifies all forms of romanticism, dispenses with atavistic myth, and establishes the 
'end of ideology'" while, ultimately, endorsing "a metahistorical faith in scientific- 
technical progress that positivist science itself cannot question".20 This was the basis of 
neo-Realism's "betrayal" of the Realist revolt against idealism and the scientific critique of 
Traditionalism's metaphysics. It was a "betrayal", in this (Frankfurt School) sense, not 
just in terms of the Thompson -Althusser dispute but in the wider sense of the "betrayal" 
of an entire Weltanschauung (emancipatory democracy) by the "totalitarian" forces of 
positivist scientism.
In an International Relations context this "betrayal" had seen the post 1914 quest 
for a sensitive, enabling, knowledge of International Relations increasingly reduced to the 
ritualised dogmas of a particular economic logic and power politics ideology. Neo- 
Realism, in this sense, was a microcosmic expression of the "totalitarianism" of Anglo- 
American modernity, an ideological hybrid which from Traditional Realism had "leam[t] 
only an interest in power" and from post-Enlightenment science "only an interest in 
expanding the reach of control".21 The implications of this Ashley represented in terms 
which echoed the lamentations of Adorno and Horkheimer surveying a modem scenario 
dominated by the blindness and paradox inducing powers of technical-rationalism. The 
major implication was the effective exclusion from International Relations discourse of 
any reflective self inquiry into questions of knowledge construction and the complexities 
of understanding the world in "realist" terms.22
20Ibid, p.251.
21 Ibid, p.228.
22Some of the more immediate implications,were: (i) a denial of history as an indeterminate social 
process in favour of a singular, universalised "history”; (ii) the denial of social practice in favour of an 
essentialised socio-political reality, set upon the behaviour of an "idealized homo economicus"; (iii) a 
narrow and self serving comprehension of power, reduced to the calculation of "means" (interests); and (iv) 
an inadequate understanding of politics, reduced to utilitarian struggle and represented as the structural "is" 
of the world; ibid, pp.258-260.
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In 1984, as indicated, Ashley's critical perspectives were still framed in 
emancipatory terms drawn, primarily, from Habermasian Critical Theory. However, 
other influences were becoming apparent in his thinking, most particularly those of 
Bourdieu and Foucault. It was from this (rather problematic) intellectual trinity that 
Ashley constructed his "dialectical competence model" alternative to neo-Realism. This 
approach, he maintained, represented the genuine fusion of theory and practice necessary 
to begin to understand the complex world of the 1980s. Rather than privileging one side 
of some positivist dualism, it was "at once subjective and objective, necessary and 
contingent".23 It recognised, moreover, that all claims for universality, "reflect and 
conceal particular points of view and particular interests". Simultaneously, it 
acknowledged that all claims made on behalf of "immediate, contingent and specific 
experience, [or]...on a unique heritage or unreflected understandings of individual 
interests" are intrinsically problematic, because they conceal "implicit universalising 
projects" about the real nature of the world.24
Such a model, argued Ashley, could open up significantly different 
understandings of International Relations. Offering interpretive, hermeneutic based 
insight it would, for example, allow reflection upon neo-Realism's status not just as a 
"theory" concerned to explain, interpret and organise the facts, but as a deeply embedded 
regime of theory and practice, which "together with the worldwide power bloc whose 
dominance it signifies and secures" helps create and reinforce "modern global 
hegemony".25 Understood this way, different questions might be asked of the process 
by which this hegemony is constructed, in terms of the "social, economic, and 
environmental conditions upon which its practical efficacy depends".26 It might,
23Ibid, p.266.
24Ibid, p.268.
25Ibid, p.276, emphasis added. 
^Ibid.
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consequently, be understood not as some sort of structuralist inevitability, nor as the
irreducible essence of contemporary international life, but as the dominant world order:
among a multiplicity of mutually interpenetrating and opposed world orders 
some of which might escape the logic of the modem global hegemony and 
assert alternative structuring possibilities.27
Once this "thinking space" was acknowledged alternative idea forms could begin to
exploit the silences and omissions of the dominant theory and practice, in order to
"transform [their] conditions of dominance, [and] produce the conditions of their own
self-realization".28 At the broader level, a more sophisticated and critically honed
appreciation of the complexities and crises of contemporary International Relations could
emerge, not just in terms of "one more cyclical economic crisis" but (perhaps) as:
an epochal crisis of world authority...involving a denigration in the learning 
capacity of the [dominant politico-intellectual] regime and, consequently, a 
loss of political control.29
The emancipatory connections, between Ashley's 1981 article and the "Poverty" 
arguments of 1984, were most explicit when he outlined the rudiments of his alternative 
approach to theory and practice. This was due, primarily, to Ashley's reassertion, in 
1984, of his earlier proposition that such an alternative was already present in the 
Traditionalist (classical) Realist approach which neo-Realism sought to make scientific. 
A major critical purpose of the "Poverty of Neorealism" accordingly, was the attempt to 
"recover" from Traditional/classical Realism "those insights into political practice which 
neorealism threatens to purge".30 Ashley was not unaware of the complicity of 
Traditionalism in the global hegemony of theory and practice associated with neo- 
Realism.31 He insisted, however, that as the "ethnomethodology of the modem tradition
27Ibid, p.279.
28 Ibid.
29Ibid, pp.278-279.
30Ibid, p.229.
31 Ibid, p.274. For all Ashley's enthusiasm regarding the critical theory potential of the Traditionalist 
approach to knowledge, he was aware of its limitations. Its appeal to the "wisdom" of the diplomatic
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of statesmanship"32 Traditionalist Realism invoked a broad hermeneutic approach to
understanding that was animated by a "practical interest in knowledge", which was
resistant to the frozen categories of neo-Realism and irreducible to its rational choice
premises.33 In 1981 Ashley had sought to utilise the sensitive Traditionalism of Herz as
an example of this hermeneutic difference. In 1984 it was Morgenthau who was
projected as the personification of Traditionalism's "practical" cognitive interest.34 In
1984, thus, a series of quotations from Morgenthau were presented, all indicating his
distaste for the post-Enlightenment "scientific” approach, all invoking a historical and
interpretivist alternative.35 Indeed, maintained Ashley, Morgenthau, on "many occasions"
stressed the "unhistoric and apolitical" nature of the utilitarian, positivistic and rationalist
commitments characteristic of neo-Realism, proposing that such commitments:
threaten to produce a form of pseudo-political understanding that falsely 
reduces the inherently dialectical character of politics to the monothetic 
orientation of economic reason, an orientation in which all perspectives, even 
the measure of power and its changes, are thought to be ultimately collapsible 
into a singular internally consistent scale of universally inter-convertible 
values.36
For Ashley this was evidence enough that Traditionalist Realists such as 
Morgenthau, "given a chance to speak, would be among neorealism's sternest critics".37 
Ashley's important critique of neo-Realism was, consequently, and in this regard, an 
attempt to reinvoke Morgenthau's voice on behalf of a silenced interpretivist insight at the
purveyors of the diplomatic true tradition was, he noted, as often as not presented in terms of history 
defined solely by the actions of "great men", ibid, p.230. There was, moreover, he proposed, little 
effective difference between the Waltzian proposition concerning "bold conjectures" as the source of theory 
and the vague "intuitionism" of Traditionalist perspectives on metatheoretical issues. And for all its 
awareness of the problems of the pseudo-scientific method of much post-World War Two Realist thought, 
the Traditionalist alternative remained conceptually incarcerated in the dualised and dichotomised 
understanding of International Relations.
32Ibid, p.265.
33Ibid, p.267.
34The ultimate "error" of neo-Realism, in this sense, was that its dominant (technical-rationalist) logic 
was repudiated by its own intellectual tradition, and by Morgenthau, the most influential Realist of all.
3 5 Ibid, pp.280-281 
^Ibid.
37Ibid, p.281.
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core of neo-Realism. It was an attempt thus to "emancipate" International Relations by 
emancipating Realism's repressed critical dimension. This particular element of the 
work, however, stands as its most obvious point of weakness. Not, necessarily, because 
of its attempt to illuminate a critical potential within Realism, "repressed" by its dominant 
reading. As stated earlier this thesis has empathy with such an ambition. Rather, the 
problems for Ashley, as his critics were quick to discern, concerned the implications for 
his general argument of the "recovery" theme.38
Kratochwil, for example, in a spirited defence of "scientific" interpretivism landed 
some telling, and valid, critical blows on Ashley's characterisation of Morgenthau as the 
exemplar Traditionalist, repelled by the positivism of neo-Realism .39 Kratochwil 
countered by simply selecting from Morgenthau's writings famous passages which 
emphasised Morgenthau's, at times, crude positivism. Kratochwil, moreover, accused 
Ashley of blindness in relation to Morgenthau's influence in transferring rational actor 
premises to contemporary Realism .40 He stressed too the intellectual insensitivity 
associated with Ashley's lumping together of critical influences drawn from diverse 
sources such as Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu in his "dialectical competence model". 
These were the kind of issues raised by others also. Gilpin, for example, though 
struggling with the intellectual issues at hand, was able to highlight the problems of 
Ashley's tendency towards dichotomy in his representation of the relationship between 
Traditionalism and neo-Realism, on behalf of an otherwise dialectically informed 
approach to knowledge and society.41
^Generally also invoking a variant of the "Robinson Crusoe" individualist argument to counter Ashley's 
claim of shared metatheoretical premises binding together neo-Realism's various strains.
39See Kratochwil, "Errors Have Their Advantage", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.304-320. 
On the issue of Morgenthau's positivist statements and the ambiguity surrounding his position generally, 
see Chapter Six of the thesis, pp.244-246.
4^On the question of Morgenthau's part in this transference, see Chapter Six of the thesis, pp.242-247.
41Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), 
pp.287-304. Gilpin's response, though pertinent on this point, was the one that perhaps illustrated best 
how correct Ashley was in his projection of neo-Realists as limited and unselfconscious in their 
understanding of the world they speak so confidently of. Gilpin's response was generally dismissive of 
Ashley's argument, pleading a Robinson Crusoe type defence on the charge that neo-Realists are bound
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Such criticisms, to some extent at least, were justified. Ashley, in 1984, 
seemingly did not comprehend (or at least did not acknowledge) that the "repression" of 
critical potential in Realism was not due to the impact of neo-Realism's positivist 
scientism per se, but to the modernist framing regime at the core of Traditionalism which 
established, at the metatheoretical level, the discursive conditions for theory and practice 
of both Traditionalism and neo-Realism. Nor did he acknowledge what Stanley 
Hoffmann understood in 1977, that Morgenthau was the "father" of scientific Realism 
and integral to the transference of economic rationalism at the core of the discipline of 
International Relations.42 Moreover, in 1984, Ashley did not acknowledge what this 
thesis has sought to illustrate in its early chapters: (i) that positivists can repudiate 
scientific rationality on positivist grounds (e.g. Popper, Lakatos); (ii) that an anti-
together by discursive commitments and chiding Ashley for the "needless jargon" of his argument, ibid, 
p.289. It was on this issue of Ashley's jargon however that Gilpin revealed the narrowness and 
superficiality of his response to serious criticism. Gilpin, for example, complained that he couldn't 
respond to some of Ashley's arguments because "International Organization failed to send an English 
translation with the original text", ibid, p.289. This was presumably a humorous comment meant to 
further convince the mainstream readers of International Organization of the tortuous and ultimately 
insignificant nature of Ashley's thinking and writing. The joke though was on Gilpin and indeed on the 
discipline, because the passage which most offended Gilpin was one which indicated only that his reading 
regimen remained incarcerated in the caricatured debates of the past. The offending passage came as 
Ashley was seeking to distinguish other approaches than the positivist one for understanding the world. 
In this vein his point was that "For eschatological discourse (evident in phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology, and some hermeneutical sciences) the objective truth of the discourse lies within and 
is produced by the discourse itself, "The Poverty of Neorealism", p.249. Gilpin's response was simply 
to pronounce that while he was sure this statement "and many like it throughout the article are 
meaningful to Ashley, I [Gilpin] have no idea what it means", "The Richness of the Tradition of Political 
Realism", p.289. There was no hint of effort here to try and understand Ashley's point which, after all, in 
1984, and after years of post-behaviouralist debate on the question of hermeneutics and the "theory 
impregnated" nature of the "facts" was not that difficult to understand. But it is not just the arrogance of 
Gilpin's response that was its most disturbing feature - such arrogance is almost to be expected in a 
discipline which has been so uncritical of its "heroic figures". The more disturbing point is the indication 
the response gave that Gilpin's understanding of the issues he deals with is remarkably shallow. It has to 
be remembered that Gilpin engages explicitely in "theoretical" debate and speaks with authority on 
"theoretical" issues. It was Gilpin, after all, who bemoaned the fact that Traditionalist scholars (unlike 
neo-Realists) were "not well grounded in social theory"; see Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism" p.231; and 
it was Gilpin in The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987) who invoked Thomas Kuhn as an influence and who was confident enough to take on the 
complex issue of ideology, including Marxist ideology. Yet, in relation to Ashley's criticism of his 
theoretical position he suddenly dosen't know what all this "means". The narrowness of Gilpin’s 
scholarship is clear enough perhaps in relation to his analysis of the world political economy which 
barely includes Eastern or Western Europe or China. In his response to Ashley a similar attitude and 
capacity was evident
42 This was acknowledged too, of course, by Robert Cox in 1981, in "Social Forces, States, and World 
Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10(2) 
(1981), pp.126-155; and by Keohane in "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in 
Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane, pp. 11 -12.
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Enlightenment approach proclaiming "historical/philosophical" knowledge can be 
advocated in terms of the essentialist, universalist principles of positivist rationalism (e.g. 
Wight, Bull and the British School); and (iii) that Verstehen based interpretivist 
perspectives (e.g. Morgenthau via Weber) are "the other side of the positivist coin".
My own view is that Ashley's "Poverty" article represents the contribution of an 
outstanding and creative thinker who, in the early 1980s, personified the restlessness and 
frustration of a liberal sector within the United States International Relations community, 
which perceived the promised "openness" of the post-Vietnam period rapidly being 
closed off by the neo-Realist hierarchy and Hegemonic Stability Theory. The 
restlessness, creativity and frustration are very evident in the "Poverty" article. The 
result, for the most part, is a stimulating and sophisticated critique of orthodox theory and 
practice pitched at the kind of intellectual level generally alien to an International Relations 
audience, a critique which prefigured much of the Critical Social Theory literature that 
was to follow. At the same time there was in Ashley's wide ranging attack on neo- 
Realism an occasionally cavalier approach to complex issues, (e.g. the connections 
between Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault) which left his arguments vulnerable to a 
critical audience only to pleased to pick up on some obvious flaws. Thus, in 
concentrating on its obvious problems of logic, his critics were able to ignore and/or 
marginalise those elements of Ashley's argument which exposed the limitations of neo- 
Realism in general.
Moreover, in missing the point on the Morgenthau issue, in particular, Ashley 
allowed the neo-Realist hierarchy to sidestep the broader questions of Realism and 
modernism and the broader inadequacies of their Tradition and discipline. In summary: 
Ashley's emancipatory work in 1984 opened up important "thinking space" for many 
within the International Relations community, but, ironically, those who were its major 
targets were able to effectively close it off. Indeed, as this thesis has sought to illustrate, 
there is still little evidence that neo-Realists have begun to address the substantive issues 
raised in Ashley's exposition of their "poverty".
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Since the mid 1980s Ashley has shifted considerably from an explicit 
emancipatory approach to a post-modernist perspective, and to a position which does 
acknowledge the larger modernist location of the issues at hand in 1984. More will be 
added later on his important contribution to the Critical Social Theory literature in this 
genre. At this point however another important contribution to emancipatory scholarship 
requires attention, one that raises these issues again, albeit in a slightly different form. 
This is the contribution of Robert Cox who, throughout the 1980s, confronted neo- 
Realism with an emancipatory perspective influenced by Habermas but also by Gramsci 
and anti-structuralist Marxism in general.
Cox. Gramsci and a Critical Theory Alternative to the Neo-Realist 
International Political Economy
Cox's essay "Social Forces, States, and World Orders" (1981) is an early example of his 
contribution to the Critical Social Theory literature, in recent times.43 This work, like 
Ashley's, also sought to "recover" from Traditionalist Realism an open ended interpretive 
nuance, which, for Cox, was located in the historical scholarship of figures such as 
E.H.Carr and Ludwig Dehio.44 And, like Ashley, Cox developed his arguments in terms 
of a major tension - between a latent Critical Theory perspective at the core of 
Traditionalism - and a "problem solving" approach, dominant since the Cold War and the 
Americanisation of the discipline.45 This "problem-solving" category generally
43Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". This has been 
reprinted with an important postscript where Cox discusses the distinction between positivist and 
historicist forms of knowledge in Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane. Cox's ideas have been 
developed in his recent work (the first of a four volume collaborative project with Jeffrey Harrod, 
Production. Power, and World Order Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987). On his Gramscian connection, see Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International 
Relations: An Essay in Method", Millennium 12(2) (1983), pp.265-291.
^ C o x , "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.131.
45The "problem solving" approach is ahistorical, static, positivistic and conservative. Accordingly "It 
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and political relationships and the institutions into 
which they are organised, as the given framework for action". Thus, "Since the general pattern of
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complemented Ashley's (Habermasian) concept of "technical" Realism, but Cox's 
argument diverged significantly from Ashley's when it came to the question of 
Morgenthau's role in the discipline's development. On this issue Cox stressed 
Morgenthau's seminal contribution to the "problem solving" perspective and to neo- 
Realism in general.46
Scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz, argued Cox, were integral to the 
objectification of Realist theory and practice, and, since the Cold War, to a concern, 
above all, with "the defence of American power as a bulwark of the maintenance of 
order".47 It was this ideological form of Realism, he charged, that continued to underpin 
and direct neo-Realism, limiting its potential for understanding to the "prevailing social 
and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized".48 Into the 
1980s then the overriding purpose of neo-Realism was a conservative problem solving 
one, concerned to "make [existing] relationships and institutions work smoothly by 
dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble" 49 Its dominant knowledge form, 
accordingly, was a crude positivism which rendered neo-Realism inadequate as a source 
of "real" knowledge about human political society because it misunderstood the 
relationship between theory and the reality it sought to explain. In his 1981 article, 
consequently, a major emancipatory task, for Cox, was to recover for contemporary
institutions and relationships is not called into question, particular problems can be considered in relation 
to the specialised areas in which they arise", ibid, p.129.
4^Indeed, he argued, it was influential scholars such Morgenthau and Waltz, though "individuals of 
considerable historical learning" who had adopted a "fixed ahistorical view...[which] transformed realism 
into a form of problem solving theory". It was scholars such as these that had been integral to the 
increased orientation of International Relations, away from those elements of its Tradition which 
approached political reality as a contingent phenomenon "susceptible to change", towards a Realism 
constructed in terms of an enduring anarchy, resistant to meaningful change, ibid, p.131.
47Ibid, p.131.
48Ibid, p.128.
49Ibid, p.129.
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International Relations scholarship some basic philosophical principles of critical 
interpretation that the neo- Realist orthodoxy had "forgotten".50
Cox's point, of course, was that all theories (including Realist hegemonic 
theories) are historically and politically grounded and, that dominated by the history and 
politics of the Cold War, Realist theory was grounded in the "problem"of how to control 
and manage an apparently enduring superpower conflict. This problem-solving approach 
was inadequate, however, because in focusing its attention upon a frozen objectified 
image of the world "out there", and not reflecting upon the larger process by which that 
image is theoretically constructed, Realism effectively blinded itself to the prospect o f a 
changing reality, generated by the dialectical interaction of theory and practice. A Critical 
Theory approach was necessary, in this context, maintained Cox, precisely because it did 
reflect upon the process of theorising, in order to "become clearly aware of the 
perspective which gives rise to theorising, and its relation to other perspectives".51
Critical Theory, thus, reconnected (theoretical) knowledge, human interests and 
the everyday practice of power, and opened up a previously foreclosed debate about the 
relationship between theory and practice. It was an approach that did not posit an 
ahistorical "continuing present", but oriented attention toward a "continuing process of 
historical change". It did not accord existing institutions and power relations the status of 
"facts" or "givens" but "call[ed] them into question by concerning itself with their origins 
and how and whether they might be in the process of change".52 It was in these terms 
that, in 1981 and in subsequent works, Cox introduced a definably Gramscian tone to his
5^The first and most important of these principles was that which rendered problematic any assertion 
about an independent reality "out there" accessible via objective empirical observation. Rather, Cox 
stressed, it is "academic convention [which] divides up the seamless web of the real social world into 
separate spheres, each with its own theorizing". Instead, he insisted, knowledge of reality is always 
intrinsically connected to social practice and "to the ways in which human affairs are organized in 
particular times and places", ibid, p.126. Consequently, "theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose": theories all have a perspective set in social and political time and space and all perspectives 
represent an image of the world as seen from the standpoint "of nation or social class, of dominance or 
subordination, of rising or declining power...or of present crisis...", ibid, p.128.
51 Ibid.
52Ibid, p.129.
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Critical Theory arguments.53 This he did in confronting neo-Realism's approach to 
International Political Economy and the hegemony question with a series of counter- 
hegemonic propositions centred less on states per se and more on the emancipatory 
potentials of "social forces".54
Cox's argument here, (complementing Ashley's) was that like everything else in 
the Realist lexicon, the question of hegemony was situated as part of a power matrix 
which reflected the dominance of an "orderer" - the most powerful state (i.e.the United 
States) - over the "ordered" Others. When change was the issue the response was 
framed, predictably, in power politics terms (the demise of "order" in the state system) 
and in the terms of the dominant perspective (United States foreign policy). To open up 
some "thinking space" and reconceptualise contemporary International Political Economy, 
Cox argued, an alternative (Gramscian) approach to hegemonic power was required, 
which insisted on a dialectic between knowledge and power, between the power structure 
(the state system) and its "superstructural" elements (e.g. ideological) that helped 
constitute and legitimate that power.
The point, maintained Cox, was that neither the structure of state interaction, nor 
the question of hegemony in the International Political Economy could be understood 
exclusively in power politics terms.55 Rather, to understand systemic and hegemonic
5^See,"Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”.
54I refer here, in particular to his "Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World 
Order", in The Emerging International Economic Order edited by H. Jacobsen and D. Subyanski 
(California: Sage, 1982); and to his major work in the genre. Power. Production and World Order. The 
issue of social forces in Cox's work is an interesting one and it represents an attempt to go beyond the 
conventional Marxist notion of the "social relations of production", although this clearly is its conceptual 
source. As Cox explains, a social forces approach is concerned with the interconnection of three 
dimensions of power (i) over the productive process; (ii) social power - the relations between classes and 
(iii) control over the state - political power. It is from this power matrix, he argues, that particular 
constellations of social forces emerge. In an interdependent world economy and with the impact within 
and upon the power matrix of monopoly capital and an internationalised production process, there are, 
suggests Cox, possibilities for change as new constellations of social forces become evident around the 
world. See, "Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World Order"; and Power. 
Production and World Order. Chapters 1 and 10 in particular.
55 While acknowledging that, at one level, neo-Realists were correct to emphasise the military and 
economic aspects of power when dealing with the questions of contemporary International Political 
Economy and hegemony, noting that the hegemony of Britain in the nineteenth century and the United
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power was to understand the power of hegemony in the Gramscian sense, as the 
"temporary universalisation in thought of a particular power structure, conceived not as 
domination but as the necessary order of nature".56 Since the Nineteenth century, in 
Anglo-American societies, the "necessary order of nature" had centred on the 
"universalisation in thought" of the correctness of capitalist market relations and its 
associated social formations. The role of the state in this hegemonic theory and practice 
was to ensure the necessary conditions in the international economy for the 
universalisation process to take place.
At the pinnacle of the hegemonic formation, thus, (e.g. the USA after 1945) the 
resultant tendency has been to herald international economic success as consistent with 
the "natural order" of modem social existence. Any challenge to this success has been 
interpreted as "unnatural" interference in the process of universalisation - at the political 
level - at the level of inter-state conflict.57 It was in this hegemonic context that Realism, 
from its disciplinary centre in the United States, has managed to reduce the complex 
matrix of issues of International Relations to a concern with hegemonic order; an order 
represented as in the interests of the state system as a whole, as in the interests of the 
"natural" (modem) order. In this schema, (Capitalist, market) economics has been 
accorded a "given", taken-for-granted, status - an (often) unspoken but powerful 
commitment within Anglo-American Realism and throughout its hegemonic territory. 
The emergence of a neo-Realist structuralism (based on microeconomic theory) and 
Hegemonic Stability Theory was, in this sense, the explicit representation of a deep 
ideological commitment in Realism, drawn out by challenges to its hegemonic power.
These challenges, Cox acknowledged, did not represent a threat to international 
capitalism per se, nor, in the short term, to the state system built upon it. Rather, he 
argued, the hegemonic crisis for the United States was, to a large extent, a crisis of
States since World War Two has been underwritten in this way; see Cox, "Production and Hegemony", 
p.38.
^Ibid.
57Ibid.
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hegemonic legitimation, the crisis of a dominant power no longer able to effectively 
articulate its hegemonic logic.58 In Gramscian terms this represented a significant 
historical moment when the hegemon could no longer project its domination as in line 
with the "necessary order of [politico-economic] nature". This, Cox suggested, was not 
solely or primarily because of the demise of institutions (e.g. Bretton Woods) that acted 
as major agencies of U.S. hegemonic power, or the end of the Cold War, as such, but it 
has to do with broader structural changes in the International Political Economy. These 
were changes which, for all their concern with structural analysis, neo-Realists could not 
adequately deal with because they were not reducible to simple models of individual state 
interaction. Rather, they concerned changes in social forces brought on by an 
internationalised production process and the international division of labour associated 
with it.
This, maintained Cox, has provoked significant responses in societies both 
favourably incorporated in the world economy, and those increasingly marginalised by it 
- with both sets of responses placing pressures upon the post-World War Two hegemon. 
In the case of the "core" societies, for example, the costs have largely been bourne by 
labour forces engaged in traditional industries (e.g. manufacturing, agricultural). Hence, 
increased tensions on issues of protectionism and "restructuring", and between small 
indigenous capitalist sectors and multinational capital. Hence, too, an antipathy to calls 
for "free" trade by the dominant politico-economic power (the United States) and the 
advocation of protected blocs in competition with the hegemon. In the marginalised 
societies of the Third World the impact has been somewhat different and the political and 
social conflict more direct. Generally, however, there has been increased conflict 
between elites seeking to control (in one way or another) the consequences of the 
internationalisation of production upon their societies and the (often) disenfranchised 
masses seeking (in one way or another) to confront the everyday misery of their 
existence. In this context too, the United States has found it increasingly difficult to
5^Here the influence of Habermas is evident also in terms of his arguments in Legitimation Crisis trans. 
T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).
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project its image of the benign hegemon ordering International Relations in favour of the 
market and "natural" (Western, modem) political structures.59
This was likely to continue, suggested Cox, because there was little evidence that 
the intellectual/policy community in the United States understood that its politico- 
economic power was dependent upon something other than its power politics capacity to 
"deter" and/or keep the world in its "natural" (free trade) state. In fact, Cox's argued, 
there was always something more than than Realist image of state power at stake in its 
reign as hegemon. It always was:
a world order...founded not only upon the regulation of interstate conflict, 
but also upon a globally conceived civil society ie a mode of production of a 
global extent which brings about links among the social classes of different 
countries. [It is] the global structuring of [these] social forces [that] shapes 
the different forms of state, while states in turn influence the evolution of the 
regulatory pattem of the global hegemony.60
This is an important affirmation of Cox's Critical Theory position. This was what he was 
getting at with his distinction, in 1981, between an ahistorical "problem solving" Realism 
and a Critical Theory approach which refused to take existing power relations as "given", 
but which was concerned with the origins of such relations and "whether they might be in 
the process of change".61 It is an important dimension of the "thinking space" that Cox 
has sought to open in his examination of the emancipatory potentials of new social forces 
and new state formations that might emerge with contemporary changes in global 
production processes.
From Cox's perspective change is not explained from the top down (i.e. at the 
behest of the major states) as in Realism, but it occurs as part of a more complex matrix, 
as changes in social forces help restructure world order and the pattern of global 
hegemony. It becomes possible, thus, to think of stability, order and hegemony not,
59More often than not, consequently, its one dimensional perspective on the issue has seen it drawn 
towards cruder articulations o f order maintenance in the Third World.
^ C o x , "Production and Hegemony", p.45.
01Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p. 128.
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necessarily, in terms of the dominant state, or as a recurring factor in some determined 
"historical" structure. Rather, history and the international hierarchy of states is 
understood, always, as pan of a dialectic between social and material forces mediated 
through the political/institutional agencies of the state. And while, like neo-Realists, Cox 
is concerned with the question of what comes after U.S. hegemony, his response has not 
been to proclaim the ungovernability of the system, but to examine the possibilities for 
alternative state formations in the future - and the emancipatory potentials of social forces 
emerging in the present
In Production. Power and World Order (1987) he approached this issue by 
developing a complex socio-historical schema set within patterns of production relations 
and their attendant social forces. This discussion was complemented by another, 
outlining various historical forms of the state characterised by their politico/institutional 
structures.62 Of most immediate significance, in this regard, was Cox's perspective on 
the period between 1945-1980 (the end of his study). In this period, he argued, there has 
been an ongoing tension between variants of the "redistributive" state formation based on 
a command economy and single party control (e.g.U.S.S.R and China) and "neo- 
Liberal" states derived from the "welfare-nationalist" states of the post-World War One 
era. In the 1970s, with the "redistributive" state formation in the process of decline and 
reformulation, some of the most powerful "neo-Liberal" states have evolved into the 
"hyper-Liberal" formations associated with the United States, under the Reagan 
Administration, and Britain under Thatcherism. In these states emphasis has been placed 
on possessive individualism, patriotism and a strong military profile, while, in both 
international and domestic policy, there has been increased antipathy to issues of (for 
example) welfare statism and human rights. It is in this context, Cox argued, that the 
marginalisation of the Third World and conflict between the marginalised and the major 
productive states is set to increase.63
62See Cox, Production. Power, and World Order, Chapters 6 and 7.
6 3Ibid, Chapters 8 and 9.
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It is, therefore, this matrix of conflicts, between material and ideological forces, 
that is the basis of the hegemonic crisis for Cox. Unlike his neo-Realist counterparts, 
however, Cox has perceived this crisis as pregnant with potential for progressive social 
change, a historical moment with the potential for counter-hegemonic response. His 
point, in short, is that if one understands the crisis in his Critical Theory terms there is 
nothing so determined about the International Political Economy that can structurally 
prevent the changes in worldwide productive processes provoking changes in social 
forces worldwide, changes not necessarily controlled by, or on behalf of, the hegemon or 
the major powers. His broader intellectual point, consistent with his philosophical 
discussion in 1981, is that there is nothing determinate about the real world "out there". 
Accordingly, it can be examined and understood from a perspective other than the 
dominant hegemonic perspective; its "answers" being effectively shaped by the 
(metatheoretical) questions asked of it. For Cox, thus, asking questions framed in the 
critical modemist tradition of the Frankfurt School and anti-structuralist Marxism, the 
answers, at least, allow for the possibility of something other than "recurrence and 
repetition" and/or the necessity of US hegemony. Above all they allow for a serious 
analytical inquiry of International Political Economy along Critical Theory lines.
Cox's Critical Theory approach is not without problems, of course. Like every 
other mode of inquiry discussed in this thesis it is replete with them. His major work, 
Production. Power and World Order, for example, really only covers the period until the 
end of the 1970s. Since that time some of its empirical analysis has been rather overtaken 
by the extraordinary events of the past decade, particularly in Eastern Europe. In this 
regard, as Stephen Gill suggested in 1990, the new state formations that seem to be 
emerging might not be characterised by greater capacity for dissent at the international 
system, but by a consolidation of "hyper-Liberalism" which will see:
a new identity of interests between established workers and transnational
productive capital, between certain financial and trading interests, consumers,
355
service workers, and even the leaders and some workers of the previously 
communist states (perhaps eventually in the USSR).64
In the context of this work, of course, there is another level at which Cox's 
Critical Theory requires critical attention. This concerns its location in modernist 
discourse. Or, more precisely, it concerns the question of whether his approach 
genuinely opens "thinking space” or whether, in post-modernist terms, its critical value is 
undermined by its modemist emancipatory commitments. My position on Cox's 
contribution, specifically, is that it represents something other than vulgar Marxism and 
that analytically it has a great deal more to offer that the narrowly framed image of 
International Political Economy projected by a figure such as Gilpin.65 I do, however, 
take seriously the post-modernist position on this issue, and there are themes in Cox's 
work which could be interpreted as consistent with a "meta-narrative" reading of 
Historical Materialism, and the historical development of a "repressed" critical rationality. 
On close reading, however, Cox's, Production. Power and World Order, for example, is 
a more sophisticated argument than this, with the detailed discussion of the relationship 
between production, social class and political power, in that work, warranting serious 
and sustained study, before any conclusion is reached regarding Cox's modernist status.
The modernist commitments and limitations of some other emancipatory 
contributors to the Third Debate are less difficult to evaluate. The work of the Anglo- 
Australian scholar, Andrew Linklater, for example, has been characterised by an explicit 
Kantian progressivism and, in more recent years, by arguments oriented toward a 
synthesis of Traditionalist Realism and Critical Theory. In two editions of Men and 
Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (1982 and 1990) Linklater’s commitment 
to Kantian philosophy has been expressed in attempts to establish, for contemporary 
International Relations, notions of "a moral progress, universality, human subjectivity
^ G ill, "Two Concepts of International Political Economy", Review of International Studies 19 (1990), 
pp.369-381, p.379.
^5In, for example, The Political Economy of International Relations.
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and autonomy".66 In between times this has led to a rather problematic reading of the new
debates in International Relations. In 1986, for example, Linklater, concluded that the
liberal Interdependence literature of the 1970s "inevitably paved the way" for a more
systematic appreciation of Marxist based perspectives on International Political
Economy.67 This notion he developed, in claiming that:
liberal analyses of interdependence combined their critique of realism as an 
empirical account of world politics with a challenge to its adequacy as a guide 
to political practice. This challenge began to recover the concept o f progress 
fo r  the theory o f international relations, and encouraged the belief that the 
purpose of international theory was not to understand 'recurrence and 
repetition' in the international system but to identify and strengthen alternative 
historical possibilities immanent within it.68
The most charitable response to a proposition such as this is that it might have relevance 
to som e  Interdependence scholarship, but is clear that, for Linklater, major 
Interdependence works, such as those of Keohane and Nye, are understood as 
contributing to the (perceived) post-Realist search for "progress" and "alternative 
historical possibilities" in International Political Economy.69 This, as the previous chapter 
indicated (and as Keohane has affirmed) is assuredly not what such works were about. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how they could be so interpreted, unless one is 
committed to an overwhelming modernist image of "history" as the unfolding of a 
progressive human rationality, most powerfully "immanent" at the core of the dominant 
ideology (i.e. as liberalism gives way to its "higher form").
This is, I think, the discursive keystone of Linklater's progressivist optimism and 
the philosophical catalyst for his broader project, outlined in Bevond Realism and 
Marxism: Critical International Theory (1990). Here, his primary concern was to 
construct "a philosophical defence of the notion of universal emancipation and a practical
^References in this thesis are to the second edition (London, Macmillan, 1990). See p.209.
^Linklater, "Realism, Marxism and Critical International Theory", Review of International Studies 12 
(1986), pp.301-312, at p.301.
^Ibid, p.302, emphasis added.
69Ibid, pp.301-302.
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inquiry into the measures which may be capable of advancing this ideal". This ambition, 
as the title of his work suggested was, for Linklater, bound up with an attempt to 
"incorporate" and "supersede" Realism and Marxism .70 It was, in other words, an 
argument in favour of dialectical synthesis that went far beyond the emancipatory themes 
to be found in either Ashley's or Cox's work. While Ashley and Cox sought to expose a 
tension within Realism that represented a potential (hermeneutic) "thinking space" for any 
Critical Theory perspective, Linklater's approach was built upon more orthodox 
modemist foundations. Consequently, Linklater’s dialectical approach had a "totalising" 
dimension to the extent that its "thesis" (Realism) and "antithesis" (Marxism) were 
represented in antinomised form, a form capable of generating a "real" meaning from both 
which could then be utilised as the basis of a synthetic "transcendence".71
This is a perspective articulated in Bevond Realism and Marxism, from a position 
rooted in Enlightenment rationalism and a reading of Realism and Marxism, in 
International Relations, which acknowledged their limitations but which seemed oblivious 
to, and/or uninterested in, those critiques o f both which stress the dangers of modernist 
universality and the imposition of essentialist meaning in theory and practice. Thus, in 
Bevond Realism and Marxism Linklater couched his emphasis on the "significance of 
moral development" and his evaluation of "the evolution of universal moral norms" in 
terms of Habermasian Critical Theory and sought his synthesis with Realism on this 
basis.72 He was aware, of course, of Realist antipathy to a position such as this and the 
added difficulties, therefore, of any dialectical synthesis.73 This, however, was no 
insurmountable problem for a scholar of the British/Australian school, who turned, in 
time honoured fashion, to Martin Wight for additional "thinking space".
7®See Linklater, Bevond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1990), p.7.
71 Ibid, p.5.
72Ibid, p.7.
73Ibid, Chapter 1, especially pp.9-15 and conclusion.
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The value of Wight here, of course, relates to his (in)famous trichotomy in 1966 
which categorised International Relations thought in terms of Realist (Machiavellian) 
Rationalist (Grotian) and Revolutionist (Kantian) perspectives.74 For scholars such as 
Bull this second category allowed space for Realist analysis of international "society", 
rather than merely a system of anarchic states. For Linklater, the final two categories 
allowed space for an analysis that "shifts the emphasis from systemic forces to systemic 
principles".75 The systemic principles at issue, in this case, were those of universal 
morality and universal community - the principles of a universalised emancipatory project 
- principles that, via Wight, could now be encompassed within a single synthetic schema 
involving elements of (Traditionalist) Realism.
As my previous comments have indicated I have some empathy with a project that 
confronts neo-Realism with insights drawn from a sophisticated Historical Materialism, a 
la Robert Cox. However, while Linklater's contribution over the years have been 
characterised by high quality analysis and a thoughtful, critical disposition, his 
perspective is more obviously problematic in terms of its modemist limitations. It is one 
thing, for example, to develop a counter-hegemonic argument on Gramscian and 
Habermasian grounds, it is quite another to seek to combine "elements of Realism and 
Marxism within one conceptual framework" particularly if that conceptual framework is 
dependent upon the "recovery" of universal moral norms and notions of universal moral 
communities.76 It is in this sense that Linklater's work is highly susceptible to the "meta- 
narradve" critiques of post-modernists concerned about the dangers of continuing to think 
and act in terms of (Western, modemist) universalist schemas for emancipation of the 
species. In a Postscript to the second edition of Men and Citizens. Linklater began to 
address the issues at stake here, and he did so with some sensitivity to the differences and
74See Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?", in Diplomatic Investigations edited by Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966). See also the comments on this 
strategy in Chapter One footnotes 24 and 53.
75Linklater, Bevond Realism and Marxism, p.17.
76Ibid, p.165.
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potential points of contact between Critical Theory and post-modernism. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether this represents a serious concern to confront the problems of 
modernism or whether the synthetic commitments persist.77 This is a question confronted 
in a slightly different way in the final example of emancipatory scholarship for discussion 
here, that centred on the mini-debate of the late 1980s between two British scholars, Mark 
Hoffman and Nick Rengger.78
Hoffman sparked off the debate in 1987 with an article highlighting the 
significance of Critical Theory approaches for the "inter paradigm debate", which for 
British scholars centred at the LSE, in particular, represents the current state of the 
disciplinary an in International Relations.79 Hoffman's proposal, complementing the 
Traditional view of the discipline's development, was that following the two "great 
debates" and the "post behavioural revolution" of the 1970s and the new International 
Political Economy surge of the 1980s, Realism had lost its status as the "agreed core of 
the subject" and the discipline was now characterised by paradigmatic diversity.80 This 
situation, he characterised as leading to both "confusion and a degree of intellectual 
insecurity" and a discipline increasingly "exciting and alive because of the diversity of 
approaches, issues and questions within it".81 Emitting one cheer for this diversity 
Hoffman's response was (like that of Giddens in the broader context and Linklater in the
77Certainly in Bevond Realism and Marxism, also published in 1990, the sensitivity towards post­
modernism is entirely absent to the extent that when alluding to the new critical debates it is virtually 
ignored. There are obtuse references however that say much. For example, when discussing theorising in 
the 1980s Linklater reduces the debates to the tension between positivism and hermeneutics. However, he 
claims, "what they have overlooked is the possibility of a critical theory of international relations which 
analyses the prospects for universal emancipation", ibid, p.4. This is an extraordinary statement given 
the focus upon this very question in almost all post-modernist scholarship but it does indicate Linklater's 
attitudes and perspectives.
78See Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Millennium 16 (1987), pp.231-249; 
Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.91-95; 
and Rengger, "Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.81-89.
79For an influential articulation of this theme see Michael Banks, "The Inter Paradigm Debate", in 
International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory edited by Margot Light and A.J. R. Groom 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1985).
^^Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", p.231.
81 Ibid.
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more immediate one) to seek to overcome any sense of intellectual insecurity by
"restructuring" the discipline in favour of a Critical Theory paradigm, which:
through the process of self-understanding and self-reflection, is able to 
provide a critique of existing social order and to point to its immanent 
capacity for change and for the realisation of human potential.82
Indeed, in Hoffman’s view, Critical Theory represented "the next stage in the
development of International Relations theory," a stage with:
the potential for creating a new focus within the discipline of International 
Relations that is post-realist and post-Marxist...[which] provides the basis 
for the reintegration of International Relations into the broader traditions and 
concerns of social and political theory.83
At its most specific, in emancipatory terms, this new Critical Theory "stage" was set to 
return International Relations thinking to its essence, its fundamental purpose. Or in 
Hoffman's (Marxian derived) terms "the point of international relations theory is not to 
alter the way we look at the world, but to alter the world".84
Responding to Hoffman's article, Nick Rengger affirmed his general agreement 
with its concerns but questioned some of Hoffman's assumptions about his Critical 
Theory paradigm and its role in the contemporary debate.85 In short, what Rengger 
proposed, gently and in a rudimentary way, was that Hoffman's notion of a radically 
inclined Critical Theory set to lead International Relations into the next stage of its 
development, missed two important points intrinsic to the issue. The first: that much of 
the critical literature of the 1980s seeking a "reintegration" of international theory and 
Social Theory, and concerned with radically transforming the discipline, did so from 
positions that were, in other respects, incompatible with Hoffman's Critical Theory.
82Ibid, p.231.
83Ibid, p.247.
84Ibid, p.244.
85Rengger, "Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman".
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There was, suggested Rengger, a growing body of critical scholarship of this kind, 
which "stood close to, or within post-modernism".86
The second point, a more substantive one in relation to Hoffman's argument, 
questioned the nature of Hoffman's Critical Theory and its relationship to the paradigms it 
sought to supersede. Rengger's point was that the Critical Theory propounded by 
Hoffman sounded very like the "establishment international theory" it opposed.87 The 
connection point here was the rationalism inherent to both. In Hoffman's approach it was 
represented in terms of the search for elements "universal to world order,". In 
International Relations, more generally, it was represented as an unambiguous 
"reductionist rationalism" integral to "problem solving" theory .88 This created the 
suspicion for Rengger that Hoffman's Critical Theory was, perhaps, philosophically 
committed to the very foundationalism and positivism that it was constructed to 
overcome. It was in this sense, part of a dominant modemist discourse, articulated in 
terms of a conventional Marxist dialectic, that is a dialectic "with a fixed terminus: a telos 
to aim for and to bring about".89
Hoffman's reply to Rengger was pitched at a significantly higher level than his 
original article, and it introduced to the debate some themes touched on in Chapter Four 
of the thesis, which are, I think, crucial to the debate between (broadly) emancipatory 
approaches and post-modernism in International Relations.90 On the question of 
rationality, for example, Hoffman took a Habermasian position in rejecting the notion of a 
single, already existing rationality, deep within modernism awaiting "re-discovery" in 
Critical Theory. Acknowledging the Enlightenment legacy within Critical Theory, it was,
S^Which Rengger termed "radical interpretivism", see ibid, p.84.
87Ibid, p.82.
88 Ibid.
89Ibid, p.83.
^ H offm an, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory".
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nevertheless, argued Hoffman "the most self-reflective outpost of the radical tradition of
the Enlightenment" and it was in this context that its rationalist commitments needed to be
understood.91 In particular, he stressed, Critical Theory understood the problem as not
human rationality per se, but "the universalisation of a single form of rationality, namely
instrumental, economic and administrative reason". Consequently, Critical Theory:
retains a concept of reason which asserts itself simultaneously against both 
instrumentalism and existentialism, which is exercised in conjunction with 
normative concerns and which is critically applicable to itself. The essence of 
rationality, in the context of critical theory, entails a limitless invitation to 
criticism. In consequence a complacent faith in rationalism is ruled out.92
The issues of foundationalism and universalism received similar defences. On the former 
Hoffman reiterated Critical Theory's antipathy to all kinds of certain knowledge, derived 
from "external" sources. Rather, he countered, Critical Theory "points to open ended 
knowledge which is continually subject to critical assessment".93 It was in this sense, he 
argued, that its notion of dialectics resisted the teleology of a "fixed terminus" approach, 
such approaches entailing "a determinism of outcomes which critical theory specifically 
seeks to counter".94 This principle, Hoffman suggested, flowed over to the question of 
universality in Critical Theory, which it always confronted in a "cautious and contingent" 
manner. The point, he maintained, was that unless a critical social theory could offer 
"universalistic standpoints" we are reduced to arguments that can only "convince a given 
audience at a given time".95 What Critical Theory provided in this circumstance, was an 
approach which, both "recognises the problem [of universality] and acknowledges its 
own limitations".96 Hoffman did not directly address the issue of post-modernism in his 
reply to Rengger but implicit throughout it was an attitude rather similar to Linklater's
91 Ibid, p.92.
^Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94Ibid, p.93.
95 Ibid.
%Ibid.
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which reduced post-modernist analysis to the realm of "dispassionate observers rather 
than concerned critics".97
Overall, the Hoffman-Rengger conversation has added a useful dimension to a 
discipline unused to the art of philosophical reflection on the way we come to "know" and 
give "meaning" to the world and, in its British context, it brought some interesting 
contemporary social theory themes to bear upon a disciplinary sector bereft, generally, of 
such discourse.98 In the context of this thesis it represents a useful point of thematic 
continuity on questions of theory and practice that have been confronted in a number of 
different ways throughout this thesis. In this regard it helps re-focus attention upon post­
modernist contributions to the Third Debate, which are now to be the focus of the final 
chapter.
Summary
This chapter has focused on one of the most potent articulations of Critical Social Theory 
scholarship in International Relations - the Critical Theory perspectives derived from the 
post-Kantian emancipatory impulse in Western philosophy and the more specific 
influences of Hegel, the Frankfurt School and anti-structuralist Marxism (e.g. in 
Gramsci). The chapter dealt with four dimensions of the Critical Theory contribution to 
the Third Debate, those of Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater and the 
Hoffman-Rengger debate. It sought in this way to give a sense of the diversity and 
analytical quality associated with the Critical Theory perspective and to indicate again 
some of the problems of a post-Kantian emancipatory perspective in its efforts to 
overcome the closure of neo-Realism in the 1980s and 1990s. Ashley's contribution was 
an important one in this regard not only for the intellectual breadth and insight it brought
97 Ibid.
98its value remains limited, for example,because of its inability to question the status of Realism in its 
"paradigm" format, and because of the rather unsophisticated and uncritical approach to the paradigm 
question in general. Vasquez's understanding of the Kuhnian perspective is of a far higher standard.
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to the debate but because of the tensions it exposed in the Critical Theory quest to 
"recover" from modernity its emancipatory dimensions. Ashley's critique of neo-Realism 
stands as perhaps the most devastating indictment of orthodox unselfconsciousness yet 
recorded in the Third Debate. And it came as little surprise that leading neo-Realist 
figures, such as Gilpin, were embarrassingly limited in their responses to him: Ashley 
after all had confronted them with their "unwritten preface". And yet, as indicated in the 
discussion, there was enough slippage in Ashley's argument to allow for counter 
responses that had a measure of validity."
Cox's contribution was interesting in this regard because it too illustrated the 
"poverty" of neo-Realism but in a slightly different manner. In 1981, applying some 
relatively orthodox Critical Theory principles, Cox was able to locate neo-Realism's 
"problem solving" approach as an updated variant of a conservative (Cold War oriented) 
Realism, committed above all to a retention of the status quo in theory and (foreign 
policy) practice. From his Gramscian oriented perspective, in 1987, he was able to 
illustrate the static and limited nature of neo-Realist analysis again, this time by providing 
an analysis of the world political economy that was inclusive, wide ranging and 
theoretically sophisticated. The contributions of both Ashley and Cox were substantially 
different from their neo-Realist counterparts in another way also, in that they raised 
questions about issues rendered effectively silenced by the orthodoxy (e.g.power, 
hegemony, change, ideology).
The problems of a Critical Theory approach were also highlighted in the chapter, 
with the tendency toward universalism and essentialism (and ultimately foundationalism) 
noted in works which, nevertheless, represent important sites of critical modernist
" T h e  reason for Ashley's vulnerability, in this regard, is an issue that goes to the heart of a debate 
touched on in Chapter Four of the thesis and the tensions between Critical Theory and post-modernism, 
which I argued were important for the future of a Critical Social Theory perspective in International 
Relations. Put simply, it is a question of whether the framing regime which distinguishes Critical 
Theory and upon which it attempts to "recover" the critical elements of modernity is such that it must 
always result in the kind of paradoxical dichotomy that Ashley's critics pounced on with such relish. I 
am not sure that it does. Whatever the case, this might be a useful area of debate for Critical Social 
Theorists in the future.
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resistance to the Realist mainstream. The chapter to follow concentrates on the primary 
site of this resistance in the Third Debate - post-modernism.
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CHAPTER NINE
OPENING UP "THINKING" SPACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (n) 
POST-MODERNISM: RECONCEPTUALISING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The nature of the post-modernist challenge to the Tradition and discipline of International 
Relations is quite literally spelt out in the title of James Der Derian's and Michael 
Shapiro's, Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics.1 
The explicit influences on this work, those of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva, 
Barthes and Baudrillard are, in more than the obvious sense, "foreign" to a discipline 
dominated from its Anglo-American centre. The influences, more generally, are those of 
discourse analysis, genealogy, deconstructionism and textuality, and it is in this context 
that post-modernists have sought to question, critique and add dimensions to the "reality" 
of International Relations.
The "foreignness" of the post-modem approach is epitomised in the inclination to 
"read" the social world as a text; an inclination integral to Derrida's deconstructive 
philosophy, aimed at logocentric framing practices, and Foucault's concern with 
discursive practices generally. The central questions asked by scholars such as these 
concern notions of "meaning" and "knowing", fundamental concepts in Western 
philosophical discourse. Or, more precisely, they concern the implication for our 
dominant forms of "meaning" and "knowing", if the processes integral to the construction 
of a text are indeed analogous to the process by which social and political reality is 
constructed. From a post-modernist perspective, the critical task is to illustrate how the 
textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to illustrate, in specific 
contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the
*See Der Denan and Shapiro eds., Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World 
Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989).
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contemporary world.2 It is in this way that post-modernism re-focuses contemporary 
analysis on the power/knowledge nexus and, to a greater extent even than Critical 
Theory, on theory as practice.
In the post-modernist contribution to International Relations, consequently, there 
has emerged an alternative way of understanding and articulating reality, one focused on 
intertextuanty and socio-linguistic practice, rather than monological literary convention 
and positivist objectivism and foundationalism.3 Whatever else this alternative approach 
achieves, it problematises the dominant modernist commitment to a world o f given 
subjects and objects, and all other dichotomised givens. In so doing it reformulates basic 
questions of modernist understanding in emphasising not the sovereign subject (e.g. 
author/independent state) and/or the object (e.g. independent world/text) but, instead, the 
historical, cultural and linguistic practices in which subjects and objects, (and theory and 
practice, facts and values) are constructed.4 Post-modern approaches in International 
Relations are thus concerned:
to interrogate present knowledge of international relations through past 
practices, to search out the margins of political theory, to listen for the critical
^Derrida, for example, sought to do this by illustrating how the logocentric process of construction in 
modernist philosophy is intrinsic to the way that contemporary social reality is constructed in terms of a 
hierarchy of socio-political "meaning", centred on a sovereign voice (e.g. of reason, reality, systemic 
interest) and a marginalised, excluded regime of "otherness". Foucault sought to further historicise these 
dual processes by illustrating how, via dominant discursive practices, we have come to "know" ourselves 
as modem peoples, and how, in this discursive context, we give (subjective) "meaning" to the 
(objectified)world. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatologv trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge trans. A.M. 
Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972).
3ln other words where real meaning is derived from the interrelationship of texts rather than from some 
objectified external source. This is what Barthes was getting at with his notion of "intertext" as "a multi­
dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash", cited in Der 
Derian, "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations", in International/ 
Intertextual eds. Der Derian and Shapiro, p.6. In the same volume see Michael Shapiro, "Textualising 
Global Politics"; and William Connolly's discussion of the "discovery" of America in intertextualist 
terms in "Identity and Difference in Global Politics". The language issue in post-modernism is influenced 
(as well as by Wittgenstein) by the critical reaction to the structuralism of Saussurian linguistics by 
scholars like Derrida and the understanding of language and discourse that flows from this debate. Thus, 
instead of language being an asset employed by a pre-existing subject, or a constraint imposed on that 
subject, language comes to be seen as the medium through which the social identity and existence of that 
subject is made possible.
4Language, thus, is emphasised, not as a capacity of, or constraint upon a "given" subject but as a 
medium through which subjects (and objects) are made.
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voices drowned out by official discourses, and to conduct a theoretic 
investigation of the textual interplay behind power politics.5
It is in this deconstructionist "thinking space" that post-modern scholars, in their 
different ways, have begun to challenge the dominant orthodoxy in International 
Relations. In this final phase of the thesis, consequently, I want to address some of the 
most significant of these post-modernist works and indicate more generally the 
contributions of post-modern scholarship to a Critical Social Theory of International 
Relations.6 The discussion will be organised around four broad concerns of post-modern 
scholarship in particular: the first emphasises the concern to open up to critical 
interrogation the "great texts" of the International Relations Tradition and discipline; the 
second focuses on post-modernist challenges to fundamental Realist concepts such as 
sovereignty, anarchy and the construction of Otherness; the third looks at some of the 
ways in which post-modernists have dealt with the questions facing International 
Relations at the end of the Cold War; and the fourth touches on the nature of, and 
prospects for, a post-modern politics of resistance in International Relations.
Textualising International Relations: Re-reading the Tradition and its Discipline
One of the major post-modernist incursions into alien International Relations territory, 
has, not surprisingly, sought to disrupt the discursive certainty derived from the 
Traditional "great texts". The aim here has not been to dismiss the dominant readings but 
to illustrate that they are, indeed, "readings"; that they can be "read" in different ways; 
that their status is derived, not from any correspondence with an essential (real) meaning,
5Der Denan, "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations", p.6.
^Post-modem scholars have been extraordinarily prolific in recent years. This, added to the complexity of 
their arguments means that I can't claim the following discussion to be comprehensive, as such. My 
aim, rather is to select what I consider to be some of the major contributions of recent times, works 
which establish some of the larger philosophical principles of post-modem scholarship in dealing with 
quite precise topics and issues. My aim on the complexity issue is the same as that throughout the work, 
to do justice to sophisticated themes while representing them in the most accessible and concise way I 
can.
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but from a discursive strategy intrinsically connected to the dominant form of (socio- 
historical) knowledge and power.7
The necessity for an alternative reading of the major Realist texts has been 
enhanced in recent times as neo-Realists have confronted the uncertainty of the age by 
calling again on "heroic figures", such as Thucydides and Machiavelli, to grant their 
updated scientism a measure of Traditional credibility.8 Scholars from more general 
Critical Social Theory perspectives have assisted post-modernists in undermining neo- 
Realism in this regard. Michael Doyle, for example, has noted that while a particular 
reading of Thucydides might well be consistent with a "minimalist" Realism which 
reduces International Relations to the crudest form of anarchy it is incompatible with the 
scientific structuralism of neo-Realism.9 Following a careful (re)reading of Thucydides' 
works, Doyle stressed the incompatibility between an approach which centres its Realism 
upon notions of "ends defined in terms of power" and rational choice theory, and a 
Thucydides, who held that:
7 At the core of this challenge has been a repudiation of the positivist reading rules characteristic of 
International Relations scholarship. The critical proposition here is that "reading" for International 
Relations has been understood as a largely unproblematical enterprise, a natural, neutral activity, whereby 
an interested individual enters into some sort of imaginative encounter with a [literary] text, reading it 
respectfully on its own terms and drawing real meaning from it. The contrary position is that this 
approach to reading is far from neutral but congruent with a particular modernist discursive practice, 
which objectifies the text and detaches the reader from it
^Kenneth Waltz, for example, has maintained that The Peloponnesian War represents a fundamental 
account of the "anarchic character of international politics". As an early Realist, claimed Waltz, 
Thucydides understood the timeless axioms of international life and consequently remained a thinker 
relevant to the contemporary age of nuclear arms with his insights into the "striking sameness of the 
quality of international life thought the millennia", see Theory of International Politics. (Reading, Mass: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979), p.66. Robert Keohane, meanwhile, in discussing the latest (structuralist) 
reformulation of Realist thought acknowledged a linear connection between Thucydides, Morgenthau and 
Waltz. Indeed suggested Keohane, in Thucydides there is to be found the three fundamental assumptions 
of Realism that in Politics Among Nations formed the basis of Morgenthau’s contribution to the theory 
and practice of United States foreign policy in the Cold War years and which in Theory of International 
Politics underpinned the structuralism or neo-Realism that is "at the center of contemporary international 
relations theory in the United States" in the 1980s and 1990s. Keohane's comments can be found in 
"Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Neorealism and its Critics edited by Keohane 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.2-11.
9Doyle, "Thucydidean Realism", Review of International Studies 16(3) (1990), pp.223-237, p.231.
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neither a state's ends nor its means nor (therefore) its choices could be 
adequately determined solely through an analysis of international structure.10
Daniel Garst has taken this theme a little further in illustrating how shaky is the 
textual foundation of neo-Realism's world view .11 Garst was particularly interested in the 
way that neo-Realists such as Gilpin, Waltz and Keohane sought to appropriate 
Thucydides as the first "scientific" Realist. There are a number of quite fundamental 
problems with such a reading, argued Garst. One major problem is that it 
misunderstands completely the emphasis placed by Thucydides on the significance of 
human actors as the "conscious initiators of events" .12 Consequently, "Thucydides does 
not begin" with structuralist principles which posit the foundation of an anarchical world 
in the "external" power distribution of actors. Nor does his argument in The History of 
the Peloponnesian War follow this logic unless one reads it an extremely limited manner, 
one which excludes from serious attention a series of verbal exchanges or "paired 
speeches" which Thucydides interweaves with the main narrative in order to "lay bare 
what stood behind the narrative" .13 This, however, is precisely what happens when neo- 
Realists such as Gilpin, Waltz and (to a lesser extent) Keohane read Thucydides. The 
result is a very unconvincing reading of Thucydides which, according to Garst, 
completely misrepresents his position on power politics, anarchy and the timeless realities 
of International Relations.14 Thus, concluded Garst, contrary to neo-Realist claims 
"Thucydides' history does not point to general laws explaining international conflict, nor 
did its author intend it to do so". Moreover:
10Ibid, p.235.
1 *Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism", International Studies Quarterly 33(1) (1989), pp.3-27.
12Ibid, p.6.
13Ibid, p.7. Garst makes the point that Hobbes’ translation of The Peloponnesian Wars noted the crucial 
significance of this strategy.
^Particularly unconvincing in regard to the correlation drawn by Keohane between Thucydides and 
Morgenthau, both of whom its asserted, sought to understand reality via the documented perspectives of 
leaders and statesmen in historical context The problem for Keohane, noted Garst, is that it is in the 
marginalised verbal exchanges rather than in the narrative per se that Thucydides presented the "accurate 
accounts of actual speeches given on particular occasions", ibid, p.5.
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Thucydides reminds us that power and hegemony are above all bound to the 
existence of political and social structures and the intersubjective conventions 
associated with them. Nothing could be more foreign to Thucydides' way of 
thinking than neorealism's ahistorical treatment of these concepts. And 
nothing could be more pernicious to Thucydides than neorealism's insistence 
that the quest for power is an underlying and enduring systemic imperative 
that exists independently of social structures created and maintained by 
human agency. 15
The significance of these critiques cannot be overstated, nor can Garst's 
conclusion that, once critically read, Thucydides is better understood not as the "father of 
realism" but as a "contested terrain for realist and critical approaches to international 
relations" .16 The critical significance of this "thinking space" is that it renders highly 
problematic the whole textual foundation of the Realist dominated discipline of 
International Relations. It brings into question the literary font of Realist eternal wisdom, 
upon which Realists from Wight to Waltz have legitimated their transhistorical images of 
"recurrence and repetition". It creates ambiguity at the core of Keohane's philosophical 
certainty concerning the "fundamental" connection between the ancient and contemporary 
worlds, now flowing through structural Realism. It signifies real doubt as to the validity 
of Krasner's neo-Realist image of "normal [anarchical] state of international affairs" .17 It 
renders ironical Gilpin's proposition that "[e]verything that the new realists find 
intriguing in the interaction of international economics and international politics can be 
found in The History of the Peloponnesian War”.ls
15Ibid, p.25. This final theme has also been probed by Hayward Alker, who has emphasised the 
significance of dialectical logic in Thucydides work. Utilising a formal dialogical approach to textual 
inquiry, Alker has illustrated how the Melian Dialogue, in particular, has been appropriated by neo- 
Realism in ways that have severely limited the consideration of political options in the contemporary 
period. See Alker, "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue", American Political Science 
Review 82 (1988), pp.805-20; see also Alker and David Sylvan, "Foreign Policy as Tragedy: Sending 
100,000 Troops to Vietnam" Paper prepared for the XIV World Congress of the International Political 
Science Association (Washington, D.C. August, 28-September 1 1988).
^ S ee  Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism", p.3.
17See the discussion on Krasner's position in Chapter Seven, pp.297-299.
^G ilp in , "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Neorealism and Its Critics ed. 
Keohane, p.308.
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The point, in reiteration, is not that these alternative readings are "right" and 
Realist readings "wrong", but that what we are dealing with at the foundation of the 
Tradition of International Relations is a contested terrain of textuality and representation, 
not an arena of politico-economic certainty, nor historical "fact". In an era in which 
hermeneutic insight and "contextuaiism" have become increasingly respectable in Anglo- 
American social theory, this might appear a rather insubstantial point to be making (or re­
making) at this stage of the thesis. However, as was stressed in Chapter One in regard to 
the positivism at the core of International Relations, this remains an issue of real 
significance because it goes to the heart of the "primitive" Realism which continues to 
dominate in this context. Thus, to acknowledge alternative readings as corresponding to 
what Thucydides thought and said, is to undermine the foundationalism that has 
underpinned Realism, and modemist thought in general since the Seventeenth century. It 
is to undermine the notion of a single, irreducible reality, against which conflicting 
interpretations/theories can be evaluated for their truth content. Moreover, to 
acknowledge the "reality" of alternative readings of Thucydides is to bring into question 
that which by its phenomenalist and nominalist premises cannot be questioned, the 
empiricist/positivism that allows Realism its (rational scientific) legitimacy, its (modem) 
intellectual and social power. It is to bring into question the very Tradition which is 
International Relations, to cast doubt upon the discipline which sets its boundaries and 
establishes its rules of thinking and research, its criterion of "meaningfulness".
Major post-modernist scholars of the Third Debate, such as R.B.J. Walker, 
James Der Derian and (post-1984) Richard Ashley are well aware of the implications for 
orthodox theory and practice of the "thinking space", opened via intertextualist strategies. 
In their contributions of recent years, accordingly, they have sought to further disrupt 
Realist textual certainty, while seeking always to illustrate the broader discursive 
connections between the dominant Tradition of International Relations and of modernist 
theory and practice.
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Walker, for example, has critically reassessed the significance of Machiavelli in
this regard finding that, as with Thucydides, and the other literary icons of Realism,
Machiavelli has been reduced to a "heroic figure" of parody and caricature by those
seeking philosophical certainty for their image of the contemporary world of states.19 To
re-read Machiavelli, in this context, is thus to "problematize the most basic assumptions
on which claims about the tradition are based". Moreover, and more directly regarding
the post-modernist concern with the knowledge/power nexus, it is to:
indicate one way of identifying some of the discursive practices that have 
turned a historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of 
the present.20
As a Realist icon, of course, Machiavelli appears in the Traditional folk lore on
one side of the great logocentric divide between Realists and Others (Idealists, "domestic"
political theorists, ideologues etc). This has provided for the discipline an "eternal
dialogue" that, in its most common reading, is reduced to an "essentialist monologue" in
which, via a great man reading of the (textual) script:
terms such as power, state and national interest appear with great regularity, 
interspersed with claims about human nature or political necessity, structural 
determinism or the tragic condition of human existence in general.21
Sometimes, as Walker noted, the dichotomised format is reformulated somewhat to 
include a via-media notion, as in Wight's work, or to take account of Weberian 
sensibilities, as in the contributions of a Morgenthau or a Stanley Hoffmann. But this 
does not in any fundamental way question either the boundaries, or the (power politics) 
premises of a Tradition framed in Realist terms.22
19Walker, "The Prince and 'The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International 
Relations" in Intemational/Intertexmal eds. Der Derian and Shapiro, pp.25-49.
20Ibid, p.29.
21 Ibid, p.31.
22In Wight's case, the middle road acts above all to reinforce the foundational legitimacy of its two 
opposite poles, while adding a mellower tone to the starkness of one of them. The utilisation of 
Weberian themes has a similar motivation and purpose in allowing those "uncomfortable" with their 
power politics commitments to seek refuge in a Weberian "ethics of responsibility". But as Walker puts
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Accordingly, crucial to all Realists, be they Humean Tories such as Wight and 
Bull or North American structuralists such as Waltz, Keohane and Krasner, is the figure 
of Machiavelli, or at least the Machiavelli of the dominant Realist disciplinary reading. 
This "Machiavelli" gives to Realism its Renaissance complement to Thucydides' Classical 
statement of the "priority of power over ethics, about the necessity of violence and 
intrigue in the affairs of state, about ends justifying means and raison d'etat” .23 
However, argued Walker, this is to simply endorse a "particularly suspicious interpretive 
history" about Machiavelli which has been long acknowledged elsewhere but not in the 
"backward discipline" of International Relations.24 At least two significant silences are 
evident in the dominant Realist reading, he suggested. The first concerns The Prince, the 
exemplar text of Machiavellian Realism. Here, Realists have accorded essentialist status 
to those passages in which Machiavelli appears to distinguish between power and ethics, 
privileging the former over the latter. But, charged Walker, to represent this as 
Machiavelli's "essential" position and, more significantly, as an element of some eternal 
Realist wisdom, is to engage in the kind of exclusionary textual strategy that is replicated 
in the dominant knowledge forms and power relations of modem social life.
In the case of The Prince, for example, the dominant reading is rendered entirely 
problematic the moment one includes that which is excluded and/or marginalised in 
Traditional discourse, the issue of virtu, and Machiavelli’s attempt to deal with the 
problem of violence in the pursuit of a life of virtu, which is the major focus of The 
Prince. Moreover, when the question of virtu is read into The Prince, it becomes 
apparent, Walker maintained, that the text revered by Realists as integral to a historico- 
philosophical Tradition of state centric Realism is, more accurately, a work concerned 
with the specific problems of the new Renaissance states. A re-reading of The Prince.
it "the ethic of absolute ends" remains the silent possibility against which necessities and responsibilities 
are articulated". See Ibid, p.30.
23Ibid, p.32.
24Ibid. It is worth recording here C.C. O’Brien's comment that according to Isiah Berlin there were at 
least twenty-eight "main interpretations" of Machiavelli. See The Suspecting Glance (London: Fairbain 
and Fairbain, 1972), p.21.
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concluded Walker, renders Machiavelli not the Renaissance heir of Thucydides, but 
"someone trying to make sense of historically specific circumstances and attempting to do 
so in the discursive categories then available to him".25
This, reading, he argued, is given added salience when the second silence of the 
Realist "Machiavelli" is opened up for inquiry. This is the silence on works other than 
The Prince, effectively ignored by Realists, which, if consulted, contain "another" 
Machiavelli and a series of questions that Realism and the International Relations 
Tradition cannot answer. The point is that the Machiavelli that emerges from the 
Discourses on Livy, or The History of Florence, or the Art of War, is not the arch Realist 
of International Relations at all, but a complex Renaissance scholar concerned above all 
"with the possibility of establishing a life of virtu within autonomous political 
communities".26 More obviously than in the The Prince, the central concern here is not 
the anarchic state system, as the Tradition and discipline must insist, but the Classical 
(Greek) conception of the polis, pan of the "domestic" realm that is (dichotomously) 
separated off from the "international" by the Tradition that proclaims Machiavelli as its 
o w n . 27 And, for those who for nearly half a century now have sought to 
unproblematically connect Machiavelli, via some linear textual chain, to the contemporary 
world of International Relations, there is, claimed Walker, another substantial problem of 
"reading". This concerns Machiavelli's philosophical antipathy to all universalist 
schemas and/or notions of transhistorical structural laws. Here, noted Walker, 
Machiavelli's acknowledgement of fortuna as intrinsic to social life and his Classical 
notion of time, undermine any appropriation of him as an early voice of a universalised 
"recurrence and repetition" and/or structural necessity.28 Rather, Machiavelli can be read
25Walker, "The Prince and the Pauper", p.33.
26Ibid, p.34.
22Thus, as Walker emphasises, though Machiavelli’s concerns with skill, virility and courage allow for 
extra-territorial situations, these are qualities considered "first and foremost" as necessary for "effective 
participation and citizenship within the community", ibid, p.36.
28Fortuna, argued Machiavelli, was "the arbiter of one half of our actions", ibid, p.37. Thus the qualities 
of virtu in the Prince were partly the capacity to deal with those things that could not be controlled.
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as drawing on Classical philosophical notions of time and being, which, for example, 
rebut any (Christian derived) notions of determinate "externalities", and/or modem 
notions of time which fit some "knowable" pattern or structure.29 Instead, Machiavelli's 
sense of time, and of political life, in time, was dominated by the notion of temporal flux 
and contingency in which the vicissitudes of fortuna rendered inappropriate and 
dangerous any philosophy of certainty, order and control.30
As in the case of Thucydides, then, the Tradition of International Relations, 
legitimated to the present by the textual certainty of power politics and structural anarchy 
in Machiavelli, is found to be highly problematic and uncertain under alternative critical 
inquiry. Thus, as Walker concluded:
Structural accounts of the international system draw upon ontological (and 
thus political) commitments that are significantly different from those to be 
found in Machiavelli's writings. [Moreover] Contrary to some translations, 
there is no clear statement to the effect that the end justifies the means. There 
is no clear notion of national interest defined as power.31
For all this, argued Walker, there should be no surprise that Realists of all hues should
continue to privilege a caricatured reading of Machiavelli, because it is integral to the:
last ditch attempts by the defenders of modernity to hang on to the promised 
certainties of scientific method and the philosophy of identity.32
The significance of the Traditional "Machiavelli", in this regard, is underscored, of
course, when one remembers that in Realism's pursuit of certainty, identity and control:
[i]t was only after Machiavelli that the principle of state sovereignty came to 
be framed within the context of the Euclidean-Galilean principle of absolute 
space rather than the complex overlapping jurisdictions of the medieval era. 
[And]...it was only after Machiavelli that it became possible to pretend that 
the state is a fixed form, a pretence expressed initially in the legal codes of
29In which time and social and political life is subordinated to and determined by some external realm of 
eternity.
3®At one level there is "recurrence and repetition" in the sense that there is a cyclical dimension to 
Machiavelli's thought. The point here is that given the surety about fortuna and the need to guard against 
it, this is hardly the rationalist and/or positivist certainty of Realist readings of it.
31 Ibid, p.40. 
32Ibid, p.44.
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territorial sovereignty, and found more recently in the reifying categories of 
so much of the socioscientific analysis of "balances of power" and "foreign 
policy decision making".33
Walker's conclusions on the Realist readings of Machiavelli are most important in 
a post-modernist context in that they return the discussion squarely to the issue of 
modernism and the discursive practices associated with the "making" of International 
Relations. This is a theme underlying W alker's proposition that, following a 
deconstructivist reading of Machiavelli it would be more appropriate, perhaps, to include 
him as part of an idealist tradition, rather than a Realist one. Machiavelli, read this way, 
is the Renaissance humanist struggling to find at least a minimal political ethics in a world 
in violent flux brought on by the emergence of the new state system. Walker's point, of 
course, is not that Machiavelli necessarily should be read this way, but that the possibility 
of this, or any other alternative reading, is excluded from serious consideration in the 
International Relations Tradition. This not only blocks off potential "thinking space" in 
an already closed discipline, it limits the insight that might be gained from a significant 
thinker; it reduces our understanding of the state system to a modemist textual caricature, 
and it continues to blind the dominant contemporary approach to theory and practice to the 
processes by which it reads its "reality", and lives it.
In particular it blinds Realism to its process of constructing its philosophical and 
social "meaning", because:
[w]hat is systematically obscured by the reifying claims about realism as a 
tradition is that realism has been constituted historically through the negation 
and displacement of a prior understanding of political life understood in the 
context of universalist aspirations. [Thus] if one is to speak meaningfully of 
a tradition of international relations theory at all, it must be an account that 
places the discursive practices of negation and displacement at the centre.34
This final theme has been central also to James Der Derian's attempts to prise open some 
"thinking space" in other regions of the Realist discursive empire. Concentrating, initially 
on opening up genealogical questions left begging by Traditionalist Realists, Der Derian
33Ibid, p.42. 
34Ibid, p.39.
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has, more recently, probed Realist strategies of "negation and displacement" from a 
sophisticated semiotic perspective.35
In the former mode Der Derian engaged in a re-reading, in 1987, of the "true 
tradition" of diplomatic statecraft.36 Acknowledging that Traditionalist Realism had 
provided a "richer vein" of historical scholarship on diplomacy than its "problem solving" 
counterpart, Der Derian emphasised, nevertheless, the closure of a Traditionalist "history" 
marked by conservatism and essentialist reading strategies.37 Thus, the Traditionalist 
image of diplomacy is often:
implicitly and uncritically supportive of a teleological view of diplomacy, the 
idea that we have reached - or even are approaching - after a long odyssey the 
best, the final form of diplomacy.38
Like all modemist schemas of this kind, argued Der Derian, the "meaning" given to 
diplomacy is one gained from a process of discursive conflict which excludes and/or 
marginalises elements o f its "history" that are not consistent with the dominant 
narrative.39 This "meaning" then becomes reified in disciplinary texts and everyday 
attitudes and behaviour, its status as a "given" of the Tradition ensuring that little, if any, 
critical questioning will take place on it in "theory" or "practice".
For example see Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987). See also "Spy versus Spy: The Intertextual Power of International Intrigue" in 
Intemational/Intertextual Relations eds. Der Derian and Shapiro; and "The (S)pace of International 
Relations: Simulations, Surveillance and Speed", International Studies Quarterly 34(3) (1990), pp.295- 
310.
3tisee Der Derian, On Diplomacy.
37Ibid, p.2.
3^Ibid, p.3. This view of diplomacy is not surprising, he argued - works on diplomacy having been 
almost exclusively written by former diplomats or by those captured by its world view. Thus, the 
literature on diplomacy, conveys "a view of diplomacy as a specialised skill of negotiation, and seeks to 
maxim-ize' that skill for the benefit of novices entering the profession. Understandably, [the] histories of 
the origins of of diplomacy tend to be sketchy and rather anecdotal. Moreover, since the authors were 
[often] serving governments at the apogee of imperial power, they probably were not interested in looking 
too widely and too deeply into a past which undermined the twin pillars of skilful negotiation - order and 
continuity", ibid, p.2.
39As Der Derian puts it: "the given origins of diplomacy have been defined more by diplomacy's present 
status and needs than by its past principles and practices", ibid, p.3.
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Consequently, to open up "thinking space" in On Diplomacy. Der Derian sought 
to explore some of the "dynamic and dispersed forces behind the formation of [Realist] 
diplomacy" .40 More precisely, and in line with post-modernist deconstructivist 
procedures, Der Derian was concerned to add a dimension to the power politics idiom 
associated with diplomatic history and its origins and explain the power of diplomacy in 
discursive terms. His genealogy of diplomacy, accordingly, was "an interpretation of 
how the power of diplomacy, in the absence of a sovereign power, was constituted and 
sustained by a discursive practice, the diplomatic culture".*1 It was, in this sense, an 
attempt to go beyond the insights of Traditionalists, such as Wight and Bull, and open up 
critical space left closed by them.42 In particular Der Derian was concerned to explore 
questions "the classical school have not explored in any depth" including the question of 
how the:
diplomatic culture was formed and transformed, and how its power of
normalisation in a Leviathan-less world has been reproduced 43
The task of this archaeological quest, as Der Derian emphasised, was not to provide a 
"new" theory of diplomacy so superior to the reigning model that it would immediately 
solve the problems of the day. The task, rather, was to illustrate how it was possible to 
reconceptualise the theory and practice of diplomacy by exposing the discursive process 
by which "diplomacy" was constructed, conceptualised and legitimated as a fact of 
International Relations in the first instance. The task, in other words, was to open 
effectively closed space in order that a crucial phenomenon of international life be, again, 
imaginatively and seriously reassessed, critically reflected upon, and empirically
^Ibid.
41 Ibid, p.4.
4 2 It was Bull for example who, in the Anarchical Society, defined this diplomatic culture as the 
"common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives"; cited in ibid, p.4.
43 Ibid.
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evaluated in complex and dangerous times.44 Given the embedded nature of the 
diplomatic culture in modem (Western) theory and practice, the difficulties of such a task 
did not escape Der Derian.
Consequently, the work is characterised by careful, sustained and impressive 
scholarship, sensitive to etymological and archival "meaning", but always critically 
attuned to that which is not said, that which is strategically excluded in the processes of 
state making and diplomatic exchange. It is characterised also by a the sophisticated 
utilisation of two critical themes, in particular. The first, a general Nietzschean approach 
to textual interrogation (i.e. genealogical); the second, the concept of alienation which 
provided for Der Derian a working definition of diplomacy - as a process of mediation 
between estranged (alienated) individuals and groups.45 The alienation concept, in this 
regard, provided the major thematic point of entry for understanding diplomacy in 
discursive terms. The history and "meaning" of diplomacy was, from this perspective, 
bound up in the attempt to mediate an estranged and alienated international realm. As 
relations of estrangement changed, therefore, so too did the theory and practice of the 
mediation process - of diplomacy. Thus, to problematise and disrupt the dominant, 
(Western, modem) notion of what diplomacy "is", required that the complex nature of 
these historical changes be illustrated, in order to expose the process by which they have 
come to "make" (and re-make) diplomacy. A further task, in this regard, was to shift 
analytical attention away from the closed ("given") discourse of the dominant diplomatic 
culture, and focus it more on the broader cultural and historical practices of an estranged 
political landscape, from which diplomacy emerged and against which its universalised 
image of reality must always be open to question.46
44ln Der Derian's terms the task was to "demarcate by interrogation (rather than pre-empt by predictions) 
new terrains for empirical studies of diplomacy", ibid, p.3.
45See ibid, p.6. The discussion of alienation in On Diplomacy goes far beyond its common articulation 
in Hegelian-Marxian terms. But it does deal with a modernist concept in a sensitive and interesting way, 
one that does not see central modemist concepts as entirely incongruous in a post-modernist idiom.
4^The focus here is not on the development of diplomacy as the unfolding of power politics negotiation, 
but of "the symbols, rules, norms and conventions of a diplomatic culture and the political configurations 
of power", ibid, p.69.
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The resulting discussion is one that sees the former student of Bull going beyond 
his teacher (and Bull's mentor, Wight) in providing a genealogy of diplomacy that 
includes, rather than excludes, historical themes and ideas that challenge the uniform 
identity of the Realist narrative.47 Emphasising "the multiplicity of discourses subsumed 
in the study of diplomacy",48 Der Derian introduced six interpenetrating but distinct ways 
of understanding how diplomacy was "made" and became "normalised". The first 
concentrated on the mythical origins of diplomacy, particularly those associated with the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition.49 The second focused on the implications for diplomacy of the 
estrangement of Christianity, inside the Holy Roman Empire and outside it, as European 
Christendom confronted its Other (e.g. Islam).50 The third and fourth themes emphasised 
that increasingly complex period when (relatively) simple horizontal estrangement began 
to give way to the vertical estrangements associated with the breakdown of Christendom 
and the emergence of a modem state system. The fifth concentrated on the major 
problems for the diplomatic culture of both the French and Russian Revolutions, and the 
Sixth, which encompassed the present period, looked at the transformation of diplomatic 
processes in the age of "Techno-diplomacy", in which "diplomacy has become a 
subsidiary of [the] technological processes of alienation".51 The implications of this 
techno-diplomatic age, particularly its capacity for surveillance and its speed factor (the 
instantaneous nature of communications, weapons delivery and response times) are 
themes that have been increasingly the focus of Der Derian's attentions in more recent
47In this way paying the kind of genuine compliment to his teacher that Bull's students in Australia have 
never done. The discussion of Hegelian and Marxian themes in the work, plus the Nietzschean influence 
opens up some interesting dimensions for "thinking space".
48Ibid, p.5.
49Ibid, pp.44-68. The alienation theme is salient at all kinds of levels here of course, including that 
alienation between "man" and God which underpinned the great dualism of Augustine and was the 
dominant influence on Western thought and diplomatic culture for at least a thousand years.
5^Ibid, pp.68-105. This was a period of (relatively) simple power relations and (relatively) simple 
approaches to mediation. The process of mediation here was to do with making sure that the interests of 
the West were protected, though by the late Middle Ages the simplicity was gone as a more vertical 
estrangement characterised relations within the Holy Roman Empire.
51 Ibid, p.203.
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times as he has brought the insights of Virilio to bear upon International Relations.52 But 
to conclude this discussion of On Diplomacy it is worth reiterating again some of the 
post-modem themes underlying its very intricate and sophisticated arguments.
Of most significance here is the fact that while the genealogy presented in On 
Diplomacy followed a basically Traditionalist chronology, it did not add up to the Realist 
"history" of an "essential" diplomatic statecraft unfolding to the present via an 
increasingly rationalised process of power politics logic. The history and philosophy of 
diplomacy, as Der Derian illustrated, is much too complex for such a narrative. The 
argument, put another way, is that there is nothing in the theory and practice of 
contemporary diplomacy that can be understood by recourse to some essentialised past, 
or some universalised common sense, or simple "historical" precedent. Diplomacy, 
rather, at every moment of its development, was shaped by the matrix of tensions, ideas 
and conflicts which underlay the estrangement of international actors and made the 
mediation process "meaningful" to those engaged in it. In the contemporary period its 
identity and "meaning" remains locked within this discursive matrix, always intrinsically 
engaged with it, never detached from it. It is in this context that Der Derian's post­
modernist re-reading of the diplomatic text seeks to speak to the "practice" of a 
contemporary diplomatic community, which, in the 1990s, faces an interdependent world 
economy, massive social inequality, unique ecological dangers and exploding historico- 
cultural tensions, with a diplomatic culture set in the illusory certainty of modernist 
universalism and essentialism.
The final word on his work is, perhaps, best left to Der Derian who sums up the
post-modernist perspective well, in suggesting that the value of On Diplomacy :
should be weighed by its ability to devalue the accepted truth or theory that 
diplomacy has an essence of common sense, and an origin that can be 
chronologically and geographically fixed. The method of devaluation has 
been, so to speak, to flood the market-place of the diplomatic discourse with
52Ibid, pp. 199-210. See also Der Derian, "Spy versus Spy: The Intertextual Power of International 
Intrigue"; and "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulations, Surveillance and Speed".
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multifarious interpretations which have at one time or another been implied or 
imposed by power-relations.53
Whatever else the post-modern interrogations of the Realist "great texts" achieve, 
they have introduced to the "post preface" agenda a question entirely begged by 
mainstream literature: it asks how/why is it that such significant aspects of Western theory 
and practice, contained in the "great texts", are systematically excluded and/or 
marginalised by contemporary Realists? One answer, of course, is offered by Critical 
Theorists such as Cox utilising Gramscian hegemonic logic. Another, more consistent 
with post-modernist scholarship, is that much like Martin Wight's "history", which 
simply leaves out whole historical epochs that do not fit his power politics pattem, neo- 
Realism "forgets" that which doesn't fit within its positivist -structuralist boundaries of 
"meaning".54 More precisely neo-Realism engages in a systematic "politics of forgetting" 
when it is confronted with the kind of interpretative ambiguity which undermines the 
sovereignty so integral to its image of reality at all levels. Accordingly, this question of 
sovereignty has been a major focus of critical attention for post-modernists in the Third 
Debate.
Deconstructing Sovereignty: Towards a New Genealogy of International Relations
The theory and practice of sovereignty is bound up with the narrative of diplomatic 
history central to Der Derian's concerns in On Diplomacy and it is an integral factor in 
International Relations discourse. The "meaning" of sovereignty in Traditionalist 
literature, for example, is commonly perceived as synonymous with state power, the 
legitimate use of state violence and legal/temtorial legitimacy and, in Hobbesian terms, 
with a supreme and necessary authority in a Leviathan-less world. For those articulating 
their Realism in more explicitly systematic terms it is the sovereign rational actor - the
53Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p.200, emphasis added.
54On this issue see John Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The 
Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism", Australian Outlook 4101 (1987), pp.45-52.
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individual sovereign state engaged in an analogised politics of market choice - that is the 
primary focus of attention.55
Post-modernist concerns on the sovereignty issue are generally focused on the 
connections between these articulations of sovereignty, across the Realist spectrum. Of 
major concern is the "given" status of the sovereignty theme within Realism, a status, it is 
argued, which renders it an effectively ahistorical, universalised component of an "art of 
the possible" bounded by Realist power politics logic. It is in this sense that the issue of 
sovereignty represents another point of closure in International Relations in an era in 
which the need for openness and flexibility of thought and action are so necessary. Post­
modernist critique, in this context, is oriented not toward the instantaneous production of 
some "alternative" to the politics of state sovereignty, but toward the opening up of our 
understanding of sovereignty in order that we be more capable of taking the opportunities 
and/or facing the dangers of a global future in which the Traditional resort to permanent 
principles and static premises is increasingly inappropriate and inadequate.
To re-read the sovereignty literature is, once again, to encounter the Western 
"meta - narrative", projecting for the Tradition of International Relations its cast of 
essentialised voices, the "heroic figures" of a homogenised "history", thinking, acting 
and speaking in terms congruent with the rise of a diplomatic culture and the logic of 
power politics .56 But, if like Richard Ashley, for example, one is asking different 
questions of this "history", it is possible to find in the post-Renaissance period, not just
5^On Sovereignty in this regard, see, for example, Martin Wight, Systems of States edited by Hedley 
Bull (Leicester Leicester University Press, 1977); F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986) esp chapter 1 and 2; Michael Donelan ed., The Reason of States 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978); Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International 
Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World 
Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). See also Perry Anderson, 
Lineages of the Absolute State (London: New Left Books, 1974) and Charles Tilly ed., The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). For a work that 
introduces some new angles on the sovereignty issue, see R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz eds., 
Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1990).
5^See for example Wight, System of States: Hinsley, Sovereignty, and Donelan ed., The Reason of 
States.
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an emerging state system destined for (largely) uncritical reification in a future 
disciplinary "pursuit of certainty", but a discursive strategy that gives that system 
"meaning" and ensures its (largely) untheorised acceptance.57 Simply put, this strategy 
acts to bind together, in a language and logic of modem reason, the sovereign man of 
post-Cartesian philosophy and the sovereign state of Thucydidean/Machiavellian origin.
This is a discursive strategy of some significance for modernism. For Liberals it
represents a space for the emergence of a civil society and the logic of the "social
contract"; for Marxists it marks a crucial "moment" of modem ideological and institutional
class oppression. From a Hobbesian perspective it is the rationale for the Leviathan. For
the dominant Tradition in International Relations, more generally, it is the site of one of
the major "problems" to be "solved" in a modem world of states - the problem of how to
reconcile the principle and practices of individual sovereignty, at the state level, with
peaceful relations at the inter-state level.58 For post-modernists such as Ashley, however,
it represents in all these articulations, a limited appreciation of the discursive process by
which the question of sovereignty has been framed in modernist thought, which, in turn,
limits the potential "answers" that might be derived from a re-reading of i t  In particular it
fails to appreciate the implications for the theory and practice of sovereignty of the
logocentric framing regime which constitutes its "meaning" in modernity.59 The key issue
here, argued Ashley, was the nature of logocentric discourse which privileged:
a central interpretive orientation - a coherent sovereign voice...that supplies a 
unified rational meaning and direction to the interpretation of the spatial and 
temporal diversity of history.60
^7I refer to two works, in particular, here "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the 
Anarchy Problematique", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17(2) (1988), pp.227-263; and 
"Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in Intemational/Intertexnial Relations ed. Der 
Denan and Shapiro. The discussion will be oriented primarily toward the "Living on Border Lines" article 
which is, I believe, a particularly important example of post-modernist scholarship given its scope, its 
philosophical content and the (Foucauldian) theory of the state it invokes.
5^For Western thought generally it is the site of one of the "perennial questions": that which explores the 
question of the individual and the state.
5 9 Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", pp.259-323.
6°Ibid, p.261.
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The problem for modernist discourse, and for International Relations, in particular, is that 
in this discursive context, the question of sovereignty had been effectively reduced to 
"ahistorical closure". This, Ashley insisted, was not to deny the differences between 
conflicting modem approaches on the sovereignty issue, or the difficulty of the issue, it 
was to acknowledge, that:
a logocentric discourse is inclined to impose closure by resorting to one or 
another fixed standard of interpretation that is itself accorded the status of a 
pure and identical presence.61
Thus, the resort to "history", "Philosophy", the "individual", the "class" or the "state" as
the sovereign voice of interpretation by which all other interpretations are judged,
excludes from the interpretive process the question of:
how, by way of what practices ongoing here and now, is just this sovereign 
voice of interpretation differentiated, set apart, and empowered so that it may 
be recognized, despite its historicity, as a pure and extrahistorical presence, a 
self evident and identical voice of of truth in itself?62
This was the question that Ashley sought to include in his post-modernist discussion of 
sovereignty. Accordingly, like Walker and Der Derian in their re-reading of other 
Traditional "givens", Ashley brought to this debate a range of additional themes and 
conceptual insights from the post-modem lexicon. In particular, in his discussion of the 
connections between sovereign man and the sovereign state, in 1989, Ashley introduced a 
Foucauldian reading of Kant to the debate that accorded it an interesting "new" angle, one 
which returns the focus of the thesis to themes developed in Chapters One and Two.63
The argument, very briefly, is this: since Kant and the fundamental break with 
Classical epistemology, "meaning" and "knowing" in the world has been founded in the
61 Ibid, p.262.
62Ibid
^Primarily from Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences trans. A.M. 
Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).
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sovereign man of modernity. Since that time mainstream history and philosophy has 
been focused on:
the heroic figure of of reasoning man who is himself the the origin of 
language, the maker of history, and the source of meaning in the world.64
However, since Kant, also, there has been an awareness that the "death of God" has not 
seen modem man bequeathed with God's omnipotence. Thus, sovereign man, invested 
with the will and the capacity to emancipate humankind from those objective forces that 
were thought to determine "meaning", and restrict "knowing", is cognisant of the fact that 
he is limited by the very knowledge that is the font of such power. Modem sovereign 
man, therefore:
upon exercising his powers of reason, sees plainly that that he is emeshed in 
language and in history, indeed that he is an object of language and history. 
[Further] if man is the transcendental condition of the possibility of all 
knowledge, he also knows himself to be an empirical fact among facts to be 
examined and conceptualized. If he is a potentially lucid cogito, he knows 
himself to be surrounded by domains of darkness and ambiguity that resist 
the penetration of his thought.65
This is the dilemma of the modem man/god, the creator of "knowing" and "meaning" 
who, knowledgeable of his limitations, must seek to overcome them and fulfil his 
potential as the maker of history, the shaper and controller of human and material destiny. 
This, then, is the driving force of the "will to knowledge" in modernity and, in the 
attempt to impose/apply that knowledge, the will to certainty, to control, to mastery, to 
power.
For all its post-Kantian differences, the argument goes, modem theory and 
practice has been founded upon this figure of sovereign man, the "heroic figure" of 
modernity seeking to deal with the constraints upon his capacity to re-make the world in 
his image. For "market" Liberalism, thus, the modem historical narrative is that of the 
possessive individual of civil society, struggling (in the general/national interest) to break
^A shley, "Living on Border Lines", p.264; see also the discussion in Chapter Two of the thesis, pp.97- 
100.
65Ibid, p.265.
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down constraints upon free choice and natural competition. For Marxism, it is the
narrative of the class conscious oppressed, struggling to break down the constraints upon
their potential as fully conscious human beings. In each case the narrative is framed in
terms of a "given" sovereign subject, privileged, via logocentric reasoning, over a world
of objectified limitadons/constraints, which "deny the promise of transcendence already
present in the sovereign subject".66 It is with the modem fusion of sovereign man and the
sovereign state, suggested Ashley, that the "will to knowledge" and the "will to power"
has found its most powerful form and institutionalised modem forum. The state, in this
sense, has become the site of reasoning man's knowledge and meaning, while,
simultaneously, representing the major resource by which the constraints upon the
fulfilment of reasoning man must be controlled, disciplined and punished. The state,
then, imbued with and shaped by man's knowledge and "meaning":
will not be disposed to turn its coercive means against reasoning man; it will 
deploy its means to tame those "anarchic dangers" of history that threaten to 
escape the will of reasoning man.67
This is a crucial theme in a Foucauldian based re-reading of the sovereignty issue, 
and in International Relations generally, because it prefigures the modem logic of power 
politics and the state centric view of an anarchical world of Otherness. In Ashley's terms, 
it gives identity to the state, as a:
time and place set in opposition to a region of anarchy-a region of historical 
contingency and chance that refuses to submit to the sovereign truth of 
reason .68
It is in this sense that, for all the differences of the International Relations literature, the 
basic questions (war, peace, security, power, hegemony, justice) remain framed in a 
modernist (e.g. Realist) discourse, which opposes a realm of sovereignty, identity and
^Ibid , p.267. This is the significance of the "Kantian turn" that was touched on in Chapter Two, pp.97- 
100, for after Kant, modem theory and practice was founded upon this framing regime to the extent that 
whatever the differences between modem ideologies, these differences were framed in terms of the 
privileged figure of reasoning sovereign man.
67Ibid, p.268.
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reasoned understanding, against a realm of anarchical Otherness - that realm which 
refuses to accept the reality of "history", of power, of structural necessity. Herein, lies 
the foundation of some of the great logocentric tensions of Realist modernism, e.g. 
between identity/difference, self/Other, and domestic/intemational. And herein lies its 
fundamental problem of understanding, because, until it acknowledges its discursive 
character it cannot acknowledge that its answers merely replicate the limitations of its 
questions. Until it does this it cannot begin to think and act outside the caricatured and 
ritualised boundaries of, "recurrence and repetition', the "security dilemma", "hegemonic 
stability" and "The Anarchical Society".
This question of anarchy was central to another of Ashley's contributions on the 
sovereignty issue that I will touch on shortly. At this point, however, a comment is 
necessary on the way that he connected his broad post-modernist re-reading of 
sovereignty directly to the conservative Realism of International Relations, which, in one 
form or another, has represented itself as distinct from, and antipathetic to, post-Kantian 
theory and practice. Ashley did this in turning to the "great texts" of Kenneth Waltz, 
which were the focus of extended discussion in Chapter Seven. Ashley brought to his 
discussion a more explicit Foucauldian language and logic which he focused on Man, the 
State and War in particular. This was not just because of the hierarchy this text invokes - 
between sovereign man - and war - the most dangerous, most irrational, constraint upon 
man. Nor was it the positioning of the state in the title of the text - as the demarcation 
between sovereign space and anarchical space - that most excited Ashley's interest. 
Rather, it was because of the closure that this framing regime invoked, for Waltz's later 
work, and for structuralist Realism in general, that Man, the State and War was so 
important.
In Man, the State and War. Waltz searched his "three images" for the space in 
which man's modem quest could be fulfilled; for the logic by which the restraining forces 
of anarchy might be overcome. He found the crude individualist image inadequate in this 
regard, so too its conventional statist equivalent. Ultimately, of course, Waltz concluded
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that only his third, structuralist image, had valid "meaning" in International Relations, and 
it invoked a meaning of betrayal in that it found the Kantian promise illusory; it found that 
"there are no guarantees that man will obey his promise to man".69 For Waltz, 
accordingly, the Realist focus shifted from the sovereignty of reasoning man to the 
sovereignty of the anarchical system. And, by Theory of International Politics (1979) 
any lingering ambiguity had gone, the anarchical structure was now the sovereign voice 
of International Relations, the shaper and maker of history, of political power, of human 
potential. Anarchy, thus, (made by man but beyond his transcendental powers) was now 
the foundation of "meaning" in relations between states, and Realist "knowing" was now 
centred on this pessimistic, fatalistic, deterministic "meaning", that, in its (historical) 
certitude required no further critical questioning. The Realist task now was to 
accommodate to the necessities of an anarchical structure and seek via scientific 
knowledge, its systemic intricacies. Unquestioned, of course, in all of this, was the 
figure of modem sovereign man, the (metatheoretical) catalyst of Waltz's anti-modernist 
Realism.
This has been the broad discursive context in which Ashley has confronted the 
sovereignty issue in terms of the Realist "Anarchy Problematique" (1988).70 And it is in 
this context that he has located the enduring power of the anarchy notion for neo-Realists 
in a contemporary replication of "interpretive dispositions and practical orientations" 
integral to modernity.71
69Ibid, p.287.
^A shley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique". 
71 Ibid, p.228.
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Sovereignty. The State And The Anarchy Problematique
Seeking to understand and explain global life in the 1980s and 1990s in a period of 
increasing uncertainty for the Traditional way of thinking and acting in the world, neo- 
Realists, argued Ashley, "are disposed to invoke one or another sovereign presence as an 
originary voice, a foundational source of truth and meaning...that makes it possible to 
discipline the understanding of ambiguous events".72 Integral to neo-Realist analysis, 
consequently, is the logocentrised opposition between a privileged interpretative centre - 
the sovereign state - signifying rational identity, a homogeneous, coherent, knowable 
"se lf  - and a dangerous, uncontrollable realm of Otherness - the domain of anarchy, 
always threatening the identity, unity and control, deemed necessary at the international 
level.
This is the Anarchy Problematique, in which a sovereign presence (the 
contemporary state) has become the principle of interpretation which allows for a 
transformation of ambiguity and difference into a coherent framework of unified 
understanding. This is the Anarchy Problematique, which (in Logical Positivist fashion) 
has established for the discipline a hierarchical distinction between that which is rational 
and meaningful (i.e. can be known scientifically and whose behaviour can be mediated) 
and that which is "outside" the realm of rational, meaningful discourse, and indeed is a 
danger to it. This is the Anarchy Problematique, which has ensured that when neo- 
Realists ask the central questions of the contemporary agenda (e.g. how can there be 
governance without an (international) government?; how can there be order without an 
orderer?; how can there be lasting regime co-operation in a situation of endemic 
anarchy?); the answers are already "given" at the (hidden, unspoken) core of the 
logocentric discourse. This, therefore, is the Anarchy Problematique that sees neo- 
Realist problem solvers already assume as axiomatic the "problem" of anarchy they 
purportedly seek to "solve".
72Ibid, pp.230-231.
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It is in the context of the Anarchy Problematique, accordingly, that the early 
"primitivism" of the discipline is replicated by neo-Realists, as the post Renaissance state, 
an "intrinsically contested, always ambiguous, never completed construct" is represented 
once again as an "unproblematic rational presence already there, a sovereign identity that 
is the self sufficient source of international history's meaning".73 Here too the modernist 
paradox continues to be writ large, as neo-Realists commit themselves to "demystify and 
explode arbitrary ideological limits imposed in history" while, simultaneously, imposing 
upon their updated scientific scholarship, an (empiricist/positivist)) metaphysic in the 
form of an interpretive principle for which "critical questioning is disallowed".74 The 
state, in this equation, is not privileged as it once was when it was represented as the the 
only sovereign figure in Realist analysis. Rather, the state is now projected as one 
sovereign actor among a multiplicity of sovereign actors (including non-state actors), and 
the new "realism" in International Relations is calculated as the sum of the rational 
decisions made by all (recognised) sovereign actors.75 But, as Ashley stressed, this has 
merely allowed contemporary Realists to acknowledge some earlier silences while 
simultaneously replicating them, primarily because appreciation of non-state actors does 
not repudiate the modernist discursive practice that sees all man/state interaction reduced 
to "sovereign" status (e.g. in individualist, rational choice premises).76
73Ibid, p.231.
74Ibid. This then is the self reasoning state "immunised from reasoned criticism because it must be taken 
to be the principle of reasoning discourse in itself’.
75Hence, the significance of a global economy is recognised and within it the impact of non-state actors 
upon the human and material resources available to states, and the choices made by them. It is recognised 
more precisely that should there be too many restrictions on non-state economic actors "world markets 
would collapse, economic contraction would set in, and in all locales, environmental deterioration, social 
dislocations, and political instability would result". On the other hand the state retains its major 
significance because with its "organisational resources and privileged claim to the means of violence", it 
is considered:
necessary to the protection of property rights, the maintenance of order, and the provision 
of the social conditions in which freedom can be sustained and production can flourish.
Ibid, p.247.
7^Thus the state is no longer necessarily conceived of in strict atomised terms in a world of 
interdependence and transnationalism; the state, nevertheless, remains imbued conceptually with kind of
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Consequently, the contemporary neo-Realist representation of the world of 
sovereign competition is beset with contradictions and anomalies so stark that they can no 
longer be easily ignored or marginalised. Thus, having incorporated into and 
acknowledged the importance of non-state actors upon the choices and interests of 
sovereign states, old questions are begged about precisely what this state now is, what its 
boundaries now are, what its "meaning" can possibly be. In a neo-Realist (market) 
context this "meaning" is represented in terms of homogeneous, choice making sovereign 
identities engaged in competitive interaction, which at the bare minimum, suggested 
Ashley, renders all actors in an interdependent world, entities with a "coherent set of 
interests and possessing some set of means that it is able to deploy in the service of these 
in terests" .77 However, simultaneously engaged in a Traditionalist enterprise of 
logocentric privileging, neo-Realists must also represent the state "as an entity having 
absolute boundaries unambiguously demarcating a domestic 'inside' and setting it off 
from a international [anarchic] 'outside'" .78
This strategy is, thus, no longer logical even in neo-Realist terms, because:
the turn to nonstate actors renders radically unstable any attempt to represent 
a historical figure - the state or any other - as a pure presence, a sovereign 
identity that might be a coherent source of meaning and an agency of the 
power of reason in international history.79
rational, sovereign identity and (basically utilitarian) decision making impulses that characterise the 
modem subject Accordingly the recognised actors (multinationals, transnationals etc) are examined on 
the basis that they are individual, rational choice making objects in the world "out there" transparent to 
the similarly endowed subjects of International Relations. On the other hand, actors, or relations between 
them that don't fit this framing pattern are either "denied recognition as [relevant] actors" or interpreted as 
"consequences of the choices actors make" (e.g. as markets in regime theory, Hegemonic Stability 
Theory), ibid, p.245.
77Ibid, p.248.
7^Ibid, emphasis added. What characterises the "inside" is what characterises the dominant representation 
of the modem Western state per se: "an identity that not only reconciles the contesting interpretations in a 
unique and universally recognised interpretation of a 'national interest’ but also effectively mobilises 
social resources, as means, by appeal to this 'interest'". The "outside" of the boundary is the realm of 
"contesting interpretations and practice [which are] recalcitrant in the face of the sovereign voice of 
interpretation that reigns within".
79Ibid, p.234.
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Ashley's point, simply put, is that in recognising the significance of non-state actors in a
Traditional world of states, neo-Realists:
must allow that the boundaries of the state and domestic society are 
themselves open to interpretation and, with different interpretations might be 
taken to include or exclude different understandings of what universal 
interests of the state might be and different understandings of the resources 
that might be legitimately summoned in the name of those interests.80
For Ashley the paradox associated with this situation is significant not so much 
for any theoretical inadequacy it exposes but for the space it opens for other ways of 
understanding global politics. The aim of his deconstructive enterprise, consequently, is 
to open up to interpretive inquiry previously closed questions on state sovereignty and the 
Anarchy Problematique. In particular, and consistent with the broader aims of the Critical 
Social Theory literature across the disciplines, his concern is to open up the dominant 
discourse on the state, to illustrate:
that the foundations that gave it its supposed identity...its evident fixity of 
purpose, and that defined its seemingly necessary limits were never so secure 
as they might have seemed.
More positively, the aim is to illustrate that the foundations of Realist theory and practice:
were never more than effects of practices of representation that could be made 
to work only so long as competing voices of an always equivocal culture 
could be excluded or silenced.81
This, for Ashley, and post-modernists in general, is a crisis of Realism to be sure but, 
more pertinently, it is the crisis of modem representationalism starkly evoked. The 
strategy of exclusion that creates and reinforces the power of modem sovereignty in 
contemporary life is here writ large in the representation of "domestic society", as a 
sovereign, rational, identity, opposed to anarchy - a region of difference, ambiguity and
80Ibid, p.250. There is no suggestion here that the state is no longer important; like the Critical 
Theorist, Cox, scholars invoking post-modernist principles of inquiry have acknowledged the continuing 
importance of the state. The point, rather is that from a post-modern perspective the critiques of state 
centrism, since the 1970s, have opened some important (if rudimentary) thinking space with implications 
for neo-Realism and modernist discourse generally.
81 Ibid, p.252.
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indeterminacy. The Anarchy Problematique then, is a modernist discursive strategy in 
which :
differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all 
places and times must be converted into an absolute difference between a 
domain of domestic society, understood as an identity, and a domain of 
anarchy, understood as at once ambiguous, indeterminate and dangerous.82
It is in this sense that International Relations is exposed as the site of discursive struggle - 
the struggle to impose a dominant discourse of "meaning" and "knowing", the struggle to 
define and produce International Relations in terms of a particular constellation of 
(sovereign) subjects and objects, which replicate that larger discursive constellation 
represented in modemist textuality. It is in this context that post-modernism pronounces 
theory as practice, the process of textuality as political power, language and 
representation as International Relations. And with the struggle now out in the open, as it 
were, scholars like Ashley with his concept of Anarchy Problematique, are beginning to 
open up a different set of questions integral to it.
Some of these questions are now central to post-modernist works on U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Michael Shapiro, for example, has asked questions of the politics of 
representation in relation to the way that the United States has represented "Central 
America", and specifically, "Guatemala", as part of that threatening realm of Otherness 
intrinsic to U.S. security discourse.83 There are at least two themes in Shapiro's work 
that require comment, both of which are important in understanding post-modernism's 
interpretivist approach and its analytical potency. The first reflects the capacity of 
intertextualist premises to open closed dimensions of international "theory"; the second
82Ibid.
83Shapiro, "The Constitution of the Central American Other The Case of 'Guatemala'", in The Politics 
of Representation ed. Shapiro (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). Post-modern 
perspectives are now appearing in the literature on the Third World and development studies, see for 
example, Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of 
his Work to the Third World", Alternatives X (1984-85), pp.377-400; and more recently Marc Dubois, 
"The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development", 
Alternatives 16 (1991), pp.1-30.
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concerns the "practical" implications for a state such as Guatemala of the dominant 
representational practices in International Relations.
The first theme was raised by Shapiro in the context of Todorov's The Conquest 
of America (1984) which problematised the conventional notion of "discovery", and 
shifted attention to a representational practice of Spanish imperialism.84 Shapiro's 
concern, in this regard, was to illustrate "that the kind of mentality which Todorov 
ascribed to the Spanish conquerors persists in the way Guatemala is constituted within the 
American foreign policy discourse".85 Seeking to show "how" foreign policy discourse 
constitutes Guatemala as an Other, rather than rake over old analytical coals on the "why" 
question, Shapiro emphasised the role played by "academicians, policy thinkers and 
journalists" in an Otherness discourse which "constitutes an unreflective apology for 
American neoimperialistic practices".86 This, he charged, is a subtle process in which 
Guatemalan society is reduced to geo-political fact, "out there", to be read only in terms 
of its "regime ideology" and/or the behaviour of its political leaders. This ignored 
"meanings" integral to the social and political history of Guatemala (e.g. of colonial and 
class relations) and, more generally, it depoliticises and dehistoricises the whole practice 
of state making, and meaning making, by which our understandings of International 
Relations are framed. In the case of Guatemala it has allowed U.S. foreign policy to
84T. Todorov, The Conquest of America trans. R. Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). The 
genre if not the specifics is that of Edward Said's Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). The 
term "discovery" here refers to the notion of finding something that was not previously there, either via 
isolated scientific experiment or in anthropological terms as in this case. The post-modern counter of 
course is bound up with Barthes' intertextualist notion and the general argument concerning representation 
as opposed to "experience". For a discussion of the difference between experience and representation in 
this context see Shapiro’s "The Politics of Fear: Don DeLillo's Postmodern Burrow", Strategies 1 (1988), 
pp. 120-141, in which he takes the fiction of Franz Kafka and Don DeLillo, and their questioning of the 
meaning of "fear" and "danger", to demonstrate how danger is bureaucratised in the contemporary era to 
such an extent that there is no longer any correlation between our immediate experience and the 
representations we consume as citizens of a state. For a broader discussion which deals with the semiotic 
approach to "discovery" in an accessible way see also W. Connolly, "Identity and Difference in Global 
Politics".
85Shapiro, "The Constitution of the the Central American Other", p.89.
8^Ibid, pp.90-91. The "why" question is not ignored, but as Shapiro puts it, it is "controversial only for 
both naive and cynical apologists of American capital" that the "why" question is bound up with attempts 
to exploit Central America for the benefit of United States capital; ibid, p.90.
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make and name Guatemala as part of an unproblematic spatial domain already imbued 
with a dominant discourse of "meaning".
To understand, more precisely, how this has been achieved and how the 
"meaning" of the object Guatemala has been constituted and represented, it was 
necessary, argued Shapiro, to investigate the constitution and representation of the 
American self in International Relations. Here attention was focused, not surprisingly, 
on the Realist security/strategic discourse that has been the primary idiom of the sovereign 
voice of the United States. To understand Guatemala, in this sense, was to understand its 
"difference" in the discursive practice of identity making. In this regard the "meaning" of 
Guatemala (and Central America in general) is bound up with the "intensity of interests 
congregated in modem superpowers...[which has] resulted in a comprehensive level of 
surveillance and intervention all over the globe". More explicitly, Guatemala is given 
"meaning" as pan of an objectification of an externalised world of Otherness (an Anarchy 
Problematique) in which:
there are ever more categories and predictive scenarios, for the modem 
security-oriented discourse can tolerate no surprises or uncertainties, not only 
because of relation to defence of a state but also to the perceived connections 
with ongoing domestic ways of life.87
This begs the question of what precise danger a small state like Guatemala could pose to 
the United States and its "domestic" way of life. The answer, as Shapiro explained, is 
intrinsic to the modernist constitution of the identity/difference dichotomy, in particular. 
Accordingly, if the self is construed in terms of contemporary security discourse, then all 
other actors in the discursive system will be located on the "axis of threats" to that 
security. If, as in the case of the United States, the self is identified most profoundly 
with a crisis management perspective, then states such as Guatemala are identified as 
"indirect threats" whose potential for disorder must be disciplined and controlled.88 
Moreover, if identity, is understood, in this sense, as a moral/grammatical code of
87Ibid, p.106. 
88Ibid, p.102.
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"meaning" in the world, then there is an added (Western, ethnocentric) dimension to the
"mentality" concerning Central American states such as Guatemala, because:
to the extent that the Other is regarded as something not occupying the same 
natural/moral space as the self, conduct towards the Other becomes more 
exploitative.89
To illustrate how this discourse is represented in ways other than direct politico- 
economic intervention, Shapiro turned to what became known as The Kissinger Report 
(1984).90 In this document, he suggested, contemporary security policy as U.S identity 
was unproblematically articulated in relation to Guatemala as Other. Consequently, The 
Kissinger Report, characterised by a "remarkable consensus" among contributors to it, 
presented its observations on the "realities of Central America" in predictable terms.91 
Prominent, therefore, among the Report's findings was one which echoed the responses 
of (at least some of) the Conquistadors in their "discovery" of the Indian peoples, 
centuries ago: i.e. for Guatemala to become a stable, less threatening Other, it must 
become like us, it must seek to replicate our identity.92
Unproblematically represented, the we here are the champions of foreign private 
investment, of multinational penetration of a potential market, albeit it in a context of an 
awareness that, in 1984, any resistance to this scenario might require something other 
than Conquistadorian strategies. Nevertheless, in 1984, the "venerable colonialist code" 
was rearticulated in, for example, the debate over what should be done should a Latin 
American country choose to "seize a U.S. company". In such circumstances, it was 
asserted, the U.S. would be forced to defend an irreducible principle of identity, which
89Ibid.
^M ore formally, The Report of the President's Bipartisan Commission on Central America (New York: 
Macmillan, 1984).
91 Both of these quotes are from The Kissinger Report as cited in Shapiro, "The Constitution of the 
Central American Other", p.l 16.
92Ibid, pp. 113-114. As Shapiro stresses the expectation is not so much to create a carbon copy of 
Western bourgeois society but to improve on the "rough draft" that Central American societies are 
regarded as. The progressivism of modernist history and philosophy and of Modernisation Theory it 
seems is not dead after all.
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States that "the property rights of its citizens must be protected in a foreign country".93 
And just to make sure the message was clear enough, in recognising that the State 
Department might have a "propensity toward accommodation" in these matters, the 
Report warned that:
Congress usually exerts pressure to proceed firmly against the small brother 
who has disregarded his big brother's rights.94
Even when a more sensitive tone was evident in the Report's findings, and even
when a Central American voice was heard within it, the identifying security/strategy
discourse remained fundamental to the "meaning" of Guatemala and to the way the U.S.
must "know" it, if it is to remain secure in its post-Monroe Doctrine sphere of influence.
This was never more evident, maintained Shapiro, than in the Report's attitude to the
question of human rights in Central America generally. On this issue there was
acknowledgement of the need for land reform, but "no question raised about
incompatibilities between the construction of American strategic interests and the ability of
the Other to acquire...land reform". In particular, there was no mention of U.S.
involvement in the overthrow of Guatemalans engaged in land reform .95 Instead, the
question of human rights was subsumed within the debate on the possibility of U.S.
intervention to protect its security interests. Thus, summing up U.S. involvement in
Guatemala and the region in general, the Report recognised that:
On the one hand, we seek to promote justice and find it repugnant to support 
forces that violate - or tolerate violation of - fundamental U.S. values. On the 
other hand we are engaged in El Salvador and Central America because we 
are serving fundamental U.S. interests that transcend any particular 
government.96
From Shapiro's post-modernist perspective, there are at least two conclusions to 
be drawn from this interrogation of one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in U.S.
93Ibid, p.113.
94 Ibid.
95For example in the intervention of 1954 which overthrew the Arbenz government 
^C ited  in ibid, p.120.
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foreign policy. The first is that the intertextuality premise was shown to be a valuable
critical counterpoint to the conventional notion of "discovery", when it came to the
process by which the political figures, academics, journalists and others associated with
The Kissinger Report, framed their "reality" of Guatemala and Central America. The
second is that, more explicitly than ever, foreign policy "theory" is better understood as
"practice". Consequently, in refuting the proposition that the findings of The Kissinger
Report were based on a reality "discovered" during its inquiries, Shapiro argued that, on
the contrary, they were framed in accordance with a discursive representation of
Guatemala and Central America that was already there in the "colonial mentality" of
European culture and literature, and in the unquestioned premises of modernity
corresponding to U.S. identity in the world. Consequently, The Kissinger Report, and
the larger U.S. security discourse that its findings replicated:
failed to understand both its own discursive practice and to attain a grasp of 
what Central America could be if it were approached in a less-appropriating 
form of knowledge/practice. The commission reproduced the kind of Central 
American isthmus that has been produced in the European imagination for 
centuries.97
The conclusion, then, is that at the core of its thinking on Central America, U.S.
foreign policy remains constricted within the static confines of a security discourse
bounded by the Anarchy Problematique and modemist notions of sovereign self and
threatening Other. And, emphasised Shapiro, this theory as practice has some frightening
implications for the region in the future, if U.S. policy makers, failing to reflect upon the
way they construct the "reality" of Central America, continue to respond to that "reality"
in Traditional fashion. Indeed, he concluded, the representation of Guatemala and
Central America in U.S. security discourse, in the late 1980s:
provides the general rationale for the already-in-place policy of active 
economic and civilian/military intervention to help the not-yet-perfected 
Central American Others.98
97Ibid, p.122. 
98 Ibid.
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David Campbell has developed these themes from a different angle in looking at 
some of the implications of U.S. foreign policy continuing, in the 1990s, to conceptualise 
the world in terms of modernist sovereignty and the Anarchy Problematique." Campbell 
has focused, in particular, on issues surrounding the demise of the major Cold War Other 
and the tendency towards triumphalism on the part of the "victors". His view is that 
euphoria and self congratulation is entirely misplaced; that to speak of victory and 
proclaim a new more democratic world order, is not only to trivialise the great dangers 
attending the breakdown of the Soviet empire, but to ignore the plight of the "majority of 
humanity" for whom there is little hope in any foreseeable future.100 But for Campbell 
there is a more immediate danger associated with the demise of the great Cold War Other. 
It is that the demise of the Soviet Union, and the complexities surrounding that event, are 
likely to be marginalised by the United States foreign policy community in favour of a 
reading set upon Realist power politics premises and an uncritical modernist 
progressivism.101 The danger is, therefore, that United States foreign policy theory and 
practice will remain incarcerated within the Cold War discursive confines of sovereignty 
and anarchy, thus remaining insensitive to many problems of its own identity and that of 
a world upon which it has such an impact.
As the discussion in Chapter Seven emphasised, the primary theme in the 
orthodox reading of the Cold War was centred on a positivist construction of reality in 
which the "Western" subject observed an objectified realm of anarchy "out there", the 
realm, after 1945, of the Soviet Other. As the organising principle of U.S. foreign policy 
this became the Cold War for Realist scholarship, understood as the "realm of necessity
^Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", Alternatives XV 
(1990), pp.263-286.
100Ibid, p.263.
101The work by Francis Fukuyama being an example of the genre. See, "The End of History", National 
Interest 16 (Summer 1989), pp.3-18.
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for U.S. policymakers" .102 The critical task, for Campbell, was to "show that US
foreign policy was constituted by dimensions other than external necessity" in order both
to expose its limits and problematise any future reading of new world orders in
Traditional terms.103 He sought, thus, to reconceptualise U.S. foreign policy in terms of
the Anarchy Problematique which, he argued, limited conventional foreign policy
discourse to certain questions and privileged geopolitical practice and security in terms of
(sovereign) territorial integrity, while ignoring, or treating as epiphenomenal, issues of
culture, ideology, representation and interpretive ambiguity at the core of the sovereign
state. In this sense U.S. foreign policy was constituted by the:
disciplining of the ambiguity and contingency of global politics by dividing it 
into inside and outside, self and other, via the inscription of the boundaries of 
the state. 104
The sovereign state (the U.S.A.) has, in this way, been framed and given identity 
in terms of the discourse of anarchy and danger "outside" it. Its foreign policy, 
consequently, has been accorded an irreducible logic which privileges the theory and 
practice of power politics in its efforts to respond to the anarchical "realm of necessity". 
Similarly, a hierarchy of "meaning" has been established which has expunged from the 
(legitimate) pursuit of "knowing" questions concerning the status of the sovereign self 
and all matters of interpretive ambiguity. But, Campbell insisted, these issues must be 
explored if we are not to further close off the possibilities for sensitive and more 
appropriate foreign policy in the future. Most importantly, he charged, the United States 
must begin to critically reflect upon itself, to reflect that its identity, framed in relation to 
danger between states in an anarchical world, is part of a much larger regime of framing 
concerned with the disciplining of dangers within the state. It must, in this regard,
^ T h i s  is from Colin Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpowers (1988) cited in Campbell, "Global 
Inscription", p.282. On this issue see Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A 
Study in the Politics of Representation", Alternatives 13 (1988), pp.443-483; and Dalby, "Geopolitical 
Discourse: The Soviet Union as Other", Alternatives 13 (1988), pp.415-442.
^ C am p b ell, "Global Inscription", p.264. 
104Ibid, p.270.
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understand that the demarcation between inside and outside, self and other, identity and
difference in International Relations, is another dimension of the way in which the
"United States" has been framed as part of a process of privileging a certain discursive
image of historical and philosophical reality. In this sense:
the practices of foreign policy serve to enframe, limit, and domesticate a 
particular meaning of humanity...it incorporates the form of domestic order, 
the social relations of production, and the varying subjectivities to which they 
give rise.105
The "particular meaning of humanity" privileged in the United States is that
centred on Liberal democratic political structures, capitalist economics and the modem
"individual". These have been the "givens" that have circumscribed the rational unity,
certainty and identity of the "United States", the sovereign presence engaged in a struggle
to domesticate and discipline a threatening realm of contradiction, ambiguity and
Otherness. As Campbell emphasised, however, when the U.S. narrative of self identity
is re-read, re-historicised and politicised, a number of excluded narratives are necessarily
reinvoked - narratives of genocide, expansionism, dispossession, of extraordinary state
surveillance, of the struggles of gender, of sexuality, of "difference", contingency,
ambiguity, and Otherness.106 When one included these readings, argued Campbell, and
when one then pondered the representation of the "United States" in its International
Relations context, the conclusion was th a t:
[t]he boundaries of the state... [have] long been the result of domesticating 
the self through the transfer of differences within society to the inscription of 
differences between societies.107
Understood in these terms, of course, the Cold War can be understood not as the only 
"realistic" response to anarchical necessity, but as a "disciplinary strategy that was global
105Ibid, p.272.
lO^The scale of "the Cold War at home" is sometimes staggering. As Campbell records the FBI alone had 
some 430,000 files on "subversives" during the 1950s; ibid, p.276.
107Ibid, p.273.
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in scope but national in design".108 More precisely the Cold War and orthodox readings 
of it can be understood as another site at which the Anarchy Problematique was invoked 
to provide a sovereign, foundational presence, from which the threat of "difference" and 
Otherness could be rendered unified and controllable. In the Cold War context, more 
precisely, it was invoked:
through the invocation of anarchy and disorder as problems that threaten the 
United States and via a concern with the 'individual' as a defining moment of 
being "American".109
This is not to suggest some simple cause and effect scenario, nor any coherent 
class/elite based design at the core of U.S. theory and practice. But what Campbell's 
argument does suggest, as did Shapiro's, is that questions of representation, 
systematically excluded from foreign policy discourse, must be included if the United 
States, and the International Relations discipline centred therein, is to be more capable in 
the future of understanding itself and the world in which it lives. What it suggests, more 
generally in relation to the present discussion, is that modernist theory is intrinsic to the 
practice of International Relations and that post-modernist critical perspectives have 
something important to contribute to the opening of that theory as practice, in the post- 
Cold War era.
From different angles, the works of Shapiro and Campbell have focused post­
modernist attention on a core element in International Relations, the discourse of strategy 
and security which has been central to Realist representations of the "is" of the world 
since 1945. The final discussion in this thesis will look, briefly, at some of the post­
modern literature that has sought, more directly, to reconceptualise the "meaning" of 
security and strategy in the era which has seen the demise of its Cold War raison d'etre.
108Ibid, p.293. 
109Ibid, p.278.
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Reconceptualising Strategy and Security in the Post Cold War Era
The discussion on strategy and security studies in Chapter Seven illustrated, I think, that 
while there were always reflective and sophisticated tendencies within that field, it was, 
and remains, an exemplary arena of positivist-Realism, technical-rationality and 
modemist discursive practices in general. 110 This being the case, post-modernists have 
been concerned to reconceptualise the "meaning" of strategic and security discourse by 
opening it to questions its Traditional agenda continues to ignore or marginalise. 
Attention, for example, has been focused on the growing sense of insecurity concerning 
state involvement in military-industrial affairs and the parlous state of the global ecology. 
Questioned, too, has been the fate of those around the world rendered insecure by lives 
lived at the margins of existence, yet unaccounted for in the statistics on military spending 
and strategic calculation. And, for those concerned to open to greater democratic 
participation a closed intellectual/policy realm, a critical target has been the (technical- 
rational) language of exclusion integral to a strategy/security discourse to the extent that 
complex questions of politics, ethics and social life, have been reduced to the illusory 
certainties of "rational" action, game-theory and systems analysis. 1 11
11^Even in the most thoughtful contemporary outposts of the genre, in, for example, the work of Barry 
Buz an, the focus of analytical attention remains firmly focused on the Traditional geo-political framework 
of reference and a privileged state, the sovereign voice of national security, albeit now as part of an 
updated "levels of analysis" approach. This is not to trivialise Buzan's contribution. There is much to 
applaud in his thoughtful approach, but it remains an example of "repressed" modernist critique. See 
Buzan, Peoples. States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books, 1983); and more recently, "The Case for a Comprehensive Definition of Security and 
the Institutional Consequences of Accepting It", Arbeidspanirer Working Papers 4 (1990), pp. 1-17. In 
these works his "level of analysis" approach is indicative also of the legacy of Traditional thinking. Thus 
while acknowledging the importance of other actors and "levels" than the state, the argument on national 
security remains rooted in the notion of a distinction between the state and civil society on the one hand 
and between individual states and the state system on the other. This is a theme raised by Walker in, 
"The Territorial State and the Theme of Gulliver", International Journal 39(3) (1984), pp.529-552; and by 
Cox in "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", Millennium 
10(2) (1981), pp.126-155. The point they both make, in their different ways is that such a position tends 
to reify the Liberal notion of a special relationship between individuals and civil society in the "domestic" 
realm while understanding as fundamentally different those relations "outside" this realm. As the 
discussions above have sought to show, this stance, however sensitively presented, excludes from serious 
critical questioning relations integral to both "inside" and "outside".
111On these themes see R. B. J. Walker, The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory 
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (Working Paper, No.3, San Diego: University of 
California, 1988); Walker, "The Territorial State and the Theme of Gulliver"; see also Walker's Chapter 
Six in One World. Many World's: Struggles For A Just World Order (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner,
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This, then, has been the context in which post-modernists have insisted that
questions of culture, language, and discourse be added to the strategy/security agenda,
and that the dominant (Realist) "m eaning” of "strategy" and "security", be
reconceptualised to include debates on the discursive process by which it has produced:
a field of strategic studies [which] conceptualizes global political space in 
ways that privilege the freedom of major powers to manipulate violence and 
threaten war as legitimate instruments of policy.112
In this regard, the post-modernist critique of Realist strategic /security discourse is aimed 
at exposing one of the most dangerous aspects of the knowledge/power nexus in 
International Relations, thus "divest[ing] power of its legitimacy and thereby disabling] 
the discourse" .113 The point of such a critique, succinctly articulated by Bradley Klein in 
terms which have a more generalised appropriateness in post-modernist scholarship, is, 
"to give power no place to hide”.114 This, it is acknowledged, is no easy task given the 
embeddedness of a discourse which, since the Cold War, has successfully projected the 
Traditional (modernist) narrative of International Relations at the forefront of its theory 
and practice, in "attributing] to the international system a timeless ontological quality of 
anarchy" which it must "manage" on behalf of the system (or society) of states.115 
Moreover, the sovereignty attributed to state actors in this narrative allowed strategists 
and security analysts to construct a Cold War scenario in which "the problems are out
1988). An interesting angle on the issue is provided also in Michael Shapiro "Strategic 
Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of "Security Policy" in the Video Age", in 
International Studies Quarterly 34(3) (1990), pp.327-341; and Bradley Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic 
Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics", Review of International Studies 
14(2) (1988), pp.133-148; Klein, "Beyond the Western Alliance: The Politics of Post-Atlantic ism", in 
Atlantic Relations: Bevond the Reagan Era edited by S. Gill (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); and 
Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO", International Studies Quarterly 
34(3) (1990), pp.311-326. This is not to forget the contributions of those who have in different ways 
sought already to overcome some of the positivist-Realist problems in this regard, for example, Jervis and 
his work on "perception/ misperception". The sovereignty issue still pertains however, in Jervis's case, in 
terms of his psychologism.
112See Klein, Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives. Centre on Violence and Human Survival 
(Occasional Paper Number 3, New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1987), p.2.
113Ibid.
114Ibid, p.5.
115Ibid, p.6.
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there, in the real world, in an international system over which statesmen have no choice, 
no control, except to react responsibly".116 Accordingly, with this a "given" of the 
nuclear age, strategic/security analysis became a major focal point of the Anarchy 
Problematique, "devis[ing] and subsequently act[ing] upon global geopolitical space 
according to the rules of strategy as a human science".117 And, on this basis, 
strategic/security discourse has been able to "naturalise" its language and purpose to the 
extent that any challenges to its hegemony has been relatively easily dismissed as 
destabilising to the "natural" order of the (anarchical) international system.118
However, as Klein suggested in 1987, when "strategy" and "security" are read in
representational terms and located in their discursive context, the detached, techno-
rationalist "naturalness" of such analysis dissolves into a modemist framework of
pseudo-scientific privileging which, in power politics terms, was/is:
designed to preserve both American leadership over the [Western] Alliance 
and the hegemony of Western multilateral trading arrangements throughout 
the Atlantic core and the Third World periphery.119
It has been in this "thinking space" that a whole range of post-modernist scholars have 
confronted the strategic/security discourse in a period which has seen the irreducible 
"reality" of the Cold War overturned, in rapid and dramatic circumstances, and the 
hegemony of the Western superpower challenged on a number of fronts. They have 
argued that to more adequately understand the potentials and dangers of the age the 
dominant Western approach to strategy and security must be reconceptualised in order 
that the nature and implications of its identity be understood in representational terms. It 
must, in this regard, be understood as part of a larger process of constructing identity in
116Ibid, p.7.
117Ibid.
1 i^In Klein's terms, "[t]he language of the whole strategic debate cloaks itself in the aseptic, ahistorical 
and anodyne terminology of a manipulative violence that sustains the practices of postwar hegemony 
without expressly addressing them. [It thus] severs its architectonic from the structure of the political 
economy it legitimates", ibid, p.16.
119Ibid, p.17.
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Western modernity, one that privileges a particular way of life and a particular "meaning 
of humanity", which is then represented as International Relations. If this process is not 
acknowledged, it is argued, understanding of human society will remain restricted to the 
Realist rituals of the Traditional sovereign state-as-actor in an anarchical world, thus 
foreclosing serious consideration on differences within and between states, and of human 
ideas and activity beyond the "necessities" of the security dilemma.120
At the forefront of this new debate on security and strategic issues have been post­
modernists eager to indicate how it might be possible to go beyond the static confines of 
theory and practice exemplified in the dominant representations of "strategy" and 
"security". Scholars such as Klein and Michael Dillon, for example, have located the 
crisis of identity in NATO as a significant microcosm of the post-Cold War period in this 
regard . 121 In one sense, as Klein has argued, NATO has become the victim of its own 
"success". This "success" was not so much in deterring the Soviet "threat", but in having 
constructed a Cold War identity for itself and its allies "which all members of the West 
either embody or aspire toward", and which was worth dying for. 122 The challenge 
spearheaded by Gorbachev has significantly undermined NATO's "success", in this 
context, by undermining the primary reason for its existence. But the Gorbachev 
phenomenon and the social revolutions in Eastern Europe have, it is argued, opened up 
an even more profound space for change - a discursive space effectively closed down 
during the reign of the Cold War identity.
This, clearly, is a space of great opportunities and obvious dangers, a space 
where the construction of Cold War cultural unity and identity is sure to be confronted by
^^This is the problem of the "levels of analysis" approach put another way. It does not of course add up 
to traditional notions of ideology, given the antipathy to all logocentric discourse including that 
concerning crude class analysis and/or notions of "false" as opposed to "real" consciousness.
121 See for Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO"; for Dillon, "The 
Alliance of Security and Subjectivity", Current Research on Peace and Violence 13(3) (1990), pp.101- 
125; see also Dillon, "Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence", Current Research on Peace and Violence 
12(2) (1989), pp.90-94; and Defence. Discourse and Policy Making Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation (Working Paper No. 4, San Diego: University of California, 1988).
^ K le in , "How the West Was One", p.320.
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those whose "difference" was expunged within it. The more direct and obvious
implications of this opened space are already to be seen and heard on the streets of those
states once unified by the threat narrative of the Warsaw Pact security discourse.123 But it
is in the West, Dillon has suggested, that the implications of the challenge to NATO's
identity are perhaps even more profound, given that organisation's connection with, and
articulation of, modernist representational practice. Bringing a post-modernist concern
with performativity to his analysis, Dillon has thus entered the "thinking space" of the era
of revolution in strategic/security discourse in an attempt to ventilate closed off obscured
and denigrated aspects of NATO rhetoric and identity formation.124 From this perspective
the crisis of identity in the West brought on by the Gorbachev challenge is understood as
a prime example of the "extent to which [the] contest over meaning is an intrinsic part of
the politics of order".125 More explicitly, it exposes relations of knowledge and power to
a different logic, one that repudiates the (positivist) sense of detachment integral to the
success of the Cold War orthodoxy. Thus:
knowledge in doubt radically problematises the exercise of power, because 
the one is the principal medium of the other [and] Power problematised, of 
course, threatens the character and constitution of political order, for without 
the inscriptions of power there is no order, because all order is an effect of 
power. 126
What is at stake here, then, is not just the future of NATO as the strategic mainspring of 
Western power and order since World War Two, but the very framework of "real" 
knowledge about International Relations that has given "meaning" to the identity of
l 23The identity theme here goes back before the Cold War, in many cases back to the state making 
processes of Versailles. In general terms though, as Dillon has put it, with the fall of the "meta­
boundary" there has been a "re-articulation - the re-entering of history - of many of the subordinated and 
aspirational identities which the post-war order has covered over"; "The Alliance of Security and 
Subjectivity", p.119.
124The term "performativity" is part of the broader Textuality theme integral to post-modernism. It owes 
a good deal to the work of the semiotician, Roland Barthes, and emphasises those rhetorical aspects of 
language performance that under modernist (particularly positivist) reading rules are ignored or demarcated 
off from the "real" (logical, rational) meaning of the text. It seeks, in this sense to explore the hidden and 
often very powerful meaning of that which is not "said", directly, and is thus concerned with historical, 
cultural and linguistic practices rather than an exclusive focus on the "author" (sovereign figure).
125Dillon,"The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity", p. 116.
126Ibid, p.117.
410
NATO and Western power and order, in that period. And this of course is why the issue 
is exciting so much attention among post-modernists, because the space opened now is 
that which leaves exposed and vulnerable the process that for so long has represented a 
particular "meaning of humanity" as the unproblematic is" of the world, the unifying, 
sovereign presence that "we" must defend, to the point of genocide if necessary, against 
"them". The process of meaning-making, in other words, is exposed as process. 
Exposed, in particular, is the process by which meaning has been made in the period of 
Realist dominance of International Relations.
This, for post-modernists such as Dillon, Klein, Walker, Ashley, Campbell, 
Shapiro and Der Derian (and for a Critical Theorist such as Cox) does not evoke concern 
over hegemonic decline and the restoration of Traditional order, but stimulates 
"celebratory" invocations of alternative political formations, of more tolerant, more 
inclusive forms of human society. Dillon articulates the "celebratory" perspective well in 
suggesting that while the "astonishing devaluation of our post-war discourse" has 
obvious dangers, it provides us with a unique opportunity to comprehend the process by 
which "questions of international (in)security are integrally related to questions of political 
subjectivity". The broader implication of the post-Cold War era, then, is that we are 
witnessing not only the dissolution of "a regime of truth", but in the increasingly 
problematic geo-political space that is "Europe", the dissolution of "the politics of political 
discourse itself ' .127 This, it must be stressed is no statement of Traditional progressivem 
on Dillon's part, the intellectual legacy of Nietzsche and Foucault eschews such a 
position. What it represents, rather, is the acknowledgement of the space for resistance to 
power politics and imposed subjectivity in a Europe now engaging everyday in the actual 
process of re-making its meaning. In this regard, it acknowledges and celebrates the 
enhanced potential for "thinking space" as the unified strategic reality of a generation 
dissolves into a site of unique re-constitution (e.g. Germany) and reconceptualisation of 
self and others.
127Ibid.
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Other post-modernists have developed these themes in their diverse inquiries into 
the post-Cold War era, some finding reason for cautious optimism that a theory and 
practice of "difference" might be emerging. This potential has been noted by Pertti 
Joenniemi, who has probed the broad discursive issues facing the West in its 
confrontation with a democratising Soviet Union in the context of the strict Otherness of 
orthodox strategic/security discourse. More recently he has looked into NATO's Cold 
War mirror image in a study of the impact upon the Warsaw Pact of the demise of its 
primary "orderer”.128 Simon Dalby, meanwhile, has continued his investigations into the 
implications of the breakdown of strategic/security discourse set upon "given" geo­
political premises in a discussion on the politics of de-alignment in the former "Western" 
and "Eastern" blocs. In the latter, in particular, he has acknowledged as positive the 
emerging critical responses among dissident groups within and outside the policy arena, 
seeking a reconceptualised form of political community in the future in which:
security is not something that can be limited to the military preparations of 
states, rather political communities have to transcend the boundaries of 
individual states, and the boundaries of alliances.129
All this, of course, needs to be kept in perspective. The war in the Persian Gulf 
(1990-1991) was evidence enough of the continuing capacity of the erstwhile Western 
superpower to invoke the Traditional "meaning" of the strategy/security discourse for its 
own interests. Nevertheless, the emerging tendencies within (often) marginalised 
communities around the world, to question the "meanings" and boundaries of their lives, 
is a theme of obvious significance for post-modernists. To conclude this discussion of 
post-modernism in International Relations, consequently, I want to touch on its
12^See Joenniemi, "The Social Constitution of Gorbachev: From an Intruder to a Communal Figure", 
paper presented at the Joint Annual Convention of BIS A and ISA (London, March 28-April 1,1989); and 
"The Post Cold War Warsaw Treaty Organization: The Pact That Unravelled", Current Research on Peace 
and Violence XIII(3) (1990), pp. 125-140.
129Dalby, "Dealignment Discourse: Thinking Beyond the Blocs", Current Research on Peace and 
Violence (1990), pp. 140-155. This is a theme attributed in particular to the Czechoslovakian Foreign 
Minister Jiri Dienstbier. On the broader issue of the increasing problems of geopolitical discourse see 
Richard Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of 
International Politics", Alternatives XII(4) (1987), pp.403-435.
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significance in relation to R. B.J. Walker's, One World. Many W orlds, a work that 
explores some of the major themes of the genre: sovereignty, textuality, 
representationalism, the Anarchy Problematique, and the limitations of strategic/security 
discourse, from the point of view of the marginalised, the silenced, the omitted, those 
whose lives, cultures and histories have, for so long, been read out of the power politics 
narrative.
One World. Many Worlds: Toward a Post-Modernist Politics of Resistance?
The immediate locus of Walker's attention are those critical social movements around the 
world working to more fully understand, resist and change dominant power structures in 
their specific sites, and under a diversity of cultural circumstances. Movements of this 
kind range from the conventional social movements in Western industrialised societies, 
organising to resist nuclear weapons, militarism, environmental degradation and gendered 
politics, to the movements in Eastern Europe and throughout the Third World, engaged in 
similar struggles, and those over specific issues of ecology (e.g. pollution, deforestation) 
and broader struggles for a more secure, peaceful and dignified life. The significance of 
these movements, for Walker, is that while they, inevitably, are pan of a global struggle 
in "One (interdependent) World", they represent also a politics of difference, the 
articulation of the "Many Worlds" of people's experiences and aspirations, which cannot, 
and should not, be constrained by the dictates of a particular "meaning of humanity" as 
projected in the Traditional discourse of International Relations.
Their significance is enhanced in this latter regard by many of their practices, 
which defy traditional grand theorised strategies of revolutionary thought and behaviour 
in favour of creative, innovative resistance, established and carried out in specific sites of 
struggle. They are, in this sense, examples of a practical political dimension of the search 
for "thinking space" in the contemporary period, activating in their everyday lives and 
struggles the concerns of Critical Social Theorists seeking to challenge dominant
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discourses of hierarchical power and repressed aspiration. These activities,
consequently, are acknowledged as part of "a transformative assault on our inherited
notions of authority, legitimacy and power" which:
carries the possibility of reconstructing the conditions for a decent life from 
the bottom up, without waiting for elites to become enlightened or replaced 
by still more elites.130
Critical social movements, in their different locations and circumstances, are engaged in 
this reconstructive enterprise in repossessing their history, language and culture, in 
rediscovering the enabling dimension of power and in confronting the "givens" of 
International Relations.131 Their struggles represent an important new dimension of 
dissent for post-modernists, suspicious of all traditional claims for emancipation, on 
behalf of the people, the class, the common interest, and sceptical of all singular, 
homogenised images of "reality", "liberty", "freedom", of all "isms" proclaiming post- 
Enlightenment visions of the good life.
This is not a perspective that denies the desirability of "planetary integrity, of 
people's security, of empowering development for all, of deepening democracy 
everywhere" .132 Rather, it is a perspective which cares enough about the possibility of 
such conditions, not to endanger them by abrogating responsibility for them again to 
another vanguard, another Realism, another Tradition, another religion, another 
Philosophy, another rational-scientific panacea for a self-satisfied, disempowering, 
bourgeois ideology. Accordingly, while there is no sense of reification or idealisation of 
critical social movements in Walker’s work, there is an appreciation of their struggles and
13^Walker, One World. Many Worlds, p.8. The claim here is not that critical social movements 
explicitly articulate post-modernist principles of critique, nor does Walker make such a claim. The point, 
rather is that their theory and practice can be interpreted in this way and some extrapolations can be drawn 
from these interpretations. I am perhaps taking a few more interpretive liberties here than Walker did in 
One World Many Worlds under the auspices of The Committee for a Just World Peace.
131They confront the "givens", of course, in both their Traditional power politics formulation and in 
their orthodox revolutionary counterparts.
132Ibid, p.154.
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aspirations as providing a sense o f what a post-m odern politics m ight look like, as a 
counter to the Traditional theory and practice o f International Relations.
In this regard it is acknow ledged that critical social m ovem ents will, and must,
continue to struggle against the m ost obvious and reprehensible injustices and dangers in
the "One" world, e.g. against nuclear arm s, apartheid, and brutal m ilitary repression in
A frica, and Central and South A m erica. But these struggles, w hile connected to the
broader "radical m ovem ent", will be energised directed and articulated by "meaning" and
"know ing" derived , not from  som e sovereign  centre, som e p riv ileged  om nipotent
presence, but from  the creativ ity  and critical capacities o f  people learning about their
w orld, in their own ways, through their ow n struggles. In this way, a broader more
profound potential for "meaning" and "knowing" m ight be realised, in which:
People learn to recognize not only the authoritarian state "out there" - the 
identifiable events o f arm oured vehicles and dawn awakenings, o f censorship 
and beatings, o f p ro p ag an d is ts  im ages and inaccessible decisions - but also 
the au tho ritarian  state "in here" - the rou tines taken fo r g ran ted , the 
conveniences o f forgetting, the capitulation o f apathy.133
For all the enorm ity o f the task, there were signs, suggested W alker, that this kind 
o f politics o f d ifference, o f enpow erm ent, o f  resistance, is beginning to em erge. One 
dim ension o f this em ergence concerns the way that the "givens" of a Cold W ar generation 
are now being questioned in International Relations. There is, for exam ple, an increasing 
appreciation that questions o f w ar and peace - the central questions o f the Realist agenda - 
cannot, any longer, "be separated from  questions o f developm ent, ecological degradation, 
abuse o f hum an rights [and] loss o f cultural identity".134 Sim ilarly, questions o f security, 
the prim ary locus o f R ealist research attention for so long, are now in the process o f 
reconceptualisation. In particular the power politics com m itm ent to a state centric security 
form at is under challenge by those w ho m aintain that it is no longer credible to reduce
133Ibid.
134Ibid, p.121.
415
insecurity in the modem world "to the necessities of life in a system of states". Instead, it 
is argued:
[s]uch a reduction was always an oversimplified fiction. It is now a wilful 
obscurantism  [thus] the distinction between friend and foe, citizen and 
enemy, inside and outside belong to an earlier era.135
This insight, is increasingly evident as peoples around the world emphasise the need to 
"understand the connections between different conceptions of security appropriate for 
different situations rather than to search for a single concept or source of security".136
Under challenge, too, in this context, is the anti-democratic nature of strategic and 
security debate, closed off by exclusivist strategies invoking notions of "national 
interestY ’national security" and a logic and language which has rendered "technological" 
that which is integral to political praxis. The experiences of a range of critical social 
movements have illustrated the dangers of this Traditional insistence on secrecy and 
exclusivity. In Central America, for exam ple, (as Shapiro indicated above) the 
connections between "national interest" and "security" is at best highly problematic for the 
great mass o f people struggling to survive under military regimes and/or authoritarian 
elites, and the influences of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, as many indigenous 
movements o f change have insisted, any meaningful notion of security must be re­
connected to an open structure of theory and practice, to participatory politics and 
radically enhanced "thinking space". In the West, too, the space opened by anti-nuclear 
movements, for example, has resulted in challenges to the anti-democratic nature of 
strategic/security thinking and policy making, and a closed Traditional discourse in 
general. This, suggested Walker, is a positive and necessary incursion into closed space 
because it confronts a "traditional habit that can prove fatal" - the habit of abandoning 
responsibility for thinking on strategy and security issues "to others who claim to know 
best". Rather, as critical social movements (and Critical Social Theorists) have argued in
135Ibid. 
136Ibid, p.122.
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a diversity of ways, these are not issues that can be left to someone else because 
"effective security must mean democratic security".137
The question begged here - about what democracy "means" - is, of course, of 
major significance for post-modernists concerned with the process by which powerful 
Enlightenment themes impose themselves as oppressive practices. It is acknowledged, 
for example, that formal political democracy is often connected to life experiences 
dominated by bureaucratic stultification, authoritarian state rule, elite sponsored apathy 
and cynicism and conditions in which "many, or even most, people are excluded from 
making decisions about thing that control their lives" .138 Thus, in confronting the 
question of democracy in contemporary times, critical social movements, like Critical 
Social Theorists, and post-modernists in particular, have become engaged in a broader 
agenda involving:
the rearticulation of political space, the discovery of new forms of political 
practice, the exploration of new horizons of knowing and being...[and] the 
struggle to establish new forms of human solidarity.139
The tendency toward a democratic politics of difference, is particularly evident, argued 
Walker, when Traditional issues of strategy and security are connected to questions of 
economic development. In this context there is an increasing acknowledgement that, in 
the age of monopoly capitalism and a world wide transformation in productive processes, 
(as described by Cox, for example) the "rhetorical power" of Traditional concepts are 
shown to be increasingly "at odds with [their] conceptual, political and ethical 
incoherence" .140 This is clear enough in regard to the concept of meaningful state 
participation in an interdependent world economy, where "the very idea of a national
137Ibid, p.126. 
138Ibid, p. 133. 
139Ibid, p. 128. 
140Ibid.
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economy is rapidly becoming a contradiction in terms".141 Accordingly, peoples 
everywhere are engaged in a search, not for greater hegemonic stability in a state centric 
universe, which traditionally has condemned millions to "live in poverty, ill health, and 
cultural deprivation, engage in hard labor and suffer premature death", but toward a 
reconceptualisation of some of the basic categories of modemist "meaning" concerning 
the "reality" of a contemporary international political economy.142
Challenged, most immediately, is the homogeneity of the modernisation
discourse, still dominant at the core of the Realist image of a world of sovereign states
hierarchically located in power politics terms. In countering this with alternative
developmental strategies "rooted in the needs of specific communities", critical social
movements have challenged also much of the modernist historical narrative and its
associated philosophical wisdom. Consequently, for many in the 1990s "so called
traditional ways of life become at least as important for understanding the potentialities of
different kinds of human community as the lure of modernization" and "development
ceases to be seen as a process imposed from the top down, something that is done to,
rather than by people". It is in this context that reconceptualised development strategies
become part of an inherently democratic process:
in which people participate in the making of their own communities, one in 
which economic life is intrinsically connected to the social, environmental, 
and cultural processes that are essential to a sustained and meaningful way of 
life.143
141 Ibid, p.129.
142Ibid. The point here is not that Traditional strategies of growth cannot be "successful" but that their 
"success" is so often associated with great structural inequalities. As Walker notes in India, currently, 
about 40% of the population are now benefiting from increased national economic growth, while 
simultaneously, about 40% are becoming even worse off. In Africa meanwhile, about 80% of peoples 
don't even have access to the basic resources that are deemed necessary in conventional economics to 
begin the development process; ibid, p.130. This, added to the demands of an industrialised world and its 
various agencies of capital and production, for profit, in a single world market, simply increases the 
prospects that the "wretched of the earth" will remain "wretched" even as the rhetoric of economic 
development and free market and Hegemonic Stability Theory is proclaimed as the only "realistic" 
solution to the problem.
143Ibid, p. 131.
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It is in engaging in this theory as practice that critical social movements activate post­
modern images of a politics of resistance. In reclaiming for themselves the process by 
which the notion of democracy is made meaningful, by reconceptualising development 
and security, they are engaged not only in an immediate challenge to power politics but in 
challenging "the presumptions of a civilisation" .144
More explicitly than anywhere else in the post-modernist contribution to
International Relations, Walker's One World. Many Worlds articulates this diverse
deconstruction of modernism and Realism, as part of a politics, not just of difference, but
of post-modern resistance. 145 It is post-modern resistance in the sense that while it is
directly, sometimes violently engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the dominant
(repressive) ways of thinking, speaking and acting in modernist political society. It is,
therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand scale emancipation, or of conventional
radicalism imbued with the authority of one or another sovereign presence.146 It is,
nevertheless, a resistance that must include an opposition to the most "intolerable"
features of contemporary human society, to processes that restrict peoples lives to misery
and basic survival. At this level it means unremitting resistance to "torture,
disappearances, and the abuse of human rights, particularly the rights to food, shelter and
other subsistence needs". And, more generally, it means resistance to:
any autocratic presumption of the right to rule, whether this presumption is 
defended with crude force or by appeal to some natural superiority given by 
gender, race, class or expertise. 147
144 Ibid, p.130.
145The connection in Walker’s thinking is clear enough in One World. Many Worlds, but just as he 
makes clear that critical social movements are not the only agencies engaging in the struggles outlined 
here, there is no suggestion that the only way to understand critical social movements is through a post­
modernist lens; ibid, pp.157-160.
14^Ibid, p.158. Nor is it concerned to "impose a common vision" of resistance upon people's struggles, 
nor in any institutionalised sense to "forge a united front capable of storming existing citadels of power".
147Ibid, p.159.
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Just as importantly, a post-modern resistance is active at the everyday, 
community, neighbourhood, and inter-personal levels where it confronts those processes 
which close off potential for people to give meaning to their lives, and change that 
meaning; which, anywhere, and at any level, systematically exclude people from making 
decisions about who they are and what they can be. It is at this level, argued Walker, that 
power politics operates most insidiously and potently, and if there is one lesson to be 
learnt from the activities of critical social movements, at this level, it is that people, given 
the opportunities to understand the processes by which they are constituted (as, for 
example, subjects in an objective world of anarchical power politics) can become aware 
that they "are not always as powerless as they made to feel" .148 In such circumstances, 
as peoples around the planet have illustrated in recent times, it becomes possible to say 
no\ to ask why; to understand how.149
Walker is at pains throughout One World.Manv Worlds to stress that neither 
critical social movements, nor post-modernist perspectives on them, have any monopoly 
of wisdom when it comes to understanding and/or responding to the complex issues of 
international theory and practice. Critical social movements are nevertheless of particular 
importance, he suggested, because their practices deal with the world, not as "a future 
abstraction but as a process in which to engage wherever one is" .150 This too, it seems to 
me, is a principle integral to any sense of what a post-modernist politics of resistance 
might be. This is indicated by Walker, also, in terms which emphasise the 
"concreteness" of post-modernist perspectives in refuting any abstract regime of theory
148Ibid.
149A range of resistances can flow from this, suggested Walker, people can: refuse the "absorption of 
military production and culture into everyday life"; they can resist the dangers of national chauvinism, the 
fiction of nuclear deterrence theory; the transformation of politics into the construction of Otherness; they 
can help prevent their social and environmental structures being destroyed in the name of efficient 
productive practices; they can oppose inappropriate technologies "and the exploitation of more vulnerable 
social groups"; and they can intervene in the processes of production, consumption and distribution, and 
thus, "extend processes of democratization into realms where it has never been tried: into the home, into 
the workplace, into processes of cultural production", ibid, p.160.
150Ibid, p. 157.
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and practice in favour of "reclaiming the potential inherent in existing practices, 
institutions and values" .151 This is an important theme in any discussion of post­
modernism, because it locates a post-modernist politics of resistance, be it articulated at 
the dissenting margins of academic life, or as part of a more direct social movement of 
change, as engaged with the language, logic and power relations of modernity, not as 
(somehow) detached from the modem world, part of Peter Dew's "philosophy of the 
avant garde".152
Walker stressed this point in the concluding passages of One World. Many 
W orlds, when, reflecting upon the significance of the new politics of critical social 
movements, he mused that it was:
not necessary to reject the [modemist, Realist] concept of security in order to 
think [critically] about peace and justice, just the particular understanding o f 
security through which the concept has been more or less turned into its 
opposite.153
This is a principle developed further to encompass the Realist agenda as a whole - the 
dominant Tradition of International Relations. Indeed, argued Walker, traditions too 
must be "reclaimed", though not in the Traditional way associated with International 
Relations. Rather, traditions must be "reclaimed" through opening up "the potential 
vitality of histories", not by closing down those histories or reducing them to the 
caricatured enscription of a particular "meaning of humanity".154
It is not surprising, therefore, that central to the concerns of a post-modem 
politics of resistance within the Third Debate has been the attempt to go beyond the 
Tradition of simplistic and dangerous closure represented as Realism. There should be 
no surprise either that post-modernists are at the forefront of a proliferating Critical Social
151 Ibid, p.161.
152Dews, The Logic of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory 
(London: Verso, 1987).
15^Walker, One World. Many Worlds, p. 161, emphasis added.
154Ibid.
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Theory literature aimed at that disciplinary ritual which, via primitive reading/writing 
practices, continues to represent "reality" in terms of "recurrence and repetition", 
structural necessity, the Anarchy Problematique, and endemic relations of Otherness. 
Least surprising of all, of course, has been the response of an entrenched Tradition and 
discipline to challenges from post-modernism. This is because, to a greater extent that 
other Critical Social Theory approaches, post-modernism has exposed International 
Relations for what it is: a textual Tradition become "reality"; a particular reading of 
(Western) philosophy and history, become transhistorical/transcultural "fact"; a way of 
framing "meaning" and "knowing" shaped by Newtonian physics and Cartesian 
rationalism, become meaning and knowing in the world of nuclear weapons, AIDS and 
ozone depletion. What post-modernism has exposed, more directly, is International 
Relations as a discursive process: a process by which identities are formed, meaning is 
given, and status and privilege is accorded; a process by which threats to identity and its 
meaning are both disciplined and punished; a process of knowledge as power.
This is what is at stake in the post-modernist challenge to the Tradition and 
discipline of International Relations as International Relations. This is what is at stake 
when those whose identities (literally and figuratively) are dependent upon the Traditional 
knowledge as power, seek to exclude post-modernism from serious analysis, marginalise 
the significance of its arguments, and/or ridicule its attempts to go beyond the boundaries 
of Traditional concepts and language. In short, at stake in the post-modernist politics of 
resistance in International Relations is that "something" that is "happening" in the modem 
world, that Jane Flax pointed to in Thinking Fragments. It is the acknowledgement , 
positively endorsed by some, lamented and resisted by others, that "a shape of life is 
dying", that a profound shift is taking place in contemporary social life as a generation 
understands that the Enlightenment dream (and the unquestioned hegemony of its 
modernist discourse) is over.155 At a more prosaic level it is the acknowledgement, in
155Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis. Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary 
West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.7. See the discussion on this theme in Chapter 
Four of the thesis, pp. 133-136.
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Holsti's terms, that a "three centuries long intellectual consensus" has broken down in 
International Relations, leaving exposed the "assumptions and world views" upon which 
a Tradition, a discipline, and a particular "meaning of humanity", were constructed.156
This final Chapter has sought to illustrate how post-modernist scholarship has 
responded to this "breakdown" in International Relations and to the broader "something" 
that is happening in the contemporary world. It has done so in terms consistent with my 
view that, in the exciting and dangerous spaces now opening up, post-modernism is the 
most exciting and least dangerous way of understanding and responding to a changing 
world.
^ H o ls t i ,  The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen and 
Unwin, 1985), p .l.
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CONCLUSION
This is a difficult work to conclude, in conventional terms, given that one of its explicit 
purposes has been to eschew any notion of final words or syntheses, and, instead, open 
to further questioning a "preface" agenda that for so long has remained unquestioned, 
effectively "concluded" .1 A final summarising discussion is appropriate, nevertheless, 
and something more needs to be said about the critical perspectives highlighted in the final 
chapters of the thesis in particular.
The thesis began by explaining why it was important that a "preface" be written 
for International Relations, and why the critical approaches utilised in this work were 
most appropriate for such an enterprise. The task, it was suggested, was to fill in the 
silences between theory and practice, interpretation and action, and knowledge and power 
in an International Relations scholarship which has provoked lamentations about its 
"backwardness", and an increasing appreciation of the dangers associated with its 
narrow, intolerant and caricatured analysis .2 This led to a discussion on the 
"primitiveness",3 in general, of perspectives which "disallow reflection"4 on the process 
by which knowledge is constituted, and which dismiss alternatives as irrelevant and/or 
peripheral to research into a real world existing "out there", independent of and/or 
resistant too, the interpretive position of the observer/researcher. It led, more 
specifically, to a connection between this "primitive" position - designated as positivism - 
and the dominant perspective in International Relations - designated as Realism.
1The thesis has, in this sense, been a celebration of "newly initiated departures" rather than "safe arrivals". 
This is Joseph Lapid's term in, "The Third Debate: On die Prospects of International Theory in a Post- 
Positivist Era", International Studies Quarterly 33(3) (1989), pp.235-254, at p.247.
2By Mervyn Frost, in Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986).
3This is R. N. Berki's theme in On Political Realism (London: J.M. Dent, 1983).
4See Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
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This positivist-Realist connection, it was argued, is as fundamental to 
International Relations in the 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, as it was from the 
moment systematic study of contemporary global politics began after World War Two. 
The unselfconsciousness associated with this situation, and the silence attending its 
replication in so many areas of theory and practice by otherwise intelligent scholars, was 
interpreted as evidence that the issues at stake on the "preface" question, went beyond the 
immediate historico-intellectual context (Cold W ar/U.S. social sciences) and necessitated 
a critical inquiry of a scope and magnitude previously not experienced in International 
Relations.
The proposition, more precisely, was that International Relations represents the 
site of a much larger philosophical commitment in modem Western life set upon the 
foundationalist paradox associated with post-Cartesian thought. This modernist 
commitment renders all knowledge not foundationally derived as, by definition, 
irrelevant, peripheral and "meaningless", and limits the capacity to think and speak 
outside a narrowly and rigidly defined boundary of "knowing" and "meaning". 
Expressed in positivist terms (and via its neo-Kantian equivalents) it has framed the way 
that the great modem ideological traditions have asked their questions of the world and 
constructed their answers. Subsequently, at the core of Anglo-American social theory 
there has been a dichotomised, logocentric logic set primarily upon the distinction 
between the sovereign figure of post-Cartesian rationalism and the world "out there".
This subject/object dichotomy has been the font of "real world" analysis ever 
since for orthodoxies seeking foundational knowledge in a world where omnipotence has 
lost its traditional (pre-modern) focal point.5 It has, consequently, been at the 
metatheoretical core of that whole framing regime that has shaped and defined 
International Relations (e.g."idealism"/Realism, fact/value, theory/practice, domestic/
5The question here of which precisely is the foundational figure in the post-Cartesian tradition continues 
to be an interesting one given Descartes ultimate commitment to a human rationality sanctioned in terms 
of an omnipotent God. Either way there is an objectified Archimedean point at the heart of modernity and 
at the discursive core of International Relations.
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international, self/Other etc) in a period punctuated by two World Wars and the Cold War 
with the Soviet Union.* 6 Accordingly, the boundaries of reality in International Relations 
have been those encompassing the enduring struggle between the sovereign individual 
(state) and the objective forces of anarchy (represented either in Traditional or neo-Realist 
terms). Intrinsic to this image of "reality" has been the figure of the sovereign 
(individual) Realist scholar emestly testing (or intuiting) the world for its anarchical 
essence. The point, more precisely, is that the modernist way of framing International 
Relations has become International Relations, the positivist-Realist image of the world 
"out there" has become reality, and the foundationalist approach to "real" knowledge has 
become the only legitimate way of "knowing" and giving "meaning". All other 
approaches have, on this basis, been excluded, by definition, as "metaphysical", 
"speculative", "theoretical" abstractions, as inhabiting the realm of the "meta- 
everything".7
This thesis sought to open up this closed framing regime, albeit not in the 
conventional way - on behalf of an alternative "realism" imbued with all the insight and 
truth lacking in the dominant Realism - but by exposing the discursive process by which 
Realism represents "reality" - the process of making a particular philosophical meaning 
universally "real". Here, the discussion turned to the interrogative perspectives of Critical 
Social Theory approaches (and post-modern perspectives in particular) to engage the 
silences and probe the unreflected inner sanctums of International Relations with 
approaches which confront the modernist image with its "other side" - that which has 
been left out of the process by which reality is made in modem Western life. It sought in 
this way to counter the universal, the essential and the objective with perspectives 
illustrating the fallibility, contingency and heterogeneity of all social life. It sought, 
moreover, to re-locate the sovereign subject - the transparent "knowable" agency of
^This, significantly, has also been the way that the disciplinary "alternatives" to the dominant perspective
have been framed.(e.g. conventional Marxism, pluralism, structuralism etc).
7On the denigration of those who (purportedly) inhabit the world of the "meta-everything" see Roger 
Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface: International Political Economy and Epistemology", Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 17(2) (1988), pp.285-293; and the Introduction to the thesis.
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modern rationality - as an always pre-interpreted, always textually represented figure of a 
particular discursive practice dominant in the post-Enlightenment era. It sought, in short, 
to illustrate that it is the process of textual representation that is the site of "real" 
knowledge in modernity and of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations. In 
seeking, simultaneously, to problematise any sense of "real-worldism" beyond socio­
cultural and linguistic practice, the thesis outlined its concern to open up a more tolerant 
and inclusive agenda on global society capable, perhaps, of understanding and 
communicating beyond the closed and dangerous parameters of the power politics 
Tradition.
Chapters One to Four of the thesis were concerned, accordingly, to explain the 
process by which a particular kind of philosophical "meaning" and a particular approach 
to "knowing" had become transformed, in the post-Cartesian period, into the meaning of 
modern social life and the only legitimate way of "knowing". Central to this 
tranformative process, it was argued, was positivism - a synthesis of empiricist 
epistemology and Cartesian rationalism - which, in its many variations, most powerfully 
represents the modernist attempt to detach the "real", the "foundational" and the 
"essential" from that prejudiced by history, culture and language. The positivist approach 
has been acknowledged as an inadequate source of "real" knowledge from the time of its 
emergence in the Enlightenment (e.g. by Hume) but this has rarely hindered its influence 
upon those seeking the existential, political, and professional security afforded by its 
"correspondence rule" logic. The controversy over positivism has not gone entirely 
unheeded, however, and as Chapter Three indicated there have been many attempts to 
detach contemporary analysis from its more obvious problems and proclaim "post­
positivist" status while continuing the quest for (social) scientific knowledge. This, 
nevertheless, has been a largely unsuccessful enterprise with major "post-positivisms" 
remaining committed to the modemist/positivist framing regime with all the implications 
this entails for analytical narrowness, intolerance and unselfconsciousness.
427
The thesis turned to the question of these implications in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven, in particular, when it critically reassessed some of the major concepts, themes, 
issues, and analytical perspectives of International Relations, with Critical Social Theory 
concerns in mind. Chapter Five had both general and specific purposes in this context. 
In general terms its aim was to locate the Tradition and discipline of International 
Relations within the larger discursive confines of modernism. It did this in the first 
instance by illustrating the exemplary modernism of the way that International Relations 
has Traditionally framed the questions it asks of history and philosophy. This, it was 
suggested, has been an almost entirely ethnocentric enterprise carried out in rather crude 
logocentric terms. Consequently, contemporary "reality" has been framed as a singular, 
self-affirming, narrative of Western (primarily Western European) eternal wisdom, 
derived (very selectively) from the scattered textual utterings of the Greeks, Christian 
theology and post-Renaissance Europe. The "facts" of this narrative of universal reality 
have been organised, also, in exemplary modemist manner - via positivist retrospective 
procedures which accord them their "real" meaning. For Realists of the Traditionalist ilk, 
consequently, (e.g. Wight, Bull) the "facts" represent themselves in the enduring 
evidence of inter-state anarchy and a pattern of "recurrence and repetition", which one 
discovers by reading the "great (historical) texts" in the present, and corresponding their 
universal meaning with the world "out there". For structuralist or neo-Realists of the 
1990s (e.g Waltz, Krasner) the modernist/positivist framing regime is continued, but in 
the "post-positivist" era more emphasis is placed on the methodological procedures by 
which the "facts" are organised and explicated.
The limitations and silences of this approach were further illustrated in relation to 
the unselfconsciousness it evoked in disciplinary self understanding. The focal point here 
was the most potent of Traditional dichotomies - between Realism and "idealism". The 
counter proposition presented in the thesis was that, contrary to orthodox perception, the 
great "alternatives" of the International Relations have always been intrinsically connected 
- as two variations on the dominant modernism/positivism theme. The first variation has
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generally framed its "reality" in terms of the struggle of democratic consciousness to 
overcome the irrationality of the world "out there", while the second has retained 
precisely the same structure of understanding but has inverted the progressivist logic in 
favour of conservative certainty about the (anarchical) world "out there".
The more specific purpose of Chapter Five was to indicate the direct implications 
of this closed "theoretical" agenda for the most important arena of "practice" in post- 
World War Two history - the Cold War between the two superpowers and their alliance 
blocs. The arguments presented on this issue indicated how crucial "thinking space" and 
policy options were emphatically and irrevocably closed off within an International 
Relations community confined within the discursive practices it left unquestioned. 
Unable to think and speak outside a "primitive" logic of (objectified, externalised) reality 
it could not question the discursive process by which a range of interpretive alternatives - 
all articulating the "facts" - were reduced to an unambiguous, singular narrative of "fact", 
which gave unity and identity to Western scholars and policy practioners, and a simple 
self-enclosed "meaning" to the Cold War and to the "reality" of a generation to follow.
Chapter Six explored some of the most important modernist themes on the Cold 
War generational agenda. It located the Modernisation debate and the debates over 
security and nuclear strategy as particularly significant in this regard. Indeed the 
narrowness and simplicity of thinking on "history", order, and international political 
economy has never been more evident than when Anglo-American scholars turned their 
attention to the "developing" societies of the Third World in the 1960s. Here, 
ethnocentric arrogance intersected with the certainties of techno-rationalist process and 
crude ideological bias to replicate, in a more precise arena, the Realist commitment to 
order, hierachy and rational action, and the positivist (e.g.behaviouralist) insistence on a 
modelled correspondence with "reality".
These were themes integral also to the questions of Western security and the Cold 
War nuclear confrontation with the forces of disorder and anarchy "out there", in the 
"golden age" of positivist-Realism and strategic analysis in the 1960s. The result, when
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all the psuedo-scientific jargon is stripped away and a critical perspective is taken to the 
"givenness” of the whole enterprise, is a body of knowledge, at best, ambiguous and 
inconclusive, at worst, resonant with the dangers and paradoxes of the general attempt to 
transform already highly problematic Traditionalist premises into a rational science of war 
and peace. Another significant implication of the positivist-Realist "golden age" is that it 
emersed a generation of International Relations scholars in its training rituals and Realist 
folk lore, and this legacy has remained a dominant factor in the neo-Realist era.
This legacy is evident in the "politics of forgetting" within mainstream Realism 
which allows the crudity and silences of the erstwhile Wizards of Armageddon to be 
replicated in the false rigour of neo-Realism’s updated invocation of U.S. hegemonic 
rule. "Forgotten" in this regard has been the analytical inadequacy of the whole 
(Traditionalist) Realist conceptual lexicon - with its notion of an anarchy "out there" 
necessitating balance of power structures and alliance relations - practices which, as 
Vasquez illustrated, are "part of the very behavior that leads to war".8 "Forgotten" too has 
been the (at best) problematic nature of the Realist rational-actor model, which underpins 
neo-Realist dictums about the universal nature of human/state behaviour, but which in its 
strategic dimension cannot account, in any consistent way, for behaviour in crisis 
situations and/or at the onset of war.9
Chapter Seven dealt directly with the tendency to "forget" in neo-Realism. Here, 
it was argued, at the core of the International Relations discipline the implications of the 
"unwritten preface" have never been starker in a period in which innovative thought and 
research has never been more vital. Consequently, and in a replication of the 
"primitivism" of the past, arrogant unselfconsciousness has abounded as those who 
disallow, disavow and decry "reflection" have illustrated their overwhelming need for it. 
Arguments, therefore, designed to provide anti-reductionist and structuralist explanations
^See John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p.221.
9Ibid, pp.210-21. This is a bit of a problem, of course, for a grand theory of human/state behaviour at 
the International level.
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of the world have been invoked in the crudest of reductionist and atomised terms (e.g.by 
Waltz); while proposals for a sophisticated Realist theory, detached from the 
"inappropriate" premises of Newtonian physics, have been advanced in terms derived 
directly and unproblematically from Newton (e.g. by Keohane).10 Moreover, in the age 
of internationalised processes of production, explosive nationalist re-awakenings, 
globalised drug cartels and the predicted perils of the "greenhouse effect", the new Realist 
mainstream has continued to represent its analytical insight in terms of the "billiard ball" 
logic of the 1950s and a simple utilitarian model associated with the behaviouralist grand 
theory of the 1960s.11 Large scale works on the International Political Economy, 
meanwhile, are projected in terms which effectively ignore and/or marginalise the impact 
of global capital upon the lives of the great majority of humans (e.g. by Gilpin);12 while 
suspicion persists that neo-Realism represents nothing as much as it does an interest in 
status quo order, Traditional patterns of domination and control (e.g.Westem politico- 
economic rule) and more specifically, at the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy 
interests of the United States as world hegemon.
Chapters Eight and Nine addressed this situation from a Critical Social Theory 
perspective. In Chapter Eight, for example, from a Critical Theory perspective sensitive 
to rational-scientific incursion into social life and honed, dialectically, to counter 
dichotomised representations of "reality", interesting alternatives were presented to the 
"given" conceptual framework, and a more inclusive and genuinely political economy 
approach was introduced. The "poverty" of neo-Realism was here contrasted to 
approaches which sought to explicitely connect theory to practice in order that the 
implications of "practice" be always open to the critical reflection of "theory" - never
^ In  Waltz’s case, see Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); on Robert 
Keohane, see "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Neorealism and its Critics edited 
by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). For a broader discussion of their insights 
and those of others who have dismissed the need few "reflection" see Chapter Seven of the thesis.
1 ^ i d ,  especially pp.317-334.
12See The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
See also the discussion in Chapter Seven of the thesis, pp.318-321.
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detached from it in some naked power politics vacuum. Thus, instead of seeking merely 
to "describe" and/or interpret and organise the facts of global hegemony (e.g. in neo- 
Realism) a Critical Theory perspective emphasises the creative power of the process of 
interpretation, description and organisation, and insists that the "creators" be always 
accountable for their role in that process.
In this sense, and in Bradley Klein's terms, a Critical Theory approach gives 
"power no place to hide"13 thus opening up a series of questions otherwise not asked. 
Questioned for example is the knowledge/power of the "detached" Realist scholar - be it 
the neo-Realist engaged in the falsificationist ritual, or the Traditionalist proffering "rough 
and ready judgement" on the "facts" .14 Either way, from a Critical Theory perspective, 
Realism is perceived not as a voice of moderated intellectual debate but of complicity in 
and reinforcement of a global structure of great inequity and manifest injustice. The 
significance of this Critical Theory approach to International Relations is that having 
opened one dichotomised region of the "unwritten preface" (e.g. theory/practice - subject/ 
object, knowledge/power) other previously closed and silenced spaces can be filled with 
the voices, orientations, capacities, insights and questions of previously marginalised or 
excluded perspectives. In this way the discursive conditions for critical argument might 
be changed to the extent that when a Robert Cox indicates, in great detail, a whole matrix 
of social, political and economic behaviour in the contemporary world that defies 
representation in (neo) Realist terms, it would receive a careful and serious investigation 
of its immediate and long term implications, rather than some ritualised resort to 
foundationalism articulated in exclusionary terms. 15
13This is a theme introduced by Klein in Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives Centre on Violence and 
Human Survival (Occasional Paper Number 3, New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1987), 
p.5. It is used in reference to post-modernist scholarship in this context, but my position is that at its 
best (e.g. in Robert Cox’s work) Critical Theory approaches are similarly oriented and, effectively so.
14This was the way that Hedley Bull represented the Traditionalist position in "International Theory: The 
Case for the Classical Approach", World Politics XVIII (April 1966), pp.361-377.
15The point here is not that Cox's position would be beyond criticism in this changed discursive 
situation, it would, on the contrary, be subject to a more profound critical scholarship than ever before in 
International Relations. The point, rather, is that Cox's important contribution could not be dismissed in 
crude Traditional terms - as "irrelevant" to the "reality" of an international political economy whose
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This was a theme developed further in Chapter Nine in a discussion of the post­
modernist search for "thinking space" in the era of neo-Realist closure. Here, the 
Tradition and discipline of International Relations was confronted with the most 
sophisticated and potent Critical Social Theory perspective on modernism, 
foundationalism  and a positivist-Realist "politics o f forgetting". Applying 
deconstructionist techniques to International Relations, post-modernist scholars have 
exposed the narrowly focused and arbitrary nature of the discursive process which has 
transformed "a historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the 
present" .16 Post-modernist critiques of Realism's "great texts" and "heroic figures", for 
example, have undermined the notion of any universal or essential wisdom at the 
historico-intellectual core of International Relations, revealing instead a contested terrain 
of textuality, represented by Realists as a single, coherent Tradition of "real' knowledge. 
The "practical" significance of this politics of representation is clear enough given the 
intrinsic connection drawn by Realists and neo-Realists between the eternal wisdom of a 
Thucydides or a Machiavelli and the contemporary "reality" of the state system, of power, 
hegemonic control and the enduring anarchy "out there" .17 The silences, omissions and 
basic inadequacies of mainstream scholarship become much easier to understand in this 
representational context, particularly if one reflects that there is no historical, 
philosophical or textual foundation to Realism, other than that constituted by a post- 
Cartesian assumption about the existence of foundations and a crude positivist reading 
regime which makes that assumption "fact".
essence can only be understood in power politics terms- and/or as mere (Marxist) "ideology" in contrast to 
the Traditionally informed, and falsified knowledge of mainstream scholarship. A further point needs to 
be made also, it is that it is not just Cox's contribution that is under discussion here, but a whole range 
of works that in a more tolerant and less intimidatory context might help illuminate a complex world 
from Critical Theory perspectives. This is an important generalisation to make because Cox's work, per 
se, is rarely the direct focus of a neo-Realist community which really isn't equipped to deal with its 
nuance.
^ S ee  R.B J. Walker, "The Prince and 'The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of 
International Relations", in Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics 
edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989) p29.
17The point here, of course, is that this connection is as strong (and as illusory) in the 1980s and 1990s 
as it was in the Traditionalist period of dominance between (approximately) 1945-1960. See the 
discussion on this issue in Chapter Nine of the thesis.
433
The limitations of Realism have been revealed in their starkest form in post­
modernist critiques of two of the most powerful themes in International Relations - those 
of sovereignty and anarchy. Both themes are direct derivatives of a logocentric framing 
regime which provides unified rational meaning to a world of diversity and difference. 
And both, consequently, represent powerful sites of conceptual closure on the 
International Relations agenda. The sovereignty theme - articulated, for example, as the 
state, the individual, the system, the facts, the class, the (analytical/behavioural) model, 
the method, the Tradition and the discipline, has acted to close off a question of human 
discourse intrinsic to a Western philosophical tradition otherwise celebrated by 
International Relations. The question, simply put is this : how is it that this sovereign 
voice/theme/figure became sovereign? Or, more precisely, how is it that the particular 
questions we ask in sovereign terms are included and legitimated on the International 
Relations agenda, while others are not? These are questions considered unnecessary, of 
course, from a self-enclosed logic set in foundationalist terms. But having undermined 
any sense of foundationalist certainty in International Relations post-modernists have 
insisted that they must be asked, and that their asking provides important "thinking space" 
for the future.
Post-modernist questioning of the Anarchy Problematique is of particular 
significance in this regard. The anarchy theme - defined by the sovereign voice of 
"domestic" society - has been an integral feature of International Relations "reality" since 
Traditionalist Realists proclaimed it so on the basis of their (dichotomised) reading of the 
"great texts". It has continued to represent a point of unreflected foundationalism for 
Realists, the point at which "theory starts" for a Hedley Bull or a Martin Wight, the 
keystone of structuralist grand theory for a Kenneth Waltz, the "basic assumption" of the 
market analogy for a Stephen Krasner or a Robert Keohane.
Accordingly, the question of the Anarchy Problematique has been probed from 
many angles by post-modernists, aware not only of its "theoretical" inadequacy but of the 
dangers and power politics complicity associated with Realist silence on it. As Michael
434
Shapiro has illustrated it is the unspoken backdrop to the representation of Guatemala as a 
potential enemy of the United States (in a world of potential enemies) and as David 
Campbell has shown it underpins and legitimates U.S. foreign policy in general, 
constituted as the defence of "a particular meaning of humanity" in an anarchical world of 
threats to that "meaning". The work of these and other post-modernist scholars has 
underlined the urgency of the need for more serious and self-reflective scholarship in 
International Relations, particularly in relation to the question of how the American "self" 
is constructed via a discursive process which privileges a narrative of (illusory) unity and 
identity over excluded "facts" of Otherness, deprivation and struggle. Having opened up 
this process, however, post-modernists have begun to also articulate the "other side" of 
the Neitzschean genealogical approach - that which via its understanding of the process of 
closure celebrates the space for openness and resistance.
The opening of Cold War strategic discourse has excited post-modernist interest, 
in this regard, and in this "thinking space" post-modernists have begun to reconceptualise 
the "givens" of a generation in order that, at the very least, the resort to simple, 
sloganised rhetoric and power politics crudity will be less effective, more keenly 
challenged and less destructive of peoples lives in the future. The search for "thinking 
space" and the possibilities for a post-modern politics of resistance have also become an 
issue for debate in relation to the struggles, achievements and potentialities of critical 
social movements around the world. Here, in their different ways and diverse contexts 
peoples have begun to question not only the immediate circumstances of power politics, 
but the whole process by which a discourse affording identity, influence, credibility and 
power to some is represented as universally and unproblematically "real" (e.g.the national 
interest, the new world order, state security, common sense, the revolutionary 
manifesto). Here, in their re-possession of culture, history and language; in their 
challenges to developmental models; in their insistence on participation; in their 
questioning of the expert; in their dissent against gendered and class "givens"; and in their 
confrontations with "big brother"; peoples have illustrated their desire to think and speak 
for themselves, to face their worlds as creative, imaginative human beings capable both of
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understanding the processes which "objectively" define them, and changing those 
processes.
In this sense, as One World. Many Worlds indicated, there is a post-modem 
dimension to critical social movement dissent, as peoples engage politically, sometimes 
violently, with modernity in the attempt to go beyond its taken for granted "reality", its 
boundaries, dominant vocabularies and its restrictive "art of the possible". In this sense, 
more pertinently, the post-modem dissent at the margins of International Relations is 
intrinsically connected to the everyday political resistance of those, at all levels and in 
their different ways, who refuse the imposition upon them of preposterous certainty, of 
ritualised hierachy and the language and logic of closure. Consequently, in its struggles 
to open the closure of an International Relations community steeped in discursive illusion 
and strategic silence, a post-modem politics of resistance can do no better than remember 
Foucault's injunction against "universal intellectuals" who detach themselves from the 
larger struggle for freedom and openness while ostensibly committed to it. Foucault's 
point, of course, was that traditionally those who have spoken fo r  the "people", the 
"state" (and state system), the "free world", the "marginalised", the "oppressed", have 
done so in universalised, essentialised and ultimately exploitative terms. 18
A post-modem search for "thinking space" in International Relations must, 
consequently, retain its commitment to the struggles of the One World, while enabling 
those in Many Worlds to speak and think for themselves. Unlike the purveyors of power 
politics dogma it must orient its analytical efforts towards the facilitation of alternative 
ways of thinking speaking and behaving in order that space be available for continued 
resistance to the discursive practices of closure. This is no paradoxical reinvocation of 
the notion of "free floating intellectuals" selflessly articulating knowledge for the good of 
humankind. It is precisely the opposite. It is an acknowledgement that none of us can 
"float" above or detach ourselves from a global political existence that is for so many
^Foucault's statements on "universal" and "specific" intellectuals are scattered through his works, 
particularly those devoted to interviews. See his comments in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings trans and ed. by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
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unremittingly bleak and terrifying. It is to recognise that to one degree or another we, as 
modem peoples, are part of the problem as well as contributors to any solution.19 It is, 
more precisely, to accept that any alternative we offer, must, of necessity, be offered in 
ambivalent terms, in terms of a historical moment in which the narratives of triumph and 
achievement in Western modernity must be reconnected to the unspoken, unwritten, 
unreflected narratives of the dispossessed and silenced.
The search for "thinking space" by Critical Social Theorists in International 
Relations represents an important dimension of the larger crisis we face at this moment. 
Post-modernist scholarship represents the most sensitive acknowledgement of this crisis 
and its ambivalence, in the face of Traditional insistence upon simplistic responses to the 
"problem", further underlines the integrity of its critical and political commitment. This 
thesis has sought to make a contribution to the larger Critical Social Theory enterprise in 
International Relations by confronting International Relations with elements of its 
"unwritten preface". It has done so in the critical spirit and with the commitment of a 
post-modernist perspective on knowledge and human society.
19At a broader level one of the issues that a Critical Social Theory perspectives must address is the 
continuing Western centric nature of the debate, even in its most sensitive critical dimensions. 
Developments in feminist literature are, perhaps, of value here, particularly in regard to the "difference" of 
a scholar such as Spivak and her dialogue with Western feminism. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
"Can the Subaltern Speak?", in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture edited by C. Nelson and L. 
Grossberg (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1988); and Spivak, "Imperialism and Sexual 
Difference", Oxford Literary Review 8 (1986) pp. 223-240.
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